The Debate over Diminished Force Projection
BY Herschel Smith
18 years, 3 months ago
Using e-mail, Google Analytics and comment information, I can tell that many of my repeat readers are professional military. Many of my posts are rather simple in import and depth from time to time, and I suspect that some of my readers wonder, “Does he not understand that there is a more nuanced debate over force projection than he has given credit?”
Now, let me post a challenge to my readers. If I am proven wrong, I will announce it in a post specifically showing my error, and if the reader wants, I will put his identity along with the post so that he can brag about showing this rookie and amateur a thing or two (and if the reader wants to stay anomymous, that’s okay too).
Here is the challenge. I posted recently on Small Wars. From the Small Wars Manual, can anyone give me anything even roughly analagous to the following:
“Killing an enemy combatant, especially a popular or loved one, will only cause the emboldening and empowering of his colleagues and the increase in the size of the enemy forces. Therefore, it is better in certain circumstances to allow the enemy to shoot at you without returning fire.”
That’s the challenge for those of you who favor “minimum” force projection. Go find such a set of statements in the Small Wars Manual.
To continue the discussion, let’s use Pakistan as a starting example. Reuters is reporting that:
QUETTA, Pakistan – Hundreds of rioters angered by the killing of a rebel tribal leader rampaged through a southwestern Pakistani city Sunday, burning dozens of shops, banks and police vehicles.
Police arrested hundreds on the second day of violent protests against the killing of Nawab Akbar Bugti, 79, in a raid on his mountain hideout.
An alliance of four Baluch nationalist groups announced a 15-day mourning period over Bugti’s death and vowed to continue protests throughout the region. A strike of businesses and public transportation was planned for Monday.
“The government has pushed Baluchistan into a never-ending war,
On September 1, 2006 at 5:54 pm, snobar said:
First time I’m here, but i must you admit that I respect your ernestness and dedication to the subject. I will return later with my verdict on your analysis, though.
On September 1, 2006 at 6:18 pm, Herschel Smith said:
Well, snobar, I have visited your blog, and I suspect that your “verdict” on my analysis will be negative and disparaging, since you consider the war in Iraq a “failure,” seem to believe that the U.S. actually DESIRES to war with anyone, and disparage some of the very persons whom I believe to be providing good analysis on the middle east (e.g., Michael Ledeen).
Here are some tips for you when you come back and provide your “analysis” of my work here.
First, I have some military types that grace me with their presence here at my blog, but I suspect perhaps for amusement only. I am a small blog; whatever I can do to influence policy and strategy I do. I suspect that this influence is a null set (or statistically insignificant). Mostly, these are just nervous ramblings of a man who is concerned for his son who will go off to war soon.
Second, I don’t really care what you think of neocons. I am hard to categorize, and so whatever insult you heap on a specific category like this, it may and may not apply to me.
Third, keep your analysis to the point. The point is not Pakistan, the broader war in the middle east, whether we will eventually war with Iran, whether the U.S. is legitimate in its war on terror and Islamic facsism, or any thing of the sort. This post is about one specific thing. Force projection in the current U.S. strategy in Iraq.
This is a nuanced and salient topic for the military. You might want to find a different post if you want to complain about the U.S. policy on the broader war against Islamic facsism.
You aren’t an Islamic facsist, are you?