It has been two productive days for the the U.S. in Iraq.  On Thursday, June 5, the U.S. apprehended a high level financier and smuggler of Iranian weapons.

Coalition forces in Iraq captured an alleged leader and a suspected primary weapons smuggler and financier for Iranian-backed enemy fighters June 5.

Acting on intelligence information, coalition forces conducted a raid on the home of the suspected “special groups” leader in Mahawil, south of Baghdad. He surrendered without incident.

In a separate operation east of Kut, intelligence tips helped coalition forces track down the hideout of a suspected special groups member who sources allege is the primary weapons smuggler and financier for Iranian-backed enemy elements in that area. The suspect and an associate surrendered when coalition forces stormed their location.

In even bigger news today, is has now been learned that the individual arrested is the number 2 figure in Hezbollah’s military wing (the deputy military chief).  “The arrest is a major achievement and could provide an intelligence bonanza,” an Iraqi source said.

The continual drumbeat isn’t that the U.S. is going to go to war with Iran.  Rather, it is that Iran is at war with the U.S. and has been for more than twenty years.  The deployment of such a high level Hezbollah leader is more evidence of the Iranian commitment to destabilization of Iraq.

In spite of the success the U.S. Marines have had in the Helmand Province (and the example that this has provided to NATO), the balance of NATO forces in Afghanistan are focused primarily on force protection, and in order to procure that protection, some shady deals have been struck.  Spiegel recently interviewed Hamid Karzai, and while the entire piece is worth studying, one exchange stands out as descriptive of the campaign thus far.  NATO forces are buying protection from criminals and warlords.

SPIEGEL: Dirty deals are still necessary for the stability of Afghanistan?

Karzai: Absolutely necessary, because we lack the power to solve these problems in other ways. What do you want? War? Let me give you an example. We wanted to arrest a really terrible warlord, but we couldn’t do it because he is being protected by a particular country. We found out that he was being paid $30,000 a month to stay on his good side. They even used his soldiers as guards …

SPIEGEL: That sounds like the story of Commander Nasir Mohammed in Badakhshan, a province where German soldiers are based.

Karzai: I don’t want to name the country because it will hurt a close friend and ally. But there are also many other countries who contract the Afghan militias and their leaders. So I can only work where I can act, and I must always calculate what will happen before doing anything.

Karzai has just described an incredibly weak government, along with an incredibly weak campaign if the Germans are paying criminals $30,000 per month for protection.  In this case, the Germans don’t have the force (or rules of engagement) necessary to accomplish force protection, and thus they are buying it.

Another extreme example comes from the Norwegians.

The Norwegian base at Meymaneh is less secure than similar bases belonging to other ISAF forces. “The officers are angry, and I can see why,” says Vice Admiral Jan Reksten, in charge of the Norwegian contingent in Afghanistan.

Faryab province in northwestern Afghanistan has become increasingly restless in recent years. Taliban strength has been growing and there has been fighting in Meymaneh both last fall and in May this year.

Both the military and political heads of the armed forces accept that the base needs strengthening. When the Norwegian force was asked what it needed to defend itself, it asked for 120 troops and long-range weapons. A mobile reaction force was also ordered, so that the allied garrisons in the area could assist each other if any of them came under heavy attack.

Initially they were offered 100 men and long-range weapons. This was pared down to what was termed an absolute minimum of 76, still including mortars.

The most recent tally has fallen to 46 soldiers, with no long-range arms. These will instead be put into storage in Mazar-e-Sharif. This is the sequence of events which has caused tempers to fray.

The base at Meymaneh is a so-called Provincial Reconstruction Team base that provides security and helps with reconstruction in their local area. There are 30 such bases in Afghanistan. The United States alone has 12.

According to defense chief Sverre Diesen and army chief Robert Mood, Meymaneh will in fact be strengthened by the arrival of the arrival of more than 40 troops. The base will house a total of 200 Norwegians, of which 60 are deployed with the helicopter ambulance team currently stationed there. A few Latvian soldiers are also on the base.

“The Swedes, Germans and everyone else have robust rapid response forces. Mortars and armoured assault vehicles are almost always included,” says Col. Ivar Halset, who takes over as commander in Meymaneh in July.

“If we come under the sort of attack we experienced in May, we would no longer have weapons superiority over the Taliban,” adds Halset.

“The nearest reinforcements are an eight hour drive from Meymaneh and a further four to five hours from the areas where trouble is most likely occur,” he concludes.

“When the Norwegian force was asked what it needed to defend itself …” says it all.  The Norwegians are preoccupied with force protection, and as well they should be.  They lack even the basic weapons necessary to do the job, and are so far away from reinforcements (eight hours) and high trouble locations (four hours) that consideration of a combat outpost or counterinsurgency operations is out of the question.

The Australians also admit that more forces are needed.

Defence boss Air Chief Marshal Angus Houston has predicted foreign forces will be in Afghanistan for more than 10 years and thousands more troops are needed there.

He told a Senate Committee yesterday the Australian troops in Oruzgan province had Taliban insurgents on the back foot.

But he admitted they were unable to “hold the ground”.

“We can prevail in small areas but not across the whole province,” he said.

“Large tracts of the province are controlled by the Taliban.

“The ability to hold territory and influence what is happening – that’s the issue. There is a long, long way to go.”

Air Chief Marshal Houston’s sober assessment was backed by Defence Minister Joel Fitzgibbon.

And then he just as quickly states that not another Australian troop will be committed to the campaign.  Upon his recent retirement, General McNeill made some important observations.

General McNeill’s Isaf control began in February last year. At that time, the force was comprised of 33,000 NATO troops. Since then, 20,000 more have been added, but still more are needed, he said.

“This is an under-resourced war and it needs more manoeuvre units, it needs more flying machines, it needs more intelligence, surveillance and recognisance apparatus”, the general stated.

“I’m not just focused on the US sector, I’m talking about across the country.”

But the example has been given to us.  Ask the Marines in the Helmand Province if they wish to give $30,000 a month to organized crime as protection money.  On second thought, we know the answer to that question before we ask, and hence, we know what needs to be done to win the campaign.  It’s just a matter of doing it.

The 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit is set to invade Indianapolis.

Hollywood special effects and Arabic-speaking actors will be helping Marines train for urban combat when Indianapolis and other nearby communities begin hosting mock combat missions Wednesday.

A special effects company will create realistic explosions in a mock Middle Eastern village at Camp Atterbury, Marine spokesman 1st Lt. Timothy Patrick said in a written statement.

Arabic-speaking actors have been hired to play villagers and hostile insurgents, Patrick said.

“We will patrol through a mock village, interact with the villagers, determine enemy threats (and) meet with village leaders,” Patrick said. “There will also be simulated improvised explosive devices and rocket-propelled grenades on strings providing explosions — all courtesy of the special effects production company.”

For the next two weeks, about 2,300 Marines from the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit, based at Camp Lejeune, N.C., will conduct urban warfare training at locations in and around Indianapolis.

Helicopters will land at the old Eastgate Consumer Mall, Brookside Park, the old Bush Stadium, Raymond Park Middle School and 22 other Indianapolis locations.

The Marines have been cleared by state, federal and local authorities, Fletcher said. The unit’s commander promised to try to keep noise to a minimum and give neighbors plenty of warning.

The Marines will practice firing weapons, conducting patrols, running vehicle checkpoints, reacting to ambushes and employing nonlethal weapons, according to a statement.

Arabic, and not Pashto or Dari?  Does this mean that the 26th MEU is headed for Iraq?  At any rate, the Indianapolis Star has another interesting take on things.

U.S. Marine helicopters will land at the old Eastgate Consumer Mall, Brookside Park and other Indianapolis locations when the city becomes a mock battlefield next week.

About 2,300 Marines from the 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit, based at Camp Lejeune, N.C., will conduct urban warfare training from Wednesday through June 19 in and around Indianapolis.

Most of the troops will be deployed at the Indiana State Fairgrounds and the Raytheon facility on Holt Road, said Debbi Fletcher of the Indianapolis/Marion County Emergency Management Agency.

“We don’t want anyone thinking that there’s an invasion happening or that we declared martial law or something like that,” Fletcher said …

“Our aim in Indianapolis is to expose our Marines to realistic scenarios and stresses posed by operating in an actual urban community, thereby increasing their proficiency in built-up areas,” Col. Mark J. Desens, commander of the 26th MEU, said in a statement. “While some of the activity will take place around Camp Atterbury, residents in many areas can expect to see helicopters flying overhead, military vehicles on the roads and Marines patrolling on foot,” Desens said.

Basically, the Marines are doing MOUT training in Indianapolis.  Sounds awesome.  But the comments at the Star are telling.

Oh hell no! The last thing we need is more right wing stormtroopers running around loose! Indy needs to say NO just like other cities have!

and,

I was wondering when this would happen.

Really?  Were you really wondering when the Marines were going to do MOUT training in Indy?

It does look like prelude to martial law. But they dont even need our troops to perform do (sic) this. According to what Ive (sic) been told, Bush has signed an agreement with Canada giving them the right to come to America and perform martial law. If our own troops wont (sic) shoot at us, the Canucks probably will. It’s really getting hard to tell who the enemy is anymore. Keep those guns handy men, it’s getting closer to lock & load.

and,

One thing I forgot to mention, one of the largest congregations of muslims are supposed to be in the Danville area. Hmmm, the jar heads on the eastside, the muslims on the westside.

No, seriously.  You can’t make this stuff up.  Fact is better than fantasy.  Then finally, this:

Thank you for expressing your concerns regarding the Marine maneuvers. The federal, state, and local authorities, including the Mayor, are in full support of this training initiative. Local emergency management authorities are also fully aware of the situation. We understand some of the concerns that are being expressed and have fully weighed those; however, the greater good is being served by allowing them access to our urban setting for future planning purposes. Any impacted neighborhoods will be notified.

Thank you,

Mary Grattan

Constituent Services Assistant

Office of Mayor Gregory A. Ballard

317-327-2580m the mayors office

We’ll see if the 26th MEU imposes martial law and shoots up Indy.  It’ll be sure to hit the news.

In Are the Taliban Really on the Brink of Defeat? the contradictory claims of progress and resurgent violence in Afghanistan were examined within the context of the NATO organizational structure.  On the other hand, no coverage of the Marine operations in the Helmand Province has been as extensive as at The Captain’s Journal with our category Marines in Helmand.  The Marines are having great success, of course.  But we weighed in on the first subject by stating that the British had exaggerated the imminent defeat of the Taliban.  Counterinsurgency takes force projection, and that, for a protracted period.

But are these two claims contradictory?  Since Glenn Reynolds linked the first post at Instapundit there was some interest in the subject.  Roger Fraley linked this post and caught on to the potential contradiction, and Noah Shachtman with Danger Room published his similarly themed article Who’s Up in Afghanistan? (several hours after The Captain’s Journal, by the way).  Noah points out:

Of course, this doesn’t have to be a binary choice. The Taliban could be causing more mischief, and the Marines may be kicking their asses.

Well yes, but more to the point, we should be seeing this as the difference between the micro- and macro-counterinsurgency level.  The Marines are not, after all, deployed all over Afghanistan.  They are in a troublesome province, to be sure, but they are only in Helmand, and then only in and around Garmser.  There is an MEU of around 3200 (the 24th MEU), not all of which is deployed in Garmser (some are engaged in training the Afghan forces and other things).

If we want to consider things on a macro-counterinsurgency level, the McClatchy bloggers link a source called Nightwatch, and opine on Afghanistan as follows:

But now listen to John McCreary, a former senior intelligence analyst for the Joint Chiefs of Staff who compiles NightWatch, an insightful analysis by a veteran professional of daily international developments drawn from open, unclassified sources. His take today on Afghanistan paints a far different – and gloomier – picture.

According to McCreary, May saw more violence than any other month since the 2001 U.S. intervention that toppled the Taliban and forced Osama bin Laden and his followers to flee into Pakistan. He says there were 214 violent incidents in more than 100 of the country’s 398 districts last month. That was up from April’s count of 199 violent incidents in 86 districts.

Writes McCreary: “Despite official efforts to spotlight improvement, the spring offensive this year is far worse than last year’s spring offensive. The security situation has deteriorated again. At no prior time has the Taliban managed to stage attacks in over 100 of the 398 districts.”

“If Taliban fighters are heading to Pakistan, they are going back to base to rest and to get more ammunition and supplies,” he concludes.

In other words, even though there are now more U.S. and ISAF troops than ever before – about 50,000, including 33,000 Americans – Afghanistan may be on track to seeing its bloodiest year yet since the U.S. intervention.

Now, McClatchy is horrible, horrible, horrible, and always biased and colored in the way they see and present the so-called news they publish.  The picture they present is worse than the conditions on the ground, because the Marines really are having outstanding success in Helmand.  After all, they are Marines.

There are two things that we just hate here at The Captain’s Journal.  First, we hate presentations of the situation that are rosier than the conditions on the ground, made that way for the purpose of justifying the campaign.  In our opinion, the campaigns (in Iraq and Afghanistan) need no justification, and we don’t waste time by debating six year old decisions.  Next, we hate presentations of the situation that are more bleak than the situation on the ground is, made that way for the purpose of undermining the very campaign we should be attempting to win.

The Captain’s Journal loves the truth, and presents critical analysis for the purpose of examination of strategy, tactics and logistics.  We do not engage in political ‘hackery’, and we don’t shill for politicians or political parties.  The campaign in Afghanistan is suffering from lack of force projection.  The campaign in Afghanistan must be won.  The Marines are showing us how to win it.  These are not contradictory points, and our articles on this have made perfect sense.

The broad strokes of the picture were painted for us by Nicholas Schmidle in Next-Gen Taliban.  Leader of the Tehrik-i-Taliban, Baitullah Mehsud, told us of some of his concrete plans for the future.

“We want to eradicate Britain and America, and to shatter the arrogance and tyranny of the infidels. We pray that Allah will enable us to destroy the White House, New York, and London.”

This theme was reiterated by Ayman al-Zawahiri, as he addressed questions via the internet from international members – or presumed members – of al Qaeda.  As we summarized in Why is there Jihad?

Nationalism is evil and out of accord with the global aspirations of al Qaeda.  Nation-states are not just not helpful, or even a necessary evil.  They are quite literally an obstacle to jihad, not because they share the loyalties of jihadists, but rather, because they fundamentally don’t acquiesce to the vision of world conquest in the name of Islam and the forcible implementation of Sharia law.  What we see as a transnational insurgency is to the jihadists simply a world wide struggle.  They don’t recognize nation-states as legitimate.

Now with the “peace accord” between Mehsud and Pakistan, Baitullah has said that he intends to send fighters to Afghanistan to assist in the insurgency.  It was merely a matter of time before Pakistan helped to implement his broader plan.  His brand of Islam doesn’t recognize borders.  “Islam does not recognize boundaries”… “There can be no deal with the United States.”

More to the point, Syed Saleem Shahzad gives us a glimpse into the evolution of the Pakistan Taliban from their relatively humble beginnings to becoming an international threat.

He has been cultivated by al-Qaeda and is now part of a nexus headed by Takfiris (those militantly intolerant of “infidels”) belonging to al-Qaeda and a group of former Pakistani jihadis who cut their teeth in Kashmir under Baitullah.

Baitullah sees a very broad role for himself and for his comrades. They do not want simply to be members of a local resistance movement. They are riding the global ideological bandwagon of al-Qaeda and envisage a complicated strategy to win a war against the West.

Regardless of whether the Taliban are engaged by the U.S. within Pakistan proper, as we discussed in Conversation with a Jihadi, the surest way to put pressure on the Taliban is to begin the pressure in Afghanistan.  The Marines have made a very good start.

Rosie Dimanno with TheStar.com gives us her take on the interview with Marine Colonel Pete Petronzio concerning the recent operations in Helmand.

Modesty does not become the Marines.

Ooh rah!

Which is the Leatherhead ejaculation, not to be mistaken with Delta Forces’ hoo-wah.

“Absolutely not have we come to anyone’s rescue,” insists Col. Pete Petronzio, commanding officer of the 2,400 Marines currently deployed to a high-pucker factor (more jarhead jargon, think squeezed buttocks) battlefield operation in the southern quadrant of Helmand province.

Except, of course, the British have been there for a couple of years, and that opium-engorged province had been reeling increasingly out of control – insofar as any stability ever existed – ground zero for a Taliban insurgency that is unnerving much of Afghanistan and freaking out the Western interventionists.

And the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit was indeed summoned specifically – like the cavalry, except that’s army – to kick out some jihadist jam; war-wizened, most of them, from tours in Iraq, returning to a country they’d long ago abandoned on orders from their commander-in-chief, that person in the White House, ostensibly leaving the post-invasion mopping up to the U.S. Army (in the east) and the International Security Assistance Force (everywhere else, as of 2004.)

Relief agencies, which are not necessarily to be trusted – embedded journalists have been reporting otherwise – claim the Devil Dogs have been heavy-handed with the local population in Helmand, forcing many to flee their homes during bang-bang thrusts.

Most Canadians would likely cringe at some of the actions the Marines have employed, although these are conventional combat tactics, however contrary to antiquated notions of peacekeeping and group-hug reconciliation, the palaver approach that a certain faction urges for defanging the Taliban.

They blow up compounds – here is the evidence, on their own military website, of a jet fighter zapping a missile at a mud-walled redoubt near Garmser where insurgents had apparently amassed. They use explosives to carve out portals in thick walls so snipers can take aim.

If nothing else, this aggressive “clearing” operation has certainly seized the Taliban’s attention. They had become accustomed, in this critical transit route region, to going about their business willy-nilly, not aggressively pursued, in large part because the Brits didn’t have enough of a footprint around Garmser, stuck largely inside their ghost-town outpost, far from the primary base in Lashkar Gah.

Yes, the British have been loath to deploy the necessary forces to get the job done.  But harkening back to the “group hug” version of counterinsurgency, they have also had a poor strategy.  But Rosie continues:

“I hope that’s a direct positive effect,” said Petronzio. “We are on a main artery that runs south to north and potentially east to west. We are attempting to put a stopper in the bottle as far south as we can. Even that’s probably not a good analogy because eventually they will flow around us. But we are having an extremely positive effect on their south to north flow. And we will continue to do that.”

It is, Petronzio reminds, an asymmetrical fight. “You may think it’s clear and tomorrow it isn’t. But we’re working our way south.”

Marines are noted for their counterinsurgency wits and effectiveness. Their focus, as Petronzio explains, is pacifying the environment, whatever that takes, so that others – let us suggest coalition partners not so leathery – can set about implementing the subsequent phases of redevelopment.

“The whole concept behind counterinsurgency is … clear … hold … build. To simplify it as best I could, it’s all about clearing out the bad guys, providing that security and holding the ground to bring in the build behind you.”

That’s bringing up the rear after somebody else kicks ass.

“Are we uniquely suited to this? I don’t know.”

Except that he does.

“We may not be uniquely suited to ‘the build.’ So there will probably have to be someone who does that for a living, to kind of come in behind us.”

He didn’t mean it as such. But that’s a dig.

It isn’t routine to find such honest, witty, in-your-face reporting in Canada or Britain.  She almost sounds … American.  The Captain’s Journal likes Rosie.  Let’s hope she gives us more.

The commander of British forces in Afghanistan has recently said that the Taliban are in very deep trouble.

Missions by special forces and air strikes by unmanned drones have “decapitated” the Taliban and brought the war in Afghanistan to a “tipping point”, the commander of British forces has said.

The new “precise, surgical” tactics have killed scores of insurgent leaders and made it extremely difficult for Pakistan-based Taliban leaders to prosecute the campaign, according to Brig Mark Carleton-Smith.

In the past two years an estimated 7,000 Taliban have been killed, the majority in southern and eastern Afghanistan. But it is the “very effective targeted decapitation operations” that have removed “several echelons of commanders”.

This in turn has left the insurgents on the brink of defeat, the head of Task Force Helmand said.

These are strong words, and they markedly disagree with other official reports.  On May 15, 2008, a NATO spokesman stated that “attacks by insurgents in eastern Afghanistan have risen sharply,” and on May 20, 2008, Admiral Michael Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, reported to Congress that violence in Afghanistan is increasing.  He also stated:

“In short, a stable Iraq and Afghanistan that are long-term partners and share our commitment to peace will be critical to achieving regional stability and security,” he said.

“This will require years, not months, and will require the support of the American people, our regional allies and concerted action by the Iraqi and Afghan people and their leaders.”

These radically divergent reports are not atypical of NATO behavior in Afghanistan.  We are accustomed to well-rehearsed strategy and clear, consistent communication from the Multinational Force in Iraq.  NATO performs more like a multi-headed creature with different countries not only failing to ensure consistency in communication, but following very different strategies (most remarkably the British at all levels of the government).

Finally, in undeniable demonstration of the point, General McNeill, top commander of the NATO forces in Afghanistan, failed to confirm the view of the British commander.

The 24th MEU deployed to Afghanistan in February 2008 to battle the Taliban in the Helmand province, and there is current discussion of deployment of more Marines to replace the 24th MEU.  Marines aren’t deployed to the campaign when the enemy is defeated.  Common sense should be applied, and effusive reports of both victory and defeat should generally be rejected in favor of seeing counterinsurgency as a protracted but necessary process.

In lieu of the British good news of imminent victory (the Brits simply got a little too emotional), we can say that the campaign in Afghanistan is winnable.  The realistic view is that force projection is required, and that, for a protracted period of time.

While purveying propaganda, al Qaeda and Taliban spokesmen often unintentionally relinquish information that points to vulnerabilities and infighting within their organization.  An interview with a jihadist is used below, along with a question and answer session by Ayman al-Zawahiri, to supply the broad outlines of two specific vulnerabilities.

Background & Report

In spite of the U.S. objections to negotiations with the Tehrik-i-Taliban, there has been enough British and Canadian support, as well as internal support within Pakistan, that the authorities were persuaded to continue the process.  They want more time.

This week the top NATO commander in Afghanistan, U.S. General Dan McNeil said any deal must include stopping fighters from crossing the two countries’ shared border.

“We have gone back and looked at the data we have over a long period of time when there have been other peace deals,” he said.  “And the fact is each time the talks resulted in a peace deal we have an increased level of activity.”

Pakistani officials insist that unlike previous agreements the new peace talks involve elected government representatives – not the military – and those representatives have more credibility with tribal leaders …

Pakistan’s former spy agency chief Asad Durrani says people living near the disputed border known as the Durand line who are sympathetic to the Taliban will not immediately change their behavior because of a peace agreement. 

“If we expect that these people will completely prevent the crossings of the Durand line – that cannot be done, simply impossible,” he said.  “If we think that we can prevent those people who feel motivated to go on the other side and help the Afghan resistance – that again is mission impossible.”

Despite U.S. criticism of the deal and pessimism even among Pakistanis about finding a lasting peace agreement, negotiator Arshad Abdullah says that after more than six years of failed policies, critics should give the new approach time.

“With these agreements hopefully Afghanistan will be better off.  It is a trial.  Basically we want the world community to give us a chance and see how successful we are,” he said.  “It is a matter of three or four months and within six months hopefully we will have an even better situation.”

But is more time going to matter?  Understanding the enemy is crucial in the struggle against the global insurgency.  An Asia Times journalist gives us a glimpse into the nature of the enemy in a recent article, and it behooves us to listen as he describes a conversation with a jihadi.

Seven months ago I visited Bajaur and Mohmandagencies. As my taxi driver headed from Peshawar, the capital of North-West Frontier Province, he was played some Pashtu music on the car’s CD. Quickly, though, he changed it for jihadi songs.

“The militants have not only brought guns to the tribal areas, they have also brought a culture which has transformed tribal society,” commented a passenger traveling with me.

Syed Saleem Shahzad (with Asia Times) then goes on to describe a more recent meeting with a jihadi in the context of thinking about this “culture which has transformed” society.  He talks with a fighter who converses with him under the psuedonym “S.”

S is the son of a Pakistani military officer and left his home after completing school at the age of 17. Ever since, he has been an active jihadi, and in eight years he has only seen his family once.

He joined al-Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan before September 11, 2001 – even serving for bin Laden – but soon after that event he went to the South Waziristan tribal area in Pakistan with Arab-Afghans such as Sheikh Ahmad Saeed Khadr and Sheikh Essa.

S said his association with Arab-Afghan militants turned him from an ordinary jihadi into an astute trainer. “In my early 20s, I was training big names of this region, including young Arabs and Uzbeks who were many years older than me,” said S.

S could have earned a monthly stipend to devote himself to being a jihad, but he chose to work as a trader in Pakistani cities to earn extra money. He then returned to the mountain vastness of Afghanistan to join the Taliban’s fight against NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) in Afghanistan.

A turning point in S’s life came when, returning from Khost province in Afghanistan where he ran a training camp, he was arrested by Pakistani Frontier Corps.

“I was passed on from one security agency to another, and each time the interrogation methods changed. My pre-9/11 association with bin Laden and Zawahiri and occasional meetings with Zawahiri after 9/11 boosted me as an ‘al-Qaeda associate’ in the eyes of my Pakistani examiners. For one-and-half years I did not see a single ray of sunlight. After thorough interrogations, they concluded that I was just a fighter and a trainer against NATO troops who happened to be a ‘renegade’ son of an army officer,” said S.

“They contacted my father and despite that he had abandoned me a long time ago, when he heard about my situation all his fatherly affection returned and he agreed to become my guarantor that I would not take part in any jihadi activities.

“So I was released in front of Peshawar railway station, blindfolded, and when my blinds were removed there was my old father in front of me. I was standing with my hands and feet chained, and when my guards removed these my father hugged me and wept profusely.

“That was the only brief interaction between me and my family as I once again went into my own world of jihad. It was me and my gun, and I never looked back to see if there was any family, a father or a mother, waiting for me … though I miss them a lot,” S related in a sad, soft voice.

Syed Saleem Shahzad goes on to discuss the location of Bin Laden and other things, but a meaningful exchange occurs late in the interview.

S said he is against the use of suicide attacks. “I do not know the exact status of such attacks in Islamic law, but certainly in my manuals of war it is prohibited. I have argued with all the top commanders that any target can be hit without the use of suicide attacks,” S said.

On strategic matters, S is clear that attacks on Pakistani security forces in the tribal areas can only add up to problems. “I always argued with top ideologues like Sheikh Essa that the more success we get in Afghanistan, the more we will gain support from Pakistan. If NATO remains strong in Afghanistan, it will put pressure on Pakistan. If NATO remains weaker in Afghanistan, it will dare [encourage] Pakistan to support the Taliban, its only real allies in the region,” S said.

Analysis & Commentary

Two very remarkable vulnerabilities have been accidentally divulged in this last exchange.  It is obvious that S is religiously motivated.  Not only does he say so, but the hold and sway this has over him is enough to break with a weeping father to go back to his commanders.  Its power is complete with this jihadist.

This same religious commitment is also causing a problem within the movement.  Note what S says about the tactics of suicide attacks.  “I do not know the exact status of such attacks in Islamic law, but certainly in my manuals of war it is prohibited. I have argued with all the top commanders that any target can be hit without the use of suicide attacks.”

There may be a couple of reasons for the difficulty, one of which is the certain death of the jihadist.  But the most significant objection doubtless has to do with death of noncombatant Muslims due to these attacks.  They would like to believe that the suicide bomb is the Taliban equivalent of the JDAM targeted with GPS.  Innocents are spared, or so the claim goes.  Baitullah Mehsud recently had his own press conference in which he says that suicide attacks are “our most destructive weapon … out atom bomb,” but better than the enemy’s atom bomb because our bomb targets only the enemy while the enemy’s kills innocents.

But this isn’t true, and there is work ongoing within their ranks to backfit a justification for their tactics.  The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point has an interesting analysis of Ayman al-Zawahiri’s recent Q&A session, and suicide tactics play a prominent role, having been brought up in the questions posed to Zawahiri.  The problem is also summarized in the most recent issue of the CTC Sentinel.

In the course of defending al-Qa`ida against charges of unjustly killing innocent Muslims during his April 2, 2008 “open interview,” Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri reintroduced Hukm al-Tatarrus (the law on using human shields) into the debate.1 A relatively unfamiliar term to non-Muslims and Muslims alike, al-Tatarrus refers to God’s sanctioning of Muslim armies that are forced to kill other Muslims who are being used as human shields by an enemy during a time of war.2 Al-Tatarrus is a religiously legitimate, albeit obscure, Islamic concept that al-Qa`ida ideologues have been increasingly using in order to exculpate themselves from charges of apostasy. The method in which al-Qa`ida is promoting al-Tatarrus, however, seeks to facilitate the sacrifice of Muslim lives in contravention of 14 centuries of religious teachings.

Al Qaeda has turned to Abu Yahya for scholarly analysis, but his scholarship is nothing short of revolutionary, and he turns out not to be much of a scholar after all.

While the Qur’anic and hadith restrictions on killing innocent Muslims were appropriate during the early days of Islam, he suggests, they should have no bearing on warfare today because modern warfare is qualitatively different. Whereas early Islamic thinkers had to consider the implications of using a catapult against an enemy fortress in which Muslims were residing, or conducting night raids against an enemy household in which Muslims were likely present, the nature of contemporary warfare is one where the enemy uses “raids, clashes and ambushes, and they hardly ever stop chasing the mujahidin everywhere and all the time, imprisoning them, their families and their supporters.” What it means to be “directly engaged in combat,” Abu Yahyaargues, has changed. By positing that Islam is in a state of constant and universal warfare, he implicitly lowers the threshold for proving that one’s killing of innocent Muslims is just.

In short, the nature of today’s all-encompassing warfare means that the jihadist movement must find a “new perception of different ways of modern shielding which were probably not provided for by the scholars of Islam who knew only of the weapons used during their era.” In these few sentences, Abu Yahya attempts to wipe the slate clean of the most sacred and defining texts with regard to the issue of killing human shields.

They are obviously struggling with the justification for what Baitullah Mehsud calls his “most destructive weapon.”  The brutality of al Qaeda in the Anbar province helped to turn the population against them.  A well aimed information campaign outlining the noncombatant casualties and suffering resulting from suicide attacks is appropriate and would possibly be effective in weakening the enemy’s tactical position.  In Anbar the U.S. had to prove themselves to be the stronger horse (to use a phrase made popular by Bin Laden).  There is no magic, and the necessary context for a rejection of jihad is its battlespace defeat.  But the battlespace defeat might be assisted by a good information campaign targeting this vulnerability.

The second important thing we learn from the interview of S is that the campaign in Afghanistan and Pakistan is, in the words of The Captain’s Journal, inextricably tied.  “If NATO remains strong in Afghanistan, it will put pressure on Pakistan. If NATO remains weaker in Afghanistan, it will dare [encourage] Pakistan to support the Taliban, its only real allies in the region,” S said.

The corollary to the the tribal region of Pakistan being a safe haven for the Taliban is that strong action in Afghanistan will affect Pakistan.  It is one campaign, a fight against a transnational insurgency, and seeing the campaign through the lens of borders and nation-states is wrongheaded.  The surest way to put pressure on the tribal region within Pakistan is to continue the chase in Afghanistan.  There is no replacement for kinetic operations to kill or capture the enemy.  We know this not only because it is common sense, but also because the enemy has told us so.

By now it isn’t news that the MARSOC Marines who were deployed to Afghanistan and accused of wrongdoing will not be charged.

The Marines of Marine Special Operations Company F “acted appropriately” when they fired in response to an attack March 4, 2007, in Afghanistan, Lt. Gen. Samuel Helland said Friday.

The written statement from the commanding general of Marine Corps Central Command came in response to a January court of inquiry into the shootings, which Army officials said killed Afghan civilians. Army Lt. Gen. Frank Kearney with Special Operations Command Central expelled the Marine special operations company from Afghanistan after the incident.

Two Marines, Maj. Fred Galvin and Capt. Vincent Noble, were named in the court of inquiry into the events in Afghanistan’s Nangahar province on March 4 and March 9, 2007.

Both men were accused, but not charged, with conspiracy to make a false official statement, dereliction of duty, failure to obey a lawful order and making a false official statement.

“Appropriate administrative actions based on the findings of the court of inquiry” will be taken against Galvin, who served as the company commander at the time of the incidents; Noble, the platoon commander at the time; and Capt. Robert Olsen, the unit’s intelligence officer and second-in-command, according to the press release from Marine Corps Forces Central Command.

Appropriate administrative actions?  Just what does this mean?  The Captain’s Journal will try to follow this to see where it goes.  W. Thomas Smith, Jr., has some interesting observations.

Galvin’s Marines were ordered out of Afghanistan – far too hastily in my professional opinion – pending an investigation that dragged on far too long, and in which too much political correctness and perhaps (based on my own personal musing) a bit of inter-service rivalry were infused: Not to mention the fact that the word of the locals, and a human rights group that was not there at the time, was considered more believable than that of the Marines.

The locals, whose stories often conflicted with one anothers,’ never could come up with a firm casualty count (though U.S. Army officers reportedly made cash payments to Afghans who said they were survivors or members of survivors’ families).

Fact is, there is no proof – much less evidence – that any civilians were killed: No bodies or forensic evidence, except for that of the suicide bomber, were recovered.

But there is a 900 pound gorilla in the room, and The Captain’s Journal will point it out if no one else will.  We still aren’t convinced that the Marine Corps should have Marines dedicated to special operations.  Force Recon?  Sure.  Someone needs to be qualified to perform reconnaissance operations (jump qualifications, etc.).  Someone in a company must be qualified as the DM, and someone must be qualified as a combat lifesaver, and so on.

But the notion of special operations has morphed – probably due to stupid television depictions – from one of specialized troops to one of supermen.  Up until now that has been the Army’s problem.  Marines are supposed to be self sufficient, hence the notion of a MEU.  Marines stick with Marines, and Force Recon supports its unit.  Otherwise, it has no function.

When Galvin’s Marines were deployed to Afghanistan months ago, they were only special operations.  They weren’t connected to any unit except MARSOC.  As for kinetic operations, if you want force projection, turn loose a company of Marine infantry.  Special operations, to Marines, means support of that company.

We’re open to compelling argument, but we still fail to see the need or the mission for MARSOC.  Does someone want to convince us?