Archive for the 'Department of Defense' Category

The draft version of the Army’s Full Spectrum Operations Field Manual counsels against the approach used by Rumsfeld (minimum force projection).  “The big idea here is that stability tasks have to be a consideration at every level and every operation,” said Clinton Ancker III, head of the Army’s Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate and an author of the guide … The old manual emphasized that stability operations usually follow combat. The draft version of the 2007 ground operations manual instructs commanders that they cannot wait for offensive operations to end before providing security and services for the population.  “Army forces must defeat enemies and simultaneously shape the civil situation through stability or civil support operations.”  In a more developed understanding of what proper force projection can accomplish – and conversely, what we missed in our toppling of the Saddam regime – it is now seen that lack of security can be the catalyst for an insurgency.

Rumsfeld’s critics generally have pointed to summer 2003 as the period when the most important misstep was made in Iraq. American forces were drawn down, and the military did not react quickly to confront a rising insurgency.

The draft manual says the seeds of an insurgency can be planted early on, even during initial military operations. And the guide’s authors say the missteps that gave rise to the insurgency may have occurred during the march to Baghdad.

“There is a period of time in the immediate aftermath of any fight where the population will rely on the [American] military to keep them safe and provide essential services,” Ancker said.

The concept, according to Ancker, is akin to what battlefield medics call the “golden hour” — the short period in which patients can be saved if their wounds are properly treated. During an offensive operation, if a military does not try to at least bandage the wounds of a society, the effort can suffer even if the battle is won. After an urban battle, commanders must try to provide basic services and security, the manual says.

“If we do not plan to account for those tasks in the immediate aftermath of a fight,” Ancker said, “then there is a period of time somebody else can step in and use that failure as a lever to create disaffected parts of the population, and that can turn into … an insurgency.”

The U.S. war in Iraq was an attempt to perform the operations fast and cheap and good, and therefore we have achieved none of those objectives.  Because we have unnecessary strategic commitments across the globe (e.g., in Japan, Europe), our force projection wanted for troops, and without them the war effort has involved prolonged operations.  While U.S. troops have performed remarkably well and with bravery, the situation on the ground is devolving, with a trend of increasing casualties.  Also because of the prolonged operations, the war effort has been anything but cheap.

The U.S. electorate has no stomach for prolonged operations, as proven by the recent election.  If wisdom is to be gleaned from this, it would be that the old engineer’s adage of “good, fast and cheap, pick any two,” should be amended to say “good, fast and cheap, pick any two as long as ‘fast’ is included.”

As evidence that the Pentagon has still proven incapable of understanding this last point, the panel of officers commissioned by General Pace to study the war and make recommendations has come back with the following: “Go Home, Go Big, or Go Longer.”

Consider the thoughts of a soon-to-be-deployed Soldier or Marine: “Will I be the last one to die in Iraq?”  Perhaps the panel should have deployed to Iraq before authoring the study.  Stubbornness in the military administration is a sign of stolid thinking.  Again, ‘go longer‘ is not an option.  It never was, it is not now, and it never will be.

There is a flurry of combat activity occurring near Baghdad and in the al Anbar Province. 

On Monday, November 13, eleven insurgents were killed in three related incidents in Ramadi.  Coalition Forces observed a small number of insurgents emplacing an improvised explosive device.  The insurgents were engaged by Coalition Forces with small arms fire, killing two.  The three remaining insurgents returned to the emplacement site and Coalition Forces fired one tank main gun round, killing all three insurgents.  There were secondary explosions, and the remains of the IED continued to burn for about an hour.

Following an IED attack on a Coalition vehicle four hours later in the same vicinity, four insurgents were killed after they attempted to take mission essential equipment from the vehicle.  Two of the insurgents were killed by small arms fire and two were killed with one main gun tank round.  This event occurred during curfew hours.

In a separate incident Nov. 14 in the same vicinity, three insurgents were observed emplacing an improvised explosive device.  They were engaged with small arms fire and a main tank gun round.  Two insurgents were killed.

On Tuesday, November 14, the same day as the operations were being conducted in Ramadi, a Coalition Forces air strike killed three terrorists (MNF Web Site implies al Qaeda) in Yusifiyyah (Youssifiyah).  Coalition Forces tracked the terrorists’ movement on a dirt road on the outskirts of Yusifiyya.  Based on intelligence that linked the vehicle and the three terrorists to a local vehicle-borne improvised explosion device facilitation network, Coalition aircraft engaged and destroyed the vehicle with precision fires.  Youssifiyah is a rural area twelve miles south of Baghdad.

Also on November 14, one Soldier and three Marines died in combat operations in the al Anbar Province.

On Thursday, November 16, Coalition Forces killed nine terrorists and detained nine suspected terrorists during a raid just south of Yusifiyah.  As Coalition Forces approached the targeted area, they called out for people to exit the buildings. Ground forces noticed several armed individuals in a nearby wooded area maneuvering against them.  Close air support was called in to mitigate the threat to the Coalition Forces ground team.  Coalition aircraft engaged the terrorists with precision fires.Several of the terrorists killed were wearing suicide vests.

The al Anbar Province remains the most dangerous part of Iraq, and security is not being achieved in part due to the lack of support by the Iraqi government.

The Shiite-dominated central government is starving Iraqi security forces in the Sunni heartland of the resources needed to fight the insurgency, according to American officers.

In Anbar province, a Sunni region west of Baghdad, many police officers haven’t been paid for three months. “It’s difficult to ask a man to risk his life if you can’t even pay him,

The talking points of Bush’s plan have been leaked to the press.  The Guardian is reporting the story:

President George Bush has told senior advisers that the US and its allies must make “a last big push” to win the war in Iraq and that instead of beginning a troop withdrawal next year, he may increase US forces by up to 20,000 soldiers, according to sources familiar with the administration’s internal deliberations.
Mr Bush’s refusal to give ground, coming in the teeth of growing calls in the US and Britain for a radical rethink or a swift exit, is having a decisive impact on the policy review being conducted by the Iraq Study Group chaired by Bush family loyalist James Baker, the sources said.

Although the panel’s work is not complete, its recommendations are expected to be built around a four-point “victory strategy” developed by Pentagon officials advising the group. The strategy, along with other related proposals, is being circulated in draft form and has been discussed in separate closed sessions with Mr Baker and the vice-president Dick Cheney, an Iraq war hawk.

Point one of the strategy calls for an increase rather than a decrease in overall US force levels inside Iraq, possibly by as many as 20,000 soldiers. This figure is far fewer than that called for by the Republican presidential hopeful, John McCain. But by raising troop levels, Mr Bush will draw a line in the sand and defy Democratic pressure for a swift drawdown.

The reinforcements will be used to secure Baghdad, scene of the worst sectarian and insurgent violence, and enable redeployments of US, coalition and Iraqi forces elsewhere in the country.

Point two of the plan stresses the importance of regional cooperation to the successful rehabilitation of Iraq. This could involve the convening of an international conference of neighbouring countries or more direct diplomatic, financial and economic involvement of US allies such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.

“The extent to which that [regional cooperation] will include talking to Iran and Syria is still up for debate …

Point three focuses on reviving the national reconciliation process between Shia, Sunni and other ethnic and religious parties. According to the sources, creating a credible political framework will be portrayed as crucial in persuading Iraqis and neighbouring countries alike that Iraq can become a fully functional state …

Lastly, the sources said the study group recommendations will include a call for increased resources to be allocated by Congress to support additional troop deployments and fund the training and equipment of expanded Iraqi army and police forces. It will also stress the need to counter corruption, improve local government and curtail the power of religious courts.

Let us at TCJ be the first out of the gate to say that this plan will fail.

First, 20,000 more troops is not nearly enough.  We need 220,000.

Second, talks with Syria and Iran will only embolden these two countries, with Iran being the most worrisome.  At at time when the U.S. should be working hard to set boundary conditions and stipulations for Iran’s behavior in the Middle East, to talk with them would undercut the U.S. position to the point that warnings will lose all force and the U.S. will lose all respect.

Third – and this point also addresses Abizaid’s testimony today before the Senate in which he said that more embedded U.S. troops with the Iraqi army and police would hasten turnover – we are still refusing to face the socio-religious landscape in Iraq.  The history of Shi’a-Sunni relations is almost as old as Islam, and just as violent.  This factious warring is getting worse, not better.  Ilan Berman, vice president for policy at the American Foreign Policy Council in Washington, states that “We have a ringside seat not only to radical Islam’s war with us, but to what’s really emerging as a civil war between radical Sunni Islam and radical Shia Islam.”  There is no lack of ability to police or wage war among either the Sunni or Shia.  The problem is not one of incompetence.  It is one of religious war.

Fourth, more money would have helped two years ago and with a stable Iraq.

Central Command (CENTCOM), responsible for operations in the Middle East, East Africa and Central Asia, is currently located in Tampa, Florida.  In what I see as a high stakes gambling move, the U.S. is moving CENTCOM to Qatar.

The United States will shift the headquarters of the Army’s Central Command to a new and expanded facility in Qatar, the US ambassador said here on Tuesday.

“Qatar and the US are cooperating towards building a new headquarters for the US Central Command. Camp Al Sayliyya has been the temporary base for several years. The two countries will expand the facilities at the Al Udeid airbase,” Chase Untermeyer told a press conference.

[ … ]

“In fact there are plans to build more infrastructure at the Al Udeid airbase not just by the US, but also by the Government of Qatar … Now the Qatari Air Force operates out of the civil airport and at some point, in one or two years, they will operate from Al Udeid airbase, which means construction of extra facilities,” Untermeyer said.

Without going into detail on US troops in Qatar and the long-term objectives, the US envoy said: “We have a very strong military relationship with Qatar, but we are guests here, so I would not define how permanent our presence is.”

He said the bases do not host combat troops, but provide logistical support to the US Air Force and used as transit points for the military.

This move parallels the construction of the gigantic U.S. embassy in Baghdad, a mammoth $592 million facility.  Despite protestations to the contrary from all sides, the U.S. will have a presence in the Middle East for years to come.  Moreover, it is likely that the U.S. will not deploy forces completely out of Iraq or the Middle East for decades.

Just in case you object, the U.S. adminstration says, “you want to bet?”

In Why Rumsfeld Had to Go, we discussed the grand new approach to warfare, enabled and spurred by the use of technology, proxy fighters, political pressure, and financial persuasion.  Here is an eerie reminder of the overprediction of the power and usefulness of our technological advantage, from just before the Iraq war:

WASHINGTON — As the nation prepares for war with Iraq, military officials say space-based assets in Earth orbit are ready to give U.S. troops and their allies a significant edge over the enemy.

“Whether it’s Iraq or any other enemy of the United States and its allies, I would tell you that we’re so dominant in space that I would pity a country that would come up against us,” said Air Force Maj. Gen. Franklin J. “Judd” Blaisdell, director of space operations and integration.

“The synergy with air, land and sea forces and our ability to control the battle space and seize the high ground is devastating,” Blaisdell said March 12 during a Pentagon briefing for reporters. “I don’t believe that many of them understand how powerful we are.”

Unfortunately, structures, systems and components in space cannot kill guerrillas.  Group-think is a dangerous thing in any profession, but in the superlative degree as it regards war.

Ever since the publication of Unrestricted Warfare by two Chinese military strategists, the Chinese have been interested in the utilization of all assets – military, financial, communication, technological – to wage war.  It has been said that the Chinese admired, and were even jealous of, the the U.S. war strategy in Afghanistan.  Ostensibly, the use of proxy fighters (i.e, the Northern Alliance), technology (bombs guided to their targets by Air Force special forces operators), and political pressure were key ingredients to successful military operations in the twenty first century.

But if the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq haven’t taught us anything else, we have learned that “force transformation” with a few more special forces operators carrying gizmos and gadgets and electronic toys simply cannot replace a military.  In an insightful critique of Rumsfelf’s bold new vision, Opfor has this to say:

To some, his leadership was inspirational. To others, he was the guy who was single handedly dismantling a force that had barely survived eight years of Clinton-era defense cuts. The name for the pain was Transformation, Rumsfeld’s baby. The Pentagon’s “bridge to the 21st century.” And before September 11, it sounded and felt pretty slick. A lighter force, with emphasis on flexibility, technology, and force multiplication. Maximum effect, minimum loss cheered supporters.

In Afghanistan, Transformation was looking pretty good. A couple of hundred SPECOP warriors exploited our new, network-centric approach to warfighting and accomplished what the much-feared Soviet juggernaut could not. Who needs tanks? Who needs divisions? One foward air controller with a horse, a laptop, and a MILSTAR uplink to a B-52 could now do the heavy-lifting of an entire mechanized brigade.

And that’s when Transformation blasted off. The Air Force started delivering Raptors and Global Hawks while BRAC cut our fighter force by 20%. Money poured into the Army’s Future Combat Systems, the Marine led V-22 procurement, and the Navy’s new Littoral Combat Ships. New tankers for the Air Force, new EELV heavy lift rockets to facilitate our budding space weapons program, a new class of aircraft carrier and a new class attack sub. All very useful weapon systems, but all very expensive weapon systems.

Operation Iraqi Freedom was supposed to get the Transformation concept over that final, sizable high-cost hurdle. Afghanistan was mostly asymmetric, fought almost exclusively at the platoon and company level. OIF was Transformation’s real test. State v. State conflict, a real army -albeit ill-equipped and poorly trained- to prove the mettle of the new force. And again, Transformation worked. Less troops, higher tech did the job. Mission accomplished.

And like a Shakespearean tragedy, Rumsfeld’s bold new vision for a brave new military collasped at the height of its success. The insurgency dug-in, and with each IED blast another hole was punched in the Transformation concept. Billion-dollar B2s flew helpless overhead as suicide bombers and roadside bombs took the lives of troops who lacked armor on their Humvess and on their bodies. 100 dollar bombs killed 100,000 dollar weapon systems. The highly touted, highly financed UAV force could only watch as car bombers exploded Iraqi marketplaces. What we needed was more troops. What we got was more gizmos.

Rumsfeld’s bold new vision for the military created a cultural milieu in which it was possible to envision remarkable military successes with what we now know to be inadequate force projection.  Like sycophants, the strategists around him wrote doctrine that created the theoretical framework to support this culture, and so the stage was set – as if a tragic theatrical production – for the situation we now face in both Afghanistan and Iraq.

We cannot shirk our responsibilities and hide the ugly truth.  The top military brass were complicit in this affair, at least some of them, but it all starts at the top.  And Rumsfeld was at the top.  Things now public began in secret some time ago in war gaming conducted by Marine General Anthony Zinni called “Desert Crossing.”  Zinni’s group came back with remarkably different recommendations than what ended up being put into place for the Iraq campaign:

The former CENTCOM commander noted that his plan had called for a force of 400,000 for the invasion — 240,000 more than what Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld approved. “We were concerned about the ability to get in there right away, to flood the towns and villages,” USA Today quoted Zinni as saying in July 2003. “We knew the initial problem would be security.”

Army General Thomas “Tommy” Franks adjusted the concept when he assumed command of CENTCOM upon Zinni’s retirement. Yet even his initial version of OPLAN 1003-98 envisioned a need for 385,000 troops, according to the book, COBRA II, — before Rumsfeld insisted that the number be sharply reduced.

The plan called for 400,000 troops, Rumsfeld approved a fraction of 0.4 of that, for a total of 160,000 troops.  So in spite of all of the bluster about giving the generals all the troops that had been requested, we now know that this was a subterfuge.  It was all smoke and mirrors.

With its strict deference to rank, the military is “hard wired” to be impervious to peer review.  Yet this is exactly what is called for by war planners.  The civilian world does this every day.  Lawyers review the work of other lawyers, engineers review other engineers, and so forth.  In the very best reviews, rank and seniority mean nothing.  The good, bad and the ugly get heard, and the dissenting voices are encouraged and given a stage on which to speak.

But it all starts at the top, and Rumsfeld was unwilling to listen to his subordinates.  This obstinance, this unwillingness to bend and adapt and adjust and modify, limited the successfulness of an otherwise brilliant man.  But it did much more than that.  It placed our boys in harm’s way without what they needed to effect the mission and win the victory.

And thus has America’s experiment with “unrestricted warfare” ended.  I don’t really care whether China learns from this example.  But the U.S. must.

On November 2, 2006, I published “Missing Weapons and Iraq’s Open Border Policy.”  In this post I argued that Iraq’s borders were essentially open, with inadequate border personnel or U.S. troop force levels to effect good border security.  I showed that the borders were replete with traffic to the point that the border guards could only log information on passports rather than inspect them for forgery.  We showed that the weapons necessary to wage jihad were already in Iraq, and that the requirements to war against the U.S. forces were twofold: cash and a fake passport.

On November 4, 2006, the Multi-National Force web site published an article entitled “Teams Build Relationships at Border.”  The story is about a joint Iraqi-U.S. border transition team, and it conveys the teamwork, mentoring, challenges and friendships associated with such a team.  It is quite a nice story, with the exception of the following assertion: “Observing this exchange, it becomes evident the border is not the only thing being secured in this remote area.”

The evidence I have marshalled in defense of my hypothesis includes, but is not limited to, the following:

1. Michael Rubin’s work showing a heavy influx of Iranian intelligence assets, money, communications equipment and military materiel into Iraq just before the war began.
2. The Washington Post reported that “Iranian personnel have established safe houses throughout southern Iraq. They monitor the movement of coalition forces, tend weapons caches, facilitate cross-border travel of clerics, smuggle munitions into Iraq and recruit individuals as intelligence sources.”
3. Iraqi General Nazim Mohammed, chief of Iraq’s border police in Muntheria, stated in June of 2005 that Iranian personnel were responsible for leading operations against Iraq.  “We captured three men and there is proof they blew up oil pipelines near Nuft Khaneh under the orders of Iranian intelligence officers,
   

Sun Tzu, “The Art of War,” III.4: “Thus, what is of supreme importance is to attack the enemy’s strategy.”  Tu Mu comments, ‘He who excels at resolving difficulties does so before they arise.  He who excels at conquering enemies triumphs before threats materialize.’

The Iraq-Iran border was a problem from before the war began.  Michael Rubin noted with some dismay the lack of U.S. responsiveness to the huge influx of fighters, Iranian intelligence assets, and cash that came from Iran into Iraq before the war.  I noted that the border is still problematic, with a flow of traffic so significant that the Iraqi border guards cannot keep up with it or adequately inspect all traffic.

Turning west to the Anbar Province, discussing Michael Fumento’s reporting on Combat Operation Posts, we saw that there was a well-worn path into Iraq in use by foreign fighers:

The impact of the FOB system was shown to me on a map. The foreigners who come into this area do so along a mini-Ho Chi Minh trail from the west, namely Jordan and Syria. And the foreigners tend to be better trained. Certainly any good sniper will come from that route, because Iraqis are terrible shots and hence crummy snipers.

I mentioned that the U.S. would see success in the war in the al Anbar Province by turning this trail into a shooting gallery.  The fighers would die or turn around at the border.  This might have been wishful thinking.  In the continuing theme of inadequate force projection, the Washington Post has an enlightening article on the porous Iraq-Syria border.

U.S. troops in the area are concerned that controls are too loose. For instance, the passport office is sparse and includes a single officer sitting at a desk behind a barred window where travelers line up to show their passports. The officer simply enters the information from each passport into a small ledger.

“The only thing he’s really doing is nothing more than creating a historical log,” said 1st Sgt. Richard DeLeon, 40, of Shafter, Calif., also a member of Apache Troop. “We can’t scan your passport to find out if it’s fake, we can’t scan your photo. You can come in if you have a legitimate passport or a good fake. The weapons are already in Iraq. All you really need to do is bring money.”

Turning our attention for a moment towards the proliferation of weapons, in an interesting finding by the Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, we have learned that there are many missing U.S. weapons in Iraq:

The Pentagon cannot account for 14,030 weapons – almost 4 percent of the semiautomatic pistols, assault rifles, machine guns, rocket-propelled grenade launchers and other weapons it began supplying to Iraq since the end of 2003, according to a report from the office of the special inspector general for Iraq reconstruction.

The missing weapons will not be tracked easily: The Defense Department registered the serial numbers of only about 10,000 of the 370,251 weapons it provided – less than 3 percent.

1st Sgt. Richard DeLeon isn’t the only one who is concerned about the presence of weapons in Iraq.  Speaking of the U.S. plan to arm the Sunni tribes who have allegedly sided with the government to hunt down al-Qaeda, Iraqi authorities have expressed deep concern over the final disposition of the weapons:

New Iraqi Army Brigadier-General Jassim Rashid al-Dulaimi, from Anbar province, said: “I cannot imagine 30,000 more guns in the Iraqi field. I hope they will reject the idea. Iraq needs more engineers and clean politicians to solve the dilemma of the existing militias rather than recruiting new ones to kill more Iraqis. The idea sounds to me [like] turning the country into a mercenary-recruitment center.

Sun Tzu, “The Art of War,” III.4: “Thus, what is of supreme importance is to attack the enemy’s strategy.”  Tu Mu comments, ‘He who excels at resolving difficulties does so before they arise.  He who excels at conquering enemies triumphs before threats materialize.’

The Iraq-Iran border was a problem from before the war began.  Michael Rubin noted with some dismay the lack of U.S. responsiveness to the huge influx of fighters, Iranian intelligence assets, and cash that came from Iran into Iraq before the war.  I noted that the border is still problematic, with a flow of traffic so significant that the Iraqi border guards cannot keep up with it or adequately inspect all traffic.

Turning west to the Anbar Province, discussing Michael Fumento’s reporting on Combat Operation Posts, we saw that there was a well-worn path into Iraq in use by foreign fighers:

The impact of the FOB system was shown to me on a map. The foreigners who come into this area do so along a mini-Ho Chi Minh trail from the west, namely Jordan and Syria. And the foreigners tend to be better trained. Certainly any good sniper will come from that route, because Iraqis are terrible shots and hence crummy snipers.

I mentioned that the U.S. would see success in the war in the al Anbar Province by turning this trail into a shooting gallery.  The fighers would die or turn around at the border.  This might have been wishful thinking.  In the continuing theme of inadequate force projection, the Washington Post has an enlightening article on the porous Iraq-Syria border.

U.S. troops in the area are concerned that controls are too loose. For instance, the passport office is sparse and includes a single officer sitting at a desk behind a barred window where travelers line up to show their passports. The officer simply enters the information from each passport into a small ledger.

“The only thing he’s really doing is nothing more than creating a historical log,” said 1st Sgt. Richard DeLeon, 40, of Shafter, Calif., also a member of Apache Troop. “We can’t scan your passport to find out if it’s fake, we can’t scan your photo. You can come in if you have a legitimate passport or a good fake. The weapons are already in Iraq. All you really need to do is bring money.”

Turning our attention for a moment towards the proliferation of weapons, in an interesting finding by the Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, we have learned that there are many missing U.S. weapons in Iraq:

The Pentagon cannot account for 14,030 weapons – almost 4 percent of the semiautomatic pistols, assault rifles, machine guns, rocket-propelled grenade launchers and other weapons it began supplying to Iraq since the end of 2003, according to a report from the office of the special inspector general for Iraq reconstruction.

The missing weapons will not be tracked easily: The Defense Department registered the serial numbers of only about 10,000 of the 370,251 weapons it provided – less than 3 percent.

1st Sgt. Richard DeLeon isn’t the only one who is concerned about the presence of weapons in Iraq.  Speaking of the U.S. plan to arm the Sunni tribes who have allegedly sided with the government to hunt down al-Qaeda, Iraqi authorities have expressed deep concern over the final disposition of the weapons:

New Iraqi Army Brigadier-General Jassim Rashid al-Dulaimi, from Anbar province, said: “I cannot imagine 30,000 more guns in the Iraqi field. I hope they will reject the idea. Iraq needs more engineers and clean politicians to solve the dilemma of the existing militias rather than recruiting new ones to kill more Iraqis. The idea sounds to me [like] turning the country into a mercenary-recruitment center.

When pressed as to why he had not requested more troops to deal with both the al Anbar Province and the deteriorating security situation in Baghdad at the same time, General Abizaid responded with the following retort: “Where would you like me to get them from?”  He continued by pointing out that the U.S. currently  has about 500,000 ground troops, and some 390,000 of them are deployed in Iraq or Afghanistan.  Abizaid has given an extremely spirited defense of the idea that the U.S. has just the right number of troops.

Contrary to this, we have argued in Force Size and other posts that the U.S. has needed more troops than are currently deployed in order to effectively and efficiently achieve security and stability, and that force projection will be inversely proportional to the amount of force that actually has to be exercised.  But Abizaid’s question is salient.  If we increased force size in Iraq, where exactly would these troops come from?  Actually, Abizaid knows, but saying it would be unacceptable because it would involve policy changes.  Generals like Abizaid should be able intelligently to discuss policy, but the policy changes needed to free troops are of a nature that would require White House and Joint Chief’s of Staff involvement and approval.  So these changes are above Abizaid’s head.

There are approximately 100,000 troops deployed in Europe, another 32,000 in South Korea, and 35,000 in Japan.  But the cold war is over, and the troop deployments in Bosnia and Kosovo are at the same time not onerous and unnecessary.  NATO could take more burden in the absence of U.S. troops.  The burden, both financial and in manpower deprivation to other parts of the world, of troop deployments in Japan is significant, and it is time to reconsider whether the U.S. can and should be the protector of South Korea, Taiwan and Japan.  Victor Davis Hanson argues for a multi-pronged approach in dealing with the North Korea situation, including a new and robust push for missile defense, as well as clear threats against North Korea.  But one interesting piece of his theoretical construct involves troop force reductions in South Korea.

To work with South Korea, we need to start withdrawing troops to Pusan—and well beyond. Much of the present mess arose from the appeasement of the Sunshine policy—in part, fueled by the revisionism of Korean ingrate leftists who rewrote the Korean War in populist terms of American imperialism and their own victimization. This was, in part, due to Korean nationalism that envisioned an eventual pan-Korea state birthed by slow and insidious osmosis from the south; and, in part, a result of strategic complacence of a half-century made possible by American subsidies and deployments. It made sense to garrison Americans on the DMZ when Seoul was weak and nascent, but not now when its population and economy dwarf the North’s. Getting America off the DMZ would give us more strategic options through air power, and wake up the South Koreans, reminding them that cheap triangulation with the United States has real costs. They can either play Churchill or Chamberlain—but it’s their call, not ours, since we have wider worries protecting Japan and Taiwan that transcend South Korea’s Sunshine nonsense.

We have also made it clear that Japan should make preparations for its own self defense.  Given troop force reductions in Europe, Japan and South Korea, the U.S. should be able to redeploy enough troops to Iraq to achieve security and in Afghanistan to deal with a resurgent Taliban.