We have been a critic of the specific use in which special operations forces have been employed in Afghanistan.  Just to rehearse two recent examples, in Lt. Gen. McChrystal Testifies we said:

TCJ had also hoped that General McChrystal would attach Army SOF to units in the field rather than use them on raids.  No such thing is on his mind, apparently.  Now, we have admitted before of our being nonplussed at this idea, this notion of SOF being the direct action kinetics troops, with so-called General Purpose troops being the defensive forces.  TCJ opposes this …

In A Half Dozen Gargantuan Bases, we said:

Even many of the Army SOF are base-bound except for their forays into the wild via helicopter rides to the next raid.  Some Army are doing it right (e.g., the Korangal Valley), as are the Marines in Helmand.  But the gargantuan bases are an obstacle to success in Afghanistan.  Empty them.  Send the Army on dismounted patrols, open vehicle patrol bases, smaller FOBs, and combat outposts.  Get amongst the people.

Regular readers of TCJ know that this is only a small sampling of our advocacy for re-attaching SOF to infantry as specialized billets.  Now comes developments in the area of use of SOF in Afghanistan.

McChrystal has asked two veteran special operators on the Pentagon’s Joint Staff, which he directs, to accompany him to Afghanistan once he wins Senate approval for a fourth star. The two are Maj. Gen. Michael Flynn, who headed intelligence for the chief terrorist hunting unit in Iraq; and Brig Gen. Austin Miller, a Joint Staff director for special operations.

Military sources say Brig. Gen. Ed Reeder, who commands special operations in Afghanistan, went in-country earlier this year to revamp the way Green Beret “A” Teams, Delta Force and other special operators conduct counter-insurgency.

Green Berets, the same group that led the 2001 ouster of the Taliban from power, now primarily work out of fire support bases, often independently of conventional forces. They fight to control the Taliban-infested border with Pakistan, and train the Afghan army.

Critics within special operations have said the A Teams need to work more closely with conventional forces and with NATO counterparts. “This would give us a needed one-two punch,” said a former operator who served in Afghanistan.

Recalling the ridiculous red tape in NATO’s Afghanistan, TCJ is in favor of returning this to as much of a U.S. operation as possible (including the British, by the way).  This isn’t to show disrespect to our NATO allies, but rather, to say that the effort must be led by the U.S.  But aside from that nuance (” … and with NATO counterparts”), we are certainly one of the critics of SOF.

Note that we aren’t critical of SF (Green Berets) being embedded with the Afghan Army anywhere.  With their language training, that’s there job.  We are indeed critical of SOF (Rangers, et. al.) being detached from infantry and the very counterinsurgency campaign that they should be supporting.  As we have said before, it is almost as bad an idea to separate SOF from the larger COIN campaign as it is to separate infantry from kinetics.

So TCJ nailed it, and we’ve been doing the fancy dancing.  Or did we, and should we?  How will this play out, and what will McChrystal do?  How will he use SOF?  Will this still be a HVT campaign to find and capture mid-level Taliban commanders, sending them to jail only to be set free and resume activities later, or will it become a real counterinsurgency campaign?  Time will tell, but this critic will continue to monitor the situation.

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This is what’s called close air support (CAS).  Warning: graphic language.

The server was down and so The Captain’s Journal hasn’t been on line for about three days.  Fixed now, and for those readers who are just waiting around to see what we have next (all three or four of you), we should resume regular posting.  Thanks for your patience.

Sincerely,

TCJ Management

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For the Aussies, it isn’t clear, but it had better be from home or they’ll get pissy.

There have been few if any complaints about the Dutch troops in Afghanistan from the other countries in the coalition forming the International Support and Assistance Force (ISAF). Generally they are regarded as valuable colleagues doing a good job.

However, there is one problem being experienced by the 800 Australian troops who share the Tarin Kowt military base in Uruzgan province with Dutch troops. The Dutch are in charge of the mess and the Aussies are less than happy about the food. There have been so many complaints about the Dutch food being “tasteless” and “not fresh” that the issue has been raised in the parliament in Canberra.

At a special defence budget hearing, Australia’s military commander air chief marshall Angus Houston commented: “It’s not Aussie food, it’s European food. People have been quite strong in their views about the European food”. Senator David Johnston said, “I think it was an insult to them. The least they could expect when they are deployed for six months is that they can eat proper food”.

The Dutch cooks at Tarin Kowt serve around 2500 soldiers a day, a mix of Dutch, Australian, French, Slovakian and British troops. The food is prepared in the Netherlands, frozen and then shipped to Karachi in Pakistan. From there it goes by road to Afghanistan. With delays at the border, the journey can take as much as two or three months. Because of food safety considerations, ISAF bases are not permitted to use local Afghan fruit or vegetables. Those are flown in from Dubai.

Houston told the Australian parliament: “We listen to our people. Our people have indicated they’d like some Aussie food.” A team of Australian military cooks has been rushed to Afghanistan.

Hmmm … proper food.  Well, the eating establishment looks something like this.

It is fairly well known that Australia won’t allow any troops but their Special Operations Forces to actually participate in kinetic operations in Afghanistan.  Now here is a picture of vittles for the U.S. Marines in Helmand (Garmser, where is there no electricity).

Well, perhaps if Australia would allow their infantrymen to deploy and perform infantry tactics and maneuvers in Afghanistan, they wouldn’t be so obsessed with “proper” vittles at a posh FOB as the Aussie SOF.

Philip Smucker in the Asia Times:

Although the US is not technically losing, it would be extremely hard to argue that Afghanistan’s safety has not been sacrificed due to the policies of a risk-averse American government. A basic premise of the US military’s own strategy is that ultimate success is gained “by protecting the populace, not the counter-insurgency force”. This principle is violated daily.

The Pentagon’s high-tech-centric approach to the fight in Afghanistan has produced – since 9/11 – a half-dozen gargantuan bases – with more on the way. These are little more than anachronistic monuments to the US military’s superior firepower. At Bagram and Jalalabad air bases, aerial drones, commanded by joystick pilots in the deserts of Nevada, circle and land. Invisible F-16s and F-15s lay figure-eight smoke trails in the blue skies above Tora Bora. At dusk, the snow line of the Hindu Kush is flush with Apache attack helicopters and larger Chinooks. None of them are the key to victory.

In the last several months of living and talking to American soldiers and officers in the field, particularly along the eastern front, I have been impressed with their understanding of what it will take to win in Afghanistan. One enthusiastic young Southerner, Major Tommy Cardone, boiled it down to a useful campaign slogan, “It’s the people, stupid!” Indeed, I was left with the impression that the US military does have a strategy; if only the cautious generals and politicians in Washington will allow it to be implemented.

To win in Afghanistan, the US military – and its Afghan partners – must follow best-practices counter-insurgency down to the last of Afghanistan’s 40,000 villages. Only by taking the fight – along with Afghan soldiers and policemen – to the countryside will the Taliban be isolated and excluded from what Chairman Mao Zedong once referred to as the sea of the people.

Regular readers know that we have always held a nuanced view of counterinsurgency.  There is no reason for FM 3-24 to place protection of the population in juxtaposition over against killing insurgents.  It isn’t an EITHER-OR choice.  It is BOTH-AND.  They are corollary and coupled propositions, not a dilemma.  See for instance the Marine operations in Helmand in 2008 in which the Marines killed some 400 Taliban fighters, but also in which the population made it clear that they wanted the Marines to stay.  From our Following the Marines Through Helmand III:

Take particular note of the words of town elder Abdul Nabi: “We are grateful for the security.  We don’t need your help, just security.”  Similar words were spoken at a meeting in Ghazni with the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan: ““We don’t want food, we don’t want schools, we want security!” said one woman council member.”

Again, similar words were spoken upon the initial liberation of Garmser by the U.S. Marines: “The next day, at a meeting of Marines and Afghan elders, the bearded, turban-wearing men told Marine Capt. Charles O’Neill that the two sides could “join together” to fight the Taliban. “When you protect us, we will be able to protect you,” the leader of the elders said.”

The narrative emerging is not one of largesse, roads, education, crop rotation, irrigation and all of the other elements of the soft side of counterinsurgency.  To be sure, these elements are necessary and good, but sequentially they come after security.

While it isn’t necessarily true – this narrative of the Army on large FOBs in Iraq until Petraeus arrrived (some Army units were conducting dismounted patrols and living amongst the people) – this problem of gargantuan bases in Afghanistan seems to be recurring.  Andrew Lubin, who has also been to Afghanistan and comments wisely on his experiences, says:

Get the Army off their huge stupid bases where bureaucracy flourishes. Put them in the field where they belong. Their “creature comforts” have gotten out of control…Burger Kings, Orange Julius, jewelry stores, -do you know they now offer massage services at Bagram? In a war zone?

Even many of the Army SOF are base-bound except for their forays into the wild via helicopter rides to the next raid.  Some Army are doing it right (e.g., the Korangal Valley), as are the Marines in Helmand.  But the gargantuan bases are an obstacle to success in Afghanistan.  Empty them.  Send the Army on dismounted patrols, open vehicle patrol bases, smaller FOBs, and combat outposts.  Get amongst the people.  Only then will they sense that you are committed and give you intelligence – leading ultimately to killing Taliban, which will then further contribute to their security, and so on the process goes.

Lt. Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal has recently testified before Congress concerning both his nomination to lead the Afghan campaign and the recent air strikes involving noncombatant casualties.

On Tuesday, Lt. Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, nominated to be the American commander in Afghanistan, vowed that reducing civilian casualties would be “essential to our credibility.”

Any American victory would be “hollow and unsustainable” if it led to popular resentment among Afghanistan’s citizens, General McChrystal told the Senate Armed Services Committee during a confirmation hearing.

According to the senior military official, the report on the May 4 raids found that one plane was cleared to attack Taliban fighters, but then had to circle back and did not reconfirm the target before dropping bombs, leaving open the possibility that the militants might have fled the site or that civilians might have entered the target area in the intervening few minutes.

In another case, a compound of buildings where militants were massing for a possible counterattack against American and Afghan troops was struck in violation of rules that required a more imminent threat to justify putting high-density village dwellings at risk, the official said.

“In several instances where there was a legitimate threat, the choice of how to deal with that threat did not comply with the standing rules of engagement,” said the military official, who provided a broad summary of the report’s initial findings on the condition of anonymity because the inquiry was not yet complete …

During his testimony, General McChrystal said that strikes by warplanes and Special Operations ground units would remain an essential part of combat in Afghanistan. But he promised to make sure that these attacks were based on solid intelligence and that they would be as precise as possible. American success in Afghanistan should be measured by “the number of Afghans shielded from violence,” not the number of enemies killed, he said.

The inquiry into the May 4 strikes in the western province of Farah illustrated the difficult, split-second decisions facing young officers in the heat of combat as they balance using lethal force to protect their troops under fire with detailed rules restricting the use of firepower to prevent civilian deaths.

In the report, the investigating officer, Brig. Gen. Raymond A. Thomas III, analyzed each of the airstrikes carried out by three aircraft-carrier-based Navy F/A-18 strike aircraft and an Air Force B-1 bomber against targets in the village of Granai, in a battle that lasted more than seven hours.

In each case, the senior military official said, General Thomas determined that the targets that had been struck posed legitimate threats to Afghan or American forces, which included one group of Marines assigned to train the Afghans and another assigned to a Special Operations task force.

TCJ doesn’t like how this testimony is going.  The General knows that the subject engagement was quite protracted, and that another “circle back” probably wouldn’t have changed things.  Yet he should also know what The Captain’s Journal has been able to uncover with a little bit of analysis, i.e., that the Taliban mass troops against smaller U.S. forces, and that in order to prevent being overrun air power has become necessary under such conditions.  He had the ideal chance to tell Congress that 68,000 U.S. troops is not enough, but instead of debating the merits of force projection in COIN, the conversation was directed at tactical ROE and “circle backs.”  This is not a good sign.

TCJ had also hoped that General McChrystal would attach Army SOF to units in the field rather than use them on raids.  No such thing is on his mind, apparently.  Now, we have admitted before of our being nonplussed at this idea, this notion of SOF being the direct action kinetics troops, with so-called General Purpose troops being the defensive forces.  TCJ opposes this, even though with this being a Marine-centric blog, we have no dog in the fight (except a belief in what is most effective for American forces).

We understand, actually.  Women are not allowed in the Army SOF, similar to Marine infantry.  The Army General Purpose forces have become a sociological experiment, and thus PFC Elizabeth went on patrol in Iraq.  She said, “It’s kind of scary because you don’t know if someone is going to pull a gun out …”

But the Russian campaign in Afghanistan saw a very high number (and proportion) of lower extremity injuries in women, and completely dysfunctional non-combat effective units because of this.  It’s even worse now with the total weight that the U.S. warrior must carry across the line, up to and even over 120 pounds at times.  Even men in their prime – 20 to 22 years of age – cannot accomplish this in high elevations across undulating terrain for protracted durations without permanent affects on their bodies.

So even though the GP Army has done the politically correct thing, the Generals rely on the SOF to get the direct action kinetics done.  Not so in the Marines.  There is no such distinction, and in fact, Force Recon and Scout Sniper, attached to Marine infantry, might even see less kinetics than infantry because of the focus on intelligence gathering.  There could never have been such a distinction with the Marines having succeeded in the Anbar Province.  Or in other words, if there had been such a distinction, the Marines would have failed in Anbar.

Again, this is an Army thing, and they have their on issues to deal with.  But you will take note from our articles and others that the Marines in Helmand don’t have women in the infantry, any more than the Army in Korangal does (whoever deployed this unit to Korangal knew better than to send women there).  And neither relies on SOF to be around to conduct direct action kinetics.

In fact, where are the SOF in Korangal?  Missing, apparently, and it’s a big Army operation front to back, just like Helmand is Marine infantry.  If McChrystal wants to put the SOF forces to real use, it’s time to attach them to infantry and send them to Korangal and other such outposts.  Enough of the cloak and dagger stuff conducted out of helicopters from posh FOBs.  Time to get dirty.

One final note.  I have been told (by certain … what you would call Army GP officers) that the tactical connection and communication between SOF and infantry is completely broken.  It doesn’t work.  It’s not only dysfunctional, it is a barrier to good conduct of COIN campaigns.  The solution is to reattach SOF to infantry and erase the differences between PTs and expectations for knowledge of direction action kinetics, and focus on SOF being specialized billets within infantry (such as sniper quals, airborne quals, and so forth).  All of the things that good SOF should know – room clearing, raids, fast roping, squad rushes, terrain seizures, etc. – Marines already know, and Army infantry should know.

McChrystal has an opportunity to raise the bar on all U.S. troops deployed in Afghanistan, get the Army off of its huge FOBs, attach SOF to infantry, and go after the Taliban while being out among the population to protect them.  He says he wants to do this, but how will he do so with only 68,000 U.S. troops and the Taliban with the momentum?  He doesn’t tell us.  We know that we want to reclaim the ring road, but how?

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From the New York Times:

Having sent the Iranian people a video greeting on their New Year, President Obama is now inviting them to help celebrate a quintessentially American holiday, the Fourth of July.

Last Friday, the State Department sent a cable to its embassies and consulates around the world notifying them that “they may invite representatives from the government of Iran” to their Independence Day celebrations — annual receptions that typically feature hot dogs, red-white-and-blue bunting and some perfunctory remarks about the founding fathers.

Administration officials characterized the move as another in a series of American overtures to Iran. The United States has not had relations with Iran since the American Embassy in Tehran was seized by protesters in 1979; the country’s diplomats have not been formally invited to American events since then.

“It is another way of saying we are not putting barriers in the way of communicating,” said one administration official. “It is another way of signaling that there is an opportunity that should not be wasted.”

A second official said the ban no longer made sense, at a time when the United States was actively engaging with Iranian officials elsewhere. In March, the administration’s special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Richard C. Holbrooke, chatted with Iran’s deputy foreign minister, Mohammad Mehdi Akhondzadeh, at a conference in The Hague.

Of course, the U.S. has “chatted” with the Iranians for twenty fives years.  Now it has devolved into grovelling to them over hot dogs and picnics.  Truth is stranger than fiction.  If I was tasked with the duty to design and formulate a plan to make Obama look weak and effeminate before the world, I couldn’t have done any better than he is doing himself.

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From Time:

Military commanders are keen to wrap up the fights in Buner and Lower Dir within coming days in order to focus their fire on Swat, where an estimated 4,000 well-armed, well-trained militants are dug in on terrain favorable to insurgents. The army claims that the local Taliban there have been reinforced by militants from Waziristan, southern Punjabis who have fought in Kashmir and jihadists from Central Asia. “Ten percent of the militants have come from outside,” General Abbas told reporters in Islamabad on Saturday. “There should be no doubt that the money, arms and equipment [are] coming from the border,” he said, in a reference to Afghanistan as an alleged route for militants traveling to reinforce those fighting in Swat.

The military’s plan for retaking Swat — eliminating the Taliban’s command structure — has been given priority. “In an insurgency, the leadership is the center of gravity,” says General Abbas. Although the military claims to have killed a number of key local commanders during the current offensive, Fazlullah and his top lieutenants remain at large, several of them still using some 36 pirate-radio stations to issue propaganda messages. “The transmission can be heard for two to three minutes before it is jammed,” said General Abbas, “but then they begin using a different frequency.”

Aware that public support for the campaign is likely to ebb, the government and military recognize that they have a limited time frame in which to work …

We had previously remarked that in light of the Taliban slipping away into the night, for success to obtain with this offensive the Pakistan Army must stay and perform long duration counterinsurgency and stability operations.  In spite of having no communication of their strategy up until now, they apparently (accidentally?) divulge one significant plank in their plan: killing “key” commanders.

Regular readers know how TCJ feels about that.  The strategy is a loser.  Granted, Baitullah Mehsud, the man that The Captain’s Journal loves to hate, should be targeted and killed, and it would be a good day for coalition forces were that to happen.  TCJ would celebrate in the superlative, and It would be a holiday for us.  The steaks would hit the grill, the champagne corks would be popped.  This is less true of mid-level commanders who are a “dime a dozen.”

But the celebration would be short, and campaign wouldn’t be over if this happened, any more than the campaign in Iraq was over when Zarqawi was killed.  The high value target campaign in Afghanistan has failed, and has at least given way to the quasi-plausible strategy of reclaiming the ring road.  The Clausewitzian concept of center of gravity caused us to focus on a single thing, concept, target, or power center, perhaps coupled with a paucity of resources and troops.

But when a mid-level Taliban commander is killed, another pops up in his place, and so on through the campaign for the last half decade.  We aren’t told who has taught the Pakistan Army Clausewitz.  Perhaps they have learned it in their military classes where there also learn their neurotic preoccupation with India.  Perhaps they have learned the high value target concept from the U.S.  Wherever they have gotten it, they need to unlearn it in favor of counterinsurgency.  Killing high value targets is no replacement for boots on the ground, and that for a long time.

Rather than focus on center of gravity, the Pakistan Army should think lines of effort and lines of operation.