Training the Afghan National Army?
BY Herschel Smith
14 years, 9 months ago
In keeping with our running coverage and commentary on the ANA, from AFP.
For Lieutenant Ed Maloney, the most difficult part of leading a four-day mission in eastern Afghanistan was persuading Afghan soldiers to leave their base in the first place.
It took three hours of negotiations on the night before departure to convince the Afghans the expedition to Sherzad district in Nangarhar province was worthwhile.
“Their predecessors had a tough time in this district, and these soldiers thought it was unnecessary and too risky,” Maloney said.
“Of course we can’t order them to do things, but we told them it was exactly the sort of security mission they needed to do and which should impress their bosses.”
Let’s leave behind the issue of tactical capabilities, corruption, drug use, officer entitlement and all of the other bad traits we have seen in the ANA. Force projection and assessment of atmospherics are the most important aspects of counterinsurgency. In the absence of U.S. forces to persuade them to work at the right things, with the ANA sitting on their FOBs afraid to go on patrol, the Taliban have nothing to fear.
The issues go well beyond knowing how to do what they are supposed to be doing. The root of the problem is that they don’t even understand what they are supposed to be doing and why they are supposed to be doing it.
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