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1. On July 29, 2021 at 12:26 am, Georgiaboy61 said:

   Re: “The superiority of tactics and training over equipment.”

   The late Colonel John Boyd, USAF (ret.), both during his long military career and then in retirement as a civilian employee of the Pentagon/DOD, distinguished himself as perhaps the finest military thinker and theorist this nation has ever produced. As a field-grade officer commanding an air wing in SE Asia, he had witnessed the Vietnam conflict up-close and personal. How, to use the phrase common at that time, “a bunch of peasants in black pajamas managed to defeat the most-powerful nation on earth.” Boyd sought to understand why, and after retiring, he immersed himself in the study of the history of war and conflict.

   One of his most-relevant insights is that superior technology is not always, or even often, the most-critical factor in who wins or loses a war. Boyd came away from his studies convinced that people and ideas matter more to the conduct of war than technology alone. Or, as he was fond of thundering at his listeners, “People, ideas and hardware – in that order!”

   Another was that there are levels of war, i.e., the moral, mental (intellectual) and the physical (kinetic) spheres. Conventional thinking about military affairs stressed that putting ordnance on target was all that mattered, and taking and holding ground – but Boyd’s studies taught him that the moral and mental spheres of conflict mattered just as much as the physical/kinetic ones, and oftentimes more so.

   The Battle of Arracourt shows a number of these truths about warfare, in the microcosm – as well as some insights which mirror more conventional military theory of Clausewitz and others.

   The German and Americans ways of waging armored warfare were of course similar in many ways, but different in others. It is an over-simplification, but the U.S. approach was to produce weapons of adequate-to-good quality, and in sufficient numbers to tilt the scales in the favor of the Allies. The Germans, on the other hand, tended to stress technological advancement and mechanical-engineering perfection over mass-production. Manufacturing a relatively small number of highly-advanced and capable tanks and armored fighting vehicles, rather than committing to a smaller number of designs and then mass-producing the heck out of them. “Quality versus quantity” …

   While it is also somewhat of an oversimplification, it is legitimate to state that the Soviets and the Anglo-Americans won the war using very large numbers of mostly 1930s-vintage weapons designs – including armor – whereas the Germans lost the war fielding much-smaller numbers of weapons with features which did not become common until the 1950s, as well as larger numbers of less-advanced designs. The Germans tended to, as the proverb states, let the perfect become the enemy of the good.

   A case in point was the Tiger I heavy tank, a 54-ton design which was first-fielded in Tunisia in 1942 and which rapidly gained a reputation – well-earned – as a tank able to dominate the battlefield against pretty much any other tank or armored fighting vehicle the Allies could send against it. With its thick armor, superb optical sights, and hard-hitting high-velocity 88mm main gun, the Tiger I was renowned for its ability to absorb amazing punishment while still remaining combat-effective. Many of German’s finest “tank aces” such as Otto Carius and Michael Wittmann ran up huge scores of enemy kills with it.

   Yet, Germany strove still to produce the Tiger II, an even larger and heavier tank of 68 tons in weight, which even today is a very large, heavy design. It had even more-formidable armor, an even more-powerful longer-barreled version of the 88mm gun, and was greatly feared by Allied tankers and other personnel.

   Objectively-speaking, however, there was no real need for the King Tiger or Tiger II, since the Tiger I was still performing so well. Indeed, the standard German medium tanks, the Panzerkampfwagon IV (~ 28 tons) with its potent KwK 40/L48 75mm L40 main gun, and the 45-ton Panther with its thick and well-sloped frontal armor and high-velocity Kwk 42/L72 75mm main gun, were also punching at or above their weight, so why did Germany need so many tank, tank destroyer and self-propelled gun designs?

   Arracourt was a battle which saw the reversal of the normal scheme of things, in that the Americans were defending against a German counter-offensive, rather than being on the offensive themselves. The German Tigers, Panthers and other AVFs which had proven so formidable in defense were now forced into high-tempo fast-moving offensive operations, while the Americans waited for them in well-chosen defensive positions. The Shermans as well as the various tank destroyers (M10s, M36s, M18s, etc.) and self-propelled guns proved their mettle when firing from well-defiladed flank or other positions for direct fire, as well as indirect fire missions by mobile and fixed artillery.

   The largest and heaviest German AVFs may have been a tough out frontally, but taken from the flanks or the rear, they were vulnerable to American AT weapons. The Germans also hated overhead plunging artillery fire, and it is not hard to see why: A 95-lb. HE shell from a 155mm “Long Tom” howitzer, dropping in from a high trajectory fire-mission, would ruin anyone’s day.

   The Americans also had control of the air, not just in terms of strategic air assets like heavy bombers and fighters, but tactically, meaning that an American didn’t have to run for cover when he heard approaching aircraft on a ground attack mission – because he knew they weren’t German. The Germans, on the other hand, lived in terror for their lives at the hated and feared “Jabos” or ground-attack fighter-bombers such as USAAF P-47s and RAF Hawker Typhoon and Tempest fighters.

   Control of the air also conveyed other benefits: Artillery spotting and the marking of targets for airstrikes, as well as enemy dispositions and troop movements.

   “Amateurs discuss tactics, professionals discuss logistics” – The Americans, fighting thousands of miles from home, and thanks to their vast material and logistical superiority – enjoyed vast quantities of ammunition, spare parts, food, water, medical and other supplies, and most-vitally, petroleum, oil, and lubricants or POL. Whereas even though the Panzerwaffe and German foot soldiers were fighting near the German border and enjoy interior lines which were continuous, they struggled to get enough petrol, ammo, spare parts, supplies, rations and all else, to their men and machines.

   Allied control of the air played no small part in these difficulties, but Arracourt, like so many other battles in the ETO in late 1944-1945, was decided by the supply men long before battle was joined.

   A last point deserves mention. Armies are characteristically rigid and procedure-bound in garrison and peacetime, but in war the smart ones – the ones who want to win battles and wars -loosen those constraints and allow their men to adopt, improvise and overcome the obstacles they encounter. The WWII-era American soldier proved to a genius at this essential and often underappreciated military art. Men like Patton knew that the key to victory was to prepare your men as best as possible, give them a well-designed plan of action, issue them their orders and then get out of their way and let them carry them out. “Lead, follow or get out of the way,” as Patton would have said.

2. On July 29, 2021 at 7:31 am, RCW said:

   The video also notes another angle, which helped the US Shermans in the battle of Arracourt, was the German 5th Panzer’s Army not being equipped with integral scouting units, so they were forced to advance blindly against the US. Tactics, training & reconnaissance all matter; Lee suffered for this shortcoming (sans cavalry scouts) in Gettysburg, if I recall correctly. How can a general know his enemy without scouting?

3. On July 29, 2021 at 8:29 am, Fred said:

   Thanks GB. Good food for thought. In any endeavor the best leaders seek to provide the training and tools (equipment) required, but most importantly the widest possible latitude in execution of the mission to ensure the success of those doing the actual work. Of course this leadership type requires discernment in personal selection overall, and roll and task assignment based more on personality than academic history. Men who are aggressive, serious, and committed that have the general aptitude for the given mission are the best and not just for war fighting.

4. On July 29, 2021 at 5:19 pm, Georgiaboy61 said:

   @ RCW

   Re: “The video also notes another angle, which helped the US Shermans in the battle of Arracourt, was the German 5th Panzer’s Army not being equipped with integral scouting units”

   Good catch…. or should I say “good recon, soldier!”? … when I went back and watched the video a second time, I noticed that fact also – but you get the prize for getting there first. Patton’s men had more up-to-date information, thanks to their recon and scouting, and were therefore able to get inside the German decision-making cycle.

   Re: “In any endeavor the best leaders seek to provide the training and tools (equipment) required, but most importantly the widest possible latitude in execution of the mission to ensure the success of those doing the actual work.”

   There has developed since the Second World War what amounts to a sort of cult surrounding the purported near-mystical military abilities of the Germans during the war. That they were the finest soldiers on earth and that the only reason the Allies won is due to overwhelming material superiority. And so on. Within the military history community, there was/is even a name for it – “The myth of German military superiority,” and some years ago a historian whose name I can’t recall at the moment, did a nice rebuttal of the idea.

   In my view, it is closer to the truth to state that at the beginning of the war, the Allies were the students and the Germans the masters or teachers, and as the war went along, those roles got reversed. Every enemy teaches its opponents how to best defeat it by how it chooses to make war in the first place. There’s no denying that the Germans were good, very good, but to beat them, the Allies had to be better. And they were.

   The Germans do deserve credit, however, for something they called “mission orders,” a concept which probably originated with General Helmuth von Moltke during the 1860s, specifically in 1869 with the study, “Instructions for Large Unit Commanders,” in which he set forth the basic idea of mission orders:

   “There are many situations in which the officer must act according to his own judgment. It would be indeed absurd if he waited for orders in moments where often no orders could be given. As a rule, however, his work is the most profitable for the whole when he carries out the will of his superior.”

   In short, the overall goals of the action being contemplated are directed by the superior officer, but the precise mechanism by which the objectives are attained is left to the judgment and discretion of the junior officer(s) closest to the operation and in-command at the scene. Decision-making and responsibility are pushed downward as far as possible.

   The Germans may have pioneered the idea, but arguably the Anglo-Americans (and even some, but by no means all, Soviet Army units, too) surpassed them in its employment during WWII. In that conflict, the best senior officers led from the front and gave their men the tools and the trust needed to carry out their missions.

   Alas, since that time seventy-five or more years ago, the U.S. military has again slipped back into its second-generation warfare ways, i.e., especially its emphasis on top-down chain-of-command and adherence to procedure rather than getting results. There have been some notable successes at third- and even fourth-gen. warfare, such as Desert Shield/Desert Storm, but these have been the exception rather than the rule.

   The problem isn’t in the men themselves. The United States still knows how to produce excellent raw material for fighting men (or well, the traditional part of it anyway). The peacetime military is made uncomfortable by genuine warriors in the mold of Patton, and prefers instead to elevate bureaucrats-in-uniform to positions of senior command. Which is how the perfumed princes came to predominate.

   Re: “Men who are aggressive, serious, and committed that have the general aptitude for the given mission are the best and not just for war fighting.”

   You sure got that right!

5. On July 30, 2021 at 5:06 pm, blake said:

   @ GB, I think I read somewhere front line American soldiers were also much better at getting damaged vehicles back in the fight, unlike their German counterparts, who had to wait for repair depot guys to get them going.

6. On July 30, 2021 at 5:51 pm, Georgiaboy61 said:

   @ Blake

   Re: “I think I read somewhere front line American soldiers were also much better at getting damaged vehicles back in the fight, unlike their German counterparts, who had to wait for repair depot guys to get them going.”

   The mechanical ingenuity and resourcefulness of the American soldier was a tremendous force multiplier during the Second World War, including the war against Nazi Germany in the European Theater of Operations.

   A case in point was U.S. Army Sergeant Curtis Culin, whose story is as-fascinating as it is historically-significant.

   In one of the major intelligence failures of the war, SHAEF invasion planners had neither known nor appreciated the tremendous obstacle the terrain immediately inland of the invasion beaches was to present to the forces attempting to break out of the beach-heads, into the Norman countryside and then into the remainder of north/north-west France proper.

   The Normandy region was studded with unimproved roads, small farms, pastures, and fields – each surrounded by or adjoined by hedgerows – earthen mounds of up to 8-10 feet in height, often topped with dense hedges, trees, and other vegetation. Norman farmers had built them for centuries in lieu of stone walls or wooden fences, to enclose their lands, protect their livestock and so on. Many hedgerows could be transited only by a gate or sunken lane carved through it. Otherwise, they formed a barrier quite impassible even to the largest wheeled and tracked vehicles.

   The hedgerow country was a defender’s dream for the German Wehrmacht, and a nightmare for the soldiers of the American, British, Canadian and other Allied forces arrayed against them. Allied photo-reconnaissance overflights and subsequent photo interpreters had not known of the hedgerows and did not see them in their photos taken from high-altitude; nor did work reach the planners via their intelligence assets on the ground.

   The Allies tried breaking out via infantry-supported armor attacks, but since the tanks had to attempt to crawl over the mounds, they presented their thin belly armor to waiting German anti-tank guns, panzerfaust and panzershrek launchers, and other weapons – and were easy prey. The GIs tried to blast their way through the hedgerows prior to attacking using demolition charges, but since the defenders knew precisely where the attack would come, they could mass against it.

   Such attacks could succeed, but Ike quipped that he doubted there was enough high-explosive in the ETO to use that tactic every time – and losses were unacceptably high anyway and the advance was still bogged down.

   The American breakout was stalled, and since the British-CW offensive was synced to the U.S. sector, the break-out stalled up and down the line. No solution to the problem seemed to be at hand. Enter Sergeant Culin and his fellow GIs.

   They came up with the idea of using cutting torches to salvage scrap steel from invasion obstacles installed on the beaches by Rommel’s defenders, and fabricating “hedge-choppers” by welding a sort of four-pronged plow-like device onto the front of M4 Sherman tanks and other armored fighting vehicles. They tested the device against a hedgerow and it worked like a charm. No advanced warning was necessary, since no explosives were used. Al the tank had to do was get up a decent head-of-steam and plow directly into the hedgerow to be cut, and presto, the GIs had a gap through which they and their armored support could attack.

   Culin’s “hedge-chopper” device as it was called, was the key to the successful breakout which followed, and the Allies surged forward all along the front, ultimately breaking out of the lodgement and into open countryside. Sergeant Culin was decorated with the Legion of Merit for his resourcefulness and performance under pressure. And his was by no means the only such example.

   If this unexplored and underappreciated aspect of WWII history interests you, consider reading “Death Traps: The Survival of an American Armored Division in World War Two,” by former U.S. Army ordnance officer the late Belton Cooper. Cooper’s memoir concerns his service in the famed 3rd Armored “Spearhead” Division, one of two heavy armored divisions then in the ETO. Cooper was a trained as a mechanical engineer prior to entering the army, and his many observations and experiences make fascinating reading.

7. On July 31, 2021 at 9:15 am, blake said:

   @GB, thanks for the response and bit of history. That stuff always fascinates me.

8. On July 31, 2021 at 4:00 pm, Georgiaboy61 said:

   @ Blake

   You bet! Check out Cooper’s book…. it is worth the time.

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