How Helene Affected The People Of Appalachia

Herschel Smith · 30 Sep 2024 · 11 Comments

To begin with, this is your president. This ought to be one of the most shameful things ever said by a sitting president. "Do you have any words to the victims of the hurricane?" BIDEN: "We've given everything that we have." "Are there any more resources the federal government could be giving them?" BIDEN: "No." pic.twitter.com/jDMNGhpjOz — RNC Research (@RNCResearch) September 30, 2024 We must have spent too much money on Ukraine to help Americans in distress. I don't…… [read more]

Publishing the Marine Photo: Remember the Words of Christ

BY Herschel Smith
15 years, 3 months ago

As you know, there is a current professional scuffle going on over the issue of the AP decision to publish a photo of a Marine after he had been mortally wounded by an RPG, but prior to his death. I refuse to re-publish the photo, but if you care to view it you can find it at the links I provide. I must provide links in order to critique the incident.

First off, Jules Crittenden critiques the incident with a complex professional analysis of the practice of taking photos and then making decisions later as to whether publication is warranted and / or even appropriate.  By Jules reaches the conclusion that:

In this case, if the Pentagon wants to maintain its rule of not allowing identifiable casualty photos, given not only the overt rules violation but the AP’s decision to ignore the Bernard family’s repeated objections, the Pentagon probably ought to bounce both the photog and the AP, if only from the operation in question. Either that or ditch the rule. The AP has no moral leg to stand on. In this business, you make a deal, you stick with it, until some extraordinary circumstances arise that call the deal into question.

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates attempted to protect the feelings of the family, by literally begging the AP not to publish the photo.

I cannot imagine the pain and suffering Lance Corporal Bernard’s death has caused his family. Why your organization would purposefully defy the family’s wishes knowing full well that it will lead to yet more anguish is beyond me. Your lack of compassion and common sense in choosing to put this image of their maimed and stricken child on the front page of multiple American newspapers is appalling. The issue here is not law, policy or constitutional right – but judgment and common decency.

Tom Ricks asks what the hell the AP was thinking?

Bob Goldich, a friend of mine whose son served as a Marine in Iraq, observes that, “the photo was not of LCpl Bernard after he had died-it was while he was dying.  I think this is crucial.  The dead feel no pain.  But the dying do, and publishing the photo transmitted LCpl Bernard’s pain to his family.”

The AP stated that despite the objections, it went ahead and ran the photo because it “conveys the grimness of war and the sacrifice of young men and women fighting it.” I confess that I haven’t looked at the photo, and don’t want to. But if that was the AP’s purpose, what was so urgent that it couldn’t wait a few weeks or months, until the family had had a chance to mourn? I mean, these wars aren’t going away.

Today I am embarrassed for American journalism. As a former military reporter, I also am angry with the AP. They’ve committed the sin, but all of us in the media will pay for it. This one will haunt us for years. The Marines especially don’t forget. What a long way to come from Iwo Jima–that iconic photo of the flag-raising on Mt. Suribachi was taken by another AP photographer, Joe Rosenthal.

I’ll end with a plea to the AP: It is never too late to do the right thing and apologize.

The AP will never apologize if their moralistic defense is any indication of their plans.

In the current case, Mr. Lyon of the A.P. said there was a “healthy discussion” within the organization about distributing Ms. Jacobson’s photo. “The decision we came to was that — as a journalistic imperative — the need to tell this story overrode some of the other considerations,” he said. “Of course, we appreciate the anguish of the family of this marine. Of course, we appreciate the sacrifice that he made for his country. At the same time, there’s a compelling reason to show the real effects of this war. Sanitizing does everyone a disservice, in my view. Limiting casualty counts to numbers and names and nothing else; that’s a very incomplete picture of what’s going on.”

Journalistic imperative.  That means that if we really, really, really, really, really want to violate our contracts, we can.  One or two or even three really’s just won’t do it.  It requires more unction than that.

Gates begged on behalf of the family, and Tom Ricks asks why the AP couldn’t have waited a few more months.  Jules advises sticking to deals with the exception of extraordinary circumstances.  Gates, Crittenden and Ricks are all justifiably outraged at publication of the photo, but none go far enough.

The agreement embedded reporters sign is that casualties not be specifically identifiable personally or with regards to a unit.  The agreement stipulates that coverage may be conducted:

… as long as the service member’s identity and unit identification is protected from disclosure until OASD-PA [Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Public Affairs] has officially released the name. Photography from a respectful distance or from angles at which a casualty cannot be identified is permissible.”

The last clause stands on its own.  Embedded reporters may not publish photos prior to notification of the family, and also may not publish them even after notification if the terms of the agreement are violated, i.e., if the casualty or the unit can be identified.  I’m not a lawyer, but (unfortunately) I spend some time in the code of federal regulations for certain obnoxious reasons, and this is simple and straight-forward.  This is not even moderatly difficult with respect to the legalities.

The rules are in place specifically to prevent the situation in which the family found themselves.  The DoD, thankfully, doesn’t leave it to journalists to judge the appropriateness of a photo.  This judgment is already made, and the rules follow the same pattern of priority as Gates’ plea.

Don’t get me wrong.  I support embedded reporters, and I support the idea that we should see scenes of war.  This is the national burden during times of war, but the burden is so far less than that borne by the families that the rules have been crafted to protect them rather than the journalists.

The AP took a responsibility upon itself that it doesn’t and cannot ever own under the terms of the agreement.  There is no extraordinary circumstance.  Period.  Waiting a few more months is not long enough.  Period.  There is outrage over the publication of the photo, and there should be.  The young Lance Corporal is obviously in shock, and his battle space pain is now his family’s pain thanks to a moralistic but immoral journalistic decision.  I would be remiss if I didn’t note that I had a copy of the Cubbison study on the battle of Wanat months ago (still hasn’t been released), and until his study had been “outed” I didn’t comment on the findings of this study.  Also, if I had taken this photo, I wouldn’t have published it.  I have even struggled in re-publishing certain already-published MSM photos on this blog.  In this instance, a blogger has more professional ethics than professional journalists.

The AP signed a contract in order to obtain the protection of the U.S. Marines.  They violated the terms of that contract, and thus they are liars – at least, the people who made the decision to release this photo.  It’s too late not to be liars, and it’s also too late not to have caused the emotional distress to the family that they did.  The damage has been done, and for it, not a single person knows a single iota of information about the campaign that they didn’t before the photo was published.  They blew their moral capital on a whim.  They threw away their soul.

In a country that has become accustomed to chuckling over what the meaning of ‘is’ is, it’s best to remember the words of Christ not only in life experiences, but preening, self-important, moralistic journalist round-tables as well: “Let your yes be yes, and your no be no,” Matthew 5:37.

UPDATE:

From Andrew Lubin,

Have you no shame?

By your cavalier actions in publishing the photos of LCPL Joshua Bernard as he lay dying, you have not only jeopardized the work of legitimate combat journalists, but you have lowered the reputation of journalistic integrity to that of those paparazzi begging for a picture of Brittany or Lindsays’ beaver.

While in theory you are protecting the public’s “right to know”, in practicality you took a young man “in extremis” and used these unauthorized photos for your own commercial interests. Worse, after calling his father for permission to use these photos – which you admit he denied you – you used them regardless of his wishes.

This is not responsible journalism; this a reality journalism not even worthy of the supermarket tabloids.

Read the whole article.

The Dismounted Campaign in Helmand

BY Herschel Smith
15 years, 3 months ago

As we have noted before while studying heavy battle space weight, requirements for cold water and completely exhausted Marines, the battle in Helmand is dismounted.  The Marines are drinking on average more than four gallons of water per day.  It is now being termed a walking war for the Marines.

ADARVESHAN, Afghanistan — The threat of buried homemade bombs, coupled with an often unforgiving terrain and a counterinsurgency agenda that requires regular presence among Afghans, is forcing U.S. Marines to take on Taliban fighters on foot.

And these footprints in the sand and dust of Helmand Province are, according to some defense analysts, leading down a path of higher American casualties that could potentially affect the American public’s support for the war here.

Almost 90 percent of the Marine operations under way in Southern Afghanistan’s Helmand are on foot, according to Col. Christian Cabaniss, commander of 2nd Battalion, 8th Marines.

“We walk. This is not Iraq. We don’t drive around,” Cabaniss said.

Often, there’s no other option, Marines here say. Mine resistant ambush protected vehicles, for example, are too big and heavy to allow nimble navigation of the labyrinth of irrigation canals and ditches in southern Helmand Province. Add to that the fact that the bulk of the population in southern Afghanistan is located in rural areas.

“To be amongst the people, you’ve got to walk out there,” Cabaniss said …

“Instead of just trying to kill us, they also want to make us spend forever to go 100 meters,” Hunt said. “If you go on the roads, you know you’re going to hit IEDs. Then you’re just stuck in vehicle recovery all day, every day.”

Troop reaction to the foot patrol strategy on a battlefield that requires them to carry up to 100 pounds of gear where temperatures regularly soar over 110 degrees is mixed.

“I’m biased,” said Sgt. Matthew Roell. “I was a pall-bearer for a while and I saw a lot of people in pieces. Whenever we go foot mobile, I’m thinking about that,” he said. “Either you’re in a truck and get hit or you’re out in the open and get hit. Either way, if it’s your time, it’s your time, you know.”

While the stakes may seem higher by being outside of protected vehicles, many infantry Marines support the combat patrol strategy.

“I prefer to be foot mobile if we get attacked because that’s where I make my bread. That’s what we’re trained to do in the Marine Corps,” said Cpl. Joshua Johnston.

As we have noted before, infantry belongs on foot.  It’s the best way to ensure contact with both the population and the enemy, or in certain circumstances, both at the same time.  But not only is it tactically what the Marines are all about, the bifurcation between vehicle-borne troops and foot-borne troops seems to be solidifying.

Two years ago when I was in Iraq, I noticed there were essentially two different primary infantry weapons (the M16 automatic rifle and the also-automatic M4 carbine) carried by America’s two primary ground forces — the U.S. Marine Corps and the U.S. Army.

Marines for the most part were carrying the M16. The Army on the other hand was primarily carrying the M4: a shorter, lighter version of the M16 with a collapsible-stock.

Not that there weren’t leathernecks carrying M4s; there were. And soldiers also were wielding 16s.

But slightly different approaches to infantry tactics had led one force to favor one version of the weapon over the other. And experts today at Headquarters Marine Corps and the Army’s Picatinny Arsenal suggest that trend is increasingly reflecting the differing operational philosophies between the two services …

One Marine officer told me, “I understand the Army has in fact considered an M-4 pure fleet, getting rid of all their M16s, and they’ve already done that within their brigade combat teams.”

Indeed, during my time in 2007 embedded with the 2nd Brigade Combat Team of the Army’s famed 1st Cavalry Division operating out of Baghdad, nearly all of the soldiers were armed with M4s — whereas during my time spent with Marine rifle squads of the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit at Al Taqaddum and Regimental Combat Team 2 near the Syrian border, I observed a far greater number of Marines carrying M16s.

The reasons were simple: Army patrols were frequently mounted (in Humvees and other vehicles) at least for a portion of any given patrol. And it is simply easier to get in-and-out of vehicles with a shorter M4.

Marine patrols however were almost always on foot (and for hours at a time).

“We see ourselves as foot-mobile infantry,” says Clark, who adds, “From the Marine Corps perspective, we issue the carbine to folks — vehicle drivers, crews, and infantry officers [tasked more with leading men than physically engaging enemy targets] — who might be impeded by a longer, heavier weapon.”

Like their Belleau Wood ancestors, Marines still pride themselves on being able to kill the enemy at great distances. And rifles are frankly better suited for distance-shooting than carbines. Though Clark adds the capabilities between the two “are very close,” and the M4 is very effective.

U.S. Army Col. Doug Tamilio, project manager soldier weapons at Picatinny Arsenal, New Jersey, tells HUMAN EVENTS, “The M4 is [now] the primary infantry weapon in the U.S. Army.”

Both approaches are needed, and the discussion above is a good example of the need for different branches of the armed forces.

Colonel Gian Gentile on Killing the Enemy

BY Herschel Smith
15 years, 3 months ago

Friend of The Captain’s Journal Colonel Gian Gentile has an article out at the Small Wars Journal, in which he quotes a Washington Post article, which itself points out that:

The Taliban has become a much more potent adversary in Afghanistan by improving its own tactics and finding gaps in the US military playbook, according to senior American military officials who acknowledged that the enemy’s resurgence this year has taken them by surprise.

US rules of engagement restricting the use of air power and aggressive action against civilians have also opened new space for the insurgents, officials said.

Yes, just like we said it would (and more here).  Continuing with Colonel Gentile’s points:

A very recent article in the Washington Post says that the enemy in Afghanistan has improved its tactical fighting abilities when confronting American forces there. The article stated that the enemy has figured out “gaps” in the current American tactical and operational approach of population centric counterinsurgency. And the article added the tactical improvement on the part of the enemy in Afghanistan, according to “American military officials,” has taken us by “surprise.” This means in effect that the enemy has the initiative.

Afghanistan is war, right? In war there has to be fighting or the threat of fighting for it to be war, right? If there is no fighting or threat of fighting then it cannot be war, right?

The answer to this tactical problem in Afghanistan provided by the Counterinsurgency Experts is better population centric Coin tactics and operations; just try harder at building schools, roads, local security forces, establishing government legitimacy, and population security through dispersion of forces to protect them. Once we get better at these processes and try just a bit harder, with a just a few more troops, then voila (just like we think happened in Iraq) victory is achieved, triumph is at hand. But where in this formulation of scientific processes are the enemy and the killing of them?

Perhaps the way ahead in Afghanistan, at least the immediate way ahead to stabilize the situation is to not focus on hearts and minds but in killing the enemy. This is not so radical of an idea, mind you. Earlier this year two infantry lieutenants and one of their sergeants, fresh from hard combat experience in Afghanistan, made the argument that the American Army was losing its ability in Afghanistan to conduct basic infantry combined arms warfare. Their solution was not better population centric counterinsurgency tactics and processes but improving infantry platoons and companies ability to close with and kill the enemy through fire and maneuver. What they were calling for was a reinvention of the American Army’s approach in Afghanistan in order to regain the initiative. And in war, whether it is counterinsurgency war, conventional war, hybrid war, whatever, the INITIATIVE is everything. In Afghanistan we have lost the initiative because population centric counterinsurgency is basically a symmetrical, reactive tactical and operational measure.

History shows that focusing on killing the enemy works in a counterinsurgency campaign. The British in Malaya for example (what follows is radically contrary to conventional knowledge about Malaya that has been built by a bevy of counterinsurgency experts and zealots since the end of American involvement in the Vietnam War but is supported by current historical scholarship) broke the back of the insurgency there by brute military force from 1951 to 1952, and not as is so commonly believed through the hearts and minds campaign conducted by General Templer from 1952 to 1954.

Colonel Gentile is deadly accurate in his assessment and his entire paper is worthy reading.  For further reading on Taliban and U.S. Marine tactics see:

Marines, Taliban and Tactics, Techniques and Procedures

Squad Rushes in Afghanistan

A Return to Offshore Balancing

BY Herschel Smith
15 years, 3 months ago

The recent chorus of calls for withdrawal from Afghanistan (which I will treat in more detail later) involve a number of different avenues, some liberal, some conservative, some pragmatic, and some nonplussed.  Courtesy of Bryan McGrath at Information Dissemination, we have a mythical reason, called A Return to Offshore Balancing (albeit somewhat dated).

As the new President takes office, the United States is in deep trouble in the Middle East. Despite Obama’s promises to withdraw from Iraq, the debacle there shows no sign of ending soon, and it has made America’s terrorism problem worse, not better. Meanwhile, Hamas rules in Gaza, Iran’s stature is on the rise and Tehran is quickly moving to acquire a nuclear deterrent—which, despite a lot of tough talk, the United States and its allies have been unable to prevent. And America’s image throughout the Middle East is at an all-time low.

All this is a direct result of the Bush administration’s misguided policy of regional transformation. George W. Bush hoped he could implant democracy in the Middle East by using the U.S. military to topple the unfriendly regime in Baghdad—and maybe those in Damascus and Tehran, too—and replace them with friendly, democratic governments.

Things didn’t work out well, of course, and it’s now vital that the new president devise a radically different strategy for dealing with this critical part of the world. Fortunately, one approach has proved effective in the past and could serve America again today: “offshore balancing.” During the cold war, this strategy enabled Washington to contain Iran and Iraq and deter direct Soviet intervention in the oil-rich Persian Gulf. As a Middle East policy, offshore balancing may be less ambitious than Bush’s grand design was—no one promises it will lead to an “Arab spring”—but it will be much more effective at protecting actual U.S. interests.

So what would it look like? As an offshore balancer, the United States would keep its military forces—especially its ground and air forces—outside the Middle East, not smack in the center of it. Hence the term “offshore.” As for “balancing,” that would mean relying on regional powers like Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia to check each other. Washington would remain diplomatically engaged, and when necessary would assist the weaker side in a conflict. It would also use its air and naval power to signal a continued U.S. commitment to the region and would retain the capacity to respond quickly to unexpected threats, like Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990. But—and this is the key point—the United States would put boots on the ground in the Middle East only if the local balance of power seriously broke down and one country threatened to dominate the others. Short of that, America would keep its soldiers and pilots “over the horizon”—namely at sea, in bases outside the region or back home in the United States.

This proposal assumes first that in using SF and SOF we have the actionable intelligence and logistics to support their interdictions, raids and HVT killings.  We will not have that with a small footprint.  Intelligence sources are killed in small footprint campaigns because their is no force projection on the ground.  Logistics would be nonexistent because every participant in trucking supplies into the FOBs or launch points for these operations would have been beheaded or shot.  Thinking that this can all be done from offshore platforms is not serious analysis.  It’s wishful and even mythical thinking.

Our friend Galrahn (who still hasn’t blogrolled TCJ) says that the light footprint model hasn’t failed us because Afghanistan is not currently a sanctuary for AQ.  The problem with this is that as Michael Yon points out, the enemy controls the terrain.  Those who would harbor AQ could come back into power.

It should be remember that the so-called Hamburg cell originally intended to attack Germany, and their minds were changed when AQ in Afghanistan (UBL) convinced them to target the U.S.  The Hindu Kush and areas South of there (Helmand) harbors AQ and other globalists and also their enablers.  Don’t think for one minute that we can simply launch clinical raids with pristine intelligence supported by operators who have all they need when they need it, with combined arms including air support that has air controllers who have all of the logistics that they need while they target only know HVTs with verifiable accuracy.

This is simply a myth – a strategic daydream.  The small footprint model has led us to where we are in Afghanistan, and claiming that we should do more of the same will continue the diminution of the campaign.  We can withdraw or we can go big, but what we cannot do is hope that more of the same saves us.

This is Your National Security Advisor

BY Herschel Smith
15 years, 3 months ago

From Jim Jones (via Jake Tapper):

Responding to criticism from former Vice President Cheney that President Obama is making the nation more vulnerable to terrorism, the president’s National Security Adviser, Gen. Jim Jones (Ret.), told ABC News in an exclusive interview that actually the reverse is true: President Obama’s greater success with international relations has meant more terrorists put out of commission.

“This type of radical fundamentalism or terrorism is a threat not only to the United States but to the global community,” Jones said. “The world is coming together on this matter now that President Obama has taken the leadership on it and is approaching it in a slightly different way – actually a radically different way – to discuss things with other rulers to enhance the working relationships with law enforcement agencies – both national and international.”

Jones said that “we are seeing results that indicate more captures, more deaths of radical leaders and a kind of a global coming-together by the fact that this is a threat to not only the United States but to the world at-large and the world is moving toward doing something about it.”

So the message is that since Obama has taken office more terrorists have been put out of business.  The metrics show success because of the person of Obama.  Continuing:

The former Marine General didn’t provide any specific numbers to back up his claim, but he said “there is an increasing trend and I think we seen that in different parts of the world over the last few months for sure.” He added that he was not “making a tally sheet saying we are killing more people, capturing more people than they did — that is not the issue.”

So it’s not about a tally sheet, and that is clearly not the issue.  Continuing:

But the numbers are going up, he said.  “The numbers of high value targets that we are successfully reaching out to or identifying through good intelligence” from both the CIA and intelligence agencies from US allies has made the difference, he said. “We have better human intelligence; we know where the terrorists are moving. Because of the dialogue and the tone of the dialogue between us and our friends and allies…the trend line against terrorism is positive, and that’s what we want. If we have a positive trend line we have a safer country.”

So the trend line is positive, and the “numbers of HVTs … has made the difference” (whatever that is supposed to mean).

Summarizing, the metrics are showing success and Obama is doing better than the previous administration.  But there is no tally sheet, and the whole issue of killing and capturing more people misses the point.  But more to the point, we are killing and capturing more people.

Got it?  Neither do I.  Your NSA is not a serious man.

Prior: Calling on National Security Advisor James L. Jones to Resign

UPDATE: Welcome to Instapundit readers and thanks to Glenn for the link.


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