In Options for Iraq, I cited the Stratfor position that the most likely change in strategy in Iraq involves a redeployment of troops, while still remaining in Iraq, but without the responsibility for day-to-day security operations.

There now appears to be growing consensus among Republicans and Democrats to shift U.S. troop involvement from a combat to an advisory role.  Evolution to an advisory role is far short of the prediction by Stratfor – and far short of what the Iraqis need – which involves responsibility for border security, militarily assisting the Iraqis, and generally keeping Iran and Syria in their respective places.  A shift of U.S. troop responsibility to advisors is not likely to happen, but this consensus does show that neither party is willing to entertain a continuation of the current strategy.

It appears as if the Iraqi administration recognizes the seismic change in U.S. politics and is attempting to accomodate it, while still retaining the services of U.S. troops in more than merely an advisory role to the Iraqi troops.  Muwaffaq Al-Rubaie, Iraq’s national security adviser, recognizes the necessary shift away from security operations by U.S. troops.

One of the most important changes “is to reduce the manifest presence of the foreign forces in the streets of Iraq’s cities. The departure of the foreign forces from inside the cities, in particular Baghdad, is important and will boost the security situation” in Iraq. He added that it is also important “to give more responsibilities and authorities to the Iraqi security forces to carry out military operations alone or with the foreign forces in the way of training and preparation.” He said: “We want acceleration in equipping, training, preparing, and arming the Iraqi security forces instead of waiting for a long time. What they are talking about achieving in years can be achieved in months.”

John Robb at Global Guerrillas is also suggesting that this redeployment of U.S. troops to bases in Iraq is a likely outcome of the recent U.S. elections.  John goes on to say that the effects in Iraq will be disastrous, while not phasing the U.S. electorate:

The US will withdraw to bases in Iraq (a completion of a trend that began last year to limit casualties) and many (perhaps half) of the US forces in Iraq will be withdrawn over the next year. This will likely be the only policy change that all decision makers can agree on. As a result, violence in Iraq will spike as unsupervised Iraqi troops are unleashed on civilians and guerrillas decimate isolated Iraqi units. It won’t matter to most of the people in the US as long as US troops aren’t involved.

There are now more than 500,000 Iraqis, mostly Sunnis, who have fled to Syria.  The Strategy Page observes that “Despite a lot of bravado on the Internet, the Sunni Arabs are losing. Not just in body count, but in terms of sharply decreasing Sunni Arab population. The Shia Arab death squads are killing more Sunni Arabs than the terrorist bombs are killing Shia Arabs … Meanwhile, parts of Anbar province, where some pro-Saddam tribes continue to offer bases for terrorists, look like a combat zone. Towns have a bombed out, shot-up and abandoned look. Anbar is being abandoned, as Sunni Arabs flee the country from both Anbar and Baghdad. While some Sunni Arab towns and neighborhoods can organize private guard forces, even these are helpless against police or soldiers moonlighting as Shia death squads … For the Iraqi Shia Arabs, the departure of the Americans won’t change anything. It was nice having them, their money, and their deadly soldiers around. But the Shia Arabs have enough guns, and people trained to use them, to deal with the Iraqi Sunni Arabs. The Americans have served their purpose, and it’s time for them to go.”

Since Iraq is at the present a Land of Many Wars, U.S. military actions against sects in Iraq necessarily have had unintended consequences.  Warring against the Shia alienates them and reminds them that the U.S. could not be trusted in the first Iraq war when we left them to be slaughtered by Saddam’s forces.  Warring against the Sunnis reminds them that it was their religious sect that was in power before the war.  The Sunnis want the U.S. to put an end to the death squads, and the Shia want the U.S. to kill the Saddam loyalists.

The salient question at the present is exactly whether the U.S. has a dog in this sectarian fight?  It is also important whether al-Qaeda will continue to remain in the Anbar Province if the U.S. forces redeploy to Kurdistan.  Without U.S. forces to fight, who will they war against?  And if the answer is the Iraqi army, then since they are dominated by Shi’ites, the questions is raised once again “does the U.S. have a dog in this sectarian fight?”

As we have discussed, a rapid increase in U.S. force projection and relentless offensive operations against the insurgents can to some extent bring stability to the region.  But in the absence of this, since the trend slope of U.S. casualties in Iraq is positive, and since the insurgents are seeing marked success against U.S. troops as snipers, the only viable option left for the U.S. is to redeploy north and restrict the power of Syria and Iran.