From Iraq News:

Baghdad, Oct 1, (VOI) – A coup almost toppled Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Malki’s government over the last two days, the Iraqi legislator Baha’ al-A’raji said on Sunday.

“Al-Malki’s government has survived a coup planned by Saddamists and Islamic extremists who wanted to send a clear message to the Iraqi government of their presence in Iraq,

From Iraq News:

Baghdad, Oct 1, (VOI) – A coup almost toppled Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Malki’s government over the last two days, the Iraqi legislator Baha’ al-A’raji said on Sunday.

“Al-Malki’s government has survived a coup planned by Saddamists and Islamic extremists who wanted to send a clear message to the Iraqi government of their presence in Iraq,

In my post Musharraf Unhinged, I cited reports that Musharraf is asking for help in Pakistan, and that there is strong political pressure to bring the Taliban into politics as a remedy for the violence that has overtaken the Taliban-controlled areas of Pakistan.  In a statement apparently designed to parrot Musharraf’s position, Senator Majority Leader Bill Frist has encouraged the same:

QALAT, Afghanistan U.S. Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist said Monday that the Afghan guerrilla war can never be won militarily and called for efforts to bring the Taliban and their supporters into the Afghan government.

The Tennessee Republican said he had learned from briefings that Taliban fighters were too numerous and had too much popular support to be defeated by military means.

“You need to bring them into a more transparent type of government,” Frist said during a brief visit to a U.S. and Romanian military base in the southern Taliban stronghold of Qalat. “And if that’s accomplished we’ll be successful.”

Frist said asking the Taliban to join the government was a decision to be made by Afghan President Hamid Karzai.

Sen. Mel Martinez, a Republican from Florida accompanying Frist, said negotiating with the Taliban was not “out of the question” but that fighters who refused to join the political process would have to be defeated.

“A political solution is how it’s all going to be solved,” he said.

At the Counterterrorism Blog (and also in the Boston Globe), Lorenzo Vidino has the following salient comments concerning democracy in Muslim world:

IN RECENT WEEKS, President Bush has delivered a series of major speeches outlining his strategy against terrorism. We have come a long way from the nebulous rhetoric of the immediate aftermath of Sept. 11, 2001.

The foe is no longer defined as “terror,” which is simply a tool used by a well-defined adversary. The new “National Strategy for Combating Terrorism” acknowledges that America’s enemy is a “transnational movement of extremist organizations . . . which have in common that they exploit Islam and use terrorism for ideological ends.” The report then outlines measures to confront that challenge. While short-term measures such as denying terrorists sanctuary or tracking their funds seem logical , the administration’s long-term strategy is less straightforward.

The obvious cure to the problem is tackling radical Islam, the ideology that motivates terrorists. But the administration believes firmly — almost blindly — that democracy is the right medicine. According to the report, democracy “diminishes the underlying conditions terrorists seek to exploit.” Promotion of democracy is, therefore, the key element in the administration’s long-term approach.

Yet democracy does not always have these healing powers. The administration contends that individuals who enjoy political participation and can freely express themselves are less likely to embrace fundamentalist messages. The truth is that today democratic societies are spawning terrorists no less than dictatorships are.

Continuing with the recent mantra, Musharraf adds to the political blitz by saying:

“They don’t know the realities on (the) ground. They’re not conscious of the reality I’m seeing – the extreme danger of this becoming a people’s movement.”

Frist was clearly referring to the Taliban (rather than the Pashtun tribes), as he told us this directly.  Mushaffar is implying that the Talibanization of the tribes will occur if the Taliban are not brought directly into the political process.

So the logic is as follows:

1. The enemy attacked the U.S. on 9/11 when they were in complete control and responsible charge of the government of Afghanistan.
2. Being in complete control of the government, there was no possibility that the Taliban were under-represented or disenfranchised, so this could not have been the reason or even a catalyst for their attack on the U.S.
3. We have fought the enemy, and he has been driven out but not defeated.
4. The enemy is too numerous and enjoys some degree of political support, and thus they cannot be defeated.
5. The solution to our failure to defeat the enemy is to give the Taliban some power in the political process so that they won’t be disenfranshised; for if they are disenfranchised, they might continue to attack us.

So there you have it.

Remaining highly recommended is the Marine Corps Small Wars Manual (large PDF document).  The war in Afghanistan is more than 4.5 years old, and the war in Iraq is about 3.5 years old.  The SWM has something to way about timeliness that will edify and enrich our understanding of the various blunders that have been made in these wars so far.  By way of editorial note, I would comment that there seems to be an undercurrent among supporters of the war(s) that is unhealthy and unproductive for the prospective of evolution in our doctrine, strategy and tactics based on our mistakes.  Analysis, assessment and constructive criticism are generally taken to be opposition to the war or to our warriors.  To be seen as patriotic and supportive of our troops, one almost has to be jingoistic.  This is not a mature attitude, but more importantly, it is not supportive of the necessary changes that will mark the future of warfare and thus the warriors who will be participating in those wars.  Proceeding now to the SWJ and what we may learn about timeliness (italics and bold are mine):

” … when forced to resort to arms to carry out the object of the intervention, the operation must be pursued energetically and expeditiously in order to overcome the resistance as quickly as possible.  The campaign plan and strategy must be adapted to the character of the people encountered.  National Policy and the precepts of civilized procedure demand that our dealings with other peoples be maintained on a high moral plan (sic).  However, the military strategy of the campaign and the tactics employed by the commander in the field must be adapted to the situation in order to accomplish the mission without delay.” (Page 34)

“The force must be of sufficient strength and so proportioned that it can accomplish its mission in the minimum time and with minimum losses.” (Page 113)

From the modern days of Blitzkrieg forward, speed and surprise were useful as a strategy to prevent the enemy from implementing a coherent defense.  Leaving behind the issue of conventional war versus COIN, rural operations versus MOUT, and all of the other issues that can cloud simple evaluations and make the lessons poignant for us, allowing a protracted period of time for [a] al Qaeda to recruit and train more foreign fighters to enter the fray, [b] al Sadr’s militia to strengthen from Iranian funding, and [c] the Baathist diehards to wreak havoc unimpeded, has caused the U.S. strategy to become muddled and weakened.  It has also added to the perception of the U.S. as an occupying force rather than a liberator.

No matter what tactics were employed, if the strategy had included defeat of the known enemy with dispatch, the U.S. forces could have focused more on COIN operations for smaller groups of poorly-trained and poorly-led insurgents.  The current U.S. mission in Iraq is not apparently one of defeating the enemy.  Rather, it is training proxy fighters to defeat the enemy.  This is strategically smart only to the degree that it is successful, useful, helpful and effective to accomplishing the final goals.  Altruism (i.e., in this case, nation-building) is not particually useful as a military strategy.

Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf made some stunning remarks recently:

Pakistan’s President Pervez Musharraf said on Saturday that the United States and its allies will fail in the “war on terror” without the support of Pakistan and its intelligence service.

“You will be brought down to your knees if Pakistan doesn’t co-operate with you. That is all that I would like to say. Pakistan is the main ally. If we were not with you, you would not manage anything. Let that be clear,” he said.

“And if the ISI (Inter Services Intelligence) is not with you, you will fail. Let that be very clear also. Remember my words: if the ISI is not with you and Pakistan is not with you will lose in Afghanistan.”

Earlier this week, a leaked document from a Britain’s Defence Ministry think-tank accused Pakistan’s intelligence agency, ISI, of indirectly supporting extremism in Afghanistan, Iraq and Britain by backing the MNA coalition of Pakistani religious parties.

Musharraf strongly denied the claims.

“From 1979 to 1989 we fought the Soviet Union for you. We won the Cold War for you,” he said, explaining that the Pakistan army and ISI played a part in training the tens of thousands of mujahideen fighters to resist the Soviets.

But after the Soviet withdrawal, the West left Pakistan “high and dry”, he said, leading to the creation of the radicalised Taliban and Al Qaeda from the remnants of the mujahudeen resistance.

In U.S. Dance with Pakistan and Iran Over Nuclear Programs, I pointed out how it would be impossible for A. Q. Khan to have given Iran nuclear technology and equipment without the ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence) of Pakistan knowing, and perhaps even assisting, in this proliferation.

It is commonly known now that the Pakistan military tired of battling the tribes and Taliban, leading to the autonomy of Waziristan and potentially other provinces.  This autonomy is allowing the Taliban to recruit and train large numbers of troops, as well as launch special operations-size raids across the border.  Now, we learn from India that the ISI was behind the Mumbai bombings, and apparently, India knows a great deal about the details of their involvement.

Musharraf is in under some political pressure in his own country, and the Waziristan accords enjoy support not only in the effected provinces, but in the media as well.

The stunning nature of Musharraf’s comments have to do not with their timing, nor their recipient.  The comments were intended to be heard by both his own people and the international community.  He wants to convince his own people that he is their savior, and the international community that Musharraf’s involvement is essential.

But recent history is showing that while Pakistan is important to the GWOT, Musharraf is increasingly irrelevant to the it, and thus Musharraf’s need to go on the offensive to show otherwise.  The most troubling aspect of Musharraf’s remarks is that either [a] he believes these things, or [b] he doesn’t.  If he believes these things, then he is delusional and mentally unstable and thus his regime is sure to fail, leaving a rogue nuclear state in the hands of Islamic facists.  If he doesn’t believe these things, then Musharraf proves the opposite of what he wants.  He proves that it is so manifestly obvious to the international community that Pakistan is so powerless against the Taliban and the ISI that a massive and embarrassing public relations campaign is warranted.

Musharraf is trying to save his regime, and thus we should be concerned over its viability.  Musharraf essentially said so to the BBC:

“Now, without understanding, everyone blames us for what is happening in Pakistan. It is something that is happening, understand it and help us.”

Michael Fumento is back in Iraq.

More ominously, the enemy has also obviously brought in crack snipers from other countries. The last death in 1/506th was from sniper fire. Closer to home (in a personal sense), last month an embed with 1/506th took what was presumably a sniper round in the ribcage that tumbled a bit and popped out his chest. I think he got out of the hospital in Landstuhl, Germany just last week. The photographer embedded with 1/506th who was shot right before I got there in April was definitely sniped, suffering two broken legs. Incidentals like machine gun fire, rifle fire, IEDs and mortar barrages just add a bit of spice. My efforts in returning, therefore, have revolved around snipers.

… my physical training this time comprised jogging with full armor and all the gear I’ll be wearing on patrol plus a bit extra. Contrary to Hollywood portrayals, a sniper cannot put a scope on a rapidly-moving target. The men of the 101st know that and whenever they aren’t under cover, they jog or go at a dead run. Nothing can provide perfect protection; sometimes you have to expose yourself to get a good shot whether with a rifle or a camera. But I can cut the odds.

Read his whole entry at Back to Iraq, by Michael Fumento. It is worth the read.