During the Battle of Wanat, nine U.S. Soldiers perished and twenty seven were wounded, while no Afghan National Army troops died and five were wounded.  This metric needs clarification, in that eight of the nine who perished that fateful night did so either defending or attempting to relieve Observation Post Top Side.  But further clarification of this metric shows us that the ANA troops apparently wouldn’t have been assigned to OP Top Side anyway specifically because of qualifications and reliability.  Additionally, the wounded were mainly applicable to COP Kahler, the main base at VPB Wanat.  The ratio of U.S. to ANA wounded is an instructive metric.

All over Afghanistan, First Lieutenants and Captains are assessing the reliability of the ANA troops with whom they patrol and fight.  This is a daily affair, and occurs through anecdotal evidence, via collaboration with fellow officers, and by various other means.  The model of understanding developed by these officers can be amended by other data points, and thus the model is a learning and evolving model as it should be.

The model The Captain’s Journal has developed thus far takes a fairly dim view of the capabilities and reliability of ANA troops thus far.  On the whole they have not performed well.  This doesn’t impugn all of the troops, but of course metrics don’t do that; they are normative and broadly applicable to general  questions.

This model has apparently been fairly consistent with the witness of the officers – both commissioned and NCOs – involved in the battle of Wanat.  First, 1 Lt. Brostrom weighs in on how he saw the ANA, stating that the ANA he was taking with him he considered not to count towards combat power.  Next, the NCOs and enlisted men weigh in (unpublished study).

… the ANA Company remained in their fighting positions, in the middle of the COP, and to the south at the southernmost TCP.  Numerous Chosen Company soldiers complained of their inactivity. One soldier with the 1st Squad TCP claimed that: “The ANA had fled from their position.”   Another Sergeant stated, “I also remember ANA not shooting that much and never leaving their foxholes.”  Sergeant _____ was not professionally impressed with the ANA performance:

They never got out of their holes. They only had four wounded, which tells me that the enemy directed their fire at the Americans, not the Afghans. The Afghans sprayed and prayed. That’s about it. To be honest, though, it was more than I expected. The other numerous occasions I’ve been on with Afghan soldiers as our backup, they ran.

Sergeant _______ summed up what most of the Chosen soldiers felt, “they were still pretty much totally useless.”

The ratio of U.S. to ANA wounded doesn’t prove the point concerning ANA reliability and viability, but it is yet another data point that confirms the suspicions and fails to change or challenge the model of the ANA as highly problematic as an independent fighting force, or even a reliable embedded fighting force.

Prior:

Investigating the Battle of Wanat

Analysis of the Battle of Wanat

Battle of Wanat Disputed?