Archive for the 'Department of Defense' Category

On November 2, 2006, I published “Missing Weapons and Iraq’s Open Border Policy.”  In this post I argued that Iraq’s borders were essentially open, with inadequate border personnel or U.S. troop force levels to effect good border security.  I showed that the borders were replete with traffic to the point that the border guards could only log information on passports rather than inspect them for forgery.  We showed that the weapons necessary to wage jihad were already in Iraq, and that the requirements to war against the U.S. forces were twofold: cash and a fake passport.

On November 4, 2006, the Multi-National Force web site published an article entitled “Teams Build Relationships at Border.”  The story is about a joint Iraqi-U.S. border transition team, and it conveys the teamwork, mentoring, challenges and friendships associated with such a team.  It is quite a nice story, with the exception of the following assertion: “Observing this exchange, it becomes evident the border is not the only thing being secured in this remote area.”

The evidence I have marshalled in defense of my hypothesis includes, but is not limited to, the following:

1. Michael Rubin’s work showing a heavy influx of Iranian intelligence assets, money, communications equipment and military materiel into Iraq just before the war began.
2. The Washington Post reported that “Iranian personnel have established safe houses throughout southern Iraq. They monitor the movement of coalition forces, tend weapons caches, facilitate cross-border travel of clerics, smuggle munitions into Iraq and recruit individuals as intelligence sources.”
3. Iraqi General Nazim Mohammed, chief of Iraq’s border police in Muntheria, stated in June of 2005 that Iranian personnel were responsible for leading operations against Iraq.  “We captured three men and there is proof they blew up oil pipelines near Nuft Khaneh under the orders of Iranian intelligence officers,
   

Sun Tzu, “The Art of War,” III.4: “Thus, what is of supreme importance is to attack the enemy’s strategy.”  Tu Mu comments, ‘He who excels at resolving difficulties does so before they arise.  He who excels at conquering enemies triumphs before threats materialize.’

The Iraq-Iran border was a problem from before the war began.  Michael Rubin noted with some dismay the lack of U.S. responsiveness to the huge influx of fighters, Iranian intelligence assets, and cash that came from Iran into Iraq before the war.  I noted that the border is still problematic, with a flow of traffic so significant that the Iraqi border guards cannot keep up with it or adequately inspect all traffic.

Turning west to the Anbar Province, discussing Michael Fumento’s reporting on Combat Operation Posts, we saw that there was a well-worn path into Iraq in use by foreign fighers:

The impact of the FOB system was shown to me on a map. The foreigners who come into this area do so along a mini-Ho Chi Minh trail from the west, namely Jordan and Syria. And the foreigners tend to be better trained. Certainly any good sniper will come from that route, because Iraqis are terrible shots and hence crummy snipers.

I mentioned that the U.S. would see success in the war in the al Anbar Province by turning this trail into a shooting gallery.  The fighers would die or turn around at the border.  This might have been wishful thinking.  In the continuing theme of inadequate force projection, the Washington Post has an enlightening article on the porous Iraq-Syria border.

U.S. troops in the area are concerned that controls are too loose. For instance, the passport office is sparse and includes a single officer sitting at a desk behind a barred window where travelers line up to show their passports. The officer simply enters the information from each passport into a small ledger.

“The only thing he’s really doing is nothing more than creating a historical log,” said 1st Sgt. Richard DeLeon, 40, of Shafter, Calif., also a member of Apache Troop. “We can’t scan your passport to find out if it’s fake, we can’t scan your photo. You can come in if you have a legitimate passport or a good fake. The weapons are already in Iraq. All you really need to do is bring money.”

Turning our attention for a moment towards the proliferation of weapons, in an interesting finding by the Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, we have learned that there are many missing U.S. weapons in Iraq:

The Pentagon cannot account for 14,030 weapons – almost 4 percent of the semiautomatic pistols, assault rifles, machine guns, rocket-propelled grenade launchers and other weapons it began supplying to Iraq since the end of 2003, according to a report from the office of the special inspector general for Iraq reconstruction.

The missing weapons will not be tracked easily: The Defense Department registered the serial numbers of only about 10,000 of the 370,251 weapons it provided – less than 3 percent.

1st Sgt. Richard DeLeon isn’t the only one who is concerned about the presence of weapons in Iraq.  Speaking of the U.S. plan to arm the Sunni tribes who have allegedly sided with the government to hunt down al-Qaeda, Iraqi authorities have expressed deep concern over the final disposition of the weapons:

New Iraqi Army Brigadier-General Jassim Rashid al-Dulaimi, from Anbar province, said: “I cannot imagine 30,000 more guns in the Iraqi field. I hope they will reject the idea. Iraq needs more engineers and clean politicians to solve the dilemma of the existing militias rather than recruiting new ones to kill more Iraqis. The idea sounds to me [like] turning the country into a mercenary-recruitment center.

Sun Tzu, “The Art of War,” III.4: “Thus, what is of supreme importance is to attack the enemy’s strategy.”  Tu Mu comments, ‘He who excels at resolving difficulties does so before they arise.  He who excels at conquering enemies triumphs before threats materialize.’

The Iraq-Iran border was a problem from before the war began.  Michael Rubin noted with some dismay the lack of U.S. responsiveness to the huge influx of fighters, Iranian intelligence assets, and cash that came from Iran into Iraq before the war.  I noted that the border is still problematic, with a flow of traffic so significant that the Iraqi border guards cannot keep up with it or adequately inspect all traffic.

Turning west to the Anbar Province, discussing Michael Fumento’s reporting on Combat Operation Posts, we saw that there was a well-worn path into Iraq in use by foreign fighers:

The impact of the FOB system was shown to me on a map. The foreigners who come into this area do so along a mini-Ho Chi Minh trail from the west, namely Jordan and Syria. And the foreigners tend to be better trained. Certainly any good sniper will come from that route, because Iraqis are terrible shots and hence crummy snipers.

I mentioned that the U.S. would see success in the war in the al Anbar Province by turning this trail into a shooting gallery.  The fighers would die or turn around at the border.  This might have been wishful thinking.  In the continuing theme of inadequate force projection, the Washington Post has an enlightening article on the porous Iraq-Syria border.

U.S. troops in the area are concerned that controls are too loose. For instance, the passport office is sparse and includes a single officer sitting at a desk behind a barred window where travelers line up to show their passports. The officer simply enters the information from each passport into a small ledger.

“The only thing he’s really doing is nothing more than creating a historical log,” said 1st Sgt. Richard DeLeon, 40, of Shafter, Calif., also a member of Apache Troop. “We can’t scan your passport to find out if it’s fake, we can’t scan your photo. You can come in if you have a legitimate passport or a good fake. The weapons are already in Iraq. All you really need to do is bring money.”

Turning our attention for a moment towards the proliferation of weapons, in an interesting finding by the Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, we have learned that there are many missing U.S. weapons in Iraq:

The Pentagon cannot account for 14,030 weapons – almost 4 percent of the semiautomatic pistols, assault rifles, machine guns, rocket-propelled grenade launchers and other weapons it began supplying to Iraq since the end of 2003, according to a report from the office of the special inspector general for Iraq reconstruction.

The missing weapons will not be tracked easily: The Defense Department registered the serial numbers of only about 10,000 of the 370,251 weapons it provided – less than 3 percent.

1st Sgt. Richard DeLeon isn’t the only one who is concerned about the presence of weapons in Iraq.  Speaking of the U.S. plan to arm the Sunni tribes who have allegedly sided with the government to hunt down al-Qaeda, Iraqi authorities have expressed deep concern over the final disposition of the weapons:

New Iraqi Army Brigadier-General Jassim Rashid al-Dulaimi, from Anbar province, said: “I cannot imagine 30,000 more guns in the Iraqi field. I hope they will reject the idea. Iraq needs more engineers and clean politicians to solve the dilemma of the existing militias rather than recruiting new ones to kill more Iraqis. The idea sounds to me [like] turning the country into a mercenary-recruitment center.

When pressed as to why he had not requested more troops to deal with both the al Anbar Province and the deteriorating security situation in Baghdad at the same time, General Abizaid responded with the following retort: “Where would you like me to get them from?”  He continued by pointing out that the U.S. currently  has about 500,000 ground troops, and some 390,000 of them are deployed in Iraq or Afghanistan.  Abizaid has given an extremely spirited defense of the idea that the U.S. has just the right number of troops.

Contrary to this, we have argued in Force Size and other posts that the U.S. has needed more troops than are currently deployed in order to effectively and efficiently achieve security and stability, and that force projection will be inversely proportional to the amount of force that actually has to be exercised.  But Abizaid’s question is salient.  If we increased force size in Iraq, where exactly would these troops come from?  Actually, Abizaid knows, but saying it would be unacceptable because it would involve policy changes.  Generals like Abizaid should be able intelligently to discuss policy, but the policy changes needed to free troops are of a nature that would require White House and Joint Chief’s of Staff involvement and approval.  So these changes are above Abizaid’s head.

There are approximately 100,000 troops deployed in Europe, another 32,000 in South Korea, and 35,000 in Japan.  But the cold war is over, and the troop deployments in Bosnia and Kosovo are at the same time not onerous and unnecessary.  NATO could take more burden in the absence of U.S. troops.  The burden, both financial and in manpower deprivation to other parts of the world, of troop deployments in Japan is significant, and it is time to reconsider whether the U.S. can and should be the protector of South Korea, Taiwan and Japan.  Victor Davis Hanson argues for a multi-pronged approach in dealing with the North Korea situation, including a new and robust push for missile defense, as well as clear threats against North Korea.  But one interesting piece of his theoretical construct involves troop force reductions in South Korea.

To work with South Korea, we need to start withdrawing troops to Pusan—and well beyond. Much of the present mess arose from the appeasement of the Sunshine policy—in part, fueled by the revisionism of Korean ingrate leftists who rewrote the Korean War in populist terms of American imperialism and their own victimization. This was, in part, due to Korean nationalism that envisioned an eventual pan-Korea state birthed by slow and insidious osmosis from the south; and, in part, a result of strategic complacence of a half-century made possible by American subsidies and deployments. It made sense to garrison Americans on the DMZ when Seoul was weak and nascent, but not now when its population and economy dwarf the North’s. Getting America off the DMZ would give us more strategic options through air power, and wake up the South Koreans, reminding them that cheap triangulation with the United States has real costs. They can either play Churchill or Chamberlain—but it’s their call, not ours, since we have wider worries protecting Japan and Taiwan that transcend South Korea’s Sunshine nonsense.

We have also made it clear that Japan should make preparations for its own self defense.  Given troop force reductions in Europe, Japan and South Korea, the U.S. should be able to redeploy enough troops to Iraq to achieve security and in Afghanistan to deal with a resurgent Taliban.