Adopting a Peacetime Approach Too Early
BY Herschel Smith
18 years ago
NATO military leadership is weighing in on U.S. strategy in Afghanistan. But before we get to their position, we’ll rehearse our own.
In our post Unintended Consequences: U.S. Strengthens Iran, we said of the Iraq war:
The U.S. troops too quickly transitioned from conventional operations to counterinsurgency …
Concerning Iraq, in our post Observations on Timeliness from the Small Wars Manual, we said:
No matter what tactics were employed, if the strategy had included defeat of the known enemy with dispatch, the U.S. forces could have focused more on COIN operations for smaller groups of poorly-trained and poorly-led insurgents.
In our post Afghanistan’s Lessons for Iraq: What Strategy?, we said:
If Afghanistan is the model for contemporary counterinsurgency operations, then the U.S. ought to rethink its strategy. There is a role for both special operators and regulars in today’s warfare. Cessation of regular operations too soon is counterproductive.
In our post Ramadi: Marines Own the Night, 3.5 Years into Iraq War, we said:
… there is simply no substitute for killing the enemy in war. Purposely circumventing urban regions in our push towards Baghdad leaving significant enemy left behind to fight another day, ignoring the al Anbar province to fester for 3.5 years, and simultaneously invoking COIN strategy, is not really COIN. It is premature cessation of conventional operations. It isn’t the failure of COIN that is to blame. It is the timing … a timing that is too connected to political altercations stateside.
NATO (British) General David Richards weighed in on our strategy early in the campaign of Afghanistan with Pentagon reporters:
The U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan failed to follow through as it should have after ousting the government in 2001, said the NATO commander in the country.
The mistake — adopting “a peacetime approach
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