Bill Roggio has a good piece entitled “The Great Taliban Turkey Shoot,” in which he outlines for us today the high numbers of Taliban dead that has resulted from recent offensives in Afghanistan by NATO forces (particularly focusing on so-called “black” operations).  I also discussed the state of affairs for the Taliban in my posts “Afghanistan, Talibanistan, Waziristan and Kill Ratios,” and “Taliban win in Pakistan (for now).”  In the last post, I discussed the fact that the Pakistanis were selling out their own tribesmen to be killed in Afghanistan in order to effect a truce with the Pakistani army (i.e., the truces that have been signed have come with a price to both the Pashtun tribes and the Pakistani army).

From The Independent, we learn of Taliban action in Afghanistan, even recently, and what it means for some of the social infrastructure of the country:

Now there is a concerted – armed – campaign to keep such children away from school. Education – particularly that of girls – is associated with the often-hated government and the occupying Western forces. Their opponents – including the Taliban – burn schools and attack teachers. The Ministry of Education said 267 schools had been forced to stop classes – a third of them in the south where five years after 9/11, fighting is intensifying as the Nato-led troops confront a resurgent opposition.

High numbers of Taliban killed — successful black operations by NATO forces netting high value targets — truces in Pakistan and the withdrawal of the Pakistani army — and burned schools.  What are we to make of all of this?

First, it is clear that the Taliban have not stood down.  They want Afghanistan back, and are prepared to continue the murder of the citizens and general application of terror in order to cause the downfall of the current Afghanistan government.  Second, the summer campaigns are over, and the Taliban will more than likely retreat to the relative warmth and safety of villages on the other side of the border.  But without the departure of the Pakistani army, there would be no warmth and safety.  The Pakistani army is weary of killing fellow Muslims, and the Taliban need a respite.  Their numbers have been depleted, and they need some time to lick their wounds.

Third, it appears that alleged “high value targets” may not be so high value after all.  Consider the case of Zarqawi in Iraq, who was replaced almost as soon as he was killed.  Black operations that kill or capture al Qaeda and other foreigners in the area might make it seem that success is just around the corner for NATO (and this may be intentional by the Taliban), but in the total absence of foreigners, the Taliban still have their eye on the ball.  The Taliban were around long before the foreigners came in to spread largesse around.

Don’t be fooled into thinking that this deal-making between Pakistan and the Pashtun tribes is actually a good thing for NATO or Afghanistan.  There is trickery all right, and this is a slick deal, but the ones being taken are Pakistan and Afghanistan.  The Taliban gets to regroup, heal, and let winter pass before starting in earnest again in the spring.  They will give up their own kin to accomplish the downfall of the regime and the re-entry of the Taliban.  They will certainly not go away, and the pressure must be relentless in order for NATO to win.

While the cloak and dagger tactics are interesting, black operations will not win the war.  Individual “high value” targets should not be given a pass, but the special operations activities will remain a sideline activity to the heavy lifting of killing the Taliban.  If this can be done utilizing only black operations, then so be it.  But it would seem that this is more than just a special forces struggle.