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1. On July 14, 2010 at 9:06 am, Warbucks said:

   Before the American people or their representatives can grasp the true needs of our defense budget a reasonable assessment needs to include deep black-ops budget sources in summary form as well.

   Black-Ops Manpower , 600,000+- people, annual cost: .$________
   Black-Ops Equipment maintenance & Repairs:…………. $________
   Black-Ops R&D ………………………………………………. $________

   Otherwise we are just squeezing water balloons and thinking something real is being cut when we sacrifice here and watch it shrink, never noticing it ballooned-up over there, hidden from view.

2. On July 14, 2010 at 10:56 am, Ben said:

   Who exactly is going to follow us home and attack us if pull out of Europe? If we leave the Korean peninsula, is North Korea going to overrun South Korea, which has an economy 30 times bigger and a far better army and then build a real navy and attack California? Most of our deployments inject us into conflicts, or potential conflicts, that need not concern us. We can still debate whether it is nonetheless wise to be involved in each case. But what’s childish and naive is the idea that we fight them there to stay safe here.

   The recommendations we make for cutting the size of the ground forces are based on two assumptions about strategy. The first is that we have fewer conventional wars to fight than in the past, especially if we stop defending allies that can defend themselves. The second is that we ought to avoid occupying countries on a large-scale in the name of counterterrorism. If you want to occupy some more countries that would prefer otherwise and maybe fight a land war in Asia in the near future, then yes, you shouldn’t be for these cuts to the ground forces.

   It is indisputable that cutting the size of ground force would save buckets of money. So I don’t understand the claim that this recommendation has nothing to do with saving money.

   Looking at spending as percentage of GDP is useful in considering its economic burden. But what you fail to point out is that GDP grows. So our 4-5 percent today means more money, in real inflation adjusted terms, than what we spent at any point during the Cold War. I explain that in more detail in this blog post.

   http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/2009/06/25/misinformation-from-heritage/

   Ben Friedman

3. On July 14, 2010 at 12:43 pm, Herschel Smith said:

   Ben,

   It’s impossible to comprehensively address every aspect in an individual article, so you will have to see other articles I have written. As for your question regarding Europe and SK, I would agree (for the most part). We have no business defending Europe, and the so-called “sunshine diplomacy” in SK would evaporate in a day were the U.S. not there. In fact, I have recommended that both SK and Japan go nuclear, and the U.S. stop spending the money to provide the protection. Of course, all of this comes with caveats. Basing in Germany provides good air-logistics to Afghanistan, and our presence in the Caucasus needs to increase (or so I believe). Russia will eventually retake Georgia without U.S. pressure or intervention. But those are just caveats to consider. In the main, I agree with your initial thoughts.

   Where I disagree is that cutting defense spending is necessary. Of course we can save money by cutting defense, just like we can save if we cut medicare, and SS, and all sorts of other things. That’s not the point. The only reason anyone would ever see it as necessary to have something called a “sustainable” spending policy is when the current administration is printing as fast as the presses will roll and spending the country blind. Defense spending neither caused the problem to begin with nor can (defense cuts) get us out of the problem. The house is burning down, and your team is recommending that we weed the garden.

   I am neither a prophet nor son of a prophet, and neither are you. If you think that you know our future conflicts, you are fooling yourself, and while I favor cuts in certain areas (e.g., EFV, V-22, F-35 while also staying with the F-22), infantry battalions is not one of them. If you lose the core of our infantry, you have lost a lot. Perhaps you should consider just how few deployable infantry battalions we actually have.

   Cutting money for the EFV, pulling out of SK, allowing Japan to go nuclear (which I support) would save some. I repeat – some. It has nothing whatsoever to do with the country going bankrupt. No amount of revisions to defense can prevent that. Our country must get on a different path for that, one we could call “sustainable domestic spending.” I’m fundamentally liberatarian in my spending views anyway. I don’t believe in government spending for much except defense and national infrastructure for interstate commerce.

4. On July 14, 2010 at 3:23 pm, Ben said:

   The report is not about entitlement spending or non-military discretionary spending. It’s about defense. We spend more on defense than we spend on all discretionary spending. We spend roughly more than 40% than we spent in 2000, adjusting for inflation and leaving out the wars. So clearly defense spending contributes to the deficit. To say so is not to suggest that other programs should avoid scrutiny or cuts or that you can balance the budget by cutting military spending alone.

   We claim no more prescience than hawks. They have a view of the future that tells them that we should essentially buy more insurance against security dangers. We have a competing view of what the future requires, and say we would rather use some of that money to mitigate other risks. There are risks and uncertainties on both sides.

   We are not trying to gut the infantry. We are saying let’s have roughly 500,000 people active in both services. I think heavy divisions are great things to have around and wouldn’t want to do without them. What we’re after is radical only in comparison to the status quo. If we were building a military from scratch, and you looked around at what our friends and enemies had, I’d don’t think our proposal would seem nuts.

5. On July 14, 2010 at 4:22 pm, Herschel Smith said:

   But see, I think we’re saying the same thing, just from two different perspectives. You’re right, if we were in imaginary land building a military from scratch, what you recommend might make some sense, even be robust. But we don’t live in imaginary land, we have history and context.

   We have had the strongest military and defense establishment in the world for a very long time. It has served us well, viz. Kaplan’s Imperial Grunts (the first several chapters). Not even Ron Paul wants to pull a “full-on” Ron Paul. He wants essential military isolationism, but doesn’t understand (perhaps because of naivety?) that this requires a total lockdown of the borders, inspection of every crate coming in via sea, and a whole host of other things Ron Paul isn’t willing to consider.

   So it’s one thing to plan for less military engagement with the world. It’s quite another to make the hard choices that go along with the change of paradigm that this would cause in our trade, travel, etc., etc. This is another discussion entirely.

   We’re not as different as you might imagine, and I have taken many an abusive, profane e-mail from senior Marine Corps officers over my opposition to the EFV and the F-35 (for VTOL capability to replace the Harrier). We need neither.

   But it’s an entirely different thing to gut the infantry, to use your words. I don’t advocate “heavy” divisions, necessarily. I have advocated that the Corps be lighter. But I do not advocate their reduction.

   I think that this conversation misses my main point though. The question about “sustainable” defense spending is only salient because we’re frantically searching for money due to the significant increases in unnecessary domestic spending. But you might respond that the judgment that this domestic spending is unnecessary is a political judgment made by the voters and lawmakers.

   And you would be right. And so you do understand, don’t you, that the calculus behind the request for the study is one of a value judgment in a political climate? Right? Can we both stipulate to that?

   My value judgment(s) include a federal government that spends only a fraction of what it currently does, and then mainly on defense. In the judgment of those who sponsored the study, defense should be cut in order to make room for the increase in domestic spending (you don’t believe that these cuts will simply redound to surplus, do you?). So to say that your study wasn’t about cuts in domestic spending is a statement of the obvious and demonstrates my point. Of course it wasn’t. That isn’t what most of these lawmakers want to do.

6. On July 14, 2010 at 8:41 pm, Warbucks said:

   And the 3rd point is, we should follow the spirit of the Constitution with a “Declaration of War” before we go waring around the neighborhood.

7. On July 15, 2010 at 12:22 am, James Harris said:

   Count me as one of those supporting the notion that defense cuts are nuts. Further, in previous posts, I’ve even disagreed with the notion that some of the new toys are not necessary. I think many of them are, in the context of strategic and tactical “function” requirements, if not the actual implementation.

   But I specifically want to address the phrases “… follow the spirit of the Constitution…” and “… declare war before (warring) …” etc.

   I consider myself a “strict constructionist” (or nearly so) on the Constitution, lest we make it a meaningless anacronysm. I disagree with the “living constitution” concept that enables some jurists and others to remake society as they would like without going through the messy and uncertain process of constitutional amendments.

   But that said, I would ask what it means to “follow the spirit” (if not the letter) of the Constitution where a “Declaration of War” is concerned, especially in modern time. What does a “Declaration of War” look like, anyway? Is there just one format? Specified where? Must it unambiguously and always contain the words “We the Congress of the U.S. Declare War on … (whomever)?”

   OR, does the fact that (with or without “appropriate” debate), the Congress specifically allocates money authorizing military action at a specific time/place against whomever constitute a de facto “War Declaration?” What would a War Declaration against Al Queda and its supporters look like, compared to a similar declaration against a state? Must we “Declare War” to support “Peace Keeping” or “Peace Making” operations that could easily escalate? What about more dire events (e.g., nuclear exchange, which is still possible) where congressional involvement is totally impractical?

   It seems to me that the existing language the Congress uses to monitor these events, and its “power of the purse” is functionally adequate, especially in modern times. Whether a specific congressional decision is wise may be a subject of argument; but I think the current functional controls are adequate if Congress functions as it should. And if it does not, then a more strict constitutional interpretation won’t help.

8. On July 15, 2010 at 9:38 am, TSAlfabet said:

   Where to start?

   First, as to the exchange between the Captain and Mr. Friedman, I want to applaud both for their civil and rationale exchange. This blog is incredibly valuable as a means for allowing the public debate of vital policy issues. The fact that one of the authors from the Cato Institute took the time to engage in a meaningful way is encouraging. Too often our political discourse is short-circuited by an absolute refusal respond rationally to well-conceived critiques.

   That said I am a big fan of the old saw that we not lose the forest for the trees. I believe the Captain touched on this, but it cannot be overemphasized that this kind of policy Report cannot, *ever*, be considered in isolation from the larger realities.

   One of these “larger realities” is the political environment which has both given birth to this Report and which will receive and implement this Report. This political environment is a White House, House and Senate that are currently controlled, in the main, by Statists– those who believe that a strong, central government is good and necessary and believe in more government spending and more bureaucracy and more central control. This is undeniable reality.

   Another “larger reality” which directly conflicts with the political environment is the unsustainable levels of deficit spending and national debt, particularly as percentages of national GDP. With the sole exception of Paul Krugman, virtually all economists agree (and the recent example of Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Ireland underscore) that the sovereign debt must be brought under control.

   Turning back to the Report, in light of the larger, political environment of spend spend spend and the economic/sovereign debt crisis, it is clear that the Report was motivated/animated by the almost desperate desire by the current ruling class to find *what they consider* to be palatable spending cuts. The ruling class cannot even contemplate cuts to social programs or the non-defense portions of the budget; those are sacrosanct. It is highly unlikely that the people will accept anything like the kind of tax hikes that would be necessary to balance out the budget. Cuts must be made and those cuts, according to the ruling class, cannot come from non-defense items.

   So the grim reality of this Report is that it is, in the final analysis, not a list of spending cuts but, in fact, a TRANSFER of spending from defense to non-defense spending. There is absolutely zero chance that any savings that might be realized from defense cuts will actually go toward reducing the national debt; they will be absorbed entirely by non-defense programs.

   And there is the larger reality that the majority of Americans are not going to accept large cuts in defense spending at a time when we are constantly reminded of the dangerous world we inhabit. So in this sense it must be pointed out that this Report is more or less dead on arrival. It may make the rounds of the Sunday talk shows and give some ammunition to Leftist politicians and the anti-war crowd, but it has little hope of ever being implemented. In my opinion, the main utility of this Report is for the ruling class to use as a scare tactic with the American public, to claim that if significant tax increases are not implemented then massive cuts to the defense budget as outlined in the Report, will be inevitable. “The Report says so,” they will claim. And they will claim that this Report is unbiased, bi-partisan, authoritative, inarguable.

   Finally, turning to the substance of the Report and its rationale, it is incredibly dangerous and short-sighted. As the Captain noted, none of us possess magical abilities to foretell the future threats to this country. Even Ben Friedman admits that a defense budget essentially is an attempt to “buy more insurance against security dangers…” It is an apt analogy. Imagine a home that is located in a home in a flood plain, in a tornado alley, on a fault line, just south of an active volcano, down the street from a reform school for pyromaniacs and across town from the mafia. There is no, other place to move. There are many threats here. There may be even some we don’t know about or cannot comprehend or imagine. But all of them are very real threats. Some immediate, some remote. Some that need immediate attention and others that may or may not ever materialize. How much insurance do you think it would be wise to obtain? How much would you spend to address the kids from the school continuing lighting fires around your property? How much to counter the moves of the mafia to set up a protection racket in your neighborhood? What about saving up for that massive flood that may wash away your home?

   It seems to me that the debate, as Friedman himself has framed it no less, is between spending on a better water treatment system (to carry through the analogy) or buying a gun to protect yourself against the real threat of a home invasion. No doubt Friedman and others could make sound arguments that domestic problems like health care and ‘living wages’ are urgent, too. But are they existential? To use the home analogy, can we maybe fix the leak in the roof ourselves rather than calling in the Federal Contractor and overpaying for his union employees, incompetence and shoddy work? And more to the point, we deceive ourselves to the extent that we think that any money saved from buying that extra “insurance” (i.e., defense cuts) is going to alleviate that backed up sewer rather than go towards building a hot tub for better backyard parties.

   It sounds a bit hypocritical for the same people who insisted throughout the Bush 43 Administration (and still insist today) that we cannot even contemplate any military action against the psychos building nukes in Iran because our military is “overstretched” or “overcommitted” or “burned out with too many overseas deployments” to suggest that we can somehow afford to reduce combat forces and shrink the military. In yet another “reality,” we are seeing that our military is not too big for the very real missions at hand but too small.

   And what about history of military reductions? If you were put in charge of risk management for the U.S. as far as national security, what would history tell you? Just in the last 100 years we have witnessed cuts to the size of the U.S. military in the 1920’s and 30’s, in the late 1940’s, again after the Vietnam War in the 70’s and after the end of the Cold War in the 90’s. In every instance, the U.S. paid a steep price. We were badly unprepared for WWII due to the cuts of the 20’s and 30’s. We were almost overwhelmed in Korea because we had so quickly demobilized after WWII. The U.S. was so depleted and demoralized after Vietnam that we could not even mount a credible mission to rescue our hostages in Iran and watched helplessly as the Soviets and their proxies took over a steady string of countries in the 70’s. Again, after the Cold War was won in 1990, when Clinton took the so-called “peace dividend,” we were unable to quickly and effectively mobilize a response to the 9/11 attacks, relying on special ops forces and smart bombs. In each case, it took years to get our military back to effective levels. It could be argued that Bush 43 did not do nearly enough to increase combat forces which resulted in overtaxing National Guard and Reserve units. In any event, from a risk management point of view, shrinking the number of combat forces has never been a wise move and has always been attended by negative consequences.

   This statement typifies the wrong-headed thinking of Preble and Friedman:

   “We are spending more on our military than we have at any point since World War II,” Preble said. “It’s absurd to think that the type of threats that we‘re dealing with today in 2010 are greater than what we dealt with in 1950 or 1960 or 1970. It’s absolutely absurd.”

   Really? In 1950 we had a massive nuclear advantage and a roaring economy. In 1960 it was basically a bi-polar world where we were at least dealing with a rational opponent that “blinked” on the missiles in Cuba. In 1970 we had a war in Vietnam that would soon be turned around by General Abrams and the change in tactics; we were withdrawing ground forces by 1973.

   To say that the threats we face today are absurdly less than the threats of the past is childish. We can argue about the relative level of threats over the last 60 years, but there is no doubt that we live in a very, very dangerous world that is far more multi-polar, inter-connected and susceptible to instantaneous mass destruction by ever-smaller and harder to detect devices. The attacks of 9/11 should have permanently awakened us to a new world where our security can be threatened in ways that we cannot imagine. The threats of the 50’s, 60’s and even through the 80’s seem almost quaint in comparison. Then we were worried about massive land engagements in Europe or Asia. Our nuclear deterrent was always a final backstop. Short of a massive ICBM exchange with the Soviets, there was no fear of attack on the homeland. What about now? We should know now that the threats are too numerous to list and only limited by the imagination of the Islamofascists who have no fear of nuclear retaliation. If an Iranian regime gets nukes, we are in deep, deep trouble. For Preble and Friedman to dismiss these threats as “absurd” is either arrogance or astounding short-sightedness. In any event, considering the range of threats– from terrorism to an ever-increasing aggressiveness from China and Russia– this is no time to start taking chances with a defensive posture. That might have been plausible in 1920, but let’s face it: we were lucky on 9/11/01; the attacks could have been much, much worse. And you can bet that when the next one comes, the terrorists will make sure that it will be.

   God help us if the recommendations in the Report are carried through.

9. On July 16, 2010 at 9:37 am, Warbucks said:

   It looks like this: …”Therefore be it Resolved by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress Assembled, that the state of war between the United States and the Imperial German Government which has thus been thrust upon the United States is hereby formally declared”….

10. On July 20, 2010 at 3:53 pm, Warbucks said:

    Over the past few years I have been on am amazing fact-finding discovery mission and have been staggered to learn a few things at the personal level of experience:
    (1) There is another real science in black-ops which is unlike anything taught in our schools, generally referred to as subquantum kinetics, which does a better job of describing reality than relativistic space-time or Newtonian Mechanistic models
    (2) black ops has weapons and equipment so far advanced over anything the public is allowed to know, even the new X-51 Waverider pales in comparison,
    (3) with 850,000 top secrete Americans and their smattering of Super Users, there are another 600,000 Above-Top-Secrete still unaccounted for even in that number
    (4) Unless with begin full disclosure to the American public and the rest of the world, there will be no “Republic” for American soldiers to protect.
    (5) Liberty, Freedom, and the pursuit of happiness can be a thing of the past within 5 years. Tyranny is closing in on us faster than we can shake it loose and the enemies of freedom are world wide, with a large and powerful share right here in the USA.

    So while we argue over a billion here and a billion there, trillions are being plundered away from us in programs no one has any notion exists.

    The more you think this is crazy talk, the worse off we are.

11. On July 22, 2010 at 8:50 pm, Warbucks said:

    Here’s one source of many excellent http://projectavalon.net/Paul_Hellyer_Bill_Ryan_20_July_2010.mp3

12. On July 22, 2010 at 8:54 pm, Warbucks said:

    Here is another released advancement, the technology of which we do not yet understand, called “Trophy”, which claims to stop inbound kinetic weapons. Trophy is some sort of energy wall being used on mobile armored vehicles.

    One of its 8 marketing claims (seen 2 min 58 secs into the Youtube Video (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=62jzAupr044)) clearly states: REDUCES PLATFORM WEIGHT as feature number 5 of 8 features.

    The video does not state that it will stop dumb-bullets. All the inbound kinetic weapons appear to include some sort of trigger device which would include electronic circuitry. Trophy would seem to set up a strong magnetic spherical protective shield that gives a false target-contact signal to the weapon’s triggering mechanism, which in turn detonates the device prematurely, rendering the incoming weapon’s armor piercing kinetics useless.

    But even still, the statement that the device REDUCES PLATFORM WEIGHT is quite profound and would seem to represent the first time I have seen a defense contractor promote such a anti-gravity marketing disclosure.

13. On July 23, 2010 at 1:02 pm, Warbucks said:

    If I had to guess about how Trophy functions after reading “Secrets of Anti-gravity Propulsion” by Dr. Paul A. LaViolette, Ph.D.-physics, I would guess that there is a phase-conjugate mircrowave beam that is transmitted to a permanent sensor probe shield. This would require considerable electric power. A tank would be large enough to carry such a device.

14. On July 23, 2010 at 1:34 pm, Herschel Smith said:

    Let’s leave comments on this post to those which are relevant to the topic please.

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