Should the Marines Have Special Operations Forces?
BY Herschel Smith
16 years, 6 months ago
By now it isn’t news that the MARSOC Marines who were deployed to Afghanistan and accused of wrongdoing will not be charged.
The Marines of Marine Special Operations Company F “acted appropriately” when they fired in response to an attack March 4, 2007, in Afghanistan, Lt. Gen. Samuel Helland said Friday.
The written statement from the commanding general of Marine Corps Central Command came in response to a January court of inquiry into the shootings, which Army officials said killed Afghan civilians. Army Lt. Gen. Frank Kearney with Special Operations Command Central expelled the Marine special operations company from Afghanistan after the incident.
Two Marines, Maj. Fred Galvin and Capt. Vincent Noble, were named in the court of inquiry into the events in Afghanistan’s Nangahar province on March 4 and March 9, 2007.
Both men were accused, but not charged, with conspiracy to make a false official statement, dereliction of duty, failure to obey a lawful order and making a false official statement.
“Appropriate administrative actions based on the findings of the court of inquiry” will be taken against Galvin, who served as the company commander at the time of the incidents; Noble, the platoon commander at the time; and Capt. Robert Olsen, the unit’s intelligence officer and second-in-command, according to the press release from Marine Corps Forces Central Command.
Appropriate administrative actions? Just what does this mean? The Captain’s Journal will try to follow this to see where it goes. W. Thomas Smith, Jr., has some interesting observations.
Galvin’s Marines were ordered out of Afghanistan – far too hastily in my professional opinion – pending an investigation that dragged on far too long, and in which too much political correctness and perhaps (based on my own personal musing) a bit of inter-service rivalry were infused: Not to mention the fact that the word of the locals, and a human rights group that was not there at the time, was considered more believable than that of the Marines.
The locals, whose stories often conflicted with one anothers,’ never could come up with a firm casualty count (though U.S. Army officers reportedly made cash payments to Afghans who said they were survivors or members of survivors’ families).
Fact is, there is no proof – much less evidence – that any civilians were killed: No bodies or forensic evidence, except for that of the suicide bomber, were recovered.
But there is a 900 pound gorilla in the room, and The Captain’s Journal will point it out if no one else will. We still aren’t convinced that the Marine Corps should have Marines dedicated to special operations. Force Recon? Sure. Someone needs to be qualified to perform reconnaissance operations (jump qualifications, etc.). Someone in a company must be qualified as the DM, and someone must be qualified as a combat lifesaver, and so on.
But the notion of special operations has morphed – probably due to stupid television depictions – from one of specialized troops to one of supermen. Up until now that has been the Army’s problem. Marines are supposed to be self sufficient, hence the notion of a MEU. Marines stick with Marines, and Force Recon supports its unit. Otherwise, it has no function.
When Galvin’s Marines were deployed to Afghanistan months ago, they were only special operations. They weren’t connected to any unit except MARSOC. As for kinetic operations, if you want force projection, turn loose a company of Marine infantry. Special operations, to Marines, means support of that company.
We’re open to compelling argument, but we still fail to see the need or the mission for MARSOC. Does someone want to convince us?
On June 1, 2008 at 10:24 pm, trollsmasher said:
OK here is my two cents from the minute that I stepped into the yellow footprints we were told that we were special or course lower than whale crap but special. I think MARSOC was an opportunity for the Corps to get a presence in SOCOM which they had previously declined. When you are in SOCOM you get more money different gizmos what have you.
I think the training afford to the Marines that go to MARSOC will be put to good use once they go back out to the fleet but do I think that we should have it I am not yet sold.
On June 2, 2008 at 5:21 am, ShadowSpear.com said:
One of the great thigns about MARSOC is that is has created an effective Special Operations Force as directed by USSOCOM. The Marine Special Operations Advisor Groups, or MSOAG, has stepped up in terms of the FID mission that US Army Special Forces are currently overwhelmed in throughout the world. They are taking up the slack and are very much appreciated. The MSOBs also serve a purpose. The establishment of MARSOC was not just so that the Marine Corps could have an SOF presence, in fact they already had (Force Recon, Recon Battalion, Det 1). MARSOC serves an important function, just as the other SOF units do. Given the circumstances, all the Marines involved with the instance overseas were cleared. If that had not been the case, would it matter? Every unit has its bad apples, who eventually get weeded out in some way or another.
On June 4, 2008 at 4:18 am, Breakerjump said:
Sometimes I really do wonder wether or not people actually read the post before commenting. But then I stop caring.
On June 4, 2008 at 8:21 pm, trollsmasher said:
Breakerjump please explain?
On June 7, 2008 at 12:30 pm, jonesgp1996 said:
I think that one part of the Smith quotation that the Captain cites is misplaced/misinformed, and that is the bit about inter-service rivalry. The special operations command within the over-arching command (in this case, CENTCOM) is a joint entity, so it is not inconceivable that there is an Army general who is somewhere in the chain of command of the Marines in question. In the muddled COIN environment, it was probably the best damage-control option available, and an Army general was the guy who was in command to do it. (As an aside, the news blurb’s use of the word “expelled” certainly serves to create the impression that the unit’s departure may have been motivated by inter-service rivalry; the journalist who wrote it & his editor ought to check their language next time.)
I’m not sure if it stings Smith that Army officers came through the area after the Marines and paid off the locals, whether they had been hurt by the incident or not. However, in the COIN environment, the cost of making good your “debt” is negligible compared to what it would be if you didn’t.
As for Marine special operations, I think one could make the argument both ways. Given the current US military push toward “jointness,” I think it’s an inescapable reality for the USMC that they may be forced to look more like the other services, if only to maintain their relevance (as perceived by others) and their budgetary support.
On June 7, 2008 at 1:08 pm, Herschel Smith said:
I think that this might point to what Breakerjump mentioned (and I think he was referring to the comment left by Shadowspear.com). You should go back and read the article again.
It has nothing to do with interservice rivalry. It has to do with the organizational structure and makeup and mission of the Marines. The Commandant has recently discussed the Marines being too “heavy,” and the need to return to a rapid deployment, self sufficient, rapid strike force.
Now, it may never again be the case that the Marines storm beaches while under live fire. I don’t know. They also should retain the COIN perspective, being so good at it as they have demonstrated.
But the point, again, has nothing to do with any interservice rivalry. The Marines are formed around an MEU concept, and special forces gets in the way unless it is in support of this idea.
As for paying off the locals, I would expect nothing less:
http://www.captainsjournal.com/2006/07/18/iraq-land-of-lies-and-deceipt/
Finally, I am sure the Marines aren’t worried about relevance, being that they just won the Anbar Province and are showing how to do the same thing in the Helmand Province. As to whether they report to higher command in another branch of the service, this is again beside the point and thus irrelevant.
As for share of the budget … well, there you might be on to something. This has been their struggle ever since formation of the Corps.
On June 7, 2008 at 1:24 pm, jonesgp1996 said:
I did read the whole article, and I get your points about the role of the Marines. What I wanted to point out was the wrong-headedness about “inter-service rivalry” that sometimes pops up in the general discourse. It just happend that the first time I saw the Smith bit was here in the “CJ” (which I come to regularly). It was W. Thomas Smith’s statement (and misinformed opinion) and the language used in the article quoted at the top of the entry that I believed needed redress, and the Captain’s blog provided the forum to do so – I appreciate having the opportunity.
I see the point about Marine SOF working in support of Marines and not being sent off to do other missions that do not fulfill that role. The Marines are already a microcosm of jointness with the MEUs, MAGTFs, etc. However, the policy direction in DoD is such that being joint in the larger sense is the way things are going, which is perhaps to the detriment of the Marines’ concept of how they operate (as you argue). Unfortunately for the USMC, it would be heretical for them to say that they don’t want to operate jointly, whether in the conventional or the SOF realm, and so they have to go with the flow.
On June 7, 2008 at 1:49 pm, Herschel Smith said:
Thanks. To follow up your point on W. Thomas Smith, I used his article as a sort of launching pad to address my other points on MARSOC. It might have been better, in hindsight, to address these two issues separately.