Apparently, Rumsfeld has begun thinking about how we have failed in Iraq and has recommended a potential remedy to the administration.  We are limited to main stream media reports about the contents of a letter he sent to Bush, reportedly on November 6 (note, prior to the election), but some of the recommendations he allegedly made are:

• Publicly announce a set of benchmarks agreed to by the Iraqi government and the U.S. … to chart a path ahead for the Iraqi government and Iraqi people (to get them moving) and for the U.S. public (to reassure them that progress can and is being made).
• Significantly increase U.S. trainers and embeds, and transfer more U.S. equipment to Iraqi security forces.
• Initiate a reverse embeds program … by putting one or more Iraqi soldiers with every U.S. and possibly coalition squad.
• Aggressively beef up Iraqi ministries by reaching out to U.S. military retirees and Reserve and National Guard volunteers.
• Conduct an accelerated drawdown of U.S. bases, noting they have already been reduced from 110 to 55. “Plan to get down to 10 to 15 bases by April 2007, and to 5 bases by July 2007.
• Retain high-end … capability … to target al Qaeda, death squads, and Iranians in Iraq, while drawing down all other coalition forces, except those necessary to provide certain key enablers for Iraqi forces.
• Provide U.S. security forces only for those provinces or cities that openly request U.S. help and that actively cooperate.
• Stop rewarding “bad behavior” with reconstruction funds and start rewarding “good behavior.”
• Position substantial U.S. forces near the Iranian and Syrian borders to reduce infiltration and, importantly, reduce Iranian influence on the Iraqi government.
• Withdraw U.S. forces from vulnerable positions and move to a quick reaction force status, operating from within Iraq and Kuwait, to be available when Iraqi security forces need assistance.
• “Begin modest withdrawals of U.S. and coalition forces (start `taking our hand off the cycle seat’) so Iraqis know they have to pull up their socks, step up and take responsibility for their country.

Rumsfeld further remarks that “In my view it is time for a major adjustment,” Rumsfeld wrote in a November 6 memorandum to the White House. “Clearly, what U.S. forces are currently doing in Iraq is not working well enough or fast enough.”  Rumsfeld further noted that the situation in Iraq “has been evolving” and said U.S. forces have adjusted from “major combat operations, to counterterrorism, to counterinsurgency, to dealing with death squads and sectarian violence.”

It is a stunning assertion that the man who superintended three and a half years of an increasing U.S. casualty rate now concludes that it is “time for a change.”  But the ideas Rumsfeld profers are not novel.  In Options for Iraq, I cited a Stratfor assessment which, in part, concluded that

We do believe that the ISG will recommend a fundamental shift in the way U.S. forces are used. The troops currently are absorbing casualties without moving closer to their goal, and it is not clear that they can attain it. If U.S. forces remain in Iraq — which will be recommended — there will be a shift in their primary mission. Rather than trying to create a secure environment for the Iraqi government, their mission will shift to guaranteeing that Iran, and to a lesser extent Syria, do not gain further power and influence in Iraq. Nothing can be done about the influence they wield among Iraqi Shia, but the United States will oppose anything that would allow them to move from a covert to an overt presence in Iraq. U.S. forces will remain in-country but shift their focus to deterring overt foreign intrusion. That means a redeployment and a change in day-to-day responsibility. U.S. forces will be present in Iraq but not conducting continual security operations.

Then, after presenting the least likely option for Iraq (based on lack of political support for appropriate force projection in Iraq), I presented what I saw as the most likely option for U.S. forces, an option that, while similar to the Stratfor position, was somewhat more detailed:

… withdraw forces to the north in Kurdistan, supporting the Iraqi army and police in offensive operations on an as-need basis.  This support would not include regular or routine “security