Troops in Afghanistan Redeploying to Barracks
BY Herschel Smith18 years ago
Thematic in our discussions here have been that the best counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy is to provide the people with security. Mothers want to know that their children can go to school and play in the yards and streets without fear of harm. To use a heavily worn expression, the way to “win the hearts and minds of the people” is to give them peace. This is true in Iraq at least of tribes and sects (the Sunni want protection from the Shia, the Shia from the Sunni, etc.).
We have shown that the force size to effect this security has been too small in Iraq, and that trust in local troops yields both uncertain results and an impedance to U.S. troops. Moreover, constantly offensive operations against guerrilla forces is a tactic that has a proven track record. Contrary to this, forces in Iraq, after the initial campaign to overthrow the regime, redeployed to well-gaurded bases, while failing to share the risk with the people and consistently conduct COIN operations against the enemy. As an example of the success of properly conducted COIN operations, our good friend Michael Fumento has recently blogged directly from Ramadi concerning the strategic success of Combat Operation Posts. These posts, scattered throughout Ramadi, ensure that the U.S. troops are close to both the people and the enemy, while also forcing daily operations against the enemy.
Contrary to this proven COIN strategy, UPI is reporting that troops in Afghanistan are redeploying to their barracks, thereby committing the same mistake we made in Iraq.
More than a month after Pakistan inked a peace deal with local leaders in the restive tribal region straddling its frontier with Afghanistan, some NATO troops are trying the same tactic on their side of the border, redeploying to barracks and relying on tribal militias to keep Taliban insurgents in check.
The truces are part of a new “hearts and minds” strategy on both sides of the border, as coalition and Pakistani authorities attempt to engage local tribal leaders and woo them away from Taliban extremists.
But the NATO deal, in four northern districts of Helmand province, comes as evidence mounts that the Pakistani truce in Waziristan has failed to reduce cross-border infiltration by Taliban fighters looking to engage coalition troops in Afghanistan.
So the strategy here is to let the tribes in Afghanistan send their fathers and sons to wage war against better trained and equipped fighters, potentially losing their lives, with these fighters being of the same or similar religious persuasion, while the U.S. troops redeploy to their barracks in safety. Stunningly, this is the strategy employed as part of the doctrine to “win the hearts and minds of the people.” The UPI article does make mention of one very important factor.
“The effort to engage the Taliban’s tribal base makes sense,” said Haqqani, “if at the same time you are degrading the ideological leadership through a military campaign.”
It is difficult to see how NATO forces will wage a military campaign while redeployed to their barracks.
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