Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, as inadvertently divulged in the recent statement by Omar al Baghdadi (or Abu Ayyub al-Masri), has become a flat organization.  Baghdadi has in large measure lost command and control of the lowest ranks of his organization. 

Background

Omar al Baghdadi is the name given to the leader of al Qaeda in Mesopotamia.  In February of 2007, Nibras Kazimi constructed a time line and description of the emergence of Baghdadi at the New York Sun, and followed this up in March of 2007 at his own blog, Talisman Gate, with further description of his identify and lineage.  In July of 2007, the Multinational Force captured a terrorist named Khaled Abdul-Fattah Dawoud Mahmoud al-Mashhadani, also known as Abu Shahid.  This man divulged a number of significant details about the al Qaeda organization, including the fact that al Baghdadi was a fictitious character and Abu Ayyub al-Masri, an Egyptian jihadist, was still the commander of al Qaeda in Mesopotamia.

Mashhadani was a leader in the Ansar al-Sunna terrorist group before joining al Qaeda in Iraq two and a half years ago.  He served   as the al Qaeda media emir for Baghdad and then was appointed the media emir for all of Iraq, and served as an intermediary between AQI leader al-Masri, Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri.  In fact, communication between senior al Qaeda leadership and al-Masri frequently went through Mashhadani.  Along with al-Masri, Mashhadani co-founded a virtual organization in cyberspace called the Islamic State of Iraq, in 2006, as a new Iraqi pseudonym for AQI.  The Islamic State of Iraq is the latest effort by al Qaeda to market itself and its goal of imposing a Taliban-like state on the Iraqi people.  This is what we have learned or confirmed from Mashhadani’s capture.  In his words, “The Islamic State of Iraq is a front organization that masks the foreign influence and leadership within al Qaeda in Iraq in an attempt to put an Iraqi face on the leadership of al Qaeda in Iraq.”  To further this myth, al-Masri created a fictional political head of the Islamic State of Iraq known as Omar al-Baghdadi.  Al-Baghdadi, who has never been seen, is actually an actor named Abu Abdullah al- Naima.  Al-Masri maintains exclusive control over al-Naima as he acts the part of the fictitious al-Baghdadi character.  To make al-Baghdadi appear credible, al-Masri swore allegiance to al-Baghdadi and pledged to obey him, which was essentially swearing allegiance to himself since he knew that Baghdadi was fictitious and a creation of his own. Al-Zawahiri has repeatedly referred to al-Baghdadi in video and Internet statements, further deceiving Iraqi followers and perpetuating the myth of al-Baghdadi.  Mashhadani confirms that al-Masri and the foreign leaders with whom he surrounds himself, not Iraqis, make the operational decisions for al Qaeda in Iraq, and to be clear, al Qaeda in Iraq is run by foreigners, not Iraqis.  According to Mashhadani, in fact, al-Masri increasingly relies only on foreigners, who make up the majority of the leadership of AQI.  He does not seek nor trust the advice of Iraqis in the organization.  This highlights the significance of the operation our forces conducted a few weeks back to kill Khalil, Khaled and Khatab al-Turki, three foreign al Qaeda leaders who had been sent into Iraq to help al- Masri shore up the organization in northern Iraq.  And finally, according to Mashhadani, al Qaeda in Iraq leader al- Masri has increasingly become more isolated and paranoid, especially of the Iraqis within al Qaeda in Iraq, as operations have killed or captured additional AQI leaders.  Mashhadani, in his own words, says, “The idea of al-Baghdadi is very weak now because other insurgent groups have realized that the concept of al-Baghdadi is controlled by the al Qaeda foreign fighters in Iraq.”  Al-Masri started — he also says:  Al-Masri started overpowering us and acted on his own accord by controlling the distribution of funding.  Al-Masri also controlled the content of these publications attributed to al-Baghdadi.  The capture of Mashhadani and his statements give us a more complete picture of al Qaeda in Iraq.  And although the rank and file are largely Iraqi, the senior leadership of al Qaeda in Iraq, as we have previously stated, is mostly foreign.

To this information, Kazimi quickly responded that it wasn’t likely that al Qaeda could pull off such a stunt, and then he followed this up with a reaffirmation of the existence of al Baghdadi.

-‘Abu Omar al-Baghdadi’, the ‘Prince of the Faithful’ in Al-Qaeda’s Islamic State of Iraq, is not a fictitious character as he’s been repeatedly characterized by US officials and military officers.

-‘Abu Omar al-Baghdadi’ is the pseudonym used by Khalid Khalil Ibrahim al-Mashhadani, who should not to be confused with Khalid Abdel-Fattah Daoud al-Mashhadani, who allegedly told American interrogators that ‘Al-Baghdadi’ is a fictitious character after he was arrested on July 4.

-Khalid Abdel-Fattah Daoud al-Mashhadani, ‘Abu Shehed’, is not as senior in the hierarchy of the Islamic State of Iraq as claimed by US officials. He should not be confused with ‘Abu Muhammad al-Mashhadani’ who is the ‘Minister of Information’ for the Islamic State of Iraq. Abu Shehed’s first cousin, Adel al-Mashhadani, is more senior, for he leads Al-Qaeda’s battalions in the Fadel neighborhood.

Recent Statement / Press Release by al Qaeda

On behalf of the Islamic State of Iraq (a.k.a. al Qaeda), Omar al Baghdadi recently issued a message entitled “As for the Scum – It Disappears like Froth (Koran 13:17).” Al-Baghdadi announces the launch of a new raid against the Awakening, the U.S.-backed tribal movement aimed at expelling Al-Qaeda from Iraq.

In the first part of his message, Al-Baghdadi criticizes the mujahideen of the Awakening movement for taking a nationalist approach, which entails embracing “unbelievers” who are Iraqi citizens (e.g., Shi’ites) and rejecting pious Muslims who are not Iraqi citizens (i.e. the non-Iraqi mujahideen affiliated with the ISI). Elaborating on this point, he rebukes the Awakening movement for adopting a political platform in which rapprochement among Iraqis takes priority over defensive jihad, which, he says, is the personal obligation of every Muslim in Iraq today.

Al-Baghdadi then announces the formation of a force called the Al-Sadiq Brigades, which specializes in “killing every apostate and unbeliever,” and has already killed some “apostates” who were involved with the Awakening movement, such as tribal leader Abu Al-Rishawi of the Al-Anbar province. He also announces the launch of a new raid on the Awakening movement, which he says will continue until the end of the 20th of the month of Muharram (about two months from now).

Al-Baghdadi states that the raid, named after Al-Qaeda explosives expert Abu ‘Omar Al-Kurdi (reportedly killed in 2006), will target anyone involved with the Awakening movement:

“…I call upon every mujahid in Iraq who yearns for Allah and for the world to come… especially the mujahideen of the ISI, to attack [the Awakening movement] using three [methods involving] explosives… with hand grenades, with IEDs… and [by carrying out] martyrdom operations.

“Those who have [already] decided… to undertake a martyrdom operation should do so during the days [of the raid]. If anyone is still hesitating… we urge him… to hurry up [and carry out] a martyrdom operation, which is most harmful to our enemies and has the greatest impact [on them]. Thus you shall tear out [their] hearts… and put an end to their greed. As they have already [admitted], they are unable to stop [a fighter] who wishes to die for the sake of Allah. Their [military] apparatuses and authorities… are unable to deal with this [threat]. He who cannot carry out an attack by means of explosives… should at least kill three apostates during the raid in [some other] manner of his choice…”

Analysis & Observations

There have been heavy political ramifications surrounding the issue of how the insurgency is constituted.  The point must be made, it has been believed, that we are fighting al Qaeda in order to prevent the waning of support for the campaign in Iraq.  But as we have discussed before, the term “al Qaeda” had been used as a surrogate for the broader insurgency.  The insurgency was originally constituted by foreign (al Qaeda) leadership, and supplemented mainly by Iraqis (Bill Ardolino also weighed in with respect to the idea of local versus foreign fighters).  Just today, MEMRI carried an account by two Saudi jihadists who were surprised to be combined with so many Iraqis upon arrival in Baghdad, Iraqis who didn’t trust them and took their participation to be meddling in their affairs.

But true to their professionalism, U.S. forces in Iraq have not gotten caught up in political debates, and have waged a smart campaign to take advantage of information and intelligence concerning the makeup of the insurgency.  Operation Alljah in Fallujah involved heavy kinetic operations to kill or capture many insurgents, among them Africans, Chechens and men of Far Eastern descent.  There was no shortage of foreign fighters allied with al Qaeda in the recent operations of the 2nd Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, but there were also indigenous fighters, and separating the two groups was pivotal to campaign.

Payment for concerned citizens, a tactic we have strongly advocated, was successfully used in Fallujah to bring work to heads of household.  This, combined with robust security (gated communities and biometrics), caused some indigenous fighters to begin to return home from Fallujah to al-Qaim where they could be carefully reintegrated into society.

The reason it is important to know the makeup of the enemy is that the strategy for defeating them is a function of how they are constituted.  Fortunately, U.S. forces have been wise in their choices, and the combination of tribal negotiations, payments, kinetic operations and reconstruction have caused the support for the insurgency to dissipate at the lowest levels – the fighters.  The indigenous Iraqis have gone home in large part, and while the Strategy Page recently discussed al Qaeda fighters moving back to Afghanistan, we were discussing this more than a month ago in Regional Flux and the Long War.  The foreigners have been killed or captured, have left Iraq, or have headed North to Mosul and Kirkuk, as we discussed in Operations in Northern Iraq: Hard Times for the Terrorists.

Al Qaeda is increasingly left with fewer fighters to do the work.  But what is more interesting than what was intended to be communicated in this most recent statement was what was not intended to be, but slipped out anyway.  Al Baghdadi, or al Masri, has divulged al Qaeda operational security, of course, without this intention.  Carefully note what has been said: “Those who have [already] decided… to undertake a martyrdom operation should do so during the days [of the raid]. If anyone is still hesitating… we urge him… to hurry up [and carry out] a martyrdom operation, which is most harmful to our enemies and has the greatest impact [on them] … He who cannot carry out an attack by means of explosives… should at least kill three apostates during the raid in [some other] manner of his choice…”

We have known for some time now that due to actionable intelligence the Multinational Force has increasingly targeted senior and mid-level al Qaeda leadership, and many have been captured or killed.  But al Baghdadi’s statement is the most stark admission to date that the organization has gone flat.  Note what happened.  The most senior al Qaeda in Iraq leader used a press release to issue tactical level orders to the lowest level ground troops.  The statement is not a rehearsal of what he has told his emirs, but rather, is spoken in the present tense imperative.  He is issuing orders.  The formation of the so-called Al-Sidiq Brigades is a media ploy, as this group includes whatever foreign fighters he has left in his organization.  He isn’t bifurcating his forces, he is temporarily renaming them for purposes of morale.

Whether al Qaeda in Iraq has an Iraqi face and Omar al Baghdadi actually exists, or al-Masri is still playing a shell game with a fictitious character, is quite irrelevant.  U.S. forces are fully engaged in knowledge of the insurgency and are using the appropriate tactics to address each part of it.  Whoever is in charge of al Qaeda has no command and control.  He has lost his officers.  The only analogue for us would be to ponder the idea of a Battalion of Marines being sent to Iraq, told to find their way there, split up, their NCOs taken away from them, and orders issued by their commanding officer to go find some enemy and kill them, with each individual Marine working alone and having a quota.

As good as the U.S. Marines are, this experiment is not likely to turn out very well, and yet this is the state of al Qaeda in Iraq.  Petraeus has said that no one should be ready to do end zone dances yet, and we have discussed the existence of some hard line Ba’athists and Fedayeen Saddam in Mosul that must be dealt with.  Yet when the most dangerous enemy lacks command and control, the situation is very favorable and the advancements undeniable.