Smaller Long Term Presence in Iraq
BY Herschel Smith17 years, 4 months ago
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates envisions a smaller, long term presence in Iraq.
LONDON (Thomson Financial) – US Defense Secretary Robert Gates is seeking a political deal in Washington to trade off troop cuts in Iraq for support for a long-term, smaller presence there, the Wall Street Journal reported Tuesday.
Citing unnamed US government officials, the Journal said that Gates and some political allies are pursuing political support for maintaining a US military presence in Iraq to continue the fight against Al-Qaeda.
The tradeoff, according to the report, is a commitment to slashing back troop levels — now about 155,000 — by the end of President George W. Bush’s term in office, in January 2009.
Gates’s goal is to mollify the strong US sentiment for a pullout of US forces, while not abandoning Iraq altogether.
‘The complicating factor is how long the administration will stick with its ‘surge’ strategy of keeping high levels of troops in Iraq to try to tamp down violence there. On this issue, the administration — and even the military — is deeply divided,’ the Journal said.
In Gates’s plan, the US would trim back its presence and its goals to fighting Al-Qaeda and simply containing a civil war that might erupt, rather than the current aim of defeating all insurgents and ending the conflict between Iraqi groups, mostly aligned on Sunni and Shiite Muslim lines.
It’s nice to be on the cutting edge. In Settling with the Enemy, I said:
When the U.S. forces begin to stand down and withdraw, to remove the U.S. men and materiel in Iraq will take more than a year. Withdrawal will be slow and deliberate. Furthermore, it is likely that complete withdrawal will not happen for a long time. More likely is that the U.S. will re-deploy to the North in Kurdistan, assisting the Iraqi army and police with kinetic operations upon request, while also serving as a stabilizer for the Middle East and border security for Iraq.
But it is just as likely that U.S. forces will not be performing constabulary operations for much longer. The counterinsurgency field manual, FM 3-24, was written based on the presupposition that the U.S. has the ten to twelve years necessary to conduct the classical counterinsurgency campaign. This was never true, is not true now, and will not be true in the future. Military needs aside, the public – by the power of the vote – has the right and prerogative within the American system to make the policy decision on the conduct of war. Asking the American pubic to support a counterinsurgency campaign over three consecutive presidential administrations is expecting the impossible, no matter how well the administration communicates the conditions of the campaign to the public.
All wars must end. The end of Operation Iraqi Freedom necessitates settling with the enemy, a high stakes strategy, absent which there is only loss of the counterinsurgency campaign.
Under Gates’ plan, the duties of the U.S. forces who are left would likely be (1) region stabilization, (2) training of Iraqi troops and police, (3) support for kinetic operations against known terrorists, and (4) border security. Constabulary operations would not be in the strategic interests of the U.S., and policing of the population would be left to the Iraqis.
In Air Power in Small Wars, I outlined the real re-involvement of air power (both Air Force and Navy) in the counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq, and in the scenario described above air power would take a much larger role. Intelligence and reconnaissance would be key in this strategy, and it is likely that much of the effort of ground troops would go to this support role. Trade cannot be completely shut down between Iraq and its neighbors, but if the trafficking of weapons and militants can be ascertained, air power can be readily used to interdict and destroy enemy targets flowing in from Syria and Iran.
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