This interesting commentary from Haaretz:

The IDF’s greatest loss was momentum. The first week of the campaign went reasonably well, borne on the wave of the stunning success of the attack of Hezbollah’s long-range rockets. Between the middle of the second week and the middle of the third week the IDF lost a week, not least because of its reaction to the eight Golani Brigade soldiers who were killed in Bint Jbail. That lost week, as the rain of Katyusha rockets continued to fall from on high, undermined the army’s self-confidence and thrust it into a posture of public self-defense. It shifted into recovery mode only because of the time it was granted by Washington. Fear of a large number of casualties was the major factor in the government’s hesitations, for almost a week, about whether to send more divisions into the fray, entailing a call-up of reserve units.

The General Staff admitted the IDF did not work fast enough. They did not grasp the fact that the context had changed and that this was not just one day of battle or a routine-security incident, but a war, which has its own laws. Commanders who were used to operations in the territories did not internalize the need for speed, persistence and continuity. In contrast, the justified criticism that units were not trained for the modalities of Lebanon diminished the importance of the demand to preserve fitness for those modalities: to train for years on end the soldiers drafted annually (as well as reserves) and who “are now in Thailand” not making use of the skills they have acquired, and this on the dubious assumption that they will have time to train for action in Lebanon between the rest of their operational tasks, instruction and exercises. Maintaining constant fitness of all the units for all the scenarios is not possible.

I have studied General George Patton and his history for a good bit of my life.  I will always be a proponent of his philosophy of war.

“Attack rapidly, ruthlessly, viciously, without rest, however tired and hungry you may be, the enemy will be more tire, more hungry. Keep punching.”

“In landing operations, retreat is impossible, to surrender is as ignoble as it is foolish… above all else remember that we as attackers have the initiative, we know exactly what we are going to do, while the enemy is ignorant of our intentions and can only parry our blows. We must retain this tremendous advantage by always attacking rapidly, ruthlessly, viciously, and without rest.”

And finally:

“In case of doubt, attack.