In what may just be the most boneheaded quote I have ever seen in print, the Washington Post says:

Also, traces of highly enriched uranium, which can be used for the core of a weapon, were discovered through environmental samples taken at another facility. Previous traces were found to have been the result of used and discarded centrifuge equipment the Iranians bought from Pakistan. Officials at the IAEA said privately yesterday that the new contamination appears to be from old spent fuel the Iranians moved out of harm’s way during their eight-year war with Iraq. 

No, not hardly.  Highly enriched Uranium does not come from spent fuel.  Further, if the argument from the IAEA was that actinides were found which were initially thought to be highly enriched Uranium, this would mean that spent fuel (note, not the gap gases inside the fuel cladding, but actual pieces of fuel pellets), in pulverized or powdered form suitable for gamma spectroscopy had become available on the surfaces of components, leading us to believe that someone took a pulverizing machine and created powdered spent fuel.  Of course, I am being sarcastic.

Finally, highly enriched Uranium includes highly enriched Uranium, i.e., U-235.  Spent Fuel includes other actinides, such as Thorium, Neptunium, Americium, Curium, etc.  The two cannot be mistaken for each other.  Highly enriched Uranium is not spent fuel, and spent fuel is not highly enriched Uranium.

In what may just be the most boneheaded quote I have ever seen in print, the Washington Post says:

Also, traces of highly enriched uranium, which can be used for the core of a weapon, were discovered through environmental samples taken at another facility. Previous traces were found to have been the result of used and discarded centrifuge equipment the Iranians bought from Pakistan. Officials at the IAEA said privately yesterday that the new contamination appears to be from old spent fuel the Iranians moved out of harm’s way during their eight-year war with Iraq. 

No, not hardly.  Highly enriched Uranium does not come from spent fuel.  Further, if the argument from the IAEA was that actinides were found which were initially thought to be highly enriched Uranium, this would mean that spent fuel (note, not the gap gases inside the fuel cladding, but actual pieces of fuel pellets), in pulverized or powdered form suitable for gamma spectroscopy had become available on the surfaces of components, leading us to believe that someone took a pulverizing machine and created powdered spent fuel.  Of course, I am being sarcastic.

Finally, highly enriched Uranium includes highly enriched Uranium, i.e., U-235.  Spent Fuel includes other actinides, such as Thorium, Neptunium, Americium, Curium, etc.  The two cannot be mistaken for each other.  Highly enriched Uranium is not spent fuel, and spent fuel is not highly enriched Uranium.

It is well known now that Iran has not only pursued an enrichment program to develop highly enriched Uranium (the only purpose for which is a nuclear bomb), but a heavy water reactor as well, the purpose for which includes the production of Plutonium.  The Middle East Media Research Institute reports on why Iran says it wants to produce heavy water (quoting Iran nuclear chief Mohammad Sa’idi):

“One of the products of heavy water is depleted deuterium. As you know, in an environment with depleted deuterium, the reception of cancer cells and of the AIDS viruses is disrupted. Since this reception is disrupted, the cells are gradually expelled from the body. Obviously, one glass of depleted deuterium will not expel or cure the cancer or eliminate the AIDS. We are talking about a certain period of time. In many countries that deal with these diseases, patients use this kind of water instead of regular water, and consume it daily in order to heal their diseases.

“In other words, the issue of heavy water has to do with matters of life and death, in many cases. One of the reasons that led us to produce heavy water was to use it for agricultural… medical purposes, and especially for industrial purposes in our country.” 

Sa’idi is lying.  The use of heavy water for the treatment of disease is so costly and unproven that it would be absurd to use it on patients in lieu of chemotherapy.  The consumption of heavy water by biological organisms inhibits cell reproduction, but is also too toxic and too costly to be considered useful for the treatment of cancer or any other disease.  It simply makes more sense to use chemotherapy and other modern treatments.

On the other hand, heavy water has two strategic military advantages to Iran.  First, rather than worry with trying to achieve Uranium enrichment on the order of that necessary to sustain criticality in conventional light water reactor designs, natural Uranium can be used in heavy water reactors.  The design of Iran’s reactor is similar to the Canadian CANDU reactors, which can be studied here, here, and here.  The consequent Plutonium produced could then be reprocessed and purified to produce a nuclear bomb that requires less mass than its counterpart Uranium bomb.  This makes such a warhead able to be delivered with the rockets that Iran currently has in its arsenal.

This is about the miniturization of nuclear weapons, and it shows that Iran is pursuing two distinct paths towards the holy grail.  The first is highly enriched Uranium, in itself capable of being a weapon, and the second is Plutonium, produced without the aid of enriched Uranium by the use of natural Uranium in heavy water plants.

It is noteworthy that Jane’s Intelligence Review in 2003 said the following of Iran’s heavy water reactor:

The IR-40 heavy water research reactor is significant because it produces high quality plutonium, the most important component for a compact, nuclear device. If Iran wishes to develop a nuclear weapon small enough to launch on top of its Shahab 3 or 4 missiles, it will most probably be an implosion device with a plutonium (Pu) core.  The only way to acquire that is through reprocessing irradiated fuel. Bushehr is a light water reactor that has received much international attention and most probably will continue to be closely scrutinised, making it difficult to clandestinely remove its spent fuel for reprocessing. Even if the IR-40 has just as much attention, the Iranians would have a better chance of removing irradiated fuel or irradiating natural uranium targets for Pu production in this reactor.

Indeed, a heavy water reactor is among the most dangerous in existence from a proliferation perspective.  One reason is that the low neutron cross section of heavy water facilitates a high number of U238 (uranium-238 isotope) atoms to absorb neutrons, resulting in the production of a greater quantity and better quality of plutonium product.

According to David Albright, Director of the Institute for Science and International Security, the IR-40 will be able to produce 8-10kg of plutonium per year – approximately one to two bombs’ worth of nuclear material.  The IAEA holds that 8kg of plutonium constitutes a “significant quantity

It is well known now that Iran has not only pursued an enrichment program to develop highly enriched Uranium (the only purpose for which is a nuclear bomb), but a heavy water reactor as well, the purpose for which includes the production of Plutonium.  The Middle East Media Research Institute reports on why Iran says it wants to produce heavy water (quoting Iran nuclear chief Mohammad Sa’idi):

“One of the products of heavy water is depleted deuterium. As you know, in an environment with depleted deuterium, the reception of cancer cells and of the AIDS viruses is disrupted. Since this reception is disrupted, the cells are gradually expelled from the body. Obviously, one glass of depleted deuterium will not expel or cure the cancer or eliminate the AIDS. We are talking about a certain period of time. In many countries that deal with these diseases, patients use this kind of water instead of regular water, and consume it daily in order to heal their diseases.

“In other words, the issue of heavy water has to do with matters of life and death, in many cases. One of the reasons that led us to produce heavy water was to use it for agricultural… medical purposes, and especially for industrial purposes in our country.” 

Sa’idi is lying.  The use of heavy water for the treatment of disease is so costly and unproven that it would be absurd to use it on patients in lieu of chemotherapy.  The consumption of heavy water by biological organisms inhibits cell reproduction, but is also too toxic and too costly to be considered useful for the treatment of cancer or any other disease.  It simply makes more sense to use chemotherapy and other modern treatments.

On the other hand, heavy water has two strategic military advantages to Iran.  First, rather than worry with trying to achieve Uranium enrichment on the order of that necessary to sustain criticality in conventional light water reactor designs, natural Uranium can be used in heavy water reactors.  The design of Iran’s reactor is similar to the Canadian CANDU reactors, which can be studied here, here, and here.  The consequent Plutonium produced could then be reprocessed and purified to produce a nuclear bomb that requires less mass than its counterpart Uranium bomb.  This makes such a warhead able to be delivered with the rockets that Iran currently has in its arsenal.

This is about the miniturization of nuclear weapons, and it shows that Iran is pursuing two distinct paths towards the holy grail.  The first is highly enriched Uranium, in itself capable of being a weapon, and the second is Plutonium, produced without the aid of enriched Uranium by the use of natural Uranium in heavy water plants.

It is noteworthy that Jane’s Intelligence Review in 2003 said the following of Iran’s heavy water reactor:

The IR-40 heavy water research reactor is significant because it produces high quality plutonium, the most important component for a compact, nuclear device. If Iran wishes to develop a nuclear weapon small enough to launch on top of its Shahab 3 or 4 missiles, it will most probably be an implosion device with a plutonium (Pu) core.  The only way to acquire that is through reprocessing irradiated fuel. Bushehr is a light water reactor that has received much international attention and most probably will continue to be closely scrutinised, making it difficult to clandestinely remove its spent fuel for reprocessing. Even if the IR-40 has just as much attention, the Iranians would have a better chance of removing irradiated fuel or irradiating natural uranium targets for Pu production in this reactor.

Indeed, a heavy water reactor is among the most dangerous in existence from a proliferation perspective.  One reason is that the low neutron cross section of heavy water facilitates a high number of U238 (uranium-238 isotope) atoms to absorb neutrons, resulting in the production of a greater quantity and better quality of plutonium product.

According to David Albright, Director of the Institute for Science and International Security, the IR-40 will be able to produce 8-10kg of plutonium per year – approximately one to two bombs’ worth of nuclear material.  The IAEA holds that 8kg of plutonium constitutes a “significant quantity

Newsmax has a good writeup entitled New Evidence Emerges in Haditha Case, and yet another good one entitled Pentagon Leaders Distorting Haditha Facts.  Both articles should be studied, and the last one shows that there is (gasp!) a problem in the Pentagon.  Someone there is a turncoat and wants to see the Haditha Marines hung out to dry.  But turning our attention to a different issue, it dawned on me that even a rudimentary sequence of events has not been published by anyone.  There is various prose out there in the MSM, but I thought I would try to boil it down to a more strict “sequence of events” using both the Newsmax links above and the posts in my Haditha Roundup category.  I’ll start the sequence much earlier so that you can get a little bit of the flavor of the Haditha area (see also my posts in the Haditha Roundup category, in which I show how troublesome Haditha was to U.S. forces).

Six Marines become surrounded by insurgents in Haditha arrproximately six months prior to the alledged incident.  These six Marines die.  IEDs, RPGs, and small arms fire from insurgents are part of the daily routine for the Marines in and around the Haditha area.

On November 19, 2005, Staff Sergeant Wuterich’s unit left Firm Base Sparta at 0700 hours on a daily mission to drop off Iraqi army troops at a nearby checkpoint.

At approximately 0715 hours, an IED exploded and severely damaged the last of four Humvees, instantly killing Lance Corporal Terrazas, the driver of the vehicle.

Wuterich stopped the convoy and he and the other Marines got out of the vehicles.

While evaluating the scene, the Marines noticed a white unmarked car carrying four men lingering near the bomb site.  The Marines ordered the men to stop, and rather than stop, the men ran from the scene.  Following SOP, the Marines fired on the men.

Wuterich began briefing the Platoon leader, and AK-47 shots were heard from residences on the south side of the road.  At this point, the squad took defensive positions around the Humvees.

A Corporal with the unit said to Wuterich that he saw the fire coming from a specific house.

Stop sequence of events.  Editorial comment: A Marine fire team consists of four members, including a fire team leader (usually a Lance Corporal, Corporal or Sergeant) who carries an M16A2 with a grenade launcher (the fire team leader is the grenadier).  The main suppressing fire is laid down by the second member, the SAW gunner (Squad Automatic Weapon, or M249).  The other two members carry M16A2s (or M4s if the combat is expected to be primarily MOUT, or Military Operations on Urban Terrain).  In order properly to effect room-clearing procedures, the fire team prepares first by throwing in a fragmentation grenade (unless there are too many rooms such as in Fallujah, in which case the fire team cannot carry enough grenades and is restricted to use of firearms).  After the grenade, the team gets into a formation where each team member is aligned front to back so close that it is called a “stack.”  As I have commented before on The Captain’s Journal, this procedure is designed to save Marine lives and kill the enemy.  Once a room is designated an enemy zone, there is no protocol and no procedure for delineating friend from foe.  In fact, if the Marines redesigned the procedure to attempt to ascertain friend from foe prior to clearing the room, and the enemy learned of this revised procedure, this information would lead to the deaths of many Marines.  Hesitation kills in this procedure.  There is no provision for hesitation, nor can there ever be.  End of editorial comment and return to sequence of events.

Wuterich’s fire team then went to the house from which they had received fire, kicked in the door, and found a door to a room with people rustling behind it.  They kicked in that door, threw in a fragmentation grenade, and followed the grenade by clearing shots (Editorial comment: I am speculating that these shots were from an M249, but I have not seen any report on this.  It is noteworthy that the M16A2 can only fire in three-round bursts, and is not fully automatic).

The Marines noted that the people in the room were men, women and children, but they noticed a back door ajar and believed that the insurgents had slipped to a nearby house.

They moved to this house, kicked the door in, and then used a fragmentation grenade and more fire to clear the room.

Upon noting that they had not found the insurgents, Wuterich ordered the Marines back to the Platoon to reassess the situation.

Finally, K company was ministered to by civilian pastors of one of the Marines in that unit who were on a church-funded missions trip soon after this incident.  This pastor has said that the Marines talked very openly, and made no mention of any guilt over any alleged intentional massacre of civilians.  This fact is likely very significant, although the MSM will not tell it to you.

End of sequence of events.  Since I have a son in the Marines, I have been following this issue closely.  I know that the most undesirable outcome of this whole affair would be a revised set of rules of engagement in which the Marines have to ascertain friend from foe.  In such a condition, there will be many more dead Marines.

Tony Snow said from the White House podium that the entire report would be released.  I am counting on it, and look forward to it with eager anticipation.  When it is, I will read all 1000+ pages of it.  If these Marines are charged, I will dissect, parse, and otherwise rip apart the report and discuss my findings on TCJ.  Pentagon, you are on notice.  Take it under advisement.

We go through some heavy stuff here at TCJ.  How about something lighter and more fun to close the night or weekend out?

I am probably showing my age here (something from 1977), but here it goes:

Styx: Come Sail Away Video

From the AP:

The U.N. atomic agency has found traces of highly enriched uranium at an Iranian site linked to the country’s defense ministry, diplomats said Friday. The finding added to concerns that Tehran was hiding activities that could be used to make nuclear arms.

The diplomats, who demanded anonymity in exchange for revealing the confidential information, said the findings were preliminary and still had to be confirmed through other lab tests. But they said the density of enrichment appeared close to or beyond weapons grade _ the level used to make nuclear warheads.

We learn something else through UPI:

The discovery marked the third instance that highly enriched uranium was found at an Iranian facility, but the IAEA said the nuclear fingerprint on the new discovery does not match that found on earlier samples, which the agency had concluded came from contaminated equipment from Pakistan, The New York Times reported Friday. 

Folks, it takes at least about 2% U-235 enriched nuclear fuel to make a nuclear reactor function (i.e., stay critical and produce power), and this value usually doesn’t go above about 5% (except for military reactors, that is, the types on board submarines, which are highly enriched for reasons that I won’t go into here).  But commercial nuclear power simply doesn’t need fuel above about 5% U-235.  The rest of it is U-238.  Something else happens to the U-238.  It absorbs a neutron to become Pu-239 which is fissile with a “thermal” neutron, and ends up producing power due to fission later on.  Pu-239 is fissile while U-238 is not — it is “fissionable,” which means it cannot fission from a neutron below 1 MeV.  What is the upshot of this?  U-238 cannot be used to make a bomb.  You have to enrich the mixture to increase the U-235 content.

When they say “highly enriched,” they mean much greater than 90% (>> 90%).  This enrichment does not work for anything except naval reactors (the technology for these reactors is not available to Iran) and nuclear bombs.

I hope this is clear to everyone.  Reactors for submarines that the Iranians do not know how to build, and nuclear bombs.  These are the only reasons a country needs highly enriched Uranium.

And what we learn from the IAEA is that the signature (characteristic gammas) of this Uranium ensures that it did not come from Pakistan where the original contamination came from years ago.  This is different Uranium from a different source.

Hold on to your shorts and tighten your seat belts.  Here we go.

The Washington Times is reporting that:

Retired Air Force Lt. Gen. Thomas McInerney, a prominent proponent in Washington of air strikes against Iran, said that whether the estimate is five years or 10 years, the time span instills complacency in war planning. He said that Mr. Bush is now following the State Department’s diplomatic path, without a clear policy.

“Everyone is in the Jergens lotion mode — ‘woe is me.’ Wringing our hands,” the former fighter pilot said.

Gen. McInerney advocates using B-2 stealth bombers, cruise missiles and jet fighters to conduct a one- or two-day bombing campaign to take out Iran’s air defenses, military facilities and about 40 nuclear targets, which includes a Russian-built reactor and an enrichment plant.

In my post “Did Israel Plan the War? Next on the List: Iran,” I said:

… the use of air power this way absolutely requires very necessary destruction of military infrastructure before the nuclear and oil infrastructure can be targeted (things such as command and control, radar, air fields, surface-to-air missile sites, etc.).

… if the sole goal of a strike against Iran is either to destroy or hold in abatement their nuclear program, then a large scale land invasion not only would be unnecessary, but may even be an impediment.  To be sure, air strikes may have to be on-going and periodic in order to prevent rebuilding of the nuclear infrastructure; satellites would have to be re-tasked; intelligence would have to be good (not only for the initial strikes, but also on a continual basis); and the U.S. and world would have to be prepared for very high oil prices.

But the notion that air power cannot destroy infrastructure — if this is what the intention is — is not just false.  It is false in the superlative degree.  If the recent Israeli-Hezbollah conflict proves next-to-nothing, it at least proves that infrastructure can be demolished.

Also in my “Iran War Plans,” I pointed out many problems with a ground war with Iran:

• Helicopters do not have the range to get Marines or special forces operators to the nuclear sites.
• The new MV-22 comes close for some of the sites, but there aren’t enough of them in service to effect this troop movement.
• The 82nd and 101st airborne would be shot out of the sky before they ever landed if we dropped them into the belly of Iran.  Even if they weren’t, we could not drop heavy equipment in with them.
• If we did a massive land invasion, it isn’t clear what our goal and objective would be: Where would our troops go?  What would they do when they got there?  How long would they stay there and for what reason?

Once again, if the goal is the destruction of nuclear infrastructure, then this can be accomplished by an air campaign.  Our goal should not be nation-building in this instance.

Strict boundary conditions and thought-rules are the order of the day.  Let’s keep our eye on the ball.  Iran’s nuclear program is the issue in any attack on Iran (we can discuss the closure of the Iranian border with Iraq and Afghanistan in a different context).

And it is nice to see that I stumbled upon the same solution that General McInerney came to by education and study.  Even a blind squirrel finds a nut from time to time.