Today HS dropped by Abu Muqawama’s place for a rockin’ and rollin’ good time.  We’ll do so again.  The discussions in the comments, other than a good bit of sophistry to attempt to prove that Iran really isn’t involved much in Iraq, is fairly complicated and you can drop by to study them.  HS feels pretty jazzed and is ready to challenge some of the boys to a mixed martial arts cage match.  Yep, HS here is 48 mature years of age with a distinguished mixture of silver in his hair, but his bench press is pretty good and he wouldn’t hesitate to throw down with the best of ’em.  HS feels some Gracie Jiu-Jitsu coming on.

But there is an issue that is so important that we’ll tackle it again.  We never tire of pointing out the truth.  In the comments you will note a narrative that keeps coming up time and again – that is, reaching out will work, and it is exactly what was done in Anbar.  Reaching out, it is claimed, is not what we did in Basra and the balance of the South of Iraq, and thus we ceded moral authority to the Iranians.  It is the fault of not reaching out.  HS is embarrassed that it took him so long in the comments to spot this error in doctrine.  Hopefully the kind reader will forgive HS.

If this is seen as an exclusive use narrative, i.e., it is about reaching out and nothing more, then HS says balderdash!  Fairy tales, lies and myth-telling!  Sure, Captain Travis Patriquin and his cultural and language skills and ideas were important.  It is nice that Patriquin drank lots of Chai.  Many Soldiers and Marines drank lots of very sweet Chai with many Iraqis.  And it made them happy.  And they watched television inside homes too, sometimes.  Fun times all around!

But while on the one hand the U.S. “reached out” in this way, Sheikh Abdul Sattar Abu Risha and his tribesmen were being bitterly fought and many were dying.  In addition to operations against the tribal fighters, a unit was specifically designated to cut his smuggling lines and thus shut down his source of income.  On a related note, HS had an opportunity to study a pre-release of Major Niel Smith’s Anbar Awakens: The Tipping Point.  In addition to including Patriquin’s slides, the good Major includes this summary point at the end: “Never stop looking for another way to attack the enemy.”  “Oooohh, said HS to Major Niel.  You are engaged in some truth-telling here.  Some of the COIN boys won’t like that very much.”  Major Niel told the truth anyway.  Here at The Captain’s Journal we call this force projection, and we have a category for it.

It’s remarkable how much easier it is to convince yourself that America should be courted when your tribesmen are showing up dead and your income has dried up because your smugglers have either been killed or cannot operate safely any more.  Sheikh Sattar’s “flipping” to our side was set up with great, painstaking care and much precision.  Also, HS has detailed knowledge of many things that happened in Fallujah in 2007 to finish off al Qaeda in Anbar, and this knowledge doesn’t change any of the above (wink!).

Counterinsurgency is certainly one part language, one part cultural knowledge, one part negotiations, and so on.  But it must be all mixed up with a healthy dose of kinetic operations against the enemy.  If those who conduct COIN do not apply it in this manner, there is no incentive to talk at the table (or over Chai).  In the South where the British were responsible, they didn’t operate from a position of strength.  From the very beginning it was soft covers, tepid rules of engagement, and a premium on nonkinetic operations.  Out of this sprang the Jaish a Mahdi and the strengthening of Badr.

And what does this all have to do with Iran?  More talks with Iran are recommended (see IRack’s post at Abu’s place).  Since HS was compared to Michael Ledeen in the comments at Abu’s place, we’ll quote Ledeen.  No, wait.  We won’t just yet.  Let’s point something out to the idiot detractors.  HS has a son who was in harm’s way in Fallujah, Iraq in 2007.  He will be again.  Ledeen has had multiple sons in harm’s way.  Neither HS nor Ledeen opines without the burden of his offspring on his heart.  This isn’t bare doctrine to us.

Ledeen also, contrary to the many doltish hacks who wish to malign his views, doesn’t favor war with Iran.  Not by a long shot.  HS has corresponded with Ledeen at length on this issue.  The opinions on Iran seem to hang around on the edges of the extreme.  Either have talks with them and hope to be successful without ever threatening military action, or go full bore into conventional operations against a uniformed army.

Each option is ugly.  The first will be unsuccessful, the second will be bloody.  Ledeen is, contrary to popular depictions, quite moderate in his views.  Push for democracy in Iran.  The end of the Khamenei regime will see the end of the meddling in Iraq.  As for talks with Iran, let’s study what Ledeen has to say about them.  Some of the authors and commenters at Abu’s place are quite young, and may not remember what someone with, um, distinguished silver in his hair may remember about Iran over lo these many years.

Senator Barack Obama wants to talk to our Middle Eastern enemies, notably Iran. He can’t imagine a happy resolution of the war without such talks. And he seems to think this desire is something new, maybe even revolutionary.

He apparently does not know that it is not at all new, and certainly not revolutionary. It is instead the fully tested “policy” of the United States for the past thirty years, ever since the seizure of power by the mullahs in 1979. We have had high-level and low-level talks, public and private talks, talks conducted by diplomats, by spooks, and by a colorful array of intermediaries ranging from former Spanish President Felipe Gonzales to nephews of Rafsanjani, Iranian-American businessmen, former NSC and CIA members, and others with more dubious qualifications.

All failed. As Ken Pollack recounts in his book, The Persian Puzzle, every carrot was offered and every stick was brandished. We tried everything. The Iranians were not interested …

Whether Badr, Sadr, Quds, IRG or the Iranian mullahs, talking from a position of weakness will lead to loss, and talking from a position of strength is always best; remember your training in Sun Tzu, dear military reader?  Does HS have to quote it for you?