Honorable Secretary Baker, I wish you had consulted with me before you and your colleagues wrote your report about Iraq.  I lived long ago, but thought I would return and visit just this once, since it seems that my counsel is so badly needed.

It is with dismay that I read your heart in the report.  I have always found that it is best to hide your intentions.  If I am able to determine the enemy’s dispositions while at the same time I conceal my own, then I can concentrate and he must divide.  And if I concentrate while he divides, I can use my entire strength to attack a fraction of his (VI.13).  War is based on deception (VII.12), and I am afraid that you have told the enemy your dispositions.

It seems that you have set great burden upon this idea of training other armies to do your work for you.  Be careful!  One who sets an entire army in motion to chase an advantage will not attain it (VII.5).  Your approach to victory should be like a jewel – with many facets.  The good and experienced general makes no mistakes in war (X.25).

Remember this adage to assure that your army will have what it needs.  Use normal force to engage; use the extraordinary to win (V.5).  And whatever you do, hasten to push forward with your forces, because speed is the essence of war (XI.29).

You have enemy both in the middle of combat with your armies, and yet also off to the side, watching, aiding, and providing succor to the enemy you are fighting.  I note with dismay that you wish to talk with them and ask for their assistance in attaining victory.  Oh, please be careful here.

I am a proponent of winning wars without fighting, but to do this requires being in a position that you have not attained and apparently to which you do not aspire.  When your ardour is dampened, neighbors will take advantage of you (II.5).  You must not miss any opportunity to master your enemy (IV.13).  Requesting their help will only empower them, tell them the thoughts of your heart, and convince them that you are weak.

You must always assume that the enemy will come to fight you, and be prepared for him (VIII.16).  Do not ever assume that your enemy will provide you with help, for it is at that time that he will take the advantage and master you.

If you wish to engage the enemy in talk, then you must do so by first positioning yourself as the master.  He who intimidates his neighbors does so by inflicting injury upon them (VIII.14).  Your enemies must be intimidated by you in order for talk of peace to have the affect you desire.

You will know when you have attained this position.  Your enemy will come to you and ask for talk, rather that you going to him.

In Ansar al Sunna Leadership: U.S. Forces Net Big Insurgent Catch, I discussed the coup that had been accomplished against what might be the most significant insurgent group in Iraq.  In Failure of Main Stream Media to Report Huge Victory Against Insurgents, I discussed how the MSM had utterly failed to understand or report the significance of this.  The Multi-National Force Web Site is now fully engaged in the story (why so late?), and is giving us some of the details of the story.

BAGHDAD, Iraq – On Wednesday, the Government of Iraq released the names and photos of several suspected senior-level Ansar al Sunna emirs who were captured by Coalition Forces during a series of raids in mid-November.

The AAS network is responsible for improvised explosive device attacks and suicide attacks on Iraqi government, Coalition Forces and Iraqi civilians.  The AAS network is also responsible for multiple kidnappings, small arms attacks and other crimes in the central and northern part of Iraq. 

One terrorist emir, Abu Mohammed aka Ismail, AAS Emir of Yusifiyah was killed during a raid late November.

The suspected Ansar al Sunna emirs who were captured are:

National level:

– Ramadan Muhammad Salih Ahmad (Bilbas) aka Abu Mustafa, AAS Emir of Iraq.  Abu Mustafa is a founding member of AAS.
– Taha Ahmad Pir-Dawud Ahmad (Surchi), aka Hajji Sa’id, Senior AAS representative and al-Qaida facilitator.
– ‘Adnan ‘Abdallah ‘Alaywi Muhammad (al-‘Ithawi), aka Abu Jaffar, AAS Secretary.  He was Abu Mustafa’s personal assistant and he was responsible for arranging AAS senior-level meetings.

Regional level:

– Hatim Abd-al-Ghafar Muslim Muhammad (al Shimar), aka Abu Taha, AAS Emir of Al Qa’im and Western al Anbar.  He allegedly was a Colonel in the Iraqi Army before the war.
– ‘Abd-al-Basit ‘Abd-al-Razzaq Hasan ‘Ali (al-‘Abbasi), aka Abu Asim, AAS Emir of Tikrit.
– ‘Ali Hasayn ‘Ali “Abdallah (Zandi), aka Abu Bandar, AAS Emir of Baqubah.
– Amjad ‘Abd-al-Sattar Muhammad ‘Ali (al-Ta’i), aka Abu Najila, AAS Emir of Ramadi and Eastern al Anbar.
– Sa’id Jasim Muhammad Khudayyir al-Jadid (al-Juwaynat), aka Abu Sayf, AAS Emir of Bayji.
– Husayn Khudayyir ‘Abbas Majid (al-Zubaydi), aka Abu Husayn, AAS Emir of Bazayiz.
– Salih Khudayyir Salman Jadi (al-Juburi), aka Sajad, AAS Emir of Fallujah.

This is another step closer to defeating al-Qaida in Iraq and helping establish a safe and peaceful Iraq.  Coalition Forces will continue to target not only senior al-Qaida in Iraq leaders, but all associated terrorist movements like Ansar Al Sunna.

What they are not telling you is just how this relates to al Qaeda.  I had known some of the relationship, but in posting originally on this, Michael Ledeen saw some inaccuracies and, by use of one of his contacts, gave me the correct scoop.  I thought I would provide you with it below, citing from my original post linked above.

“Ansar al-Islam was formed out of a merger of the majority Kurdish groups Hamas (inspired by but not identical to the Palestinian group of the same name), Second Soran Unit, and al-Tawhid. I think September 2001 was the last time that they were majority Kurdish, because after that they started receiving a heavy influx of “Afghan Arabs

Ever wonder what a B-1B Bomber looks like after it has landed without the landing gear down?

The pilot(s) forgot to lower the landing gear.  Air Combat Command has the story, and more pictures can be found here.

I might be behind the news cycles a bit on this, but there is an interesting story concerning innovation and adaptation from troops in Iraq.  Hat tip to Arms and the Law, troops have discovered that they can find trip wires by shooting silly string at them:

Dear KSFO Listeners,

My good friend Deborah Johns, Vice-President of Marine Moms of Northern California, whose son William has is now serving his third tour of duty, sent me this very important letter.

Hi Melanie,

I have heard from William for the first time in 3 months. I was so excited to get a call from him. He told me that the Marines really have the pressure on the insurgents and the Marines are really uncovering big stuff that makes it difficult for them. William also said that good things are happening and to let everyone know, and to hang in there with them and keep supporting them because they need the support of the American people.

William also said that they need handwarmers because it is cold and more importantly–send Silly String. They are able to dispense that stuff from 10 feet away and it will detect trip wires that are not visible to the naked eye and saves their lives before entering a building. He said the Silly String just floats through the air and lays gently on any trip wire and works pretty cool. If there are no trip wires then it just falls and hits the ground.  So, we are trying to send any Silly String possible.

Thought you might like to know some good news from the battle field.

Love, Deb

No high tech gadgetry or gear necessary.  Purchasing it from Walmart and sending it over by mail is the most efficient way to put it in the hands of the troops.  If a defense contractor gets hold of the idea and it becomes part of the DoD budget, the cost will go up by three orders of magnitude (product testing, product QA, management oversight of the program, retirement benefits, etc.).

Note: This article has been updated and expanded with The NCOs Speak on Rules of Engagement.

In his article Spinning Haditha, Marine W. Thomas Smith made the following sad but prophetic observation:

… every student of military science understands the ugly nature of insurgencies; where insurgents are un-uniformed, unconventional fighters who move freely throughout the community during the day, and become bushwhackers at night. They routinely use women and children as human shields, and often coerce the latter into the service of operating guerrillas.

This is particularly effective against U.S. forces, because the enemy knows that no matter how much stress they may be under, American soldiers will go to great lengths to avoid killing women and children; and even hesitate (at great risk to themselves) when they see women and children shooting at them.

I followed on to predict that charges of civilian casualties and inappropriate rules of engagement would become a staple of enemy propaganda, that rules of engagement would be modified, and that U.S. troops would become increasingly hesitant to fire on the enemy. Every one of these predictions has come true.

As discussed in Newsweek’s expose on Marine Captain Rob Secher, Captain Secher wrote home that “any time an American fires a weapon there has to be an investigation into why there was an escalation of force.”

In my article Unleash the Snipers!, I noted that Marines in Ramadi have noted the hindrance the rules of engagement have become to their missison:

The military has also tightened rules of engagement as the war has progressed, toughening the requirements before a sniper may shoot an Iraqi. Potential targets must be engaged in a hostile act, or show clear hostile intent.

The marines say insurgents know the rules, and now rarely carry weapons in the open. Instead, they pose as civilians and keep their weapons concealed in cars or buildings until just before they need them. Later, when they are done shooting, they put them swiftly out of sight and mingle with civilians.

In my article Racoon Hunting and the Battle for Anbar, I noted that Marines from Fallujah report that:

“A lot of us feel like we have our hands tied behind our back,

There is enough bad news coming from Iraq, and I have done my fair share of reporting and commenting on it.  But from time to time there are outstanding and remarkable stories of victory and success, and these instances are made all the more remarkable by the fact that the main stream media completely ignores them.

In Ansar al Sunna Leadership: U.S. Forces Net Big Insurgent Catch, I reported on the capture of eleven senior level leadership of terrorist group Ansar al Sunna.  Specifically, among those captured were the emirs of Iraq, Ramadi, Baqubah, Tikrit, al Qa’im, Bayji and Baghdad.  They also captured two terrorist facilitators, a courier, an explosives expert and a financier.  The detention of these terrorists delivers a serious blow to the AAS network that is responsible for improvised explosive device attacks and suicide attacks and on Iraqi government, Coalition Forces and Iraqi civilians.  The AAS network is also responsible for multiple kidnappings, small arms attacks and other crimes in the central and northern part of Iraq.  AAS is considered by some to be a leading terror organization in Iraq … Although some AAS senior leadership allegedly hide in Iran, they continually plan attacks to disrupt Iraqi reconstruction efforts.  This allows the AAS leadership to attempt to disrupt Iraqi reconstruction progress using their followers, while keeping the leadership out of harms way.

I went on to point out that an emir is a chieftan, or a military governor of his assigned territory.  This was no small catch of trouble-makers.  Ansar al-Sunna is considered by some experts to be the most important insurgent group in Iraq, and U.S. forces captured more than half a dozen high level leaders of the group.

There is a case to be made that while the killing of Zarqawi had a Hollywood aspect to it, the capture of these insurgents was more significant and will have greater ramifications than the demise of Zarqawi.  Major news organizations should have been clamoring for information in order to weave a story together for the American public.  Americans should have information to share with each other over nightly dinner, and this specific victory should be in the public consciousness for several weeks to come.

Writing the article was relatively easy.  A few minutes worth of study of the press releases, a few more studying the relevant articles about it, and finally a few more studying the research and scholarly works on Ansar al-Sunna, and presto, there was the article.  Granted, Michael Ledeen had to write me and correct (what I hope to be a somewhat inconsequential) point of history on the group, but still, the reader now knows more than s/he did prior to reading my article.  Ignoring my foible on history, the main thrust of the story is encouraging, and would have taken a seasoned reporter only a few minutes to a couple of hours to construct.

But again, on what might be the most significant counterinsurgency victory in months, the main stream media is noticeably absent.  I posted my article on December 2, and decided to give the main stream media Monday, the start of the normal weekly news cycle, to pick up on the story.  But a quick check of the major outlets shows that there is nothing out there.  Is this a symptom of their incompetence or their bias?

And the ghosts of U.S. servicemen cry out … and haunt the memory of a nation who sent them off to war without what they needed to win.

In Options for Iraq, I mentioned something that might have come as a surprise to readers.  The U.S. is under what is called by the U.N. Security Council a “security partnership