During the Battle of Wanat, nine U.S. Soldiers perished and twenty seven were wounded, while no Afghan National Army troops died and five were wounded.  This metric needs clarification, in that eight of the nine who perished that fateful night did so either defending or attempting to relieve Observation Post Top Side.  But further clarification of this metric shows us that the ANA troops apparently wouldn’t have been assigned to OP Top Side anyway specifically because of qualifications and reliability.  Additionally, the wounded were mainly applicable to COP Kahler, the main base at VPB Wanat.  The ratio of U.S. to ANA wounded is an instructive metric.

All over Afghanistan, First Lieutenants and Captains are assessing the reliability of the ANA troops with whom they patrol and fight.  This is a daily affair, and occurs through anecdotal evidence, via collaboration with fellow officers, and by various other means.  The model of understanding developed by these officers can be amended by other data points, and thus the model is a learning and evolving model as it should be.

The model The Captain’s Journal has developed thus far takes a fairly dim view of the capabilities and reliability of ANA troops thus far.  On the whole they have not performed well.  This doesn’t impugn all of the troops, but of course metrics don’t do that; they are normative and broadly applicable to general  questions.

This model has apparently been fairly consistent with the witness of the officers – both commissioned and NCOs – involved in the battle of Wanat.  First, 1 Lt. Brostrom weighs in on how he saw the ANA, stating that the ANA he was taking with him he considered not to count towards combat power.  Next, the NCOs and enlisted men weigh in (unpublished study).

… the ANA Company remained in their fighting positions, in the middle of the COP, and to the south at the southernmost TCP.  Numerous Chosen Company soldiers complained of their inactivity. One soldier with the 1st Squad TCP claimed that: “The ANA had fled from their position.”   Another Sergeant stated, “I also remember ANA not shooting that much and never leaving their foxholes.”  Sergeant _____ was not professionally impressed with the ANA performance:

They never got out of their holes. They only had four wounded, which tells me that the enemy directed their fire at the Americans, not the Afghans. The Afghans sprayed and prayed. That’s about it. To be honest, though, it was more than I expected. The other numerous occasions I’ve been on with Afghan soldiers as our backup, they ran.

Sergeant _______ summed up what most of the Chosen soldiers felt, “they were still pretty much totally useless.”

The ratio of U.S. to ANA wounded doesn’t prove the point concerning ANA reliability and viability, but it is yet another data point that confirms the suspicions and fails to change or challenge the model of the ANA as highly problematic as an independent fighting force, or even a reliable embedded fighting force.

Prior:

Investigating the Battle of Wanat

Analysis of the Battle of Wanat

Battle of Wanat Disputed?

Michael Yon weighs in on ROE in Afghanistan.

I’ve witnessed too many missions (several in the last week) wherein British or Americans refused to fire because they could not positively spot a weapon, despite it being flagrantly obvious that we were tracking actual enemies.  It’s very frustrating for me at times because I want to say to an American or British commander…Take the shot!  This is too obvious! But that is not the place of a writer.  The strategic wisdom behind the Rules of Engagement can be difficult to contest, though tactically, those same ROE can be fantastically frustrating.  Tactically, the restrictive ROE endanger our troops every day, but strategically there is no doubt that strong ROE save the lives of even more.

Ah, and that’s the question, isn’t it?  In the end, which contributes the most towards conclusion of the campaign and the safest prosecution of the effort?  I have exchanged e-mail with Michael about this, respectfully of course, since I so admire Michael and his work.

The tension is between tactical interests and strategic interests.  I will not divulge the situation or the sources, but I know of instances in which I would differ with the conclusion that the strategic interests were served with a less robust ROE.  I have detailed a more public instance of robust ROE before, and noted that lack of this approach might have led in the end to more Marine casualties.

But since the tactical directive has been issued by General McChrystal, it may be moot to debate the point.  Let’s move ahead to unintended consequences.  Lack of more robust ROE has even recently caused Taliban fighters to escape from buildings because it could not be demonstrated that there were no noncombatants.  Yet lack of logistical support with helicopters, along with doctrinal reticence concerning distributed operations in the Marine Corps, cause the inability (or refusal) to pursue escaping Taliban.

Yet later, we are told by local Afghans that the Marines should follow and kill every single Taliban.

“It is still just the beginning,” said Mullah Shin Gul from Nad Ali district. “The Americans need to begin reconstruction, by agreement with the people. They should establish centers here in the districts, and they should follow every single Taliban and kill him. In a short while it will be too late. The people will lose trust.”

ROE is a situation specific issue, and no one set of ROE is most efficiently applied in every situation.  Perhaps it’s advantageous to implement the specific tactical directive that McChrystal has given us in Afghanistan.  Perhaps.  Time will tell.  But what is clear at this juncture is that there aren’t enough troops or logistical assets to conduct the chase that ensues when the current ROE is implemented.  Afghanistan is too large, the mountains are too numerous, and the terrain is too forbidding to BOTH implement the current rules of engagement AND refuse the chase.

herbal viagra forums India Viagra Cialis Vicodin snorting viagra health
viagra patent levitra Herbal Viagra Australia viagra anxiety
taking viagra woman Viagra Online Shop In Uk cheap gerneric viagra,
generic viagra levitra and cialis pills Russian Viagra Women News can i take viagra
viagra how it works Cialis New Viagra herbal viagra forums
snorting viagra health Buy Generic Viagra viagra patent levitra
viagra anxiety Wholesale Viagra taking viagra woman
cheap gerneric viagra, Viagra Mexico generic viagra levitra and cialis pills
can i take viagra Impotence Viagra viagra how it works
herbal viagra forums Get Viagra snorting viagra health
viagra patent levitra Viagra Uk Cost Pill viagra anxiety
taking viagra woman Viagra Over The Counter cheap gerneric viagra,
generic viagra levitra and cialis pills On Viagra can i take viagra
viagra how it works Anti Viagra herbal viagra forums
snorting viagra health Price Of Viagra viagra patent levitra
viagra anxiety Viagra By Post taking viagra woman
cheap gerneric viagra, Natural Alternatives To Viagra generic viagra levitra and cialis pills
can i take viagra Cheapest Viagra Substitute Sildenafil viagra how it works
herbal viagra forums How To Use Viagra snorting viagra health
viagra patent levitra Does Medicaid Cover Viagra Kentucky viagra anxiety
taking viagra woman Viagra Pay With Paypal cheap gerneric viagra,
generic viagra levitra and cialis pills Viagra Price Comparison can i take viagra
viagra how it works Viagra Uk Cheap Purchase Buy herbal viagra forums
snorting viagra health Viagra Online Price Iframe viagra patent levitra
viagra anxiety Can Women Take Viagra taking viagra woman
cheap gerneric viagra, Viagra Price Strategy generic viagra levitra and cialis pills
can i take viagra Viagra Ingredients viagra how it works
herbal viagra forums Ladies Viagra snorting viagra health
viagra patent levitra Purchasing Viagra In The United Kingdom viagra anxiety
taking viagra woman Viagra Potenzmittel cheap gerneric viagra,
generic viagra levitra and cialis pills Viagra For Woman can i take viagra
viagra how it works Marajuana And Viagra herbal viagra forums
snorting viagra health Levitra Vs Viagra viagra patent levitra
viagra anxiety Viagra Warning taking viagra woman
cheap gerneric viagra, Viagra Online Store generic viagra levitra and cialis pills
can i take viagra Canadian Viagra viagra how it works
herbal viagra forums U 5672 Viagra snorting viagra health
viagra patent levitra Problems With Viagra viagra anxiety
taking viagra woman Women Viagra cheap gerneric viagra,
generic viagra levitra and cialis pills Generic Viagra Online can i take viagra
viagra how it works Viagra From Canada herbal viagra forums
snorting viagra health Buy Viagra In England viagra patent levitra
viagra anxiety How Does Viagra Work taking viagra woman
cheap gerneric viagra, Rush Limbaugh Viagra Dominican Republic generic viagra levitra and cialis pills
can i take viagra Viagra 50mg viagra how it works
herbal viagra forums Suppliers Of Viagra snorting viagra health
viagra patent levitra What Is A Alternative To Viagra viagra anxiety
taking viagra woman Viagra Dosage cheap gerneric viagra,
generic viagra levitra and cialis pills Viagra Light Switch Plate can i take viagra

A disturbing report from the Daily Mail.

Thousands of British troops cannot be sent to Afghanistan because they are too fat to fight, a leaked army memo revealed.

The war effort is being hampered by the number of front-line troops who are either obese or too unfit to be deployed to Helmand in the south of the country.

The news comes at a time when commanders are desperately fighting for more troops to be sent to the province to replace those who have been injured or killed.

According to the emergency memo, a ‘worrying trend of obesity’ is preventing soldiers from being deployed to the province.

It raises concerns that soldiers are failing to carry out the basic minimum of two hours physical exercise a week.

The document, obtained by the Observer, also warns that Britain’s ‘operational effectiveness’ is being undermined by low levels of fitness and raises concerns that lives could be lost because some soldiers are not fit enough to cope with the challenging conditions in Afghanistan.

‘The numbers of personnel unable to deploy and concerns about obesity throughout the army are clearly linked to current attitudes towards physical training,’ the memo from Major Brian Dupree of the army physical training corps in Wiltshire states.

He called for the army to ‘reinvigorate a warrior ethos and a culture of being fit’, concluding that it had ‘not consistently maintained our standards of physical fitness’.

To tackle the problem, the army is introducing a ‘body composition measurement’ in October to target overweight soldiers. It will also enforce a minimum of three physical training sessions a week.

The news comes as military commanders are demanding more British troops be sent to Afghanistan to protect ground recently gained from the Taliban in Operation Panther’s Claw.

An extra 125 troops have already been sent to replace those injured or killed in the offensive which has seen the highest number of British casualties since the conflict began.

There are currently 3,860 army personnel classified as PUD – personnel unable to deploy – with a further 8,190 classified as ‘of limited deployability’ for medical reasons.

The MoD said it could not provide a breakdown of these figures.

The current army fitness policy states that to be fit to fight requires a minimum of two to three hours of physical activity per week.

In the memo, which is dated July 10, Major Dupree said: ‘It is clear that even this most basic policy is not being implemented.

‘To cope with the demands of hybrid operations in Afghanistan and future conflicts the army needs personnel with that battle-winning edge that sustains them through adversity. It is clear this message has been diluted recently and this attitude must change.

‘The increasing PUD list and concerns over obesity in the services are clearly linked to this indifferent attitude.’

Patrick Mercer, head of strategy at the Army Training & Recruiting Agency, said: ‘This lack of personal fitness is a disgraceful state of affairs. The army is desperately undermanned anyway and for obesity to be a problem is extraordinary.’

The memo comes three years after the army relaxed its rules to allow recruits with a higher body mass index (BMI) to join after research found that two thirds of British teenagers were too fat to meet fitness requirements.

Applicants with a BMI of 32 – two points above the World Health Organisation’s definition of obesity – can now enlist.

Is this a joke?  I hesitate even to link and comment on this article because I wonder if it’s going to be proven a hoax.  Perhaps some British reader can weigh in and tell us if this report is legitimate.

Even if the condition is ameliorated, two hours of physical training per week is a preposterous level of training for Solders.  By the end of the day today, between weight training (today was bench press, inclined bench press, and curls, Tuesday it’s legs, Wednesday it’s back and posterior deltoids, etc.) and my aerobic activity, I will have put in more than two hours of physical training, and I am 50 years old.  Again, I put in more than two hours per day, not per week.  Surely this report is in error.  Surely.  Can one of our loyal British readers confirm or deny this report, or at least place this in context for us?

viagra how it works Which Is Better Lavitra Or Viagra herbal viagra forums
snorting viagra health Apcalis Levitra Viagra viagra patent levitra
viagra anxiety Viagra Uk taking viagra woman
cheap gerneric viagra, How To Get Viagra Prescription generic viagra levitra and cialis pills
can i take viagra Viagra Pics viagra how it works
herbal viagra forums Cialis Or Viagra snorting viagra health
viagra patent levitra Viagra Online No Rx viagra anxiety
taking viagra woman Recreational Use Of Viagra cheap gerneric viagra,
generic viagra levitra and cialis pills Viagra Bon Marche can i take viagra
viagra how it works Viagra Liver Damage herbal viagra forums
snorting viagra health Viagra Store In Canada viagra patent levitra
viagra anxiety Purchase Viagra taking viagra woman
cheap gerneric viagra, Viagra Oral Jelly generic viagra levitra and cialis pills
can i take viagra Buy Cheap Viagra Online Uk viagra how it works
herbal viagra forums Viagra Order Cheap Iframe snorting viagra health
viagra patent levitra Viagra Suppliers In The Uk viagra anxiety
taking viagra woman Cheapest Viagra Prices cheap gerneric viagra,
generic viagra levitra and cialis pills U 2732 Viagra can i take viagra
viagra how it works Viagra And Sperm Count herbal viagra forums
snorting viagra health Viagra Compounds viagra patent levitra
viagra anxiety Buy Viagra Online In Uk taking viagra woman
cheap gerneric viagra, Canada Viagra generic viagra levitra and cialis pills
can i take viagra Viagra In Britain viagra how it works
herbal viagra forums Alternative To Viagra snorting viagra health
viagra patent levitra Buy Viagra Online viagra anxiety
taking viagra woman Side Effects Of Viagra cheap gerneric viagra,
generic viagra levitra and cialis pills Buy Viagra On Line can i take viagra
viagra how it works Viagra Fedex herbal viagra forums
snorting viagra health Natural Herbal Alternatives To Viagra viagra patent levitra
viagra anxiety Female Use Of Viagra taking viagra woman
cheap gerneric viagra, Took 100mg Viagra generic viagra levitra and cialis pills
can i take viagra Viagra Without Prescription viagra how it works
herbal viagra forums Discount Viagra Online snorting viagra health
viagra patent levitra Suppliers Of Viagra In Uk viagra anxiety
taking viagra woman Discount Viagra Pills cheap gerneric viagra,
generic viagra levitra and cialis pills Buy Viagra Without Prescription can i take viagra
viagra how it works Drinking And Viagra herbal viagra forums
snorting viagra health Viagra Pharmacy viagra patent levitra
viagra anxiety Mail Order Viagra In Uk taking viagra woman
cheap gerneric viagra, Non Prescription Viagra generic viagra levitra and cialis pills
can i take viagra Viagra Canada viagra how it works
herbal viagra forums How T Get Viagra snorting viagra health
viagra patent levitra Viagra Next Day Delivery viagra anxiety
taking viagra woman Indian Viagra cheap gerneric viagra,
generic viagra levitra and cialis pills Buy Viagra Online 35008 can i take viagra
viagra how it works Viagra Buy Online herbal viagra forums
snorting viagra health Viagra Size viagra patent levitra
viagra anxiety Vicodin Viagra taking viagra woman
cheap gerneric viagra, Generic Viagra Pill generic viagra levitra and cialis pills

A recent review of the U.S. efforts in Iraq has yielded quite a negative assessment.  The following is taken from the text of a memorandum from Col. Timothy R. Reese, Chief, Baghdad Operations Command Advisory Team, MND-B, Baghdad, Iraq.

” … we aren’t making the GOI and the ISF better in any significant ways with our current approach. Remaining in Iraq through the end of December 2011 will yield little in the way of improving the abilities of the ISF or the functioning of the GOI. Furthermore, in light of the GOI’s current interpretation of the limitations imposed by the 30 June milestones of the 2008 Security Agreement, the security of US forces are at risk. Iraq is not a country with a history of treating even its welcomed guests well. This is not to say we can be defeated, only that the danger of a violent incident that will rupture the current partnership has greatly increased since 30 June. Such a rupture would force an unplanned early departure that would harm our long term interests in Iraq and potentially unraveling the great good that has been done since 2003. The use of the military instrument of national power in its current form has accomplished all that can be expected.” The general lack of progress in essential services and good governance is now so broad that it ought to be clear that we no longer are moving the Iraqis “forward.” Below is an outline of the information on which I base this assessment:

1. The ineffectiveness and corruption of GOI Ministries is the stuff of legend.

2. The anti-corruption drive is little more than a campaign tool for Maliki

3. The GOI is failing to take rational steps to improve its electrical infrastructure and to improve their oil exploration, production and exports.

4. There is no progress towards resolving the Kirkuk situation.

5. Sunni Reconciliation is at best at a standstill and probably going backwards.

6. Sons of Iraq (SOI) or Sahwa transition to ISF and GOI civil service is not happening, and SOI monthly paydays continue to fall further behind.

7. The Kurdish situation continues to fester.

8. Political violence and intimidation is rampant in the civilian community as well as military and legal institutions.

9. The Vice President received a rather cool reception this past weekend and was publicly told that the internal affairs of Iraq are none of the US’s business.

The Colonel goes on to outlines the problems with the Iraqi Security Forces.

a) Corruption among officers is widespread b) Neglect and mistreatment of enlisted men is the norm c) The unwillingness to accept a role for the NCO corps continues d) Cronyism and nepotism are rampant in the assignment and promotion system e) Laziness is endemic f) Extreme centralization of C2 is the norm g) Lack of initiative is legion h) Unwillingness to change, do anything new blocks progress i) Near total ineffectiveness of the Iraq Army and National Police institutional organizations and systems prevents the ISF from becoming self-sustaining j) For every positive story about a good ISF junior officer with initiative, or an ISF commander who conducts a rehearsal or an after action review or some individual MOS training event, there are ten examples of the most basic lack of military understanding despite the massive partnership efforts by our combat forces and advisory efforts by MiTT and NPTT teams.

And in what could be the most telling testimony of the increased danger to U.S. forces, as well as the expenditure of U.S. reputation to no avail, Colonel Reese goes on to outline the changes in atmosphere and attitude since the signing of the SOFA.

It is clear that the 30 Jun milestone does not represent one small step in a long series of gradual steps on the path the US withdrawal, but as Maliki has termed it, a “great victory” over the Americans and fundamental change in our relationship. The recent impact of this mentality on military operations is evident:

1. Iraqi Ground Forces Command (IGFC) unilateral restrictions on US forces that violate the most basic aspects of the SA

2. BOC unilateral restrictions that violate the most basic aspects of the SA

3. International Zone incidents in the last week where ISF forces have resorted to shows of force to get their way at Entry Control Points (ECP) including the forcible takeover of ECP 1 on 4 July

4. Sudden coolness to advisors and CDRs, lack of invitations to meetings,

5. Widespread partnership problems reported in other areas such as ISF confronting US forces at TCPs in the city of Baghdad and other major cities in Iraq.

6. ISF units are far less likely to want to conduct combined combat operations with US forces, to go after targets the US considers high value, etc.

7. The Iraqi legal system in the Rusafa side of Baghdad has demonstrated a recent willingness to release individuals originally detained by the US for attacks on the US.

As an initial comment, the first Middle Eastern Army that is able to develop and implement a strong NCO corps will dominate the region.  We have tried exceedingly hard to instill this concept into the ISF, only to fail it would appear.

Uncle Jimbo at Blackfive isn’t appreciative of Colonel Reese’s position.

Amidst all of his caterwauling, and again I’m not saying that hs (sic) complaints don’t have merit, but he fails to consider that one gargantuan reason for us to stay a bit is to avoid leaving a power vaccuum (sic) that would undoubtedly be filled by Iran. That means we have a huge incentive to put up with the endemic craptasticness of the nascent Iraqi institutions and work to form a long term strategic relationship. We need to be their number one ally or Iran will be and that would negate many of the security gains a free deomcratic (sic) Iraq represents. So suck it up sir, and drive on with your mission.

Well, I appreciate the sentiment, and my own son risked his life in Fallujah in 2007; but it just isn’t that simple.  We have previously discussed the actual increased danger to U.S. troops stemming from Iraqi interpretations of the SOFA.

U.S. officials told the Post there have been numerous disagreements between the two forces. The newspaper reported one clash in which a U.S. unit wanted and failed to get permission to send out a patrol to trap insurgents allegedly planning a mortar attack on a U.S. base from an adjacent Iraqi neighborhood named Amiriyah. “I understand you have your orders,” the Iraqi commander told the American commander, “but I have my orders, too. You are not allowed to go inside of Amiriyah.” Iraqi soldiers have blocked American convoys, U.S. officials said.

So there is a very real danger to U.S. troops with the increased ISF chest-thumping.  But beyond the near and present danger, there is the very real diminution of U.S. reputation that we predicted would occur.  As for Iran, the current SOFA restricts the ability we have to be a counterbalance to its power.  Just recently, ISF attacked the home base for the MEK, an anti-Iranian group within Iraq The Captain’s Journal had been watching for some time.  This attack was a nod to Iranian influence and power in Iraq.

Should we leave?  Not exactly.  We had previously recommended that we withdraw the logistical and air support for the ISF to see if they are capable of holding terrain.  There are current reports of violence in Haditha.  Contra the views of Pollyanna Iraq analysts like Nibras Kazimi (who believes that the Shi’ites have defeated the Sunnis in Iraq), I have long believed that despite the fact that the Sunnis comprise only 15% of the population, rejection of the Sons of Iraq program would lead to further violence and potential undermining of the Maliki government.  Then again, I have always thought of Maliki as a stooge who is too driven by sectarian interests even to see threats to his own administration.

We had suggested that U.S. focus be the Iranian border and training operations.  Along with a standdown of troops over the next 24 months in order to supply troops to the campaign in Afghanistan, this should be sufficient to keep U.S. troops busy.  Keeping busy and doing the minimum we can to prevent cross border operations may be all that we are capable of doing.  Bush’s failure to see and address this as a regional war is only exacerbated with the new administration and the SOFA.

Let’s not fool ourselves into thinking that we are able to do the things we have in the past in Iraq.  We are under new rules, and these rules have a draconian affect on even our ability to ensure force protection.  Actions have consequences, and the SOFA should never have been signed.  Left impotent inside the cities, in order to ensure force protection, we must withdraw to the countryside and focus on different things.  I believe that Colonel Reese understands this.

Prior:

Redux on U.S. Troop Restrictions in Iraq

House Arrest for U.S. Forces in Iraq

Iraqi Commanders Move to Restrict U.S. Troops Under SOFA

The Violence Belongs to Iraq Now

can i take viagra Viagra Discount 800 Number Customer Service viagra how it works
herbal viagra forums Viagra Women snorting viagra health
viagra patent levitra Buy Australian Viagra viagra anxiety
taking viagra woman Mexico Viagra cheap gerneric viagra,
generic viagra levitra and cialis pills Buy Viagra Uk can i take viagra
viagra how it works Viagra And Alternatives herbal viagra forums
snorting viagra health Mixing Vicodin Viagra viagra patent levitra
viagra anxiety Fake Viagra Prescription taking viagra woman
cheap gerneric viagra, Viagra 100mg generic viagra levitra and cialis pills
can i take viagra Viagra For Sale Without A Prescription viagra how it works
herbal viagra forums Pictures Of Viagra Pills snorting viagra health
viagra patent levitra Buy Viagra Onli viagra anxiety
taking viagra woman Q Buy Viagra cheap gerneric viagra,
generic viagra levitra and cialis pills Low Cost Viagra Online can i take viagra
viagra how it works Super Viagra Pro herbal viagra forums
snorting viagra health Viagra Commercial viagra patent levitra
viagra anxiety Viagra Cheap taking viagra woman
cheap gerneric viagra, Viagra For Pulmonary Hypertension generic viagra levitra and cialis pills
can i take viagra Viagra Headache viagra how it works
herbal viagra forums Viagra And Discovery snorting viagra health
viagra patent levitra Edinburgh Uk News Viagra Site Search viagra anxiety
taking viagra woman Soft Tabs Viagra cheap gerneric viagra,
generic viagra levitra and cialis pills Chinese Viagra can i take viagra
viagra how it works Viagra And Cannabis herbal viagra forums
snorting viagra health Viagra Soft Tabs viagra patent levitra
viagra anxiety Womans Viagra taking viagra woman
cheap gerneric viagra, Viagra Difference In Mg generic viagra levitra and cialis pills
can i take viagra How To Make Home Made Viagra viagra how it works
herbal viagra forums Viagra Timing snorting viagra health
viagra patent levitra Viagra Ads viagra anxiety
taking viagra woman Viagra Nz cheap gerneric viagra,
generic viagra levitra and cialis pills Too Much Viagra can i take viagra
viagra how it works Viagra Versus Cialis herbal viagra forums
snorting viagra health Discount Generic Viagra viagra patent levitra
viagra anxiety Find Viagra Edinburgh Pages Search taking viagra woman
cheap gerneric viagra, Viagra Cialis Levitra generic viagra levitra and cialis pills
can i take viagra How Do Viagra Segment The Market viagra how it works
herbal viagra forums Who Is Viagra Target Market snorting viagra health
viagra patent levitra Fake Viagra viagra anxiety
taking viagra woman Mature Viagra cheap gerneric viagra,
generic viagra levitra and cialis pills Viagra Reviews can i take viagra
viagra how it works Generic Viagra herbal viagra forums
snorting viagra health Female Version Of Viagra viagra patent levitra
viagra anxiety Viagra Discount taking viagra woman
cheap gerneric viagra, Viagra In The Uk generic viagra levitra and cialis pills
can i take viagra Cuddle Chemical Viagra Boosts Performance viagra how it works
herbal viagra forums Over The Counter Viagra snorting viagra health
viagra patent levitra Viagra Purchase viagra anxiety
taking viagra woman Viagra Bromocriptine Combination cheap gerneric viagra,

We have previously dealt with the apparent desire for an Afghanistan SOFA (Status of Forces Agreement) on par with the Iraq SOFA.  Bad idea, said we.  It has made U.S. forces in Iraq virtually impotent to conduct missions, even when their own force protection is involved.

U.S. officials told the Post there have been numerous disagreements between the two forces. The newspaper reported one clash in which a U.S. unit wanted and failed to get permission to send out a patrol to trap insurgents allegedly planning a mortar attack on a U.S. base from an adjacent Iraqi neighborhood named Amiriyah. “I understand you have your orders,” the Iraqi commander told the American commander, “but I have my orders, too. You are not allowed to go inside of Amiriyah.” Iraqi soldiers have blocked American convoys, U.S. officials said.

The campaign in Iraq is at a more advanced stage than in Afghanistan, and a SOFA for Afghanistan would have literally disastrous consequences for the campaign.  A recent Congressional Research Service Report details considerations and history for both the SOFA in Iraq and “agreements” thus far in Afghanistan.  For Afghanistan, the SOFA Study notes (lengthy quote):

An agreement exists regarding the status of military and civilian personnel of the U.S. Department of Defense present in Afghanistan in connection with cooperative efforts in response to terrorism, humanitarian and civic assistance, military training and exercises, and other activities. Such personnel are to be accorded “a status equivalent to that accorded to the administrative and technical staff” of the U.S. Embassy under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961.  Accordingly, U.S. personnel are immune from criminal prosecution by Afghan authorities, and are immune from civil and administrative jurisdiction except with respect to acts performed outside the course of their duties. In the agreement, the Islamic Transitional Government of Afghanistan (ITGA) explicitly authorized the U.S. government to exercise criminal jurisdiction over U.S. personnel, and the Government of Afghanistan is not permitted to surrender U.S. personnel to the custody of another State, international tribunal, or any other entity without consent of the U.S. government. Although the agreement was signed by the ITGA, the subsequently elected Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan assumed responsibility for ITGA’s legal obligations and the agreement remains in force. The agreement does not appear to provide immunity for contract personnel.

The agreement with Afghanistan does not expressly authorize the United States to carry out military operations within Afghanistan, but it recognizes that such operations are “ongoing.”  Congress authorized the use of military force there (and elsewhere) by joint resolution in 2001, for targeting “those nations, organizations, or persons [who] planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001…. ” The U.N. Security Council implicitly recognized that the use of force was appropriate in response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, and subsequently authorized the deployment of an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to Afghanistan. Subsequent U.N. Security Council resolutions provide a continuing mandate for ISAF , calling upon it to “work in close consultation with” Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF—the U.S.-led coalition conducting military operations in Afghanistan) in carrying out the mandate. While there is no explicit U.N. mandate authorizing the OEF,
Security Council resolutions appear to provide ample recognition of the legitimacy of its operations, most recently by calling upon the Afghan Government, “with the assistance of the international community, including the International Security Assistance Force and Operation Enduring Freedom coalition, in accordance with their respective designated responsibilities as they evolve, to continue to address the threat to the security and stability of Afghanistan posed by the Taliban, Al-Qaida, other extremist groups and criminal activities…. ”

In 2004, the United States and Afghanistan entered an acquisition and cross-servicing agreement, with annexes. An acquisition and cross-servicing agreement (ACSA) is an agreement providing logistic support, supplies, and services to foreign militaries on a cash-reimbursement, replacement-in-kind, or exchange of equal value basis. After consultation with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense is authorized to enter into an ACSA with a government of a NATO country, a subsidiary body of NATO, or the United Nations Organization or any regional international organization of which the United States is a member. Additionally, the Secretary of Defense may enter into an ACSA with a country not included in the above categories, if, after consultation with the Secretary of State, a determination is made that it is in the best interests of the national security of the United States. If the country is not a member of NATO, the Secretary of Defense must submit notice, at least 30 days prior to designation, to the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.

On May 23, 2005, President Hamid Karzai and President Bush issued a “joint declaration” outlining a prospective future agreement between the two countries. It envisions a role for U.S. military troops in Afghanistan to “help organize, train, equip, and sustain Afghan security forces” until Afghanistan has developed its own capacity, and to “consult with respect to taking appropriate measures in the event that Afghanistan perceives that its territorial integrity, independence, or security is threatened or at risk.” The declaration does not mention the status of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, but if an agreement is concluded pursuant to the declaration, it can be expected a status of forces agreement would be included. In August 2008, shortly after U.S. airstrikes apparently resulted in civilian casualties, President Karzai called for a review of the presence of all foreign forces in Afghanistan and the conclusion of formal SOFAs with the respective countries. However, to date, it appears that formal negotiations have yet to begin between the United States and Afghanistan.

The lack of restrictive framework for our engagement in Afghanistan suits The Captain’s Journal just fine.  But Hamid Karzai keeps pressing for such an agreement with the U.S.

The language is veiled and cloaked, but it’s there.  Karzai wants a SOFA.  It is imperative that the U.S. reject such a notion outright, no matter what stage of the campaign the current administration wishes we were in or what stage they believe exists.  Again, an agreement would effectively mean the end of the campaign as we know it.

generic viagra levitra and cialis pills Viagra Sales can i take viagra
viagra how it works Wal-mart Viagra Price herbal viagra forums
snorting viagra health Viagra Next Day viagra patent levitra
viagra anxiety Viagra Cialis taking viagra woman
cheap gerneric viagra, Detumescence Priapism Viagra generic viagra levitra and cialis pills
can i take viagra Super Viagra viagra how it works
herbal viagra forums Cheap Viagra Online snorting viagra health
viagra patent levitra Viagra For Peyronies Disease viagra anxiety
taking viagra woman Buy Viagra Per Pill cheap gerneric viagra,
generic viagra levitra and cialis pills Buying Viagra Online can i take viagra
viagra how it works Viagra Danger herbal viagra forums
snorting viagra health Guaranteed Cheapest Viagra viagra patent levitra
viagra anxiety Will Viagra Make You Larger taking viagra woman
cheap gerneric viagra, Cheap Viagra Sales generic viagra levitra and cialis pills
can i take viagra Viagra Shelf Life viagra how it works
herbal viagra forums Viagra With Out Prescription snorting viagra health
viagra patent levitra Viagra Effects viagra anxiety
taking viagra woman Order Viagra cheap gerneric viagra,
generic viagra levitra and cialis pills Buy Viagra Cheap can i take viagra
viagra how it works Do Boots Sell Viagra herbal viagra forums
snorting viagra health Viva Viagra Song viagra patent levitra
viagra anxiety Canadian Generic Viagra taking viagra woman
cheap gerneric viagra, Which Is Better Cialis Or Viagra generic viagra levitra and cialis pills
can i take viagra Viagra Fuerteventura Market viagra how it works
herbal viagra forums Viagra Online At snorting viagra health
viagra patent levitra Viagra Videos viagra anxiety
taking viagra woman Viagra Sore Wife cheap gerneric viagra,
generic viagra levitra and cialis pills Dosage Viagra can i take viagra
viagra how it works Instructions For Viagra Use herbal viagra forums
snorting viagra health Viagra Song viagra patent levitra
viagra anxiety Buy Viagra In Canada taking viagra woman
cheap gerneric viagra, Viagra Joke Sheet Off Leg generic viagra levitra and cialis pills
can i take viagra Viagra Incidents viagra how it works
herbal viagra forums Viagra Alternative snorting viagra health
viagra patent levitra Viagra Wikipedia viagra anxiety
taking viagra woman Viagra Max Complaints cheap gerneric viagra,
generic viagra levitra and cialis pills Herbs And Viagra Interaction can i take viagra
viagra how it works Generic Mexican Viagra herbal viagra forums
snorting viagra health Viagra And Women viagra patent levitra
viagra anxiety Natural Viagra Substitutes taking viagra woman
cheap gerneric viagra, 18 Takes Viagra generic viagra levitra and cialis pills
can i take viagra Purchase Viagra Online viagra how it works
herbal viagra forums Low Cost Alternatives And Viagra snorting viagra health
viagra patent levitra Generic Viagra Lowest Prices viagra anxiety

Afghanistan expert Joshua Foust reviews Seth Jones’ In The Graveyard of Empires at Firedoglake.  There is also an interesting discussion thread in which both Josh and Seth participate.  Josh doesn’t take a very high view on the innovation in Seth’s book, although he notes the good history that it provides.  You might want to drop by and take a look at the review and discussion thread.

I have not read the book, but I follow Seth Jones and Josh Foust, as well as Afghanistan.  A few brief comments of my own follow.

I tire of the “Afghanistan is the graveyard of empires” meme.  Alexander the Great still has blood line in the Hindu Kush, or at least his warriors do.  As one particularly smart commenter said at Michael Yon’s web site to this meme:

Afghanistan certainly was not a ‘graveyard’ for the Macedonian, Parthian, Kushan, Hun, Ghaznavid Turkish, Mongol or Timurlic Empires! All conquered Afghanistan quite successfully; and it happens that the Widow’s second Afghan war (1878-80) reduced the place to a British vassal state, which it remained until after WWI.

I also grow tired of the mission creep meme.  We went in to take out al Qaeda and its safe haven, we did that, and we didn’t leave (or so the meme goes).  We stayed on to accomplish nation building.  Seth Jones in particular advocates the counterterrorism approach rather than the counterinsurgency approach to Afghanistan.  I have variously responded that:

A few more policing assets in Afghanistan and Pakistan would mean simply a few more policing assets to die at the hands of Taliban and al Qaeda … The answer is not black or special operations, police, surreptitious behind-the-scenes deals, prison cells, interrogations, incorporation of the enemy into politics, or negotiations. The immediate answer to the problem of an enemy who would kill you is to kill the enemy with fire and maneuver.

Just to make sure that you don’t mistake this for the kill ’em all approach to COIN, rest assured that I understand the need for holding terrain, both physical and human.  Corruption must be dealt with, government must be set on its feet, the ANA and ANP must be trained and rid of its dross, and the horrible drug problems must be addressed.

I advocate killing bad guys, and lots of them.  As many of them as possible.  But only as a precurssor to follow-on operations to build the country.  You see, the mission didn’t creep, no matter what America has been led to believe.

We went into Afghanistan to deal with globalists – those who have religiously-based beliefs concerning a transnational insurgency – and also those who would harbor them.  This last part is the more difficult, and it’s what necessitates the nation building.

To be sure, there are some that believe in short forcible entries to conduct small operations to deal with immediate threats.  When the threat appears again, do it again.  Even some field grade, staff and flag officers believe this.  Perhaps most field grade, staff and flag officers believe this way.  It is a viable position, but the question remains as to whether this is beneficial and efficient in the long run.  I maintain that it isn’t.

Which leads to the third meme I see developing at the discussion thread at Firedoglake.  It pertains to the need for more NGOs, and that … right now.  But the problem is that NGOs can only operate in a climate of relative security.  Hence, the need to kill bad guys, and lots of them.  While not denying that NGOs must be a significant player in the campaign, there are distinct phases to COIN campaigns, with heavier kinetics usually occupying the initial stages (I owe my understanding of this not only to my son, but also to Colonel Gian Gentile).

There are no easy answers to Afghanistan, and discussion threads like this one are beneficial only to the extent that the smoke is cleared, we admit what we’re up against, and we commit the necessary resources to do the job.  Hopefully, to long time readers we have been clear in our advocacy, including but not limited to: more troops, security first, holding terrain, clearing the ANA and ANP of corruption rather than increasing the size of the forces, going after the drug cartels and criminals rather than the farmers, eventual heavier inclusion of NGOs to assist with agriculture and other things, and outright rejection of a SOFA with Afghanistan.