15 years, 9 months ago
It’s nice to receive my son home from his second deployment, the first in Fallujah in 2007, the second on the 26th MEU. We stayed on beautiful Emerald Isle for the week, and the LCACs were a bit late getting on to shore on Monday. The reception was a night time event.
15 years, 10 months ago
We have closely followed the implementation of the Taliban strategy (pointed out here at The Captain’s Journal one year ago and one half year before it began in earnest) to shut down lines of logistics via the Khyber region and through the Torkham Crossing. The closing of the Manas Air Base in Kyrgyzstan has occurred due to entirely different reasons than enemy strategy. Or has it? Russia is asserting itself in what it considers to be its near abroad, and has essentially bribed the officials in Kyrgyzstan to close down the Manas Air Base. This makes the U.S. utterly dependent on logistical lines that run through Russia to Central Asia. Of course, this places the U.S. in a precarious position regarding membership of Georgia and Ukraine in NATO, as well as missile programs in Poland and elsewhere. If the U.S. is dependent on Russia for logistics, then it is much more likely that Russia will be able to assert itself in the region with U.S. weakness because of dependence on Russian cooperation for logistics.
For this reason The Captain’s Journal had recommended approximately two months ago that the U.S. work harder on a potential logistical lines through the Caucasus region, specifically, from the Mediterranean Sea through the Bosporus Strait in Turkey, and from there into the Black Sea. From the Black Sea the supplies would go through Georgia to neighboring Azerbaijan. From here the supplies would transit across the Caspian Sea to Turkmenistan, and from there South to Afghanistan.
If this line of supply came to pass, then this leaves the issue of refueling for air supply and transit through the region unaddressed, since this was the primary mission of the Manas Air Base. Stephen Blank, professor at the US Army War College, has written that of the potential replacements for Manas, none appear to be viable. But unaddressed in Blank’s commentary is the potential to base air support in either Azerbaijan or Turkmenistan.
Returning to lines of logistical supply, as we recently reported, there are ongoing talks concerning the Caucasus region regarding the very routes we have discussed. Furthermore, trial runs of supplies are ongoing to test these routes.
… the Air Force is working on contingency plans to move the tanker fleet to bases in the Persian Gulf if it loses basing rights to Manas.
The Azeri capital, Baku, is emerging as a leading candidate to substitute for Manas, should the Kyrgyz government refuse to reconsider its withdrawal of the basing rights.
American and Azeri officials said that the focus of the discussions on Monday and Tuesday was a surface route that would move supplies from the Georgian port of Poti on the Black Sea and overland to Baku, where they would cross the Caspian Sea to Aktau, Kazakhstan, and then overland across Uzbekistan into Afghanistan.
A second potential route would land cargo at the Caspian seaport of Turkmenbashi, in Turkmenistan, for transit into Afghanistan. Talks on supply routes have also been held with officials in Tajikistan, another neighbor to the north of Afghanistan.
One American official said the first “trial run” of cargo containers on the new route was conducted within the last two weeks, with shipments of lumber sent from Turkey to Georgia to Azerbaijan, and then onward toward Afghanistan.
So this report notes not one, but two potential lines of logistical supply over land, as well as the potential replacement of the Manas Air Base with Baku, Azerbaijan. At this point it might be that the Russians backpedal on disallowing Manas to continue to function (thus the recent equivocation in the news), since U.S. involvement in the Caucasus (i.e., their near abroad) is the last thing they want.
But this logistical transit route is viable. First to Azerbaijan.
Azerbaijan is more developed than Turkmenistan, and is obviously the center of gravity of both of the potential logistical lines discussed above. Baku would be almost ideal for an air base to support refueling operations for U.S. aircraft supporting Operation Enduring Freedom. Turkmenistan is far less developed, and the only viable route for supplies would go through Ashgabat from the port city of Turkmenbashi, and then South to Kandahar or East to Kabul.
Much ink has been spent spilled over the human rights record of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, and both are undoubtedly repressive regimes, although there is evidence that Turkmenistan is slowly and gradually changing for the better. There is also significant corruption in Turkmenistan. But there is also indication that Turkmenistan is opening up to economic cooperation. They have expressed an interest in becoming an associative partner in the ECO (Economic Cooperation Organization), and have recently opened their air space to NATO supply flights to Afghanistan.
The U.S. has a history of moral preening when it comes to working with unsavory dictators and political regimes, but this preening must be put aside in favor of functionality and logistics. Georgia, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan have all expressed an interest in working with the U.S. to enable lines of logistical supply to Afghanistan. This plan is, after all, what provided more than 40% of the supplies to Russian troops during their campaign.
Moreover, a stronger presence in the Caucasus region is in the interests of the U.S. in both the near and long term. Stronger ties will serve to ensure continued supplies to U.S. troops in Afghanistan, cement critical relations in this region and Central Asia, and provide a counterbalance to Russia’s increasing hegemony in their near abroad. It is the right time and circumstances to engage the Caucasus.
Postscript: The Captain’s Journal thanks Mr. Bob King, Instructor, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Department of Joint, Interagency and Multinational Operations, Leavenworth, for the encouragement to write this article.
15 years, 10 months ago
Introduction
Several related but sometimes divergent reports are given below, followed by commentary and analysis.
Max Boot, Frederick Kagan and Kimberly Kagan, New York Times:
The main challenge is to overcome years of chronic neglect in terms of economic development, government services and above all security, which has allowed the insurgency free access to large swaths of the country. The good news is that the Taliban holds little appeal for most Afghans — a BBC-ABC News poll last month showed only 4 percent desired Taliban rule. The Sunni and Shiite insurgencies in Iraq, by contrast, maintained much greater support in their respective communities until they were defeated.
Even without much popular backing, Afghan insurgents are staging an increasing number of attacks, but major cities like Kabul and Jalalabad, which we visited, are relatively safe and flourishing. The civilian death toll in Afghanistan last year was 16 times lower than that in Iraq in the pre-surge year of 2006, even though Afghanistan is more populous.
Syed Saleem Shahzad, Asia Times:
Ahead of the resumption of battle in Afghanistan now that the weather is warmer, the Taliban have a virtual siege all around the capital Kabul. They have significant control in the vital districts of Wardak, Logar, Parwan and Kapisa.
A second strategic ring to reinforce this siege comprises the provinces of Kunar, Nooristan and Ghazni. The four vital entry and exit routes for the Taliban’s supply lines – Nimroz, Herat, Nangarhar and Kandahar – are also heavily manned by the militants.
In addition, after striking peace deals with the Pakistani security forces, the newly formed United Front of Taliban in the Pakistani tribal areas is ready to pump at least 15,000 to 20,000 fresh fighters into Afghanistan. These are expected to start crossing the rugged – and unmanned – border in April …
“Five percent of the Taliban is incorrigible, not susceptible to anything other than being defeated,” Biden said. “Another 25% or so are not quite sure, in my view, of the intensity of their commitment to the insurgency. Roughly 70% are involved because of the money.”
In a weekend New York Times interview, Obama floated the idea of engaging with non-radical members of the insurgency, as Afghanistan heads toward August 20 elections that will test its ability to govern itself.
However, it appears that Washington has already missed the boat. The reason is the all-time high domination of al-Qaeda-influenced militants – the neo-Taliban – who are not willing to make any deal short of the withdrawal of foreign occupation forces and the restoration of the Taliban regime.
Despite the killing of a large number of important al-Qaeda commanders, these hardliners have a strong presence among the Pakistan militants allied with the three main commanders – Mullah Bradar, Sirajuddin Haqqani and Anwarul Haq Mujahid. These three have pledged their allegiance to Taliban leader Mullah Omar, who has transformed the Taliban into an ultra-conservative force compared to a few years ago when the Taliban were a Pashtun tribal movement.
Paula Newton, CNN:
Kabul is clogged with traffic and people and at the best of times there is no way to assure safety in this city. And it’s alarming for this correspondent to hear the same line from both the Taliban and one of the city’s top cops: Insurgents can hit the city anytime, anywhere.
That’s not to say the Kabul Police force isn’t trying. They are now talking about a double ring of security around the city and they’ve gotten better at enforcing it. Many cities around the world with many more resources, are having their own battle with terrorists and so in that context, the security forces here aren’t doing a bad job.
Securing this capital is a crucial test not only for the city’s police force, but for the whole country. They need to know they can stand on their own and sort out their own security without thousands of foreign troops turning their capital into a fortress.
Less than three years ago, foreigners could walk the streets of Kabul in relative safety and have the luxury and freedom to hail their own cabs and try out the local food. Some foreigners of course still do that, but the majority live in armed camps throughout the city, fearing both random attacks and targeted kidnappings …
The fact is, even if Kabul becomes more secure in the coming months it may remain virtually cut off from the rest of the country for some time. And then there’s still the issue of how to secure the city itself with a police force of grossly underpaid officers who claim they are on the take just to survive?
Commentary & Analysis
Afghanistan is a land of extremely challenging terrain, and yet engagement of this terrain by U.S. forces has meant that many of the rural inhabitants around Kandahar have fled to the city. “Massive numbers of people have already been forced from their villages in the fighting zones, and the numbers are going up as security continues to deteriorate.
It is a displacement that is fostering social upheaval and crime. It is straining the limited resources of a city with little food and shelter to offer. And it is creating a growing legion of young men with no land to farm and no jobs – young men who are ripe pickings for the Taliban.”
The insurgency must be fought and security provided for the population in both rural and urban areas. Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan is going to be very difficult, especially since we have [incorrectly] relied for some time on direct action by special operations forces against high value targets as being the cornerstone of our offensive operations.
Max Boot’s commentary is almost certainly overly optimistic, while Shahzad’s analysis is both informative and moderately propagandistic at the same time. While the Taliban own much of the countryside (and almost all of it at night), the Asia Times report makes it sound as if the Taliban are capable of launching major conventional operations against large urban population centers. The Taliban have launched small Battalion-sized operations against the U.S. Marines, and while the Taliban are much bolder and more tactically skillful that the enemy in Iraq, they have been beaten in numerous engagements. In one such instance the kill ratio was 50 : 0.
Yet American tactical superiority won’t negate the very real affects of the influx 15,000 – 20,000 hard core Taliban fighters in Pakistan being freed to perform operations in Afghanistan due to the so-called peace deal with the Pakistani government. There is no doubt that security is degrading as it has been for more than a year, and there is also no doubt that major insurgent attacks have occurred and will increase in the population centers of Kabul and Kandahar.
With the Afghan police “on the take,” high on cannabis or opium much of the time, and under constant threat and sometimes inept when sober, rapid turnover to Afghan forces isn’t an option. Mr. Biden is certainly dreaming when he says that as much as 70% of the Taliban are redeemable. While the indigenous poor who participate for money should be courted as elements who might side with anti-globalist forces in Afghanistan, targeting mid-level Taliban commanders for negotiations will likely bring about the same disaster as the British failure with Musa Qala and our deal with Mullah Abdul Salaam. It accomplished little and wasted precious time.
While Mr. Biden prevaricates on the makeup of the Taliban, U.S. Soldiers, Airmen and Marines will see a difficult year in Afghanistan. 2009 will be a determinative year in the campaign.
15 years, 10 months ago
The New York Times published an article concerning temporarily halting SOF raids in Afghanistan.
The commander of a secretive branch of America’s Special Operations forces last month ordered a halt to most commando missions in Afghanistan, reflecting a growing concern that civilian deaths caused by American firepower are jeopardizing broader goals there.
The halt, which lasted about two weeks, came after a series of nighttime raids by Special Operations troops in recent months killed women and children, and after months of mounting outrage in Afghanistan about civilians killed in air and ground strikes. The order covered all commando missions except those against the highest-ranking leaders of the Taliban and Al Qaeda, military officials said.
American commanders in Afghanistan rely on the commando units to carry out some of the most delicate operations against militant leaders, and the missions of the Army’s Delta Force and classified Navy Seals units are never publicly acknowledged. But the units sometimes carry out dozens of operations each week, so any decision to halt their missions is a sign of just how worried military officials are that the fallout from civilian casualties is putting in peril the overall American mission in Afghanistan, including an effort to drain the Taliban of popular support.
Andrew Exum got to this one before we did, perhaps partially because he is now being paid to blog a certain portion of his time at CNAS. Maybe Nagl could throw a few dollars our direction and we can blog more. At any rate and on a serious note, what Exum says is worth hearing concerning his position that the line between counterterrorism and counterinsurgency is a false one.
I asked a highly respected retired U.S. Army general a year ago what the appropriate role for direct action special operations forces was in a population-centric COIN campaign. His answer was that direct action SOF is highly valuable because “it’s the way you play offense.” At the same time, though, it absolutely has to be tied into a greater COIN strategy. The cool kids cannot be allowed to just run amok, no matter how much they may want to.
Oh good heavens! “… The way you play offense.” Regular readers of The Captain’s Journal know how we approach the issue of SOF after having read:
And perhaps it’s true that we are biased towards a certain position given that this is a Marine blog (and please don’t drop comments or send notes saying that there is such a thing as MARSOC now). But still, there is a certain adolescent obsession with SOF being supermen that permeates this discussion and many like it.
SOF are not supermen. They are (or should be, or started out) as soldiers with specialized billets. Language, training, and cultural knowledge not typically found in the balance of the Army or Corps should mark SOF. For SEALs, they must do things that require specialized training, such as underwater demolition requiring use of the closed circuit oxygen system rebreather, and so on. Airmen who use satellite uplink equipment need specialized training.
To pretend that kinetics is performed by SOF while the “big Army” does something else is both elitist and insulting. It is insulting to infantry because it says to them that they aren’t really qualified to perform kinetic operations. But if reality is a gauge, squad rushes, satellite patrols, fire and maneuver tactics, stacks and room clearing operations, raids, use of night vision equipment, fast roping, and so on, are all things that infantry both trains on and has conducted in Iraq for years. These are infantry specialties, and SOF cannot and should not lay sole claim to them. As for that matter, flag and field grade officers who coddle this notion aren’t helping matters with the big Army.
Perhaps the supporters of this myth of the SOF superman are considering reality when recalling what is beginning to be the stark differences between Army basic training and Marine boot camp. From Thomas Ricks Making the Corps:
Army basic training is intentionally ‘user friendly’. All units at Fort Jackson, which trains support personnel – clerks, cooks, truck drivers, nurses and mechanics – are gender integrated. Men and women sleep in separate barracks, but do everything else together … the rifle ranges at Fort Jackson are named after states, not great battles. There is no shock theatre ‘pick up’. “We do not try to intimidate,” explains Lt. Col. Mark G. McCauley, Commander of the receiving area. “We do not try to strike fear in their hearts. We conduct the handoff in a calm, quiet, professional way. We want the soldiers in training to have a sense of comfort.”
‘Fun’ isn’t a word one hears on Parris Island. Here it comes naturally to the lips of trainees. “They teach us, but they also make it fun,” says Eric Escamilla, a soldier-in-training from Lubbock, Texas. Spec. Sheila Suess, his comrade in Delta Company, agrees as they eat breakfast in their mess hall. At other tables, trainees chat in conversations. No drill instructors hover, and there is no shouting anywhere in the building …
Out on the bayonet assault course, Alpha Company of the Third Battalion, 13th Infantry Regiment, is going through the paces. The platoon sergeant – the Army equivalent of senior drill instructor – addresses them. “Soldiers, please be interested in what I have to say,” begins Staff Sgt. Ron Doiron. “This is the only time in your military career you get to do the bayonet assault course. Make the most of it. Let’s have some fun out here” … Alpha Company takes off through the piney woods, climbing over low obstacles, sticking the tires and rubber dummies with bayonets. Jumping down into a trench, Pvt. Tralena Wolfe’s knee pops. She comes off the course, sits on a log, and cries.
As for a more timely assessment, you may go to the Army Times where Marine Captain Josh Gibbs discussed his trip to Fort Jackson. Perhaps the Army is being used as a social engineering experiment, which would explain the interest that the Democrats normally take in increasing the size of SOF. Only the champions of SOF can completely explain why they advocate seeing kinetics as the primary domain of SOF with [who knows what] the domain of the infantry.
But without such an explanation and justification, the following objections should suffice at the moment.
Now, as for counterterrorism versus counterinsurgency, regular readers know that we are nonplussed and unimpressed with the cloak and dagger missile strikes in Pakistan, and dark of the night raids in Afghanistan. These people show up, shoot up a place, perhaps take some people, go, and the next day are not heard from or seen. No one knows who the hell these people were, where they came from or why they were here. All people know is that they brought violence to their community. This is no way to win friends or influence people.
The Marine Corps infantry model is different. In operations in the Helmand Province, the Marines were described at times as being in “full bore reloading” mode. Over 400 hard core Taliban fighters were killed in and around Garmser. But then they didn’t leave. They sat with laptop PCs running EXCEL, logged and computed the losses and local worth of all of the things destroyed, and then paid cash to the people of Garmser.
Cash, all nicely set out in a tent, with carpeted entrance, inviting the tribal elders and heads of household to come in and collect the money for the broken windows, doors, etc. Then the Marines supplied security to the area to keep the Taliban out. Sure, the 24th MEU had to leave and unfortunately, the British apparently could not hold the terrain.
But this serves as a picture of how it’s done. Exum is smart enough to know this. Killing high value targets, according to our contacts, has led to the vicious cycle where Taliban operations stand down for a couple of weeks for them to sort out who their next mid-level commander is, several weeks or months of Taliban violence after they do, then raids take this man out, and so on the stupid procedure goes. The procedure is a loser.
So why did the SOF command stop the raids for a couple of weeks? What will they do after a couple of weeks? Will the raids start over? If so, why did they stop? There isn’t anything wrong with raids as long as it is against the right targets, but expecting them all to be done by SOF without the presence there the next morning is absurd strategy. It may make for good movies and cloak and dagger talk about who Exum calls the “cool kids,” but it makes for a bad campaign.
In the end, there is a stark difference between counterterrorism and counterinsurgency. One is performed by police, U.S., Interpol, and so forth, through banking, intelligence agencies, and diplomatic contacts. The other is performed by the Army and Marine Corps infantry. Or at least, it is by the Marines, and should be by the Army.
**** UPDATE ****
Michael Yon posts a provocative piece today concerning a number of things, including whether we will abandon Iraq, but also including his current take on Afghanistan and training of the Afghan Army. Please read the entire piece, but take particular note of this one paragraph.
I’ve asked many key officers why we are not using our Special Forces (specifically Green Berets) in a more robust fashion to train Afghan forces. The stock answers coming from the Green Beret world – from ranking officers anyway – is that they are taking a serious role in training Afghan forces. But the words are inconsistent with my observations. The reality is that the Green Berets – the only outfit in the U.S. military who are so excellently suited to put the Afghan army into hyperdrive – are mostly operating with small groups of Afghans doing what appears to be Colorado mule deer hunts in the mountains of Afghanistan. Special Forces A-teams are particularly well suited to train large numbers of people, but are not doing so.
Ahem, like I was saying …
15 years, 10 months ago
Yochi J. Dreazen opines in the Wall Street Journal concerning how the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan hinges upon far-flung outposts. A few salient parts follow.
“You can’t commute to work in counterinsurgency,” Gen. Petraeus told a security conference in Munich. He declined requests to be interviewed for this article.
Afghanistan, however, is different from Iraq. It remains a destitute country with few roads and virtually no modern infrastructure, meaning the outposts are unusually isolated. Outposts in Iraq were located in major cities, so they were able to protect the vast majority of the Iraqi populace. In Afghanistan, most outposts are in rural areas like Seray. Often, these outposts can be reached only by air. That has prompted fears the bases could theoretically be overtaken by insurgents before reinforcements can arrive.
The article then turns to Wanat as an example of what can happen in what he calls “far-flung outposts.” More on this in a minute. Continuing with Dreazen’s article:
David Kilcullen, a counterinsurgency expert who has long advised Gen. Petraeus on Iraq and Afghanistan, supported the outpost strategy in Iraq. But he says the U.S. is making a mistake by deploying so many troops to remote bases in Afghanistan.
Mr. Kilcullen, a retired Australian military officer, notes that 80% of the population of southern Afghanistan lives in two cities, Kandahar and Lashkar Gah. The U.S. doesn’t have many troops in either one of them.
“The population in major towns and villages is vulnerable because we are off elsewhere chasing the enemy,” he said.
Andrew Exum picks up on this theme and poses a number of questions.
Afghanistan is a really big country — bigger than Iraq — and we are trying to protect more terrain with fewer troops. The old maxim that he who defends everything defends nothing seems to apply here. Are we, by putting troops in little far-flung outposts, setting them up for more Wanats? Should we instead be camped out in the big cities of Kabul, Kandahar and Lashkar Gah as Kilcullen suggests? Should not our first priority be to secure the Afghan people in order to reduce violence in the country and facilitate the upcoming national elections?
Joshua Foust responds to Exum’s questions thusly.
Umm, should not. The last people to assume that “the people” reside in the cities, and so there their operations should focus, were the Soviets. The Taliban run circles around the U.S. and ISAF precisely they control most of the countryside and not the cities. The problem isn’t Kabul, but the Tagab. The problem isn’t Kandahar but the hills above it. The problem isn’t Lashkar Gah, but Garmser. The problem isn’t Khowst, but Spera. The problem isn’t Herat, but Shindand. The problem… well, you get my point (and that list wasn’t meant to be comprehensive, merely illustrative, in case that weren’t obvious). If you want to do a population-centric COIN in Afghanistan, you do it in the countryside …
… this kind of flabbergastery is perfectly emblematic of why knowing buzzwords like “population-centric counterinsurgency” is really worthless without that other COIN buzzword, “intimate knowledge.” You can’t make a strategy population-centric if you don’t know the population, COINdinistas.
Without considering nuance and detail, it is easy to conflate issues. We have extensively covered the Battle of Wanat, and while the base may have been “far-flung,” close air support was initiated within 27 minutes of the start of the battle, close combat aviation within 62 minutes, and reinforcement and relief within approximately 2 hours. The Battle of Wanat happened and proceeded as it did in large part due to other decisions: Eight of the nine who perished did so as a result of defending Observation Post Top Side, U.S. forces didn’t occupy or control the high ground, intelligence failed as indications of massive Taliban troop movements were ignored, and a host of other issues.
Wanat is a sidebar discussion regarding the overall strategy of the campaign. So who is right? Should we protect the population in large urban centers as suggested by Kilcullen (and questioned by Exum), or is Foust right that properly engaging Afghanistan means doing so in the countryside? The answer means everything to the campaign.
First off, it is important to correct wrong impressions that this information can give. The U.S. doesn’t have troops in Kandahar, for instance, because that is a Canadian operation under the purview of the ISAF. Canada currently has approximately 2700 troops in Kandahar, and this force presence is soon to double with the addition of a U.S. BCT.
Furthermore, part of the 10th Mountain Division is now garrisoned near Kabul in Maidan Wardak and Logar provinces to the south of Kabul. So it simply isn’t true that the U.S. forces are all going to far-flung outposts as opposed to securing the population centers.
But at what price? At Forward Operating Base Altimur, the 10th Mountain has access to Lobster tails, massage services, skype hookups, jewelry shops and six kinds of ice cream. While no one should begrudge them their creature comforts, the most problematic of all concerns is that they are said to be “bored.” So should these troops be in more rural locations instead of urban centers?
This debate falls into the trap of Clausewitz – that of trying to find a unitary focus for our efforts. Both Exum and Foust favor a population-centric model, and yet The Captain’s Journal supports a different view. U.S. forces are present in Afghanistan because there are enemies of the U.S. located there, and also those who harbor enemies of the U.S. Without them, the likelihood of our presence is vanishingly small. The enemy is our target.
If the enemy announced his presence and fought without the benefit of mixing with the population, the rate of the fight would be more productive. This has occurred even recently in Afghanistan, when the Taliban evacuated Garmser of its population, dug in and unsuccessfully faced down the Marines of the 24th MEU. During their deployment in Helmand, they killed some 400 hard core Taliban fighters in what was described at times as “full bore reloading.” Yet the tribal elders also said that “When you protect us, we will be able to protect you,” showing little interest in reconstruction, programs and assistance.
But it will not always be this clear. The enemy is who we are after, but to get to them at times requires focusing on the population. Every situation is unique, and thus rather than finding a center of gravity, it is best to see the campaign as employing lines of effort. In spite of the lack of adequate troops, the campaign will not be an either-or decision, focusing on the enemy or the population. It will be both-and.
Foust is right. The Russians focused on the large population centers, and left the countryside to the Taliban. But Exum is also right to question only deploying in rural areas. Kandahar has seen its share of troubles, and even the Canadians admit that the sense of security has plummeted because of Taliban activity. The Taliban are there in force, the population has no security, and thus a force presence is required in Kandahar.
No single narrative is adequate to describe what is required to successfully prosecute the campaign, and buzzwords add little if anything to the discussion. We must be smart and allow the local situation to dictate the plan of action. Whether from tribal elders in Garmser or the more sophisticated population of Kandahar, the message is the same. The enemy cannot be allowed to rule the population.
15 years, 10 months ago
In January of 2009 Andrew Lubin authored an open letter to the President concerning Afghanistan. This was carried on his own web site and also the Small Wars Journal blog. A number of recommendations were made, but one observation bears repeating.
Get the Army off their huge stupid bases where their bureaucracy flourishes. Put them in the field where they belong. Their “creature comforts” have gotten out of control -Burger King, Orange Julius, jewelry shops; do you know they now offer massage services at Bagram? In a war zone?
The Washington Post published an article entitled From a Fortified Base, a Different View of Afghanistan. The beginning of the article justifies Lubin’s concern and continues with this theme in the superlative degree, although not just at Bagram.
FORWARD OPERATING BASE ALTIMUR, Afghanistan, March 2 — From the air, this U.S. Army camp in Logar province looks like a fortified gravel pit on a barren slope, surrounded by two-tiered sacks of dirt and razor wire.
But inside the wire, the hundreds of young sappers and scouts and cavalry troops from the 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division, all newly arrived for a one-year deployment, have a pretty good life.
There is a heated recreation tent with treadmills and table tennis, 24-hour Internet service, Skype hookups and a bank of low-cost, instant-connection phones. A muted cacophony of domestic chatter rises from the rows of plywood booths.
“Don’t forget to make the car payment . . . She told me the new baby has red hair . . . I thought we agreed not to talk about that till I get home . . . No, it’s real quiet here, Ma . . . I saw some pretty nice hunting rifles on the Net . . . Are you being a good girl for Daddy?”
One tent away is the DFAC, or dining facility, where a crew of cheerful civilian cooks from India stays up all night preparing a smorgasbord of goodies. There is a mountain of fresh strawberries and grapes, replenished daily. There are six kinds of ice cream and pie. There is surf and turf every Friday night, with lobster tails flown from Maine via Dubai. After a late patrol, the men can still get grilled cheeseburgers at 2 a.m.
The living and bathing accommodations are luxurious, too, especially for soldiers who have slept on open rocky ground and gone for weeks without a real shower on previous deployments in much more primitive and dangerous conditions, such as insurgent-plagued Konar province to the east.
The 20-cot sleeping tents are neatly arranged between gravel paths that absorb the mud and snow. They are lighted brightly enough for soldiers to read at night, although most prefer watching action movies on their laptops. They are heated by giant black plastic hoses that blast in air so hot it can dry a pair of washed socks in 20 minutes. The hoses also pull out the exhaust so powerfully that they can suck up nearby objects — even a visitor’s sweater and cellphone — like some stealth worm from a science fiction novel.
Then there is the view, which is utterly breathtaking. Logar, located in central eastern Afghanistan about 50 miles south of the capital, Kabul, is a wide valley surrounded by mountains. From the lookout post at Altimur, set atop an abandoned stone wall, one can gaze in any direction at a vertiginously sculpted panorama of pristine white peaks.
But the men of the 3rd Combat Brigade did not come here for a sightseeing vacation, and they seem edgy and bored in this cramped military spa. They are young and fit and ready for action, and the drizzly, leaden weather means little contact with the Taliban insurgents they came to fight.
This approach can be contrasted with that taken by the 24th MEU when they deployed to the Helmand Province. Col. Peter Petronzio, commander of the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, observed that “You need physically to be there,” he said. “You need to continue to move about the population, let your presence be known, but do it in a way so that you are not smothering and overwhelming. You have got to let life go on.”
The Marines lived for most of their deployment in Helmand without electrical power, e-mail, connectivity, or comfortable living arrangements.
No ice cream for the Marines. Food was prepared over an open fire in the Helmand Province, Afghanistan.
Marines on patrol in Now Zad, Afghanistan.
Corporal William Ash, a squad leader from 1st Platoon, Bravo Company, Battalion Landing Team 1st Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment, 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), along with a stray dog lead a patrol through a city in Helmand Province, Afghanistan. When the platoon moved into the area, they found two stray dogs, and each time the Marines head out on patrol the dogs are right at the Marines’ side.
Continuing with the 3rd Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division, is there anything to do in Logar? Perhaps so. “Recently in Logar, armed locals blocked the highway into Kabul for hours, in protest of a night raid where US forces killed one and detained three others. According to local reports, the nearly 2,000 protestors burned tires and chanted anti-US slogans.”
The capabilities of the 10th Mountain Division versus the Marines is not at issue here. The issue pertains to command decisions concerning how troops are to be used, the strategy employed in Afghanistan, and the tactics used to effect that strategy. Clearly, this is not the right use of the 10th Mountain Division.
15 years, 10 months ago
Iran is quickly advancing towards becoming a nuclear state. In troubling developments in air power, Iran can now deploy UAVs, and Russia may have supplied Iran with new air defense systems, including their long range S-300 surface to air missiles. If they haven’t, the system is being used as a bargaining chip by Russia. There are reports that they have refused to sell the missile system, but responding to the Israeli plan to sell weapons systems to Georgia by saying that Moscow expected Israel “to show the same responsibility.” In the first case, Iran is armed with an air defense system that would make an attack against its nuclear assets much more difficult. In the second case, Russia has used this potentiality to weaken Georgia and prime it for another invasion.
Pavel Felgenhauer at the The Jamestown Foundation has recently published a commentary entitled Russia’s Coming War with Georgia. The commentary very smartly connects the isolated Russian base in Armenia – which in itself is further demonstration of Russian intentions of control over its “near abroad” – with the need to control Georgia. Says Felgenhauer, “The ceasefire last August has left the strategically important Russian base in Armenia cut off with no overland military transit connections. The number of Russian soldiers in Armenia is limited to some 4000, but during 2006 and 2007 large amounts of heavy weapons and supplies were moved in under an agreement with Tbilisi from bases in Batumi and Akhalkalaki (Georgia). At present there are some 200 Russian tanks, over 300 combat armored vehicles, 250 heavy guns and lots of other military equipment in Armenia – enough to fully arm a battle force of over 20,000 (Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozrenie, August 20, 2004). Forces in Armenia can be swiftly expanded by bringing in manpower by air transport from Russia. Spares to maintain the armaments may also be shipped in by air, but if a credible overland military transit link is not established within a year or two, there will be no possibility to either replace or modernize equipment. The forces will consequently degrade, undermining Russia’s commitment to defend its ally Armenia and Moscow’s ambition to reestablish its dominance in the South Caucasus.”
Concerning the timing of the potential invasion, Felgenhauer observes:
While snow covers the Caucasian mountain passes until May, a renewed war with Georgia is impossible. There is hope in Moscow that the Georgian opposition may still overthrow Mikheil Saakashvili’s regime or that the Obama administration will somehow remove him. However, if by May, Saakashvili remains in power, a military push by Russia to oust him may be seriously contemplated. The constant ceasefire violations could escalate to involve Russian servicemen – constituting a public casus belli. The desire by the West to “reset” relations with Moscow, putting the Georgia issue aside, may be interpreted as a tacit recognition of Russia’s right to use military force.
With the addition of the Biden pronouncement that the U.S. would “press the reset button” with Russia, the U.S. is now in the throes of a logistical dilemma. On the one hand, the missile defense program for NATO states is meant as a deterrent for a potential Iranian nuclear and missile based military capability. On the other hand, the current administration is seen as likely to jettison the whole project.
The U.S. is now beholden to Russia for logistical supply lines to Afghanistan. General David Petraeus has visited numerous European and Central Asian countries recently, including Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. Supplies are soon to leave Latvia bound for Afghanistan. But the common element in all of the logistical supply lines are that they rely on Russian good will. This good will exists as long as the missile defense doesn’t, and the missile defense was intended to be used as a deterrent for Iranian nuclear ambitions.
Alternative supply routes have been suggested, including one which wouldn’t empower Russian hegemony in the region, from the Mediterranean through the Bosporus strait, into the Black sea, and through Georgia to neighboring Azerbaijan. From there the supplies would transit across the Caspian Sea to Turkmenistan, and from there South to Afghanistan. An alternative to the air route from the recently closed Manas Air base is sea transport to India, rail or truck to the Indian-controlled Kashmir region, and then air transport to Kabul. But none of these options has been pursued. The current administration is locked into negotiations that empower Russia.
Pakistan President Zardari has observed, and correctly so, that Pakistan is in a state of denial concerning the threat posed by the Taliban, yet rather than eliminate the threat, the strategy has been to make peace deals with the Tehrik-i-Taliban and plead for the same financial bailout being offered across America, saying that in order to defeat the Taliban Pakistan needs a “massive program,” a “Marshall Plan” to defeat the Taliban through economic development.
Certainly, some of the foreign policy problems were present with the previous administration, from the failure to plan for logistics for Afghanistan, to support for Musharraf’s duplicitous administration, assisting the Taliban by demure on the one hand while money was received with the other. But the currents appear to be pointing towards a revised world opinion of what the U.S. is willing to sustain on behalf of “good relations,” and the current administration’s prevarications appear to be going headlong into numerous dilemmas.
We wish to use the missile program in Europe as an bargaining chip to avoid the reality of an Iranian nuclear program, while the Iranian supreme has said that “relations with the U.S. have for the time being no benefit to the Iranian nation.” Russia, who is assisting Iran in its military buildup, is unimpressed because we have planned for no other option for logistics for Afghanistan except as dictated by Vladimir Putin. The best that we can come up with, so far, is to forestall the planned troop reduction in the European theater, a troop reduction that is needed to help fund and staff the war against the global insurgency.
Pakistan’s Zardari figures that if the administration is willing to give away on the order of a trillion dollars, they can play the game of “show me the money” like everyone else, from Russia over logistical lines to Afghanistan to over-leveraged homeowners in the U.S.
Israel figures that all of this points to throwing their concerns under the bus, and thus they have launched a covert war against Iran, a program that is unlikely to be successful, pointing to broader regional instability in the near term. Hassan Nasrallah, leader of Hezbollah, has said that they will acquire or have acquired anti-aircraft weapons. While they have stood down over the war in Gaza, they are apparently preparing for more of the same against Israel.
The current administration has attempted to befriend Syria, while at the same time the USS San Antonio has interdicted Iranian weapons bound by ship to Syria, intended for Hezbollah or Hamas. Most of this has occurred within less than two months of inauguration of the current administration in Washington. It may prove to be a difficult four years, with unintended consequences ruling the day.
Update: Welcome to Instapundit readers and thanks to Glenn for the link.
15 years, 11 months ago
Edward Joseph writing for the Washington Post gives us a glimpse into how some of the former anti-Soviet Mujahideen feel about the U.S. presence in Afghanistan.
I recently visited the exhibit during a seven-week mission to evaluate a U.S. program assisting local governments in Afghanistan. On our way out of the museum, we bumped into a prominent mujahed fighter and his entourage. When an American in our group told him that the United States would never forget the Afghan fighters’ struggle against the Soviets, he smiled and nodded proudly. “And we also can never forget your fight against the Taliban now,” the American added. With that, the mujahed’s smile vanished — and so did he, with all his people, after an awkward goodbye.
A full sixty percent of the Afghan population see the Taliban as the biggest threat to Afghanistan. This Mujahideen can be counted as one of the irreconcilables, and Petraeus has noted that we must pursue and kill them. But the author goes on to discuss what turns out to be an important underlying problem in Afghanistan: corruption.
Everywhere I went, people complained about corruption. “The government is corrupt from A to Z,” said a road contractor working in one of the most dangerous provinces. The pressure, he explained, begins with “suggestions” that he hire officials’ relatives and friends and rent vehicles only from certain providers; it ends with the officials telling him exactly how big a cut of his profits they’ll take to let the project continue.
This theme is so ubiquitous that it isn’t difficult to find reports of corruption. It applies to everything in life.
When it comes to governing this violent, fractious land, everything, it seems, has its price.
Want to be a provincial police chief? It will cost you $100,000.
Want to drive a convoy of trucks loaded with fuel across the country? Be prepared to pay $6,000 per truck, so the police will not tip off the Taliban.
Need to settle a lawsuit over the ownership of your house? About $25,000, depending on the judge.
“It is very shameful, but probably I will pay the bribe,” Mohammed Naim, a young English teacher, said as he stood in front of the Secondary Courthouse in Kabul. His brother had been arrested a week before, and the police were demanding $4,000 for his release. “Everything is possible in this country now. Everything.”
Kept afloat by billions of dollars in American and other foreign aid, the government of Afghanistan is shot through with corruption and graft. From the lowliest traffic policeman to the family of President Hamid Karzai himself, the state built on the ruins of the Taliban government seven years ago now often seems to exist for little more than the enrichment of those who run it.
Ubiquitous corruption is now causing a major problem in the counterinsurgency campaign. Some of the population is beginning to contrast the massive, systemic corruption of the current regime with Taliban rule.
Some in Kabul have become nostalgic for Taliban times. “At least, with the Taliban, we had security,” one mechanic told me after we haggled over the cost of my motorcycle repair. “No one would steal my tools. Now life is dangerous, the cost of food and gas are expensive, and the government does nothing for us. They work only for themselves, because they know this won’t last” …
[Some] seem nostalgic about the Taliban government’s honesty and integrity, despite the harsh rules. One recent cartoon in The Kabul Times showed a $100 bill on a human body, pointing to an Afghan government ministry and saying, “If you need help, don’t go in there without me!”
According to one report, NGOs now dedicate an average of 7 to 8 percent of their budget to paying bribes—sometimes called “facilitation fees” or “marketing fees” on paper—many directly to government official coffers. USAID and military organizations seem able to avoid much of the corruption, but ordinary Afghans face it regularly. There are at least four phrases in Dari specifically for persons who demand bribes, my favorite being chor sat o bist, “420,” the code for corruption.
“It’s not that the system is corrupt,” the U.S. State Department’s new anti-corruption director told me in September, inside a heavily guarded compound in Wazir Akbar Khan. “It’s that corruption is the system.”
Corruption undermines legitimacy of the government, especially for the poor and lower middle class. This has been and is being exploited by the Taliban, whether in Afghanistan or Pakistan. The PakTribune has a remarkable anecdotal account of this kind of exploitation. It is a lengthy account, but necessary if we wish fully to understand one of the tools that the Taliban have used to come back to power.
It was during a visit to Peshawar that I met a senior police officer. He narrated a story which was brow-raising. He told of a person from Bannu who lent Rs 40,000/ to a man he knew, who promised that he would return it within a specified time. He told the borrower that he had saved up the said amount to help pay for his children`s education. When the agreed time lapsed, he asked him to return the amount. The borrower started making excuses and after a few months he flatly refused and challenged the lender to do what ever he could. There is a Pukhtun word for it “Laas Da Azaad De”.
The man went from pillar to post to seek justice but with no result. The police proved incapable as the borrower was a powerful man with strong connections. When he tried to knock on the door of the court for justice he was dismayed to hear that it would take months for the case to come to a hearing and years to reach a final judgment. After all that, the chances were that the verdict would go against him as he was up against powerful people. To top it off, he was told he had to pay Rs. 1000/ upfront every time he wanted to put his case forward for a hearing. This amount did not include the amount he was going to pay the lawyers. When he calculated it, the approximate amount turned out to be more than the actual amount he was going to seek justice for.
At the end of every day, he would go back home heart broken; cursing his luck to be living in a country where there was no justice for the middle or poor classes. He tried to persuade the borrower by pleading with him, explaining how desperately he needed the money for his children’s education. He even offered a discount or to split the amount into installments, but all in vain. It was like hitting a brick wall. He felt dejected, helpless and powerless to see his children suffering just because he came from strata of a society pushed against the wall.
One evening, he heard a knock on the door. He opened it and saw two strangers with bushy beards standing outside. Thinking they were there to collect ‘Chanda’, he asked with irritation what they wanted. They told him that they saw him crying in the mosque and on enquiry they were told that someone was refusing to pay his money back. With a surprised look on his face, he asked them who they were.
“We are local Taliban” Then they asked if he would let them have his side of story. He saw a ray of hope and ushered them in. After listening to his story, the Taliban told him that the borrower had committed an un-Islamic act, and if he wanted they could persuade him to return the said money. “We want your permission”. His heart jumped with flickering optimism and immense joy and without any hesitation, he gave them his consent. Before they left the premises they asked for 72 hours.
According to the police officer, the Taliban went to the influential man and told him it was un-Islamic not to pay the amount he had borrowed from the man. They threatened that if he did not pay the debt back within 48 hours; he would bear the consequences. They also told him how Taliban had previously dealt with people like him. Shivers went through the spine of the ‘powerful’ man as he knew what their threat meant. With a dry mouth, frightened face and shaking body he nodded his head in agreement, promising he would pay back the amount. The next day, he went to the house of the lender and paid back the full amount he had refused up until then. He apologised for the delay and requested him to tell the Taliban not to harm him or his family and to let them know that he had returned the money. The Taliban never went back to ask whether he got the money back, but they must had been watching the development. From that day on, according to the police officer, that man became a strong supporter of Taliban. Could anyone blame him?
When Taliban justice is seen as free of corruption, the people can overlook its harshness – at least, some of them. As long as corruption is the way of life in Afghanistan and the Taliban are seen as the anti-corruption faction, the campaign will be very hard to prosecute, and in fact no lasting good is likely to come of it.
The application of soft power is necessary in Afghanistan, and this power doesn’t necessarily mean more largesse. But it does mean that we must be clever and crafty regarding the politics, governance, mentoring and instruction of the Afghan government, and the accountability we demand of the current (and future) regime. We must not be as politically stolid as we were in Iraq. We might just win the military campaign and lose the country because we back a corrupt regime.
15 years, 11 months ago
This generation’s Ernie Pyle, Michael Yon, has posted a very important Powerpoint presentation. His post is entitled The Eagle Went Over the Mountain. Michael has posted some very important prose on the campaigns in both Iraq and Afghanistan. But sometimes all a good journalist has to do to be good is find and send on the important things he finds. The trick is in knowing what’s important. Every unit planning a deployment to Afghanistan, and even those who are not, should spend time studying this presentation for its worth in the fundamentals of tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP). The Powerpoint presentation is linked just below.
the_eagle_went_over_the_mountain3
Here is one excerpt on a common tactic.
The bait and ambush attack is one of the most common ambush techniques used by the enemy. The enemy is very observant and has noticed how aggressive Marines are compared to other coalition forces. They have use this to their advantage on several occasions and have drawn Marines into complex ambushes with catastrophic results.
In this scenario a platoon minus was patrolling the town when they were engaged with sporadic small arms fire from a distance. They returned fire and were moving further into the town when they were engaged by a single enemy fighter who fired on the platoon and broke contact. The platoon chased the fighter through the town when they suddenly found themselves in a dead end.
The enemy attacked the platoon from the rear and pushed them further into the dead end. The enemy had driven the platoon into a fire sack and they ambushed the platoon from the roof tops. This continued until aviation assets came over head and broke the ambush.
Here is a visual depiction of the tactic.
This is only the beginning of the discussion concerning logistics ambushes, fire and maneuver tactics, development of enfilade fire, and even the thickness of the mud walls of the Afghan homes (18″ thick, resistant even to 20 mm Vulcan). As few of the summary points of the presentation follow:
Fire Control: Enemy forces have demonstrated a high level of fire control in numerous engagements. They have shifted and focused their fires on what they perceived to be the greatest threat. Ambushes have generally been initiated with bursts of machinegun fire followed by volleys of RPGs. The beaten zone of the RPGs have been within six inches to a foot. This shows a very developed system of fire control and points to a section leader controlling these fires. The complexity and size of some of these ambushes point to a platoon and company level command structure.
Interlocking fields of fire: The enemy did an excellent job of placing fighting positions in locations where they could mutually support each other. As elements of the platoon attacked one position, they would be engaged from multiple firing positions. Several times during the engagement elements of the platoon would be pinned down from accurate fire coming from several directions until other elements could maneuver to destroy those positions.
RPG Volley Fire: Almost every time the enemy attacked the armored vehicles, the enemy attacked with volleys of 2-3 RPGs. This demonstrated a high amount of coordination and discipline. Often times these attacks came from multiple firing positions.
Combined arms: The enemy demonstrated an advanced understanding of combined arms. Most of their attacks on the platoon combined machine gun fire with RPGs, rockets and mortars. Enemy forces used their PK machine guns to suppress turret gunners while several RPG gunners would engage vehicles with volleys of RPGs. They also attempted to fix the vehicles using RPGs and machinegun fire for attacks with rockets and mortars.
Fire and Maneuver: The enemy proved to be very adept at fire and maneuver. The enemy would fix Marines with RPG and machine gun fire and attempt to maneuver to the flanks. This happened with every engagement. If elements of the platoon were attacked from one direction, they could expect further attacks to come from the flanks. This occurred both with mounted and dismounted elements of the platoon.
Anti-Armor Tactics: The enemy did not attempt to penetrate the crew compartment of the vehicles they engaged. They fired volleys of RPGs to the front end of the HMMWVs in order to disable them and start a vehicle fire. Once the crew evacuated, they would engage them with crew served weapons. This demonstrates a very detailed understanding of the limitations of their weapon systems and a thorough knowledge of our armor vulnerabilities.
“Karez” Irrigation Ditches: The enemy utilized prepared fighting positions built into irrigation ditches to maneuver about the battlefield and attack the platoon. These ditches ranged from four to seven feet deep and made any frontal attacks very difficult. The enemy would attack from one position and rapidly maneuver to another. This facilitated flanking attacks. The enemy also used tree lines to stage their attacks from. Many wooded areas are bordered with mud walls and irrigation ditches, which the enemy used for cover and concealment.
Massing Forces: The enemy was able to mass their forces to over 400 enemy on the battlefield on several occasions. This was not normally the case in Iraq. Situations here in Afghanistan can quickly escalate and even company sized elements can find themselves outnumbered, outmaneuvered and outgunned. The enemy will not always mass but they will rally to defend their leadership or protect their interests. They have conducted ambushes that have swelled to 400 fighter engagements and have also massed to that size to conduct attacks on Forward Operating Bases.
Defense in Depth: The enemy plans their defenses with depth and mutual support in mind. In one ambush the enemy engaged the platoon from a tree line that was supported by fighting position to the north that were tied into the defense and prevented us from flanking the ambush site. These machine gun positions had excellent fields of fire and machine guns were set in on the avenues of approach. The enemy fought to the death in the tree line to defend their base 200 meters to the north. As the platoon attempted to attack the base from the flank, they were engaged from multiple machine gun positions with excellent fields of fire with interlocking fields of fire.
Fire Discipline: Engagements have lasted from two to forty hours of sustained combat. Marines must be careful to conserve rounds because there may not be any way to replenish their ammunition and it is not practical or recommended to carry an excessive number of magazines. Marines took a few moments to apply the fundamentals of marksmanship and this greatly improved the ratio of shots fired to enemy fighters killed. Crew Served Weapons do not always need to be fired at the rapid rate. Good application of shoulder pressure will tighten beaten zones and lead to effective suppression. Talking guns will help conserve ammunition.
Fire Control: Fire control was critical during the battle from the team to platoon level. One of the main reasons the platoon did not take many casualties during the battle was due to the effective coordination between crew served weapons, precision fires, CAS, mortars and small arms. This permitted the platoon to place pressure on the enemy force and focus fires as required to maneuver elements of the platoon to close with and destroy the enemy. Enemy forces use water to reduce the dust signature around their battle positions and it can become very difficult to locate enemy firing positions in the chaos of battle. Unit leaders can use tracers in the day time and lasers at night to mark targets for crew served weapons and small arms fire. Vehicle commanders and drivers can walk gunners on target using ADDRACS, target reference points and the field expedient mil system (one finger, four fingers from the hay stack). The impacts from MK-19 are easily seen and can be used to orient the other gunners.
Combat Load: Marines had to conduct numerous trench assaults and squad rushes during the eight hour battle and the heavy weight of their armor and equipment greatly hampered their movement. After this battle all of the Marines reevaluated their combat load and reduced the amount of ammunition that they carried. After the battle, Marines normally carried no more than 4 to 6 magazines and one grenade. In the company ambush in Bala Baluk no Marine fired more than four magazines in the eight hours of fighting despite the target rich environment.
This is not nearly all of the important TP observations. The entire presentation is worth the time to study and re-study, and there are a number of counter-tactics that the Marines found that they could use with success. This extremely important observation concludes the presentation: Iraq has allowed us to become tactically sloppy as the majority of fighters there are unorganized and poorly trained. This is not the case in Afghanistan. The enemy combatants here will exploit any mistake made by coalition forces with catastrophic results. Complacency and laziness will result in mass causalities.
The Recon Marines and the authors of this report have done a great service to the balance of U.S. forces in theater for providing this analysis both of the enemy TTP and successful defeaters for them. While a new study is released from the think tanks about every week on Afghanistan, this presentation should be considered the most important thing to come out of Afghanistan in the past two years. I have discussed this with Michael Yon, and on this we agree.
It deserves as wide a distribution as possible. Thanks to Michael for posting this, and a special thanks to the brave warriors of the Force Recon Marines.
15 years, 11 months ago
In The British Approach to Counterinsurgency we weighed in on the British Kajaki dam project (for readers unfamiliar with this project visit the links provided). While brave and effective operations were necessary to deliver large turbines to the dam for electricity generation, we observed that this front in counterinsurgency was merely one, an important one also being that of focus on the enemy.
The point is that in order for infrastructure to work, the enemies of that infrastructure must be targeted. The dam won’t long operate if its operators are all killed, or if other replacement parts have to undergo such intensive operations in order to be deployed at the plant. Infrastructure is good, as is good governance. But for these softer tactics in counterinsurgency to be successful, the Taliban must be engaged and killed.
Soon after this “defense analysts” also weighed in with similar concerns.
… electricity supplies are likely to face disruption from Taliban attacks unless the region is cleared of militants, analysts said.
The area is not densely populated, so the power lines must cover many miles of hostile land to reach the remote villages that are due to be linked up to the dam. British troops in Helmand control an area of only a few miles radius beyond the Kajaki dam, so pylons and substations will have to cross what is now a stronghold for militants operating in the region.
“The power lines coming out of Kajaki are going to be extremely vulnerable to attack,” said Matthew Clements, Eurasia analyst at Jane’s Defence. “The arrival of the extra turbine is a major blow to the Taliban, so they are going to be keen to make sure the project fails.”
“In Iraq we’ve seen that overhead power lines are extremely difficult to protect, and there’s no point generating electricity if you can’t distribute it,” said Paul Smyth, head of operational studies at the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies.
The point about electricity is also similar to our observations on the grid in Iraq as well as irrigation and water supply systems. So whatever happened to the dam? Were our warnings prescient or merely an overreaction? More on the dam shortly.
Thematically similar operations are being waged in Afghanistan by the Texas National Guard.
Fifty-two Texas National Guard men and women are planning an attack on a Taliban stronghold near here that other Army units estimate would take thousands of U.S. and Afghan soldiers to capture.
The Texans plan to win the battle of Khajanoor Farms without firing a shot …
A Texas National Guard Agribusiness Development Team plans to defeat the Taliban’s hold on the big wheat-seed farm at Khajanoor by building a larger, quality seed farm in the high mountain plains of Ghazni province.
If approved – and if the climate at 10,000 feet can be mastered – the Nawur Farm could free Ghazni’s wheat farmers from Taliban-approved suppliers and lousy products imported from Pakistan.
“It could also save lives,” said Col. Stan Poe of Houston, commander of the Texas agribusiness team …
“For seven years, we’ve been chasing the Taliban. They literally just come back,” said Illinois National Guard Col. David Matakas. “We can go in and kill a lot of people and do no good. It’s more important that we push forward with training the Afghan forces and focus on turning a district, a tribe or a village away from the Taliban, one at a time” …
Khajanoor Farms is in the code-red Andar District. A large force of Taliban fighters controls the 2,500 acres of wheat fields and subsistence plots from caves in mountains overlooking the farm.
Khajanoor was built in 1975 as a government farm to supply wheat seeds to five provinces. There are 96 farm buildings on the site, two wells and a crude irrigation system. The farm’s flour mill is a shambles.
Satellite photos show sharecropper farmers are still cultivating wheat for seeds, but much of the farm is broken down.
U.S. forces say the seed produced at Khajanoor is sold under Taliban control to farmers loyal to the Taliban cause.
The Texans had visited wheat farms in the far north Nawur district, an area populated by descendants of Genghis Khan known as Hazaris. Some of the Hazari farms were at elevations of 10,000 feet. Trees were growing at elevations 1,500 feet higher than you’d find in North America or Europe.
The Ghazni provincial government owns vast tracts of land in Nawur.
There’s plenty of water stored in a vast snowmelt playa called Daste Nawur.
Martin and James thought this offered a way to defeat the Taliban at Khajanoor Farms. They designed a giant, 20,000-acre wheat seed farm north of Daste Nawur that could provide seeds for most of Afghanistan’s wheat farmers.
The Hazaris were eager to help the Texans and willing to learn how to run a large farm …
Lt. Col. Al Perez of San Antonio is the agribusiness team’s market specialist. He’s been in the military for 23 years, both in the regular Army and the Texas National Guard.
“This is way much better than pulling the trigger,” he said. “Way, way better.”
So the plan is to compete with the inefficient Taliban-sponsored operation and send the local population on its way to independence from the thugs.
It’s a nice idea, and along with better language training, The Captain’s Journal supports such tactics. We have applauded similar efforts by the Department of Agriculture. So the proof of our support for the nonkinetic part of counterinsurgency is on the books.
But there is a subtle although important problem with this account. Notice that kinetic operations and population-centric operations are placed in juxtaposition for purposes of contrast rather than complement. This is a far better way, says Lt. Col. Perez. Indeed it is, if it works without any focus on finding and killing the Taliban.
But the Taliban have proved resilient and adaptive. To assume that they can be beaten by developing better seed assumes that they won’t take over “protection” of the new production operation. Not so, for Taliban operations in both Afghanistan and Pakistan.
The Taliban have made a significant amount of money in operations ranging from taxation of various local businesses, to “protection” for larger industrial operations, to kidnapping and extortion of cell phone providers. With the Taliban unmolested in this region there is no assurance that they won’t strong-arm the operations for cash. Mere operation of businesses has not proven to be enough incentive yet for the population to revert to armed resistance against the Taliban.
As for the status of the Kajaki dam?
Afghan workers have kept the power station running throughout the past 30 years of war and upheaval, and even now have negotiated with the Taliban so they can travel to work from their villages …
The Taliban hold sway in the countryside around the dam and even charge people for electricity, so they can be persuaded to let the workers keep the power plant running, the workers said.
“We do not have a problem with anyone,” Mr. Rasoul said. “We tell them we are working and producing electricity for everyone in the villages and towns.”
In the case of the dam, it hasn’t exactly been a nail in the coffin of the insurgency. In fact, they are making money off of it. It’s advisable to see soft operations such as this agricultural expedition as part of a whole rather than an alternative to targeting the enemy. This was our argument in Center of Gravity Versus Lines of Effort in COIN.
The Texas National Guard deserves credit for innovative tactics in the counterinsurgency campaign. It is apparently a long term program and it will be self-evident if successful. But the program should not be seen as a replacement for other lines of effort, including targeting the enemy so that he doesn’t use his criminal enterprise to flip yet another soft counterinsurgency program to his favor.
Prior:
Kidnapping: The Taliban’s New Source of Income
The U.S. Department of Agriculture Does COIN
The British Approach to Counterinsurgency
Defense Analysts Echo The Captain’s Journal Concerning Kajaki Dam
The Role of Electricity in State Stabilization
Targeting the Insurgency Versus Protecting the Infrastructure
