Archive for the 'Department of Defense' Category

I have covered issues pertaining to rules of engagement in the following articles:

• More Evidence Against the Rules of Engagement
• The NCOs Speak on Rules of Engagement
• Politically Correct Rules of Engagement Endanger Troops

In a Washington Times commentary, retired U.S. Navy Admiral James A. Lyons, Jr., weighs in on the overly restrictive rules of engagement that hamper U.S. military efforts in Iraq.  His sentiments are similar to the other reports on ROE, and work nicely to add to the things I have said in the articles listed above.  He gives steps that must be followed in order to engage the enemy in Baghdad.

In order to ensure that the additional combat troops being deployed to Iraq can achieve their objectives, we must change the current restrictive rules of engagement (ROEs) under which they are forced to operate. The current ROEs for Baghdad — including Sadr City, home of the Mahdi Army — have seven incremental steps that must be satisfied before our troops can take the gloves off and engage the enemy with appropriate violence of action.

1. You must feel a direct threat to you or your team.
2. You must clearly see a threat.
3. That threat must be identified.
4. The team leader must concur that there is an identified threat.
5. The team leader must feel that the situation is one of life or death.
6. There must be minimal or no collateral risk.
7. Only then can the team leader clear the engagement.

These ROEs might sound fine to academics gathering at some esoteric seminar on how to avoid civilian casualties in a war zone. But they do absolutely nothing to protect our combat troops who have to respond in an instant to a life or death situation.

If our soldiers or Marines see someone about to level an AK-47 in their direction or start to are receive hostile fire from a rooftop or mosque, there is no time to go through a seven-point checklist before reacting. Indeed, the very fact that they see a weapon, or begin to receive hostile fire should be sufficient justification to respond with deadly force.

We do not need to identify the threat as Sunni, Shia, al Qaeda or Mahdi Army. The “who” is immaterial. The danger is not. The threat of imminent attack must be immediately suppressed. And while we must always respect the lives of the innocent, the requirement of minimal or no collateral damage cannot preempt an appropriate response.

The insurgents, be they Sunni or Shia, are well aware of our restrictive ROEs and they use them to their advantage. Indeed, as the thousands of insurgent-inflicted Iraqi civilian deaths illustrate, the death squads, assassination teams and al Qaeda killers in Iraq have no regard for human life. Victims are looked upon as expendable: cannon fodder in order to achieve their objectives. As we saw in Lebanon, Hezbollah held women and children hostage in the same buildings they used to conduct offensive operations. They wanted civilian deaths. This same tactic is being used in Iraq today.

We cannot, therefore, afford to keep our combat troops shackled by a naive, legalistic disadvantage that takes no note of the real world, or the real battlefield. Moreover, our combat forces are currently fighting a two-front war: a literal battlefield in Iraq, and a virtual front in Washington, where politicians snipe at our troops with words, threats of budget cuts, and unrealistic strictures on our warriors’ behavior. Both the Iraqi insurgents and the radical Islamist fundamentalists dedicated to the destruction of Western values and democracy understand quite well that today, wars are not only fought on the battlefield but are also won or lost in Washington. They are only too happy to watch as our politicians water down our military goals and objectives in the name of some misbegotten legalistic concept of fair play and gentle warfare.

Our combat forces have never lost an engagement in Iraq. Let’s make sure they don’t lose the war in Washington. Unshackle the military and let our soldiers and Marines do their job. This will quickly silence the critics, as well as the insurgents and radical Islamist fundamentalists.

Assessment and Commentary

Admiral Lyons gives us a remarkable list of steps, each of which is logically and chronologically connected to the preceeding step.  It reads like a written procedure, something that would be used as a list of activities for a worker while performing adjustments to setpoints of an electronic piece of equipment during the course of a work day, rather than doctrine to allow U.S. troops to make split-second decisions of life and death.  There is no discussion of “close with and destroy the enemy by fire and maneuver” in these rules.  It demonstrates just how out-of-touch the lawyers who author the ROE are with the U.S. fighting man, counterinsurgency in particular, and warfare in general.

In requiring that the “situation is one of life and death,” the focus is placed squarely on a defensive posture rather than an offensive one, and in requiring that there be “minimal or no collateral risk,” the ROE have given the insurgent the perfect weapon (women, children, and concealment to prevent the successful quantification of risk by U.S. troops can be used to prevent engagement).

The list of places and activities in which the enemy can engage to avoid U.S. action is extensive.  In prior articles, minarets have been shown to be favorite hideouts for enemy snipers, and yet U.S. forces will not even allow police to be stationed at the entrances to Mosques for fear of being disliked by the population.  The Taliban have shown that they can gather in the hundreds for funerals, and still avoid being targeted by U.S. forces because religious gatherings are off limits.

Just recently press coverage was given to a nonlethal weapon (ray gun that increases the temperature of the skin), and while the technology was interesting to most readers, there is a nugget of gold in the report that is far more important than the ray gun.  It was reported that Airman Blaine Pernell, 22, said he could have used the system during his four tours in Iraq, where he manned watchtowers around a base near Kirkuk. He said Iraqis often pulled up and faked car problems so they could scout U.S. forces.

“All we could do is watch them,” he said. But if they had the ray gun, troops “could have dispersed them.”

Note again, and remember that the enemy is being allowed to gather intelligence that could redound to death and/or injury to U.S. troops: “All we could do is watch them.”

Troop levels can surge, new nonlethal weapons can be brought on line, and better body armor can be deployed in Iraq.  But until the ROE are revised top to bottom, the counterinsurgency in Iraq will fail because the enemy is being given too many weapons to use against the U.S. forces.  We have met the enemy, and it is the ROE.

Introduction 

In Politically Correct Rules of Engagement Endanger Troops, I used main stream media reports of soldiers and marines conveying the problematic nature of the rules of engagement under which they operate.  As a result of this article, two NCOs who were in Iraq (one near Ramadi and the other in Kirkuk) wrote me to express their agreement, sharing even more detailed and remarkable stories of U.S. forces being hamstrung by overly restrictive rules of engagement.  I discussed this in The NCOs Speak on Rules of Engagement.

As a result of both of these articles, my readers have paid close attention to similar stories, and faithful reader David Neumann sent me the link to the Hugh Hewitt Show where rules of engagement were discussed.  After listening, I contacted Milblogger T. F. Boggs, Sergeant in the Army reserves, who recently completed his second deployment in support of OIF.  Sergeant Boggs was happy to converse with me on rules of engagement, and gave me permission to transcribe and publish the portion of the show in which he discussed this topic.  The transcription follows, after which I will offer an assessment and commentary (the content of which is only my responsibility).

T.F. Boggs on Rules of Engagement

Caller:

I wanted to ask, regarding the rules of engagement, it’s frustrating to me and I think a lot of people that our troops have to be held to such a stringent set of rules in a war like this where everything seems blurred.  And I was wondering how the troops feel about it?

Boggs:

Yes, we feel the same way you do, and one story from my experience probably best expresses this … and officers would probably tell me that I should know the rules of engagement … I should act thereupon.  But the point is that the rules of engagement that are there now are hamstringing the soldiers because we think about what we’re doing before we can actually do it.  The second IED we got hit by – I was in the first truck – we saw the guy who blew the IED up on us.  So we were chasing after him, we were on the fly … seems like an eternity but it was like seconds … we were trying to figure out, okay, do we engage this guy, what’s going to happen to us if we engage this guy, are we going to get into trouble, what are we going to say, what are we going to do when this is all over with … so we shoot flares at him, and he doesn’t respond.  So we shoot another, doesn’t respond, so what do we do?  So we shoot warning shots to the side, warning shots to the other side.  Ten seconds of this stuff goes by, and this guy is gaining speed, taking off on us, and I finally tell my gunner, “just go ahead and kill this guy – I’ll take the rap for it.

Apparently, Rumsfeld has begun thinking about how we have failed in Iraq and has recommended a potential remedy to the administration.  We are limited to main stream media reports about the contents of a letter he sent to Bush, reportedly on November 6 (note, prior to the election), but some of the recommendations he allegedly made are:

• Publicly announce a set of benchmarks agreed to by the Iraqi government and the U.S. … to chart a path ahead for the Iraqi government and Iraqi people (to get them moving) and for the U.S. public (to reassure them that progress can and is being made).
• Significantly increase U.S. trainers and embeds, and transfer more U.S. equipment to Iraqi security forces.
• Initiate a reverse embeds program … by putting one or more Iraqi soldiers with every U.S. and possibly coalition squad.
• Aggressively beef up Iraqi ministries by reaching out to U.S. military retirees and Reserve and National Guard volunteers.
• Conduct an accelerated drawdown of U.S. bases, noting they have already been reduced from 110 to 55. “Plan to get down to 10 to 15 bases by April 2007, and to 5 bases by July 2007.
• Retain high-end … capability … to target al Qaeda, death squads, and Iranians in Iraq, while drawing down all other coalition forces, except those necessary to provide certain key enablers for Iraqi forces.
• Provide U.S. security forces only for those provinces or cities that openly request U.S. help and that actively cooperate.
• Stop rewarding “bad behavior” with reconstruction funds and start rewarding “good behavior.”
• Position substantial U.S. forces near the Iranian and Syrian borders to reduce infiltration and, importantly, reduce Iranian influence on the Iraqi government.
• Withdraw U.S. forces from vulnerable positions and move to a quick reaction force status, operating from within Iraq and Kuwait, to be available when Iraqi security forces need assistance.
• “Begin modest withdrawals of U.S. and coalition forces (start `taking our hand off the cycle seat’) so Iraqis know they have to pull up their socks, step up and take responsibility for their country.

Rumsfeld further remarks that “In my view it is time for a major adjustment,” Rumsfeld wrote in a November 6 memorandum to the White House. “Clearly, what U.S. forces are currently doing in Iraq is not working well enough or fast enough.”  Rumsfeld further noted that the situation in Iraq “has been evolving” and said U.S. forces have adjusted from “major combat operations, to counterterrorism, to counterinsurgency, to dealing with death squads and sectarian violence.”

It is a stunning assertion that the man who superintended three and a half years of an increasing U.S. casualty rate now concludes that it is “time for a change.”  But the ideas Rumsfeld profers are not novel.  In Options for Iraq, I cited a Stratfor assessment which, in part, concluded that

We do believe that the ISG will recommend a fundamental shift in the way U.S. forces are used. The troops currently are absorbing casualties without moving closer to their goal, and it is not clear that they can attain it. If U.S. forces remain in Iraq — which will be recommended — there will be a shift in their primary mission. Rather than trying to create a secure environment for the Iraqi government, their mission will shift to guaranteeing that Iran, and to a lesser extent Syria, do not gain further power and influence in Iraq. Nothing can be done about the influence they wield among Iraqi Shia, but the United States will oppose anything that would allow them to move from a covert to an overt presence in Iraq. U.S. forces will remain in-country but shift their focus to deterring overt foreign intrusion. That means a redeployment and a change in day-to-day responsibility. U.S. forces will be present in Iraq but not conducting continual security operations.

Then, after presenting the least likely option for Iraq (based on lack of political support for appropriate force projection in Iraq), I presented what I saw as the most likely option for U.S. forces, an option that, while similar to the Stratfor position, was somewhat more detailed:

… withdraw forces to the north in Kurdistan, supporting the Iraqi army and police in offensive operations on an as-need basis.  This support would not include regular or routine “security

Apparently, Rumsfeld has begun thinking about how we have failed in Iraq and has recommended a potential remedy to the administration.  We are limited to main stream media reports about the contents of a letter he sent to Bush, reportedly on November 6 (note, prior to the election), but some of the recommendations he allegedly made are:

• Publicly announce a set of benchmarks agreed to by the Iraqi government and the U.S. … to chart a path ahead for the Iraqi government and Iraqi people (to get them moving) and for the U.S. public (to reassure them that progress can and is being made).
• Significantly increase U.S. trainers and embeds, and transfer more U.S. equipment to Iraqi security forces.
• Initiate a reverse embeds program … by putting one or more Iraqi soldiers with every U.S. and possibly coalition squad.
• Aggressively beef up Iraqi ministries by reaching out to U.S. military retirees and Reserve and National Guard volunteers.
• Conduct an accelerated drawdown of U.S. bases, noting they have already been reduced from 110 to 55. “Plan to get down to 10 to 15 bases by April 2007, and to 5 bases by July 2007.
• Retain high-end … capability … to target al Qaeda, death squads, and Iranians in Iraq, while drawing down all other coalition forces, except those necessary to provide certain key enablers for Iraqi forces.
• Provide U.S. security forces only for those provinces or cities that openly request U.S. help and that actively cooperate.
• Stop rewarding “bad behavior” with reconstruction funds and start rewarding “good behavior.”
• Position substantial U.S. forces near the Iranian and Syrian borders to reduce infiltration and, importantly, reduce Iranian influence on the Iraqi government.
• Withdraw U.S. forces from vulnerable positions and move to a quick reaction force status, operating from within Iraq and Kuwait, to be available when Iraqi security forces need assistance.
• “Begin modest withdrawals of U.S. and coalition forces (start `taking our hand off the cycle seat’) so Iraqis know they have to pull up their socks, step up and take responsibility for their country.

Rumsfeld further remarks that “In my view it is time for a major adjustment,” Rumsfeld wrote in a November 6 memorandum to the White House. “Clearly, what U.S. forces are currently doing in Iraq is not working well enough or fast enough.”  Rumsfeld further noted that the situation in Iraq “has been evolving” and said U.S. forces have adjusted from “major combat operations, to counterterrorism, to counterinsurgency, to dealing with death squads and sectarian violence.”

It is a stunning assertion that the man who superintended three and a half years of an increasing U.S. casualty rate now concludes that it is “time for a change.”  But the ideas Rumsfeld profers are not novel.  In Options for Iraq, I cited a Stratfor assessment which, in part, concluded that

We do believe that the ISG will recommend a fundamental shift in the way U.S. forces are used. The troops currently are absorbing casualties without moving closer to their goal, and it is not clear that they can attain it. If U.S. forces remain in Iraq — which will be recommended — there will be a shift in their primary mission. Rather than trying to create a secure environment for the Iraqi government, their mission will shift to guaranteeing that Iran, and to a lesser extent Syria, do not gain further power and influence in Iraq. Nothing can be done about the influence they wield among Iraqi Shia, but the United States will oppose anything that would allow them to move from a covert to an overt presence in Iraq. U.S. forces will remain in-country but shift their focus to deterring overt foreign intrusion. That means a redeployment and a change in day-to-day responsibility. U.S. forces will be present in Iraq but not conducting continual security operations.

Then, after presenting the least likely option for Iraq (based on lack of political support for appropriate force projection in Iraq), I presented what I saw as the most likely option for U.S. forces, an option that, while similar to the Stratfor position, was somewhat more detailed:

… withdraw forces to the north in Kurdistan, supporting the Iraqi army and police in offensive operations on an as-need basis.  This support would not include regular or routine “security

Over at Blogs of War, John Little has discussed the new Department of Defense blog called “For the Record.”  John cites the assessment of “For the Record” by D-Ring:

For the Record has been criticized as a shoddy attempt to rebut negative conversation about the war in Iraq and the Department of Defense. All this Web site does is link to a given article from the mainstream media and blast it. And it comes across as quite petty.

On top of that, For the Record misses the whole point of a blog — community. There is no blogroll, no ability to comment, no conversation. It follows the traditional DoD model of communication that says “we will send our messages to the people from up on high.

The Greenville News, of South Carolina, recently carried a story entitled “Soldier Seeks Funds to Buy Safety Gear.”

Furman University associate professor Matt Feigenbaum says a former ROTC student of his lost an arm and an eye to a rocket-propelled grenade attack in Afghanistan, so he knows how dangerous a tour of duty can be.

Early next year, it will be Feigenbaum’s turn to ship out — and he’s asking for help to keep him and about 130 other Upstate troops as safe as possible.

A National Guard second lieutenant, Feigenbaum wants to raise $800 per soldier to buy helmet inserts, gloves and other gear.

“The Army does provide basic equipment,” he said. “But if you talk to the guys who are in-theater, there is better quality equipment you can get.”

Feigenbaum is the executive officer of Bravo Company, a part of the 1-118th Infantry Battalion. All of the troops under his command are from the Upstate and include sheriff’s deputies and a Woodmont High School assistant principal, he said.

They’ll be entering a combat zone that has become increasingly hostile, even as it has been overshadowed back home by the war in Iraq. Militants were launching 600 attacks a month as of the end of September, up from 300 a month as of March, according to The Associated Press.

“It certainly raises” the fear level, Feigenbaum said. “It’s a healthy fear. I would hope everybody would expect the danger we are going into.”

The helmet inserts can reduce the risk of serious head injury by 60 percent, he said. Soldiers can use high-quality gloves and socks because they expect to experience temperatures down to minus 30 degrees in the mountains, Feigenbaum said.

“Because the U.S. government often purchases its supplies from the lowest bidder and provides soldiers the basic necessities,” he wrote to potential donors, “Bravo Company’s Family Readiness Group is asking for donations so our soldiers can be equipped with the highest quality protective gear.”

He also wants to buy the troops phone cards and Web cams to make it easier to communicate with family.

The company will be away from the Upstate for more than a year starting in January, Feigenbaum said. Troops will head to Camp Shelby near Hattiesburg, Miss., for about three months of training and then spend a year overseas training Afghan police and army forces, he said.

The Army National Guard has been stretched increasingly thin since the launch of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom.

The Guard has transferred equipment from non-deployed units to deployed units, according to an October 2005 report from the Government Accountability Office.

As a result, non-deployed troops have fallen short of several kinds of equipment, including machine guns, night-vision goggles and Humvees, the GAO reported.

The helmet inserts are presumably the padding suspension system that I covered in “Old and New Body Armor for Marines,” and are intended to reduce the effect of blunt force trauma due to IEDs.  Brain Injury is the signature wound of the Iraq war.  Use of the padding suspension system has been ordered by Marine Administrative Message 480/06.

When my son recently trained at Fort A. P. Hill, the training caused the destruction of several pairs of Cammies, which of course, he had to replace out-of-pocket.  I am cataloguing the equipment we have already purchased at the MCX: more boots, ballistic glasses (because the issued pair are worse than second-rate), Cammies, etc., etc.  Prior to deployment I will publish a list of equipment my son and I have had to purchase out-of-pocket, along with an estimate of the cost.  The innovative Second Lieutenant above had a praiseworthy idea: appeal to the people on whose behalf they fight.

In the mean time, we should collectively query ourselves: Do we really support the troops?

In a stunning word picture of Ramadi today, Martin Fletcher of the Times Online tells us what he saw as he recently entered Ramadi (h/t SWJ).

Ramadi has been laid waste by two years of warfare. Houses stand shattered and abandoned. Shops are shuttered up. The streets are littered with rubble, wrecked cars, fallen trees, broken lampposts and piles of rubbish.

Fetid water stands in craters. The pavements are overgrown. Walls are pockmarked by bullets and shrapnel. Side roads have been shut off with concrete barriers to thwart car bombs. Everything is coated in grey dust even the palm trees. The city has no functioning government, no telephones, and practically no basic services except sporadic electricity and water supplies. It has been reduced to a subsistence economy.

There are stray cats and wild dogs, but few cars or humans. Ramadi’s inhabitants have either fled, or learnt to stay indoors.

The letter from al Qaeda high command to Zarqawi indicates just how little true respect they have for their fellow Sunnis in the Anbar Province and just how far they are willing to go to effect their grand plan for a radical Islamic state.

“… be humble to the believers, and smile in people’s faces, even if you are cursing them in your heart, even if it has been said that they are “a bad tribal brother,

The draft version of the Army’s Full Spectrum Operations Field Manual counsels against the approach used by Rumsfeld (minimum force projection).  “The big idea here is that stability tasks have to be a consideration at every level and every operation,” said Clinton Ancker III, head of the Army’s Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate and an author of the guide … The old manual emphasized that stability operations usually follow combat. The draft version of the 2007 ground operations manual instructs commanders that they cannot wait for offensive operations to end before providing security and services for the population.  “Army forces must defeat enemies and simultaneously shape the civil situation through stability or civil support operations.”  In a more developed understanding of what proper force projection can accomplish – and conversely, what we missed in our toppling of the Saddam regime – it is now seen that lack of security can be the catalyst for an insurgency.

Rumsfeld’s critics generally have pointed to summer 2003 as the period when the most important misstep was made in Iraq. American forces were drawn down, and the military did not react quickly to confront a rising insurgency.

The draft manual says the seeds of an insurgency can be planted early on, even during initial military operations. And the guide’s authors say the missteps that gave rise to the insurgency may have occurred during the march to Baghdad.

“There is a period of time in the immediate aftermath of any fight where the population will rely on the [American] military to keep them safe and provide essential services,” Ancker said.

The concept, according to Ancker, is akin to what battlefield medics call the “golden hour” — the short period in which patients can be saved if their wounds are properly treated. During an offensive operation, if a military does not try to at least bandage the wounds of a society, the effort can suffer even if the battle is won. After an urban battle, commanders must try to provide basic services and security, the manual says.

“If we do not plan to account for those tasks in the immediate aftermath of a fight,” Ancker said, “then there is a period of time somebody else can step in and use that failure as a lever to create disaffected parts of the population, and that can turn into … an insurgency.”

The U.S. war in Iraq was an attempt to perform the operations fast and cheap and good, and therefore we have achieved none of those objectives.  Because we have unnecessary strategic commitments across the globe (e.g., in Japan, Europe), our force projection wanted for troops, and without them the war effort has involved prolonged operations.  While U.S. troops have performed remarkably well and with bravery, the situation on the ground is devolving, with a trend of increasing casualties.  Also because of the prolonged operations, the war effort has been anything but cheap.

The U.S. electorate has no stomach for prolonged operations, as proven by the recent election.  If wisdom is to be gleaned from this, it would be that the old engineer’s adage of “good, fast and cheap, pick any two,” should be amended to say “good, fast and cheap, pick any two as long as ‘fast’ is included.”

As evidence that the Pentagon has still proven incapable of understanding this last point, the panel of officers commissioned by General Pace to study the war and make recommendations has come back with the following: “Go Home, Go Big, or Go Longer.”

Consider the thoughts of a soon-to-be-deployed Soldier or Marine: “Will I be the last one to die in Iraq?”  Perhaps the panel should have deployed to Iraq before authoring the study.  Stubbornness in the military administration is a sign of stolid thinking.  Again, ‘go longer‘ is not an option.  It never was, it is not now, and it never will be.

There is a flurry of combat activity occurring near Baghdad and in the al Anbar Province. 

On Monday, November 13, eleven insurgents were killed in three related incidents in Ramadi.  Coalition Forces observed a small number of insurgents emplacing an improvised explosive device.  The insurgents were engaged by Coalition Forces with small arms fire, killing two.  The three remaining insurgents returned to the emplacement site and Coalition Forces fired one tank main gun round, killing all three insurgents.  There were secondary explosions, and the remains of the IED continued to burn for about an hour.

Following an IED attack on a Coalition vehicle four hours later in the same vicinity, four insurgents were killed after they attempted to take mission essential equipment from the vehicle.  Two of the insurgents were killed by small arms fire and two were killed with one main gun tank round.  This event occurred during curfew hours.

In a separate incident Nov. 14 in the same vicinity, three insurgents were observed emplacing an improvised explosive device.  They were engaged with small arms fire and a main tank gun round.  Two insurgents were killed.

On Tuesday, November 14, the same day as the operations were being conducted in Ramadi, a Coalition Forces air strike killed three terrorists (MNF Web Site implies al Qaeda) in Yusifiyyah (Youssifiyah).  Coalition Forces tracked the terrorists’ movement on a dirt road on the outskirts of Yusifiyya.  Based on intelligence that linked the vehicle and the three terrorists to a local vehicle-borne improvised explosion device facilitation network, Coalition aircraft engaged and destroyed the vehicle with precision fires.  Youssifiyah is a rural area twelve miles south of Baghdad.

Also on November 14, one Soldier and three Marines died in combat operations in the al Anbar Province.

On Thursday, November 16, Coalition Forces killed nine terrorists and detained nine suspected terrorists during a raid just south of Yusifiyah.  As Coalition Forces approached the targeted area, they called out for people to exit the buildings. Ground forces noticed several armed individuals in a nearby wooded area maneuvering against them.  Close air support was called in to mitigate the threat to the Coalition Forces ground team.  Coalition aircraft engaged the terrorists with precision fires.Several of the terrorists killed were wearing suicide vests.

The al Anbar Province remains the most dangerous part of Iraq, and security is not being achieved in part due to the lack of support by the Iraqi government.

The Shiite-dominated central government is starving Iraqi security forces in the Sunni heartland of the resources needed to fight the insurgency, according to American officers.

In Anbar province, a Sunni region west of Baghdad, many police officers haven’t been paid for three months. “It’s difficult to ask a man to risk his life if you can’t even pay him,

The talking points of Bush’s plan have been leaked to the press.  The Guardian is reporting the story:

President George Bush has told senior advisers that the US and its allies must make “a last big push” to win the war in Iraq and that instead of beginning a troop withdrawal next year, he may increase US forces by up to 20,000 soldiers, according to sources familiar with the administration’s internal deliberations.
Mr Bush’s refusal to give ground, coming in the teeth of growing calls in the US and Britain for a radical rethink or a swift exit, is having a decisive impact on the policy review being conducted by the Iraq Study Group chaired by Bush family loyalist James Baker, the sources said.

Although the panel’s work is not complete, its recommendations are expected to be built around a four-point “victory strategy” developed by Pentagon officials advising the group. The strategy, along with other related proposals, is being circulated in draft form and has been discussed in separate closed sessions with Mr Baker and the vice-president Dick Cheney, an Iraq war hawk.

Point one of the strategy calls for an increase rather than a decrease in overall US force levels inside Iraq, possibly by as many as 20,000 soldiers. This figure is far fewer than that called for by the Republican presidential hopeful, John McCain. But by raising troop levels, Mr Bush will draw a line in the sand and defy Democratic pressure for a swift drawdown.

The reinforcements will be used to secure Baghdad, scene of the worst sectarian and insurgent violence, and enable redeployments of US, coalition and Iraqi forces elsewhere in the country.

Point two of the plan stresses the importance of regional cooperation to the successful rehabilitation of Iraq. This could involve the convening of an international conference of neighbouring countries or more direct diplomatic, financial and economic involvement of US allies such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.

“The extent to which that [regional cooperation] will include talking to Iran and Syria is still up for debate …

Point three focuses on reviving the national reconciliation process between Shia, Sunni and other ethnic and religious parties. According to the sources, creating a credible political framework will be portrayed as crucial in persuading Iraqis and neighbouring countries alike that Iraq can become a fully functional state …

Lastly, the sources said the study group recommendations will include a call for increased resources to be allocated by Congress to support additional troop deployments and fund the training and equipment of expanded Iraqi army and police forces. It will also stress the need to counter corruption, improve local government and curtail the power of religious courts.

Let us at TCJ be the first out of the gate to say that this plan will fail.

First, 20,000 more troops is not nearly enough.  We need 220,000.

Second, talks with Syria and Iran will only embolden these two countries, with Iran being the most worrisome.  At at time when the U.S. should be working hard to set boundary conditions and stipulations for Iran’s behavior in the Middle East, to talk with them would undercut the U.S. position to the point that warnings will lose all force and the U.S. will lose all respect.

Third – and this point also addresses Abizaid’s testimony today before the Senate in which he said that more embedded U.S. troops with the Iraqi army and police would hasten turnover – we are still refusing to face the socio-religious landscape in Iraq.  The history of Shi’a-Sunni relations is almost as old as Islam, and just as violent.  This factious warring is getting worse, not better.  Ilan Berman, vice president for policy at the American Foreign Policy Council in Washington, states that “We have a ringside seat not only to radical Islam’s war with us, but to what’s really emerging as a civil war between radical Sunni Islam and radical Shia Islam.”  There is no lack of ability to police or wage war among either the Sunni or Shia.  The problem is not one of incompetence.  It is one of religious war.

Fourth, more money would have helped two years ago and with a stable Iraq.