Terror Tactics
BY Herschel Smith16 years, 9 months ago
Al Qaeda finds it difficult to emplace IEDs because of the population (which points them out to U.S. forces) and UAVs operating discretely above. Further, in both Iraq and Afghanistan, direct kinetic engagements are being avoided. The kill ratio which has been maintained throughout both Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom is approximately 10:1. This has caused huge losses for al Qaeda (and the Taliban in Afghanistan), and they have largely transitioned to a tactic which is much more surreptitious and difficult to stop: the suicide bomb. Eight U.S. soldiers died Monday due to this tactic.
A man walked up to a group of American soldiers on foot patrol in an upscale shopping district in central Baghdad on Monday and detonated the explosives-filled vest he was wearing, killing five soldiers and wounding three others and an Iraqi interpreter who accompanied them.
In eastern Diyala Province, north of the capital, three more American soldiers and an interpreter were also killed Monday when they were attacked with an improvised bomb, according to the military, which did not release any more details.
Another soldier was wounded in the blast.
The suicide bombing in Baghdad was the deadliest single attack on American soldiers in the capital since the height of the troop buildup here last summer. Nine Iraqi civilians were also wounded in the blast, according to officials at Yarmuk Hospital, where the victims were taken.
Reports from Iraqi witnesses suggest that the soldiers may have let down their guard because of the relative quiet of the last few months, leaving the safety of their Humvees and chatting with residents and shopkeepers.
Hours later, a car bomb exploded outside a hotel in the northern Kurdish city of Sulaimaniya, killing two people and wounding 30 in the first significant attack in that city in several years.
Noncombatants have also been targeted with the violence in other parts of Iraq.
A roadside bomb has killed at least 16 people travelling on a bus in southern Iraq, reports say. At least 22 people were also wounded in the attack.
The civilian passenger bus was travelling on the Basra-Nasiriya road some 80km (50 miles) south of Nasiriya, police said.
The attack came a day after eight US soldiers and an interpreter were killed in two separate incidents, the US military said.
One attack took place in Diyala province, killing three soldiers and an interpreter, while five other soldiers were killed in a suicide attack in Baghdad.
As if consistent with swarm theory, al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan have also directed their efforts away from direct kinetic engagements and are using the same tactic of suicide bombs.
A new United Nations report says insurgent and terrorist violence in Afghanistan sharply increased last year, with more than 8,000 conflict-related deaths …
His report also highlights the way the conflict has changed from a conventional war between western forces and the Taliban to an insurgency using suicide attacks, assassinations, abductions and roadside bombings.
Pakistan has recently seen its share of the same thing. On Tuesday, Lahore suffered another suicide attack.
Suicide attackers detonated two huge truck bombs in Pakistan Tuesday, killing 26 people, partly demolishing a police building and deepening a security crisis facing the new government.
Another 175 people were wounded in the attacks in the eastern city of Lahore, which came just minutes apart in the morning rush-hour and left rescue workers scrambling through rubble in a bid to find survivors.
It is ultimately ineffective to fight these tactics within the battlespace itself. By the time the suicide weapon (the ordnance and the human) has made its way to the population it is too late to stop it. There is no incentive to stop these tactics on the part of the jihadists, because they can directly reverse the kill ratio to their own advantage. These tactics have to be fought at their proximate birthplace, which in this case is Iran and Syria for Iraq, and Iran and Pakistan (NWFP and FATA) for Afghanistan.
The stream of jihadists has to be dried up. The enemy has adapted his tactics to reverse the kill ratio in the battlespace. Without adaptation by U.S. forces, we cannot long sustain this reversal of effectiveness. The hard choices must be made about black operations against known facilitators and handlers in Syria, air strikes against training camps in Iran, strikes into the NWFP and FATA areas of Pakistan, and other options that should be available to stem the flow of global fighters. It’s a matter of winning or losing the campaigns.
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