Getting the Strategy Right
BY Herschel Smith16 years, 8 months ago
“I got nothing but mad props for 2/6. With another unit from October 2006 to April 2007, many of us often found ourselves questioning the logic of how we were doing certain things, and positing “why can’t we do such and such.” 2/6 came in and, well, did such and such. During the relief-in-place with the company that replaced us replaced my faith in the U.S. Marine Corps; I’ve never been more impressed.” (courtesy of Michael Totten)
The whole persona of the 2/6 [Marines], the way they’re running operations, is to provide for the citizens. The IPs [Iraqi Police] are like that too, they’re out there engaging the people. They [used to get] attacked so much that they were a military force, doing military-type operations. When they showed up, they showed up hard. Now it’s more ‘Hey what’s going on? How are you doing? What can we do for you?’ It’s yielded huge gains.” (courtesy of Bill Ardolino)
The Small Wars Journal blog has an interesting continuation of the debate over strategy in Iraq by Pete Mansoor, entitled Misreading the History of the Iraq War. Part of Mansoor’s commentary follows:
In his latest missive on the U.S. endeavor in Iraq (“Misreading the Surge Threatens U.S. Army’s Conventional Capabilities”), Army Lieutenant Colonel Gian Gentile claims that the Surge forces and the new U.S. Army and Marine Corps counterinsurgency doctrine had little effect on the situation in Iraq. Rather, U.S. forces paid off the insurgents, who stopped fighting for cash. Once again, Gian Gentile misreads not just what is happening today in Iraq, but the history of the war.
To borrow a quote from Ronald Reagan, “Gian, there you go again.”
Gentile’s analysis is incorrect in a number of ways, and his narrative is heavily influenced by the fact that he was a battalion commander in Baghdad in 2006. His unit didn’t fail, his thinking goes, therefore recent successes cannot be due to anything accomplished by units that came to Iraq during the Surge.
The facts speak otherwise. Gentile’s battalion occupied Ameriyah, which in 2006 was an Al Qaeda safe-haven infested by Sunni insurgents and their Al Qaeda-Iraq allies. I’m certain that he and his soldiers did their best to combat these enemies and to protect the people in their area. But since his battalion lived at Forward Operating Base Falcon and commuted to the neighborhood, they could not accomplish their mission. The soldiers did not fail. The strategy did.
This is a common narrative concerning the security plan and revised strategy for Operation Iraqi Freedom, i.e., “it’s all about the combat outposts.” If the troops are on a FOB (Forward Operating Base), they cannot possibly engage in counterinsurgency. This may be true under certain conditions for the mega-bases such as Camp Fallujah. But this perspective seems very incomplete and truncated. The experience of the Marines of 2/6 during Operation Alljah shows us why.
With the Anbar province pacified it might be difficult to recall the condition as recently as late 2006 in Ramadi and throughout the province. The condition was bad almost beyond words, but with the success of the Marines and tribes in combating al Qaeda and other insurgents in the Western part of Anbar, the Eastern parts fell subject to their horror. Fallujah, which had always been a very hardened city, was the new home to rogue elements from all across the globe. Libyans, Chechens, and other hard core jihadist fighters called Fallujah home in early 2007. They had utter and complete control, and were protecting a huge weapons cache in the industrial area, including small arms, explosive ordnance and chlorine. The Marine command in this area of operations called Fallujah “unwinnable.” At this point, the Anbar campaign could just as easily have taken a turn for the worse, and in fact could have turned completely in favor of the insurgency.
Into this came the Marines of the 2nd Battalion, 6th Regiment. The population had clearly sided with the insurgents. On one occasion the Marines witnessed the ultimate commitment being made by the locals (or perhaps the ultimate cowardice, or perhaps both). The neighborhood children were sent out to demarcate the location of Marines on patrol by encircling the area and raising black balloons for insurgent mortars. Soon enough, the mortar rounds started dropping.
Fallujah was pacified, but the Marines of 2/6 didn’t do it by living in combat outposts for seven months. In fact, they were deployed to a FOB named Reaper, constructed specifically for 2/6 on the South side of Fallujah. Upon 2/6 leaving Reaper, this FOB was never to see U.S. troops again. This episode – the narrative, the FOB, the experiences, the unique things accomplished – remains not only important in the history of the Marines, but an un-mined jewel of counterinsurgency practice.
The Marines of 2/6 were rotated out to combination combat outposts / Iraqi police precincts for weeks at a time, and then rotated back to FOB Reaper to provide force protection for weeks, or conduct patrols, or nighttime census missions, or intelligence driven raids, or whatever the mission happened to be at the time. These rotations were staggered so that the combat outposts were never unmanned, FOB Reaper always had adequate force protection, raids always had manpower, kinetic operations always took place against insurgents, checkpoints were always manned, and Iraqi police always had U.S. presence. Sleep was a luxury, and all of the Marines were always busy. Close and constant contact with the police and population and relentless kinetic operations against the insurgents was characteristic of the time that 2/6 spent in Fallujah. The closest analogy that can be given of this operation is that of a swarm. The Marines swarmed over Fallujah until the insurgents were killed or captured and the population sided with the U.S. This close contact was not allowed to diminish the implementation of force protection. While force protection was maintained, force projection was the hallmark of the final Marine Corp battle for Fallujah.
Whatever else can be said of the Iraq campaign, there were not enough troops (force size) to accomplish the mission (force projection). This is not a fault of Gentile’s unit. Concerning strategy, only Lt. Col. Gian Gentile and his reports can know if they accomplished the force projection needed to win a counterinsurgency. If so, then his unit should be seen as a continuation of the overall campaign for Iraq. After all, for those who claim that counterinsurgency takes ten to twelve years, it should not be surprising that a single deployment is only a part of the campaign rather than the thing in its entirety. Time was necessary to convince the population that the U.S. troops were not “short-timers,” and thus Gentile may be right. Neither the strategy nor the troops failed, but again, only Gentile knows if the force projection was adequate.
It all comes down to having enough troops and doing the right things with those troops. Whether those troops man a checkpoint or conduct an intelligence-driven raid or take population census or go on patrols, where they live is only of logistical importance. If it is beneficial to live at a combat outpost in some particular circumstance, then that’s where they should be. If it is beneficial to live at a FOB but rarely spend time there because of constant contact with the population, they that’s where they should be. While this experience raises the issue of Marine deployment length (7 months) and whether another branch of the service could survive longer deployments (e.g., 12 or 14 months) at the same pace, nonetheless, the salient points are unimpuned. They key is what the troops do and how often they do it, not where they sleep.
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