What kind of counterinsurgency for Afghanistan?
BY Herschel Smith
15 years, 1 month ago
Amid robust public debate concerning counterinsurgency and whether it works – and if so, what brand works – two successful counterinsurgency campaigns may be briefly studied to ascertain the common elements. At the recommendation of Professor Gian Gentile I have studied a paper by Karl Hack entitled “The Malayan Emergency as Counter-Insurgency Paradigm,” The Journal of Strategic Studies Vol. 32, No. 3, 383-414, June 2009. Hack argues (quite persuasively) that during the Malayan emergency (1948 – 1960, repeatedly cited for COIN examples) Britain applied distinct elements to different phases of the campaign, with the notion of winning hearts and minds coming after a phase of aggressive patrols, population control, etc. It is naive, argues Hack, to believe that the blend of policies found at the optimization phase will work at the outset of the conflict. This is important to remember as we ramp up reconstruction teams for Afghanistan in unsecured areas.
The next successful example is the campaign for Anbar. The much heralded tribal awakening (lead by Sheik Abdul Sattar Abu Risha) unique to Ramadi followed on the heels of significant kinetics to shut down the smuggling lines of Sheik Risha and even kill his tribal members in noteworthy gunfights. In Haditha it required sand berms surrounding the city (to keep fighters from infiltrating from Syria) along with a police strong man, Deputy Commander Lt. Col. Muhada Mahzir. In Al Qaim it required heavy kinetics by the U.S. Marines followed on by a police chief strong man named Abu Ahmed. In Fallujah it required heavy kinetics by the U.S. Marines followed on by biometrics, aggressive policing and patrols, gated communities, payment to the Sons of Iraq, and aggressive Iraqi police (and this in 2007 following even heavier kinetics during al Fajr in 2004).
Creation of utopia or comprehensive state-building wasn’t in the stable of features brought to bear on either campaign discussed above, and yet they were more than marginally successful. But creation of the circumstances necessary for population control wasn’t quick or easy, and there are no magical formulae to incant in order to effect these conditions. That’s why Gentile has argued that the center of gravity may not be the population, and it must be discovered by the forces involved in the conflict. I have gone further and argued that a campaign may not (and in many cases probably doesn’t) have a center of gravity, necessitating multiple lines of effort.
In all cases of successful counterinsurgency there have been enough troops (and the necessary tactics) to effect population control, and thus the idea of small units in forbidding human and physical terrain such as Wanat and Kamdesh are a profoundly bad idea, leading in the end to dead U.S. troops and ruined national reputation before the population we wish to control.
Andy McCarthy argues that McChrystal should be granted his troops for the campaign in Afghanistan (while also strangely arguing that the strategy isn’t clear – why would we sacrifice troops if the strategy isn’t clear?), and then later argues against the practice of counterinsurgency. More correctly, he is arguing against the practice of state building and population-centric counterinsurgency. The opposing view is expressed by Joshua Foust when he expresses doubt about the fact that the Marines can successfully occupy Garmsir but haven’t brought enough ANA and ANP forces or good Afghan governance with them for any kind of staying power. The Marines “thought” they had it right each time they swept through Garmsir.
But the facts are suitable to another narrative. The British could never hold Garmsir, which is why the U.S. Marine Corps 24th MEU was deployed there in 2008. They subsequently turned over to the British, who then could not hold the terrain. Hence, Operation Khanjar was necessary to once again retake Garmsir. The problem is not that the basic schema was wrong. The problem is that there have never been enough troops implementing the right tactics to hold the terrain once it has been taken. The 24th MEU had to leave. More U.S. Marines should have been deployed because creating good governance and population control – and killing the enemy – don’t happen overnight (as if we can wave a magic wand and deploy good governors and policemen).
McCarthy is right in that creating a utopia is neither a possibility nor a necessity in Afghanistan, but wrong in the implicit presupposition that counterinsurgency done right cannot work. Foust is right in that there needs to be follow-on stability, but as we have pointed out the ANA and ANP cannot now provide that security and population control. We have much less with which to work in Afghanistan than we did in Iraq. That’s why General Petraeus said that of the “long war,” Afghanistan would be the longest campaign.
Poverty doesn’t create radical Islamic insurgencies, since Bangladesh is among the most impoverished countries on earth but doesn’t suffer from the transnational actors that afflict Pakistan and Afghanistan. Raising Afghanistan from its impoverishment to a nation of relative wealth may be an impossible task, but may be unnecessary (contra the population-centric COIN advocates). The Taliban continue their propaganda campaign, lately by telling us effectively that they won’t allow al Qaeda back in (or at least that they have no global aspirations). This is a dubious claim given the mutual admiration, respect and even love between UBL and Mullah Omar. Hakimullah Mehsud, new head of Pakistan’s Tehrik-i-Taliban (and who may be much worse than the deceased Baitullah Mehsud), has said that the relationship between al Qaeda and the TTP is one of love and affection.
As for Garmsir, there are fighters that simply must be killed.
CAMP DELHI, Afghanistan, Oct 3 (Reuters) – On the frontline of Washington’s counter-insurgency in Afghanistan, intelligence officer Hajji Mir Hamzai stands before a map and tells a young Marine where the Taliban are next likely to strike.
“I know here and here, I have heard they want to place bombs,” Hamzai, an Afghan who works for the National Directorate of Security points to a wall and tells Captain Trevor Hunt through a translator.
Hunt wants to know if any of the Taliban in Garmsir district can be turned into allies.
“All Taliban are the same,” said Hamzai, whose three brothers were killed in two separate suicide attacks by the Taliban.
“There is another type which is also called Taliban. They are simple. They are not politicians, they are just locals … But the ones that fight, the only way is to kill them,” said Hamzai, who uses a network of undercover agents to gather information.
As there is in every insurgency, there are locals who will put away their weapons when they learn that the costs are too high to continue – but the corollary is that until they are persuaded of this fact they will not put away their weapons. But there is a hard core element that must be killed. This requires troops, as does long term securing and controlling the population.
We needn’t create a utopia, any more than we need to impose Western-style democracy. The religious and social underpinnings aren’t even in place to support such framework. But we must kill the globalists and we must control the population until such time as a reliable security apparatus is prepared to fill in behind us once we leave. This will be a long-duration effort. At one and the same time, this is the maximum and minimum we can hope to accomplish in this campaign. We don’t have the national resources or staying power to do more, but if we do less we will likely suffer having to repeat Operation Enduring Freedom because of the mistakes made the first time around. This is the nexus which defines success.
On October 8, 2009 at 8:09 am, TSAlfabet said:
Yes, indeed.
The overall point that is coming out through the ongoing debates is: (1) that Afgahanistan is not Iraq in terms of capacity for central government and that any effort to turn Afghanistan into anything like a modern state (even 20th Century modern) will be a costly and futile one, and; (2) success if possible in A-stan but not without a large increase in force projection married with lines of effort in population control, kinetic ops, special ops, COIN methodology, etc..
Having said that, McCarthy makes a very good point: what chance is there that this President is going to make the right call on this? If the President will not, what is the sense in staying in A-stan at all? Better to take the hit in prestige/propaganda, save military lives and treasure, and re-group for the inevitable re-invasion of A-stan (and/or Pakistan FATA) in 2013 after the next election. And let’s bring India along in 2013, too.
On October 8, 2009 at 4:03 pm, rrk3 said:
As we all know there are vast differences in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Just a few:
1. Iraq is relatively urban
2. Iraq’s people are vastly more educated than Afghanistan
3. Iraq also has a history of a strong central government and the institutions even if corrupt to govern.
4. Iraq also has a sense of nationhood even with tribal division
Afghanistan has none of these relative advantages for population centric warfare. In addition the main tribe does not look like they can be brought over to our side even though Karzi is a member.
I believe that there needs to be a surge into Afghanistan with probably more than 40K troops. There will be a need for large scale kinetic operations in the hopes that we for the short term can kill enough of them fast enough to buy us some time. Then instead of dictating COIN policy let the warfighters find the fulcrum. We should not think of the new COIN manual as the end all be all playbook that has to be followed but a guidline with good ideas.
On October 8, 2009 at 4:59 pm, BruceR said:
So the Helmand secret police guy is insistent that those guys down the road who killed three of his brothers and are trying to kill him need to all be killed by the Marines and can’t ever be allowed to surrender, and he’s ready to point out where they live. Check. Can’t see anything possibly going wrong with that scenario.
On October 8, 2009 at 5:47 pm, Herschel Smith said:
“Allowed to surrender.” Let’s try that once again.
“Allowed to surrender.” Oh my, I am afraid that thou dost daydream. You are following a different campaign than am I. No Taliban would want to surrender given the circumstances.
No, BruceR, I think he is suggesting something quite different. I think he is suggesting the same thing we saw here:
http://www.captainsjournal.com/2009/07/26/follow-and-kill-every-single-taliban/
The hard core folks won’t surrender.
On October 8, 2009 at 7:08 pm, Warbucks said:
Let me walk through one other idea…..
What we need is a light remote controlled aircraft of which there are several being tested by the US Army, that is taken to the forward post, flys a pattern over the post, synchronizing highly accurate GPS “micro”-coordinates onto a visual landscape. The visual landscape includes everything rocks, buildings, windows, trees, everything all recorded around the post and stored electronically. Every point in space in say 2-inch intervals is given its micro-coordinates around the forward post, several miles in each direction… say, out past mortar range.
Those micro-coordinates are then filed in master targeting computers and those coordinates are then released as needed to assigned strikes to any of several weapons the operator has in his arsenal.
The warrior in the field sees the enemy through electronic eyes. He touches his computer screen to identify the target, then taps the kill button (or pulls a trigger device), those 2-inch accurate GPS micro-coordinates are instantly routed into the assigned delivery weapon of choice which kills the target.
The warrior has to be taught several tasks, (a) target identification (b) weapon type selection (c) permissions and verifications (d) firing the weapon. His team partners maintain the weapons. Airborne weapons are maintained at a home base and sent back to the forward post.
The system has to be able to kill with high precision (like a sniper) with 99.99999% reliance. One of the weapons in the arsenal of weapons assigned to the operator needs to include an airborne, on-station drone always on station 24/7 out of hearing range, above the forward post. This enables the operator to call in instant air strikes with additional high precision.
It all works off a matrix base of very high quality GPS micro-coordinates which can only be obtained with a precursor flight by recording, remote controlled, low altitude aircraft either in advance of the forward post construction or as it is being constructed.
We have almost all this already, but we do not use micro-coordinates of that level of accuracy. That requires us to rely on larger weapons than needed or rely on greater use of ammunition than needed.
In theory a squad should be able to hold off a mass attack of several hundred.
Just a thought.
On October 9, 2009 at 9:07 am, BruceR said:
Dude, lots of Taliban surrender. Their jailors are bribed and they’re released, generally within 3 days or so, but every serious Taliban has been in ANSF custody at least once by now. It’s a timeout pass for them. I’ve shared benches in ANA offices with more than a few.
My point is not that serious ones will stop fighting. You’re right, they won’t. It’s that you’re relying on a guy with the NDS (the shiftiest of the ANSF agencies) and a family grudge to tell you who the serious ones are and thinking that’s somehow going to negatively affect the real insurgents. There’s lots of feud- and crime-based violence in these areas that has nothing to do with insurgency.
On October 9, 2009 at 9:42 am, Herschel Smith said:
I don’t think we’re saying such radically different things. When I say surrender, I mean really surrender. If it is as you say, then either [a] there are real Taliban gaming the system because the system sucks and they know how to use it to their advantage, or [b] they aren’t real Taliban.
I know that some of this happened in Iraq too, but the system in Iraq was suited to handle it to some degree. A system as UN-serious as you describe can never work, no matter how many NGOs we bring in to help.
Related: I think that they way to handle the local insurgents (not serious Taliban, but add-ons like the ones who do it for pay) is to make it so expensive in terms of risk to life that they relinquish their pay and melt away. We will never be able to “fix” Afghanistan well enough to make them relinquish this occupation because Afghanistan is a utopia. They must fear the occupation more than they loath any other.
At least, that’s the way it worked in much of Iraq.
On October 9, 2009 at 10:07 am, Herschel Smith said:
As a quick followup to the comment above, the population-centric COIN advocates claim that for every one insurgent killed, ten more pop up in his place. Yes, I know that they claim this.
10 insurgents, kill 1, now you have 9 + 10 = 19. Kill one, now you have 18 + 10 = 28. And so on. You can do the series with only one replacing the one you kill, and you never see a decrease in the insurgency.
But why does it have to be so? This is only an assumption, and a bad one at that. It didn’t work that way in the Anbar Province. It’s too bad when the doctrine that one espouses doesn’t match the facts. When that happens, one either has to change the doctrine or ignore the facts.
On October 10, 2009 at 8:33 am, rrk3 said:
Was reading the news this morning and there is a small glimmer and let me say small glimmer of hope here. The WSJ journal has a good article about using former Muj commanders from the Russian/Afghan war. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125512927578177051.html
To Hershel’s point about the exponential growth of insurgents I agree there is no emperical data to support the kill one get ten more. Also a way to solve this problem as I continue to say. Is to kill enough of them fast enough and let them know exactly what the cost is to bear arms against us and that will deter your “accidental guerillas.”
On October 10, 2009 at 12:35 pm, TSAlfabet said:
Warbucks, your idea would be swell except:
1. We have seen what happens when technology gives greater situational awareness of the battlespace– the “warrior” on the front line is slapped down and the decision making for “pulling the trigger” is given to a Colonel sitting in a FOB or in Kabul or even in Tampa. These gutless wonders then take forever to make a decision about whether to pull the trigger and the utility of such an awesome system is lost.
2. Even if the frontline warriors were allowed in practice to pull the trigger, they dare not because the !#$!#%!! ROE tell them that they must be 110% certain that (a) they have positively identified the person in that square inch of mud, and (b) there are no innocents or anyone who could possibly, remotely, conceivably be construed as an innocent or be MADE to look like an innocent by those crafty insurgents — this applies to sub (a) as well— and, (c) they are certain that they are using only the type of munition that will kill the insurgent in the most humane and merciful way possible with absolutely no chance that the UN, EU, NATO, Iran, Kabul, ISAF, Pakistan, China, Russia, Venezuela or Cuba would complain. If they get it wrong, then they can count on being brought up on charges by the JAG, the Hague, Spanish judges and the U.S. State Run Media. They can look forward to having their reputation trashed, their family targeted and a future of legal bills to pay off.
Other than that, it sounds like a neat system.
On October 10, 2009 at 12:45 pm, TSAlfabet said:
To echo other thoughts and amplify: if the U.S. is not willing even to send a paltry 40,000 troops to even take a shot at victory, there is no one in A-tan (or P-stan for that matter) who will take the U.S. seriously from here on out. They will rightly conclude that this Admin doesn’t have the guts for this fight and at that point it is all over.
We already see reports of U.S. troop morale plummeting based on the lack of resources and ROE. Once the word gets out that the U.S. is backing down, we will not be able to find a single, reliable ally anywhere in A-stan or P-stan. As I predicted some months ago, the State Run Media is already shaping the “public battlespace” in the U.S. to accept that A-stan is a lost cause and that half-ass measures are the best way forward.
Anytime that Joe Biden is getting serious attention, the ship is already sinking.
On October 10, 2009 at 12:59 pm, TSAlfabet said:
RRK3, thanks for the WSJ link.
the most disturbing thing I see from the article is this crazy idea of trying to ensure allegiance to “the central government.” What central government? We need to get used to the idea that A-stan is going to be a tribal, warlord society for the near future at least. We need to be co-opting these people like we did the sheiks and elders in Anbar. Our priority is to keep out Al Qaeda and secure the population. If we have to use hired guns, so be it.
And the comment by the U.S. officer that the police are the first line of defense is wrong. In a CIVIL society, police are the first line. In a war, the Army is that line. The police can only come in to the extent that an area has been pacified.
On October 10, 2009 at 8:05 pm, rrk3 said:
All,
Some research I did lately is that even if we kill 10,000 Taliban and allies a year for 10 year we will not even get into their military age males cycle. I do not think we are approaching this level now.
We are restrained by poor ROE. The Taliban in another article today I ready has quadrupled in size since 2006. Then today the TTP launch an attack on the GHQ of the Pakistan army. I am not getting real good vibes here.
Are we really in this to win or just contain?