Afghanistan expert Joshua Foust reviews Seth Jones’ In The Graveyard of Empires at Firedoglake.  There is also an interesting discussion thread in which both Josh and Seth participate.  Josh doesn’t take a very high view on the innovation in Seth’s book, although he notes the good history that it provides.  You might want to drop by and take a look at the review and discussion thread.

I have not read the book, but I follow Seth Jones and Josh Foust, as well as Afghanistan.  A few brief comments of my own follow.

I tire of the “Afghanistan is the graveyard of empires” meme.  Alexander the Great still has blood line in the Hindu Kush, or at least his warriors do.  As one particularly smart commenter said at Michael Yon’s web site to this meme:

Afghanistan certainly was not a ‘graveyard’ for the Macedonian, Parthian, Kushan, Hun, Ghaznavid Turkish, Mongol or Timurlic Empires! All conquered Afghanistan quite successfully; and it happens that the Widow’s second Afghan war (1878-80) reduced the place to a British vassal state, which it remained until after WWI.

I also grow tired of the mission creep meme.  We went in to take out al Qaeda and its safe haven, we did that, and we didn’t leave (or so the meme goes).  We stayed on to accomplish nation building.  Seth Jones in particular advocates the counterterrorism approach rather than the counterinsurgency approach to Afghanistan.  I have variously responded that:

A few more policing assets in Afghanistan and Pakistan would mean simply a few more policing assets to die at the hands of Taliban and al Qaeda … The answer is not black or special operations, police, surreptitious behind-the-scenes deals, prison cells, interrogations, incorporation of the enemy into politics, or negotiations. The immediate answer to the problem of an enemy who would kill you is to kill the enemy with fire and maneuver.

Just to make sure that you don’t mistake this for the kill ’em all approach to COIN, rest assured that I understand the need for holding terrain, both physical and human.  Corruption must be dealt with, government must be set on its feet, the ANA and ANP must be trained and rid of its dross, and the horrible drug problems must be addressed.

I advocate killing bad guys, and lots of them.  As many of them as possible.  But only as a precurssor to follow-on operations to build the country.  You see, the mission didn’t creep, no matter what America has been led to believe.

We went into Afghanistan to deal with globalists – those who have religiously-based beliefs concerning a transnational insurgency – and also those who would harbor them.  This last part is the more difficult, and it’s what necessitates the nation building.

To be sure, there are some that believe in short forcible entries to conduct small operations to deal with immediate threats.  When the threat appears again, do it again.  Even some field grade, staff and flag officers believe this.  Perhaps most field grade, staff and flag officers believe this way.  It is a viable position, but the question remains as to whether this is beneficial and efficient in the long run.  I maintain that it isn’t.

Which leads to the third meme I see developing at the discussion thread at Firedoglake.  It pertains to the need for more NGOs, and that … right now.  But the problem is that NGOs can only operate in a climate of relative security.  Hence, the need to kill bad guys, and lots of them.  While not denying that NGOs must be a significant player in the campaign, there are distinct phases to COIN campaigns, with heavier kinetics usually occupying the initial stages (I owe my understanding of this not only to my son, but also to Colonel Gian Gentile).

There are no easy answers to Afghanistan, and discussion threads like this one are beneficial only to the extent that the smoke is cleared, we admit what we’re up against, and we commit the necessary resources to do the job.  Hopefully, to long time readers we have been clear in our advocacy, including but not limited to: more troops, security first, holding terrain, clearing the ANA and ANP of corruption rather than increasing the size of the forces, going after the drug cartels and criminals rather than the farmers, eventual heavier inclusion of NGOs to assist with agriculture and other things, and outright rejection of a SOFA with Afghanistan.