How Many Rounds of .45 ACP Was Used in Operation Enduring Freedom?
BY Herschel Smith
2 days ago
This isn’t meant to start yet another debate about 9mm versus .45 ACP, or any other cartridge. Lord knows, we have enough of those over these pages. To each his own, and YMMV. Choose what you want to shoot, and get good at it.
But I thought it would be an interesting question, how many rounds of .45 ACP were supplied to OEF? What did the logistics look like?
My oldest son helped me out with that. Here is the answer.
How many rounds of .45 ACP were supplied in Operation Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan)?
ChatGPT said:
To help find accurate information, could you clarify if you’re looking for the total number of .45 ACP rounds supplied throughout the entire duration of Operation Enduring Freedom (2001–2014), or a specific year or branch (e.g., Army, Special Forces)? Also, are you looking for official U.S. military data or third-party sources as well?
You said:
I’m interested in the duration of the campaign. Find any source you can.
ChatGPT said:
Got it. I’ll look into how many rounds of .45 ACP ammunition were supplied over the full duration of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, using any publicly available sources including government records, military procurement data, and defense industry reporting. I’ll let you know what I find.
Use of .45 ACP Ammunition in Operation Enduring Freedom (2001–2014)
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF, 2001–2014) saw U.S. forces in Afghanistan primarily armed with rifles and 9×19 mm sidearms. The .45 ACP (Automatic Colt Pistol) cartridge was not a standard-issue caliber for most troops during this period. Instead, .45 ACP ammunition was used in limited quantities by specialized units, such as certain U.S. special operations forces and elite Marine Corps units
. As a result, the number of .45 ACP rounds supplied or expended in Afghanistan was only a small fraction of overall ammunition usage in OEF.
Special Operations Forces and .45 ACP Use
A Colt M45A1 .45 ACP pistol as used by USMC special operations units in Afghanistan (tan Cerakote finish worn from field use)
. U.S. special operations forces and the USMC’s elite units continued to favor .45 caliber pistols for their greater stopping power, even after the rest of the military switched to 9 mm in the 1980s
. During OEF, .45 ACP was carried by units such as:
Army Special Forces and Delta Force – These units historically used customized M1911A1 pistols and other .45 caliber handguns. Delta Force, for example, was a proponent of the .45 ACP round, valuing its performance in close-quarters scenarios
. Many Delta operators in the 2000s deployed with match-grade M1911-type pistols before later transitioning to other platforms (e.g. Glock)
.
Marine Corps Force Recon and MARSOC – The USMC issued .45 caliber pistols (designated M45 or M45A1 Close-Quarters Battle Pistols) to Force Reconnaissance and Marine Raider units
. Early in OEF, these were hand-built M45 MEU(SOC) .45 pistols; by 2012 a new Colt M45A1 was adopted under a $22.5 million contract for up to 10,000 pistols
. Each Marine special operator carried this .45 sidearm in Afghanistan, reflecting the continued preference for .45 ACP among elite Marines.
Navy Special Warfare – Some Navy SEALs also used .45 caliber sidearms. Notably, the SEALs had adopted the Mk23 Mod 0 SOCOM pistol (a large H&K .45 ACP handgun) in the 1990s, and later variants like the HK45C. While many SEALs in OEF carried 9 mm Sig P226s or, later, Glock 19s, certain missions (requiring suppressed fire or extra stopping power) still saw .45 ACP pistols in use
.
Outside of special operations, most U.S. personnel in Afghanistan did not use .45 ACP. The standard sidearm for Army and conventional Marine units was the 9 mm M9 pistol, and even crew-served or vehicle weapons did not use .45 (they used 5.56 mm, 7.62 mm, .50 BMG, etc.). An Army House Armed Services Committee hearing in 2004 highlighted that 5.56 mm, 7.62 mm, and .50 BMG rounds made up over 95% of small-arms expenditures, leaving all other calibers (including 9 mm and .45) to share less than 5%
. This underscores that .45 ACP was a niche ammunition type in the Afghan theater compared to the billions of rifle and machine gun rounds expended.
Procurement and Supply Data for .45 ACP (2001–2014)
Because .45 ACP was used by a limited subset of forces, it was procured in modest quantities relative to other ammunition. The Department of Defense did not publicly break out exact .45 ACP consumption for Afghanistan, but available procurement records and reports give some insight:
Annual DoD Ammo Procurement: The U.S. military’s overall demand for small-caliber ammunition (all types under .50) skyrocketed during the war on terror, rising from ~730 million rounds in FY2000 to nearly 1.8 billion rounds by FY2005
. Within this huge increase, most were 5.56 mm and 7.62 mm rounds for rifles and machine guns. By contrast, .45 ACP constituted a very small portion. For example, if ~1.8 billion small-caliber rounds were needed in 2005, under 5% of that (~90 million) covers all other calibers beyond the main three
– and .45 ACP would be only a fraction of that figure (since 9 mm pistol ammo needs for regular forces were larger than .45 needs). Thus, the scale of .45 usage was in the low millions of rounds, not hundreds of millions, over the entire conflict.
U.S. Army and Joint Ammunition Purchases: The Army’s Program Executive Office for Ammunition handled most ammo procurement for all services during OEF
. The Army’s budget documents generally lump .45 ACP under generic “small arms ammo” lines, but special orders were placed to support units needing .45. Notably, ammunition contracts via Army Contracting Command included .45 ACP as a line item alongside 9 mm. (For instance, a 2016 Army contract to Olin-Winchester covered 9 mm, .38, and .45 caliber pistol ammunition in one package
, reflecting how these pistol calibers are grouped for procurement). During OEF, DoD often sourced .45 ACP from commercial manufacturers (such as Federal Cartridge/ATK or Olin Winchester) since the primary government-owned ammo plant focused on NATO calibers
.
Marine Corps Ammo Reports: A 2008 DoD Inspector General audit of ammunition funds provides a snapshot of .45 ACP supply. In one USMC supplemental ammunition request for GWOT (FY2007), the Marine Corps ordered approximately 274,000 rounds of .45 caliber ammunition as part of its OEF/OIF needs
. This single order (costing ~$98.6 K) was relatively small – by comparison, the same document shows orders of millions of rounds of 5.56 mm in that year【44†】. The Marine Corps confirmed that the M45 .45 caliber pistol was standard for Recon and MARSOC personnel in OEF
, and they allocated war funding to buy both the new pistols and the ammo to feed them. As MARSOC expanded after 2006, annual .45 ACP procurement for the Marines likely stayed in the few-hundred-thousand range to supply training and deployments.
SOCOM and Other Services: U.S. Special Operations Command units (Army SF, Navy SOF, etc.) draw ammo from service channels, so their .45 ACP needs were fulfilled through Army and Navy ordnance logistics. While detailed breakdowns are not public, it’s known that SOCOM kept .45 ACP in inventory for units fielding weapons like the MK23 pistol or HK UMP45 submachine gun. These specialty ammo requirements were relatively small and often satisfied by contracts with major ammo suppliers. For example, Winchester Ammunition has been a key supplier for military pistol ammo; it received multi-year contracts to produce .45 ACP for the Army both during and after OEF
. This ensured that deployed special operators in Afghanistan had a steady supply of .45 ACP for their sidearms, even though the caliber’s usage was limited.
Estimates of .45 ACP Rounds Used in Afghanistan (2001–2014)
No precise public figure exists for the total .45 ACP rounds expended in OEF, but given the above information we can outline the best estimates and context:
Magnitude: Over 13 years of war, U.S. forces in Afghanistan probably used on the order of a few million rounds of .45 ACP in total. This is tiny compared to rifle ammunition – for perspective, U.S. forces expended billions of 5.56 mm rounds in Iraq/Afghanistan. Even 9 mm pistol ammo (standard for most troops) vastly outweighed .45 usage. One military estimate noted that pistol and other small calibers (aside from 5.56/7.62/.50) accounted for under 5% of rounds fired
, and .45 was only a subset of that category. Thus, if 5.56 and other main rounds numbered in the billions, .45 ACP likely numbered in the low single-digit millions at most across the entire conflict.
Annual Usage Patterns: In the early years of OEF (2001–2005), .45 ACP use was minimal – only certain special ops (like Army Delta or some SEALs) were deployed with .45 pistols, since the Marine Force Recon teams (users of .45 MEU(SOC) pistols) were relatively few. After 2006, the formation of MARSOC and continued deployments of Army Special Forces increased the number of .45-caliber weapons in theater. By the peak war years (2009–2012), the Marine MARSOC and Recon teams, Army SF ODAs, and a portion of Navy SOF were each deploying with .45 sidearms. If we assume a few hundred operators carrying .45 pistols at any given time, each might fire a few hundred rounds in theater per year for proficiency or combat – that yields maybe tens of thousands of rounds per year in-country. Much larger quantities would be used in pre-deployment workups and training back in the US (which wouldn’t count as OEF consumption but drove procurement). For example, an entire MARSOC company workup can consume tens of thousands of .45 rounds in training, ensuring operators are proficient with their pistols.
Supply vs. Combat Expenditure: It’s important to distinguish ammunition supplied to Afghanistan from rounds actually fired in combat. Ammunition supply often exceeds expenditure to ensure ample reserve. The U.S. likely shipped hundreds of thousands of .45 ACP rounds to Afghanistan over the course of OEF to equip special ops units and security details. Not all of this would be shot; some would be used for range practice on bases, some carried on missions, and any surplus eventually redeployed or disposed of. Toward the war’s end, efforts like “Operation Ammunition Clean Sweep” collected unused munitions for retrograde
– it’s plausible that leftover .45 ammo was among recovered stocks, given its limited use. In short, the rounds fired in combat were likely a subset of those delivered. (For context, direct firefights involving pistols were rare; most troops, even special ops, relied on primary weapons first. The .45’s role was often as a secondary weapon or for close-quarter scenarios.)
In summary, while exact figures are unavailable, .45 ACP ammunition played a very limited role in OEF. It was primarily used by special operations and elite Marine units, with yearly procurement in the low hundreds of thousands of rounds and aggregate usage on the order of only a few million rounds over 13 years. This is negligible next to the standard rifle and machine-gun ammo expenditures
. Nonetheless, the military ensured that those who needed .45 ACP – from Delta Force operators to Marine Raiders – were reliably supplied throughout the conflict, via dedicated contracts and logistics channels
. The continued procurement of .45 ACP (even beyond OEF’s end) underscores that this cartridge remained an important niche capability for U.S. forces, valued for its proven effectiveness in the close-quarters and special mission contexts encountered in Afghanistan.
Sources: Military ammunition supply audits and budgets
; U.S. Congressional testimony on small-caliber ammo in GWOT
; Department of Defense contract records
; defense industry reporting on special operations weapons
; and official USMC statements on .45 pistol fielding
So there you have it. Logistics supported the supply of a couple of million rounds of .45 ACP to OEF.
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On March 24, 2025 at 9:32 pm, Paul B said:
Well it is a very capable round, just like to find a double stack version of the 1911.
On March 24, 2025 at 10:12 pm, Georgiaboy61 said:
Good detective work putting together the story…. thank you for that….
The fact that the ordnance faculties of the U.S. military establishment supplied all of those different types and calibers of small-arms and other ammunition puts the lie to one of the claims made by those in favor of standardization around one pistol cartridge, i.e., that multiple types would strain our logistics capacity beyond its abilities to adapt. That’s clearly not the case, as both 9x19mm and 45 Auto/ACP were well-supplied to those who needed them and apparently when/where it was needed.
@ Paul B
If memory serves, in the FA industry, double-stack M1911s are termed “2011” models. That’s nothing official, but slang which has become part of the vernacular. I don’t own one myself, but recall seeing that designation someplace.
On March 24, 2025 at 11:37 pm, Anonymous said:
This is a fascinating question and a fascinating way to get an answer . And to my mind – absolutely terrifying. It seems so well thought out on so many levels, it points out its own inadequacy of information, but then gives you a guess. One that seems to be based on the best data available. It’s very good at convincing you.
But it’s also so utterly wrong, because the missing context is not part of public information. AI absolutely sucks at any question that deals with fat tails of distributions. And as soon as you start talking about SF in this period is nothing but fat tails.
At one point Delta shot some very significant (double digit percentage) of the entire army ammo budget. People at that level were shooting an entire 1911 apart in pre-deployment workups.
Back of the envelope math says that 1,000,000 rounds a month were being fired on that range by that unit alone.
Now, granted that doesn’t move the needle that far, when you’re talking about 1.8 billion rounds. But it is several multiples higher than the AI suggested. It may even be the case that in certain time periods, more .45 was being shot by a handful of units then 9mm by the rest of the big army. The big army didn’t/ still doesn’t/ never has cared about pistols or pistol craft. Some units really do. And so will never see their real budgets.
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gell-Mann_amnesia_effect
We really need a gellman amnesia type term for this kind of AI product.
On March 25, 2025 at 6:24 am, Lord T said:
Most would have been used in training as well with only a fraction used on actual missions.
I’m impressed with how much data was there though and it shows how much ammo is used. Nice business there if you can get it. I though the billion rounds bought by Obama was a lot more but it sounds like it was just a stocking up exercise.
On March 25, 2025 at 8:34 am, Herschel Smith said:
@Anonymous,
I don’t normally approve comments with illegitimate email addresses, but this comment is interesting.
I suspect one thing, and know with certainty one more thing.
I suspect that (1) there is no way to know with any certainty how many rounds of .45 ACP were logistically supplied or shot, and (2) we might come up with a better estimate if I were to write a research paper on it, but no one is paying me to do that.
Besides, even if I did that, I suspect that the projections would come with a high variance.
So this is the best we have until and unless someone is interested enough to pay for the analysis.
On March 26, 2025 at 10:55 am, Ned said:
G 61ST: Para-Ordinance was building double stack 1911’s in 1990.
I think the main difference between a double stack 1911 and a 2011 is that the grip frame is a separate sub-part of the frame.
I have a Para double stack 45 and a RIA 22 TCM/ 9mm convertible labeled a “1911 A2”. Both have solid frames. I suspect that trigger work and access is much improved with a 2011 two-piece frame.
FWIW, the 22 TCM is a hoot to shoot. Big muzzle blast, almost no recoil and a 45 grain pills going about 2000fps out of the 5″ barrel. Consequently, I’ve never actually changed the barrel and recoil spring to shoot 9mm.