Using More Ammo Than Is Tactically And Academically Called For
BY Herschel Smith
1 year, 5 months ago
“Even though (Wagner leader Yevgeny) Prigozhin acted out, yelling give me ammo, give me ammo, there was no actual ammo hunger,” says Ocherkhadzhiev. “The problem was, they used six times more ammo than is tactically and academically called for. They just buried the Ukrainians in shells. And in these conditions, the Ukrainians still defended.”
I don’t want the discussion thread to turn into a political one. That’s not the point of the post.
But I find this remark utterly fascinating. I know that when the Marines first joined the fight in Afghanistan, the Taliban were surprised at the fact that they (the Marines) could carry a half dozen magazines in a tactical vest and stretch the ammo out to cover a 24-hour fire fight under the supervision of good NCOs (the NCO corps in the U.S. military is entirely a product of Western culture and Eastern and Middle Eastern armies completely lack such a structure, focusing instead on commissioned officers, in the end making them less capable or efficient, something I’ve written on extensively). The disciple of targeting, fire control, etc., surprised the enemy combatants.
Similarly, the practice of the Taliban was to bury U.S. troops in fire. Seldom would they take the attack straight to U.S. forces except en masse (Battalion versus Company). I’ve also written extensively on that subject in Massing of Forces.
On June 30, 2023 at 5:14 am, Aesop said:
OTOH, Prighozin’s convicts tended to get results, and reputedly won a lot, whereas the Russian conscripts have continually failed, for months upon months.
Headshots are elegant, and save great quantities of ammunition, but they seldom decide battles, so depending on them is foolish unless losses don’t mean anything to you. So is having troops who hunker down and fire nothing, which saves a great deal on ammunition expenditure.
The quote sounds like it came from the regimental quartermaster of the 24th Foot at Isandlwana.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XMuECoTZr5M
On June 30, 2023 at 2:33 pm, Drake said:
There is a time and place for suppressing fire and a time for more precision work.
The basic offensive tactic of most modern armies is “fire and maneuver” which generally means pinning down the enemy with volume of fire while an assault element finds a flank to get in close for the kill. Doesn’t mean that suppressing fire can’t be accurate, but it has to be of sufficient volume to keep their heads down so they don’t notice their getting flanked.
On June 30, 2023 at 3:48 pm, Herschel Smith said:
There are different flavors of fire and maneuver. There’s a squad rush, for example, which is intense and violent and uses a lot of fire. Then there is the sort of fire and maneuver which doesn’t take so much fire support but relies more on closing with the enemy by concealment, requiring time and patience, but not so much fire support.
I maintain the position above. It isn’t so effective to use up all of the logistics by firing and hoping you hit something, even for suppressive fire. 2/6 went to Fallujah in 2007 with Trijicon ACOGs on their SAWs.
On June 30, 2023 at 10:37 pm, Georgiaboy61 said:
@ H. S.
Re: “There are different flavors of fire and maneuver. There’s a squad rush, for example, which is intense and violent and uses a lot of fire. Then there is the sort of fire and maneuver which doesn’t take so much fire support but relies more on closing with the enemy by concealment, requiring time and patience, but not so much fire support.”
As far back as the Second World War, captured German soldiers – upon being asked their opinion of the U.S. soldiers – commented that the Americans fought the war “like rich people…” They were referring to our preference to spending copious amounts of ammo instead of the lives of our young men.
A case in point was that once the U.S. Army crossed into Germany, and began fighting in heavily-built up urban and suburban areas, the standard operating procedure quickly became one of relying brute firepower to clear and hold structures.
By that point in the war, the Germans had become experts at tactical retreat and exacting the largest price per yard of their territory. Stepping into the street in a German town or city where fighting was still going on – was to risk a quick death. Since being in the open was risky, the GIs simply started clearing houses and buildings one at a time, by blasting through one and into the neighboring structure, all the while remaining behind cover or at least concealment.
Fewer men KIA, WIA, and MIA – but used up a lot of ammunition and other ordnance.
In the Pacific Theater, where the Marines and the Army island-hopped towards Japan, the Japanese took to digging in to such a degree that by the time of Iwo Jima and Okinawa, many American servicemen went days without seeing an actual enemy soldier above ground, yet continued to take heavy fire and sustain losses.
And with the rise of the assault rifle and truly man-portable automatic weapons during/after WWII, the fire-power revolution in small arms well and truly took off.
Firepower was used to hose down entire areas of jungle, sectors of fire in which the enemy was suspected to be, but often could not be confirmed to be. Rounds expended per confirmed enemy KIA soared, first to 50,000 per confirmed VC or NVA and then past it. Not just by individual soldiers and Marines, but by crew-served weapons, CAS, etc.
The basic impulse behind spending ammunition instead of men is a sound one insofar as the prevention of casualties is concerned; it is the right thing to do – but it does create a problem eventually in that if a military forgets how to fight using the older methods (which do not depend as much upon an enormous logistical tail or giant surplus of ammo), and only remembers how to do it using modern doctrine and tactics, then it risks getting itself into a jam sooner or later.
Re: “Then there is the sort of fire and maneuver which doesn’t take so much fire support but relies more on closing with the enemy by concealment, requiring time and patience, but not so much fire support.”
That’s how most nation-state professional armies used to be trained to fight up until around the mid-20th century. Certainly those in the West. In the latter part of the 19th century and into the 20th century, bolt-action rifles were the standard long-arm of the individual soldier. Many armies considered the wastage of ammunition to be a real problem. This concern was amplified once the Great Depression came along and squeezed budgets even further.
The now-famous bolt-action Springfield M1903/1903A1 30-06 (and follow-on models) service rifle was designed with a magazine cutoff selector, which was designed to disable magazine-feeding of rounds. The rifleman could fire the shot in the chamber, but then either had to load rounds individually by hand, or turn off the cutoff. The cutoff was used for reasons of parsimony, but also as a device whereby the user could keep a reserve of cartridges in the magazine, should emergency rapid fire be needed.
That was the mentality in those days. Every shot was to be aimed, if possible, and emphasis was placed upon precision fires out to the limit of unaided eyesight and the iron sights of the time. Volley-fire was occasionally used for long-range or extreme long-range harassing and interdiction fires, but with the rise of crew-served heavy machine guns in WWI and other crew-served weapons, this became less common.
And most military forces – lacking a surplus of men or ammo or both – learned how to use sound field-craft and small-unit tactics to get within range of the enemy. The British learned that lesson the hard way, and on the receiving end – as did the U.S. – at places like Spion Kop and Kettle Hill.
On July 1, 2023 at 8:36 am, Aesop said:
Precision fire as a viable tactic died about a minute after the first “Banzai!” charge in the South Pacific, and by the human wave attacks of the ChiComs and Norks, it was deader than canned tuna.
That, on top of the industrial warfare of the machinegun, begun in WWI trenches, and perfected by Wermacht squads from 1939-45.
It didn’t come back into vogue until snipers were re-employed in Vietnam, and remains pretty much their sole province.
ACOGs and suchlike have helped, but note that individual basic loads had climbed from seven mags for the M-16, up to 10-20 or more, from the 1980s to the 20-teens.
This does not bespeak the dominance of aimed fires.
“Anything worth shooting is worth shooting twice. Life is dear, and ammo is cheap.” – Murphy’s Laws Of Combat
On July 1, 2023 at 2:31 pm, Georgiaboy61 said:
@ Aesop
Re: ““Anything worth shooting is worth shooting twice. Life is dear, and ammo is cheap.” – Murphy’s Laws Of Combat
Yes, quite so, but you left out something important: You still have to hit the target to neutralize it. What you disdain as “precision fire” is known in plain language as hitting the target. Frankly, I’m surprised that a former Marine would think the way you do. The Marines, well, at least the Old Breed, considered nothing more important than aimed, precision fire.
And if “spray and pray” is so gosh-darned effective, why did the army just invest a bunch of money on enhancing their LR precision firepower with the new Sig MCX Spear 6.8×51?
Clearly, there are two sides to this debate, and you are not giving proper consider to one side of it.
On July 1, 2023 at 4:43 pm, Herschel Smith said:
In the MC there is no debate. For violent affairs like squad rushes, they need suppressive fire. For other kinds of maneuver warfare, they need precision fire. Riflemen are ALWAYS expected to lay down precision fire.
In Iraq, my son never used burst on his M4, and neither did any other Marine. The only burst was when he ran a SAW and even then people misunderstand. They lay down bursts of nine rounds (maximum), and even then, only for intervals, or else they will melt the barrel.
Spray and pray isn’t a viable form of warfare. It’s a viable form of wasting ordnance and running your logistics folks back to the pols and telling them we can’t sustain this for long.
Same, for example, as supplying fuel to FOBs. Did you know that 50% of casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan were taken because of supplying diesel fuel to engines to get power at FOBs, HQ and hospitals?
Logistics rules everything.
On July 1, 2023 at 10:30 pm, Georgiaboy61 said:
@ H. Smith
Suppressive fire has its uses; I’ve never denied that. Fire-and-maneuver tactics, to name one example – are dependent upon suppressive fires. But I stand by my remarks that precision fire has always been the Marine Corps way. We agree on that, I think. “Every Marine a Rifleman” is near-holy writ in the ‘Corps and for good reason.
Far as logistics are concerned, there is a famous old quote in military affairs circles, which says “Amateurs discuss tactics, professionals discuss logistics…” and it is just as true-and-correct today as when it was originally stated by Napoleon Bonaparte in the early 19th century, or whoever else.
Well-supplied professional armies with a favorable tooth-to-tail ratio can and often do fight in a manner in accordance with their logistics. Forces not so well-supplied must devise other means of accomplishing their objectives. Logistical superiority is certainly desirable, but its superiority is no guarantee of victory or success. The Vietcong in SE Asia and the mujahadeen in Afghanistan have certainly shown that.
On July 2, 2023 at 4:41 am, Aesop said:
@GeorgiaBoy:
Nota bene I didn’t say anything worth shooting is worth missing twice.
If you’re shooting at something, only hits count.
If you’re doing suppressive fire, it still needs to be hitting where their heads and torsos would be if they weren’t ducked and covering.
But what you’re not doing is shooting precision fire in a PMI-approved offhand stance. Notably, IIRC, the final stage in the current USMC course of fire presents fleeting targets engaged while wearing battle rattle, hit or miss, and no points for style.
Standing out in the open with your elbows flapping at 6 and 3 o’clock stopped working at Rorke’s Drift, when the enemy had the good manners to mainly only have spears to use while charging in opposition.
Peer-to-peer gunfights require being accurate enough, fast enough. I.e. “effective” fire.
Not headshots. That’s “precision fire”.
Those are nice if you can get them, but they’ll be the exception, not the rule.
Unless you’re rocking an M40A1/A3/A5, or equivalent.
Or the enemy is really dumb.
Combat is “effective” fire, not “precision” fire.
But Comrade Pinchfart in the OP was griping about Wagner using more ammunition than “The Manual” said was correct.
We’ve seen his type hereabouts.
He was Major Malfunction from Heartbreak Ridge.
He needs to go back to the supply depot, and let warriors fight the battles.
But he explains in moments the current lack of success from Russian forces in Ukraine.
They’re still fighting by manuals written in 1946.
Color me shocked.