Archive for the 'Iraq' Category



Continuing Operations in Fallujah

BY Herschel Smith
17 years, 5 months ago

Around mid-May, raw video of recent combat action in Fallujah was posted.  There are a number of interesting characteristics of this action, but particularly note the sniper fire coming from minarets.

In Fallujah: The Continuing Battle for Hallowed Ground, we discussed Fallujah being the most active city in the Anbar province for the insurgency, and the use of Fallujah as a staging location for enemy activity throughout not only Anbar but Baghdad as well.

Insurgent and U.S. operations continue with relentless consistency in and around Fallujah.  Eighteen people were killed south of Fallujah on June 5th when a “suicide bomber driving a truck packed with explosives plowed into a busy commercial district, police said. Fifteen others were wounded.” (other reports vary as to numbers killed and wounded).  “Some witnesses said the attack occurred near a meeting of tribal sheiks who have been fighting Al-Qaeda in Iraq.”

The multinational force does not issue press releases on all combat operations, and so the ease with which we can catalog coalition operations is a pointer to the regularity and comprehensive nature of the kinetic operations against the insurgency.

June 5th combat action by U.S. forces:

During continued operations to disrupt the al-Qaeda in Iraq network in Anbar province, Coalition Forces conducted a raid on four associated buildings northeast of Fallujah.  The ground force detained 13 suspected terrorists for their association with a cell that carries out attacks against Iraqis and Coalition Forces with VBIEDs, snipers, and mortars, and targets Iraqi infrastructure.

June 7th combat action by Iraqi army:

Iraqi Army Forces on June 7 detained four members of an al-Qaeda in Iraq terrorist cell believed to be responsible for setting improvised explosive devices and conducting small arms fire attacks against Iraqi and Coalition Forces on and around Camp Fallujah.

With Coalition Forces present as advisors, Iraqi Soldiers detained the four suspects in the vicinity of Al Fayath, located south of Camp Fallujah. During the operation they seized assault rifles, numerous magazines, ammunition, and materials used to construct, trigger and place improvised explosive devices.

June 8th combat action by U.S. forces:

Coalition Forces killed one terrorist and detained 12 suspected terrorists during operations targeting the al-Qaeda in Iraq network Friday in Anbar province.

Based on information gained from an operation May 27, Coalition Forces raided several buildings northeast of Fallujah.  After they announced their presence through an interpreter, one terrorist outside the building threw a hand grenade at the ground forces.  Coalition Forces took appropriate self-defense measures and engaged the armed terrorist with small arms fire, killing him.

Coalition Forces searched the buildings and detained 12 suspected terrorists on scene for their alleged involvement in the al-Qaeda in Iraq network.  Information gained from earlier operations indicates the suspects are involved in indoctrination for al-Qaeda in Iraq.  In one ceremony conducted by the network, those who declined to join the terrorist group were killed.

June 9th combat action by U.S. forces:

Coalition Forces killed five terrorists and detained 11 suspected terrorists during operations targeting the al-Qaeda in Iraq terrorist network in central Iraq Saturday morning.

Coalition Forces tracked a suspected al-Qaeda in Iraq weapons distributor to a building southeast of Fallujah.  As they approached the area, five men in the front yard reached for weapons.  Responding appropriately to the hostile threat, Coalition Forces engaged the armed men, including the suspected weapons distributor, killing them.  Two other suspected terrorists were detained.

June 10th combat action by U.S. forces:

Coalition Forces captured six suspected terrorists Sunday morning during operations that continue to deny safe haven to members of the al-Qaeda in Iraq terrorist network.

Based on information gained during a successful operation May 27, Coalition Forces targeted a location in Fallujah looking for an individual suspected of recruiting for al-Qaeda.  The suspected jihad leader is known for using “join or die

Iraqi Government on the Verge of Powerlessness

BY Herschel Smith
17 years, 5 months ago

In Intelligence Bulletin #3, we said:

… if Sadr returns to Iraq, his arrest or disappearance might incite such a firestorm of problems that the Baghdad security plan is brought to a halt.  The Mahdi army doesn’t like even the presence of combat operation posts or bases in Sadr City.  Sadr will never be convicted in a court in Iraq, and a show trial that exhonerates him would be the worst of all possible outcomes.  The U.S. is tracking the whereabouts of Sadr.  Major General William Caldwell said that Sadr was still inside Iran as of 24 hours ago.  This seems like a confident report, and assuming its accuracy, it gives lattitude for the appropriate action to remove Sadr from the political and spiritual scene, thus enabling the security plan to succeed.  We highly commend the notion of a strategic disappearance of Sadr as one key to the overall success of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

In Iran, Sadr, and Iranian Forces Deployed Throughout the Middle East, we said:

At the standdown of the surge and security plan, Sadr will return to Baghdad, heavily guarded, to women crying and waving their scarves in the air, and men shooting their AK-47s and and swearing to kill on command.  Sadr will be received back as not just a hero, but as someone almost divine, who stood down the U.S.  Any capture of Sadr and turnover to the courts of Iraq would have the opposite outcome of that intended, because no Iraqi court will convict Sadr of crimes, thus exhonerating and codifying him in his rule of his followers.

Iran will then have their forces deployed in Lebanon, headed by Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, and in Iraq, headed by Moqtada al Sadr.  Only confident actions by the administration – rather than acquiescence by the State Department – will avert such an outcome.  The Brits would rather “de-escalate,

Air Power in Small Wars

BY Herschel Smith
17 years, 5 months ago

The Marines take a close one.

In Can the Air Force Contribute to Counterinsurgency?, I posted my response to Major General Dunlap’s comments concerning the use of the Air Force in counterinsurgency.  Dunlap made other interesting observations in his comments.

FM 3-24 reflects an outdated notion of airpower in its annex. Specifically, with respect to the collateral damage issue, it expresses a ‘fossilized’ view of airpower’s propensity to cause collateral damage and openly discourages commanders from employing it.

Mysteriously, FM 3-24 has no such cautions about other kinds of fires (MLRS, artillery, etc.) In fact, today’s airpower’s precision targeting pods, smaller warheads, weaponeering, ISR, and ground-based controllers, etc., have all served to vastly reduced collateral damage – from even the high standards of 2003’s major combat operations.

Perhaps the video above is an example of what Dunlap discusses.  Dunlap is trying to put meat on the skeleton of theory concerning the involvement of air power in small wars, while in fact the increased use of air power is occurring at this very moment.

Four years into the war that opened with “shock and awe,” U.S. warplanes have again stepped up attacks in Iraq, dropping bombs at more than twice the rate of a year ago.

The airpower escalation parallels a nearly four-month-old security crackdown that is bringing 30,000 additional U.S. troops into Baghdad and its surroundings — an urban campaign aimed at restoring order to an area riven with sectarian violence.

It also reflects increased availability of planes from U.S. aircraft carriers in the Persian Gulf. And it appears to be accompanied by a rise in Iraqi civilian casualties.

In the first 4 1/2 months of 2007, American aircraft dropped 237 bombs and missiles in support of ground forces in Iraq, already surpassing the 229 expended in all of 2006, according to U.S. Air Force figures obtained by The Associated Press.

“Air operations over Iraq have ratcheted up significantly, in the number of sorties, the number of hours (in the air),” said Col. Joe Guastella, Air Force operations chief for the region. “It has a lot to do with increased pressure on the enemy by MNC-I” — the Multinational Corps-Iraq — “combined with more carriers.”

The Air Force report did not break down the specific locations in Iraq where bombings have been stepped up. But U.S.-led forces also are locked in new and dangerous fronts against insurgents outside Baghdad in such places as Diyala, a province northeast of the capital.

Left unaddressed in this account is whether the increased use of artillery would have caused the same collateral damage as ordnance delivered by air, or whether the rise in civilian casualties is even related to the use of air power.

The air force (and navy) has said “we want back in this war.”  The Multinational Force has said, “it’s good to have you back.  As to how this all happens, we’ll have to work those details out as we go.”  And Dunlap’s project remains interesting.

**** UPDATE ****

The Strategy Page has a related commentary, large parts of which are reproduced below:

A major problem in Iraq is that there are two, quite different, solutions to the violence problem. Most of the bombings, and violence in general, are the work of Sunni Arab groups, desperate to get back into power, and avoid being brought to justice for atrocities committed during Saddams long reign. The Iraqi solution is the traditional one; punish the entire Sunni Arab community. Since the Kurds and Shia now have far more men under arms than do the Sunni Arabs, this approach would result in a series of battles against Sunni Arab neighborhoods (in large cities) and towns (out in the countryside). These areas would be cut off from the outside world. Food, water and electricity would cut off as well. Surrender or die. Those who surrendered would be disarmed, taken to a border area, and forced out of the country. In some areas, there might be massacres as well. It’s an Iraqi tradition that’s hard to shake.

The other approach is less popular among most Iraqis, and it is the American one. This involves getting Sunni Arab leaders to tame the terrorists in their midst, and become law-abiding Iraqis. Few Kurds or Shia Arabs feel they can trust the Sunni Arabs, but if they want to keep American troops in the country (which keeps the Iraqi casualty rate down, and unfriendly neighbors out), they have to go along with the current “surge” campaign. This has resulted in two interesting developments. First, many more Sunni Arab leaders are switching sides, coming over to the government, and joining the fight against the Sunni Arab terrorists groups (a mélange of  nationalist and religious fanatic organizations, plus al Qaeda and other foreign factions.) Sunni Arab militias are not much more effective against the terrorists (who are certainly more fanatical, a major military advantage in the Arab world), than the Iraqi security forces. But these new alliances have led to more information about where the terrorists hang out, and this has resulted in the greater use of American smart bombs. So far this year, about 250 have been used. That compares to the 229 dropped for all of 2006. In Afghanistan, where the number of terrorists is much lower, and the tips more numerous, nearly a thousand smart bombs have been used so far this year. Iraqis have also adapted to the use of smart bombs, and civilians are more quick to get out of the way when terrorists invade, and take over, their homes. Thus while the smart bomb use has more than doubled this year, the number of  civilian deaths from these weapons is only up about 25 percent (that’s about fifty people so far this year). In both Afghanistan and Iraq, the terrorists try to use civilians as human shields. Understandably, the civilians are reluctant to cooperate.

This is interesting on a number of levels.  First, as I have hinted in my articles on rules of engagement (and especially see The NCOs Speak on Rules of Engagement), the protest that more robust ROE would infuriate the population and lead to high civilian casualties turns out to be incorrect.  The ironic truth appears to be that when civilians learn that a home is no protection from U.S. combat action, when the insurgents show up they leave the home or drive the insurgents out.  If the presence of the insurgents means less security (as has been the case so far), then U.S. refusal to deal with the insurgency due to ROE means a prolonging of that insecurity (consider also the calamitous British failure in Basra and the degradation of security over the last three years, a subject for a future article).

Second, in using the phrase “religious fanatic” (there are surely some of them in Iraq) the authors at the Strategy Page appear to be ignoring Kilcullen’s view, i.e., there are no religious fanatics in the insurgency in Iraq.

Fallujah: The Continuing Battle for Hallowed Ground

BY Herschel Smith
17 years, 6 months ago

In Enemy Operations in Baghdad and Fallujah, relying on Andrew Lubin’s reporting from Fallujah, we discussed Fallujah as being a hot spot of insurgent activity as the ‘security plan’ got underway, and how far ahead Ramadi was in terms of pacification than other some parts of the Anbar province.

This contrast is accentuated by recent reports, and from the perspective of combat operations, Fallujah still remains the most active city in the Anbar province.  Omar Fadhil observes that after “Looking at the two main routes of al-Qaeda and how the main strongholds around Baghdad are aligned, they suggest that the Fallujah area and its immediate surroundings still remain the main hub for terrorists.”  Fallujah is strategically located, being in the Anbar province but close enough to Baghdad (slightly more than half an hour drive away) to still be a significant base for the insurgency in Baghdad.

The Marines continue to set up checkpoints, conduct raids, and patrol through the streets and neighborhoods of Fallujah.  The insurgency continues to terrorize the population.  “In western Iraq on Thursday, a suicide bomber hit a police recruiting center in Fallujah, and there were conflicting reports about the death toll. Police said as many as 25 people were killed, but the U.S. military said just one policeman died.”  Yesterday, the insurgents sent several mortar rounds into residential population centers in Fallujah, killing nine noncombatants.

One reason for the continued violence in Fallujah is the lethargy of involvement of the tribes in combating the insurgency contra the model displayed in Ramadi.  Mohammed of Iraq the Model gives us an explantion of the state of the so-called Awakening Council in the greater Fallujah area.

A member of the Anbar Awakening Council said that forces loyal to the council are close to clear Ramadi from terrorists who destroyed the city with the sabotage acts against society and infrastructure, adding that these forces are almost done clearing Heet, Kubeisa, Rutba, Barwana and Baghdadi while progress toward Fallujah, Huseiba and Haditha remains slow because the formations of the Awakening are still humble (in those areas).

Michael Yon is sending positive reports back from Anbar, but he is in Hit (or Heet), not Fallujah.  The reports we are receiving and reading are consistent with the observations of Omar and Mohammed.  Anbar cannot be discussed in a single breath, for it is too diverse.  Fallujah lags behind the balance of Anbar and remains an area affected by the insurgency.

One needn’t spend much time around Marines to learn what Fallujah means in the lore and history of the United States Marine Corps.  The first and second battles for Fallujah made it hallowed ground for the Marines.  The insurgency seems determined to incite violence and prevent pacification of the area.  The Marines are just as determined not to see the desecration of hallowed ground.  And so the battle continues.

**** UPDATE ****

From AP:

U.S. and Iraqi forces killed seven members of al-Qaida in Iraq and destroyed a truck bomb factory Saturday in Fallujah, the military said.

A two-hour gunbattle began just after 7 a.m. when Fallujah police came under small-arms fire and spotted two men wearing suicide vests fleeing from the scene. Marines accompanying the police returned fire, killing both militants, according to a statement.

The Marines with the 2nd Battalion, 6th Marine Regiment then fired at five other suspects trying to escape, killing them and causing another suicide vest to explode, the military said.

The U.S.-led forces subsequently discovered a compound with two trucks rigged as suicide bombs and more bomb-making materials, which the military said were destroyed in a controlled detonation that did not damage nearby buildings.

Eight suspects were detained for questioning, the military said.

And from the Middle East Times:

BAGHDAD —  UPDATED: Unidentified gunmen shot dead a local Al Qaeda leader in the western Iraqi city of Fallujah Saturday, police said, as fighting between rival Sunni factions undermined the insurgency.

The apparent assassination of the militant kingpin came as the US military announced that marines and Iraqi security forces had killed seven Al Qaeda fighters in a gunbattle during an assault which led to a truck bomb factory being destroyed.

Both incidents appeared to be linked to increased cooperation between Sunni factions, once sympathetic to the Iraqi resistance, and the US military, which is encouraging nationalist factions to fight Al Qaeda.

Colonel Tareq Al Dulaimi, a senior police intelligence officer with close ties to Anbar Province’s pro-US tribal coalition, confirmed reports that Muwaffaq Al Jugheifi had been killed but did not identify the attackers.

Dulaimi described the slain Al Qaeda leader as an Iraqi from Fallujah.

The process that Ramadi has been through … grips Fallujah at the moment.

The Summer War with Iran

BY Herschel Smith
17 years, 6 months ago

The Guardian brings us a report on the coming summer war with Iran, intended to peak just prior to the report by General David Petraeus to congress in September.

Iran is secretly forging ties with al-Qaida elements and Sunni Arab militias in Iraq in preparation for a summer showdown with coalition forces intended to tip a wavering US Congress into voting for full military withdrawal, US officials say.

“Iran is fighting a proxy war in Iraq and it’s a very dangerous course for them to be following. They are already committing daily acts of war against US and British forces,” a senior US official in Baghdad warned. “They [Iran] are behind a lot of high-profile attacks meant to undermine US will and British will, such as the rocket attacks on Basra palace and the Green Zone [in Baghdad]. The attacks are directed by the Revolutionary Guard who are connected right to the top [of the Iranian government].”

The official said US commanders were bracing for a nationwide, Iranian-orchestrated summer offensive, linking al-Qaida and Sunni insurgents to Tehran’s Shia militia allies, that Iran hoped would trigger a political mutiny in Washington and a US retreat. “We expect that al-Qaida and Iran will both attempt to increase the propaganda and increase the violence prior to Petraeus’s report in September [when the US commander General David Petraeus will report to Congress on President George Bush’s controversial, six-month security “surge” of 30,000 troop reinforcements],” the official said.

“Certainly it [the violence] is going to pick up from their side. There is significant latent capability in Iraq, especially Iranian-sponsored capability. They can turn it up whenever they want. You can see that from the pre-positioning that’s been going on and the huge stockpiles of Iranian weapons that we’ve turned up in the last couple of months. The relationships between Iran and groups like al-Qaida are very fluid,” the official said.

“It often comes down to individuals, and people constantly move around. For instance, the Sunni Arab so-called resistance groups use Salafi jihadist ideology for their own purposes. But the whole Iran- al-Qaida linkup is very sinister.”

Iran has maintained close links to Iraq’s Shia political parties and militias but has previously eschewed collaboration with al-Qaida and Sunni insurgents.

US officials now say they have firm evidence that Tehran has switched tack as it senses a chance of victory in Iraq. In a parallel development, they say they also have proof that Iran has reversed its previous policy in Afghanistan and is now supporting and supplying the Taliban’s campaign against US, British and other Nato forces.

Tehran’s strategy to discredit the US surge and foment a decisive congressional revolt against Mr Bush is national in scope and not confined to the Shia south, its traditional sphere of influence, the senior official in Baghdad said. It included stepped-up coordination with Shia militias such as Moqtada al-Sadr’s Jaish al-Mahdi as well as Syrian-backed Sunni Arab groups and al-Qaida in Mesopotamia, he added. Iran was also expanding contacts across the board with paramilitary forces and political groups, including Kurdish parties such as the PUK, a US ally.

“Their strategy takes into account all these various parties. Iran is playing all these different factions to maximise its future control and maximise US and British difficulties. Their co-conspirator is Syria which is allowing the takfirists [fundamentalist Salafi jihadis] to come across the border,” the official said.

Of course, there are longer term issues to deal with regarding Iran’s nuclear program.  In fact, it appears that the erstwhile problems with Uranium enrichment might not be as insurmountable for Iran as previously thought.

One year from now, Iran could possess the means of producing a nuclear bomb – that was the chilling message delivered by Ambassador Dore Gold during an interview with Ynetnews Tuesday.

Gold, who has written numerous books on the Middle East, is President of the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs (JCPA), and has served as Israel’s ambassador to the United Nations.

He was responding to a statement released Tuesday morning by the International Atomic Energy’s Director (IAEA), Mohamed El-Baradei, who said Iran had made massive progress in creating uranium enrichment centrifuges, so much so the world should consider it a ‘fact that Iran can enrich uranium independently.

Gold said the information revealed by El-Baradei undercut previous estimates of when Iran could weaponize its nuclear process …

“If all Iran wanted to do was destroy the State of Israel, it would simply invest in the 1300 kilometer range Shihab – 3 missile, which which it already has,” Gold said, adding that Iran was however developing North Korean missiles with far great (sic) ranges.

The Iranian Mullahs have said that there will be absolutely no negotiation with the U.S., so the U.S. intent to chat Iran out of a nuclear program (following the counsel of the Baker Commission) is as likely to fail as the European effort over the last four years.

Whatever else happens, while Americans are frolicking at the beach and parks this summer, it is sure to be busy for Soldiers and Marines in Iraq, battling more than just Iraqi insurgents.  Then unfortunately, this will not end it.  The Long War continues.

Why There is No Insurgency in Iraq

BY Herschel Smith
17 years, 6 months ago

In my judgment, it is inadvisable to speak in superlatives regarding a military engagement such as the one in which we are involved in Iraq, such as: “if we’ll just do this we can win,” or “if we do that we’ll lose,” or “the insurgency is comprised of exactly this group of people.”  This includes the idea that there is such a thing as a typical insurgency and the idea that Iraq is precisely at civil war.  As we have seen, the scene in Iraq is a nasty brew of many problems, including lack of reconciliation between competing political groups, 1000 or more years of hatred among religious sects, foreign fighters such as AQI and AAS, suicide bombers who have as their motivation religious commitments, and power grabs by legitimate tribal communities and illegitimate criminals, thugs and other rogue elements.  So it is with some suspicion that I initially read Stephen Biddle’s analysis of the situation in Iraq.  However, he makes some interesting points, and his commentary is worth studying.

SPIEGEL ONLINE: Mr. Biddle, you just returned from a four week stay in Baghdad where you had been asked to advise General Petraeus, the commander of American forces in Iraq. Did you come back with a sense that he has a workable idea on how to improve the situation in Iraq?

Stephen Biddle: I am very impressed with the general’s ability. I think he is an extremely able public servant. If anyone is able to make the best of this, it’s him.

SPIEGEL ONLINE: General Petraeus is known to be an expert in counter insurgency. In fact the entire administration seems to think that this should be the focus. You on the other hand have argued that counter insurgency is not what is needed in Iraq. Why?

Biddle: A classical ideological insurgency is a war of ideas in which a sub-national group is challenging the ideas by which the government runs the country. In this kind of war of ideas, you can in principle win by changing people’s ideas. Given that, the classical strategy for waging counter insurgency is oriented around winning hearts and minds. You engage in a process of political reform in which you introduce democracy to make the government’s ideas legitimate. You engage in a campaign of economic development assistance. And you try and train an indigenous military to wage the war. All those strategies are what the Bush Administration’s approach to Iraq has been. They make some sense, if the problem you are trying to solve is a classical ideological insurgency. Except, Iraq is not.

Continue reading Stephen Biddle’s analysis at Spiegel Online: Why There is No Insurgency in Iraq

Religious and Cultural Sensitivities in Counterinsurgency

BY Herschel Smith
17 years, 6 months ago

In my article Religion and Insurgency: A Response to Dave Kilcullen (and associated comments), I responded to Dave Kilcullen’s article Religion and Insurgency at the Small Wars Journal.  In order to continue the conversation, let’s tackle a real life instance where cultural and religious sensitivities come to bear in the counterinsurgency campaign.  Whereas it might have been assumed that the only application to my claims was that of seeing the insurgent as a jihadist, religiously motivated and completely unamenable to our COIN efforts (certainly this is one application for some number of them), there are far more applications where a proper understanding of religion and culture would help frame the discussion.

A Stryker Colonel Talks About the Situation in Iraq:

FORT LEWIS – The commander says the loss of two soldiers hit everyone hard. We had a rare opportunity to speak with Col. Stephen Townsend from Baghdad Tuesday.

The 4,000 Fort Lewis-based soldiers have been there since last summer and now are in the hotspot, Baghdad.

“We feel pretty fortunate to be doing what we’re doing,” Col. Townsend said. “Right now, the Arrowhead Brigade is employed in a role that is ideally suited for a Stryker Brigade. We’re being very mobile. We’re going to where the tough jobs are. We’re helping out with both the Coalition and the Iraqi security forces there where the tough jobs are.

“We’re pretty fortunate about that. It’s pretty gratifying to see the progress the Iraqi security forces are making. In fact, the operation that we’re in now an Iraqi general is actually running the operation and I’m working for him rather than an American general.”

Col. Townsend and the 3rd Brigade have been to Iraq before, but this is their first time patrolling Baghdad.

Cpl. Jason Ratliff out on patrol says on video provided by the Army, “We always look for weapons and we try to see if people know anything.”

PFC Elizabeth Turan on patrol says, “It’s kind of scary because you don’t know if someone is going to pull a gun out. But it’s not that bad.”

‘Elizabeth’ is not one of those names that can be mistaken since it is not a gender-neutral name.  ‘Elizabeth’ is a woman, and she is on patrol in Baghdad.  We might make several observations about this.

For whatever reason (meeting recruitment goals, political pressures), the Pentagon wants women in combat.  Of course, there are practical matters with which to contend, including unit cohesion, lower torso strength of women, a higher rate of lower extremety injuries, etc. (in fact, the Russian campaign in Afghanistan saw a much higher rate of lower extremity injuries in women).  But leaving behind the practical effect on U.S. forces, has anyone stopped to consider what we are communicating to those whose hearts and minds we want to win?

In the heavily patristic and tribal society that is Iraq (and in fact the whole Middle East), family and tribe function to a great extent by providing protection and security.  This is codified into the religious framework of the region by Islam.  The very notion of accepting security from women would be seen as scandalous, humiliating and repugnant to the head of a family or tribal elder.  But in our so-called “security plan,” accepting security from women is precisely what we are offering (and in fact demanding) from men who cannot accept this offer.

We routinely offer up rhetorical flourish on winning hearts and minds, while Elizabeth is on patrol in Baghdad.  And no one stops to ponder the question “just what are the consequences of these actions?”

Religion and Insurgency: A Response to Dave Kilcullen

BY Herschel Smith
17 years, 6 months ago

On April 15, 2007, Dave Kilcullen authored a commentary on Edward Luttwak’s commentary entitled Dead End: Counterinsurgency Warfare as Military Malpractice.  Kilcullen invokes this discussion in his most recent commentary entitled Religion and Insurgency at the Small Wars Journal; Kilcullen puts forward a series of interesting thoughts on the role (or lack thereof) of religion in the current insurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Without studying these articles, my commentary will be read in a vacuum.  It is recommended that you spend the time necessary to understand Kilcullen’s arguments before tackling my response.  In the lengthy article that follows, Smith responds to Kilcullen; first to his views concerning the relationship of Islam and the insurgency in Iraq, second to his views concerning the Peters / Luttwak position, and finally the current state of affairs concerning rules of engagement and the Petraeus letter to the troops concerning the same.

The three central theses of Kilcullen’s commentary follow:

First, there is solid field evidence that modern counterinsurgency methods, properly updated for the new environment, actually are effective against current insurgencies. Second, insurgents in both Afghanistan and Iraq are not actually particularly religious — certainly, they are no more religious than the societies they are attacking. Indeed, there is an empirical problem with the whole notion of a “religious

The Enemy of My Enemy

BY Herschel Smith
17 years, 6 months ago

In Splits, Reorganization and Realignments Within the Insurgency in Iraq, I argued that the internecine warfare within the Sunni insurgency was a good thing for coalition troops in the short term, but that sooner or later, one side will win.  This side — whichever it happens to be — will then turns its sights again on the so-called “occupiers” (i.e., the U.S.).  The insurgency doesn’t end, it merely morphs into something different than it is at the present.

The Middle East Times brings us a fascinating story of U.S. armed forces learning counterinsurgency, adapting and bringing innovation to the battlefield.  Things like this simply cannot be taught.  They have to be learned by troops at the front.  This is a lengthly article, but well worth your time (along with a few comments by me at the end).

Joseph Krauss
AFP
May 9, 2007

SAMARRA, Iraq —  On a dark street in the restive Iraqi town of Samarra a young man masked with a bandana and a baseball cap looks over his shoulder before pulling out an aerosol can and spray-painting across a wall.

A US Army officer standing behind him squints at the flowing Arabic script, then turns to a reporter traveling with his platoon.

“What does that say?” he asks.

The young vandal is an army translator whom the soldiers call Matthew – publishing his real name would put him in danger.

Matthew is charged with sowing seeds of strife between the town’s two main insurgent groups, Al Qaeda in Iraq and the Islamic Army of Iraq.

While Al Qaeda takes its inspiration from Osama Bin Laden’s international Islamist struggle, the Islamic Army is a coalition of Iraqi Islamists and Baathist supporters of the ousted dictator Saddam Hussein.

And while both groups are fighting to oust American forces from Iraq, there are also signs of growing conflict between them – a conflict that the local security forces and their US allies are keen to exploit.

The two groups have clashed on the Internet, with the more nationalist Islamic Army criticizing Al Qaeda for targeting Iraqi civilians and for its attempts to impose a harsh Saudi-inspired version of Islamic law.

Within Samarra, the Islamic Army enjoys wide popularity because of its single-minded focus on attacking US forces, while Al Qaeda intimidates local residents with spectacular bombings and coordinated attacks on police.

“Al Qaeda is based on Islamic extremism, while the others only focus on the occupiers,” said Colonel Jalil Al Dulaimi, who was police chief of the town north of Baghdad until he was killed in a coordinated attack on police headquarters this week. “But from our perspective, anyone who carries weapons is a terrorist. It doesn’t matter what faction they are a part of,” he added.

The commander of the US Army’s 82nd Airborne, 3rd Brigade, Charlie Company, based in Samarra, agrees that both groups pose a threat to security in the town but says that there are important differences.

The Islamic Army “is against coalition forces and ISF [Iraqi Security Forces] that work with the coalition,” says Captain Eugene “Buddy” Ferris. “Al Qaeda will blow up bombs in markets. Al Jaish Al Islami [the Islamic Army] won’t,” Ferris adds. “If reconciliation is ever going to occur then the Islamic Army is a group you could work with.”

Both insurgent groups tag the walls with slogans, threats, and boasts.

Al Qaeda’s street artists write: “The Samarra police are infidels, so we will bring you young men who love martyrdom,” and “We will destroy all those who cooperate with the Americans.”

The Islamic Army scribes write much the same thing, but threaten “the occupiers” instead of the local security forces and collaborators.

Matthew’s job is to redirect the artistic impulses of each group against the other. “It’s a way to destabilize their unification efforts,” says First Lieutenant Charlie Hodges, who leads one of the graffiti patrols.

Abu Tiba, the alleged leader of Al Qaeda in Samarra, is a frequent subject.

Hodges tells Matthew to write something really terrible about Abu Tiba, something that the Islamic Army of Iraq might say about him, something that will start a fight.

Matthew nods. Then in bright red paint he writes “Abu Tiba is a terrorist and those who work with him are terrorists.”

It seems somehow less menacing than the crossed out “USA” daubed next to it on the dusty brown wall.

Hodges does not read Arabic, so he asks a reporter traveling with the platoon to translate. Hodges is clearly disappointed. The black propaganda effort needs a lot more street cred than Matthew is giving him.

They climb back into the Humvees, drive around the corner, and try again.

Hodges sees writing on the wall, but he has to ask to make sure that it is insurgent sloganeering and not something else, such as a sign advertising someone’s vegetable stand.

He asks about one long sentence. Matthew tells him it is a Koranic verse. “Leave that one alone,” Hodges says.

Finally they find a message telling the occupiers to leave. Matthew scribbles over it. Then Hodges tries again. “This time, I want you to write that Al Qaeda has killed many in the Islamic Army,” he says.

“Al Qaeda has killed many from the Islamic Army,” Matthew writes.

Then the local Iraqi police step in, not to handcuff Matthew and charge him with vandalism, but to offer suggestions on how to spice up his prose.

Many of the police are well-practiced themselves, having sprayed messages like “Long live Iraq, Long live the First Battalion,” and “the First Battalion are Heroes” on the blast walls surrounding their bases and compounds.

An argument ensues between Matthew and the police – three men in mismatched uniforms with AK-47 assault rifles slung around their necks.

One cop finally suggests something that is greeted with enthusiasm. Matthew amends the message.

“Al Qaeda has killed many FIGHTERS from the Islamic Army.”

The paint is running out. Hodges tells Matthew that his writing is too large, and orders everyone back to the vehicles.

The heavily armed US soldiers who had fanned out along the darkened street return to the Humvees, the police climb into their pickup trucks, and under the cover of darkness and an all-night curfew they head back to base.

Again, the use of graffiti to incite conflict between competing insurgents is adaptive, innovative, and apparently effective.  It is not learned at Quantico or Leavenworth.  It is learned in the school of the hard knocks.  The U.S. troops are the best in the world, but there are two cautionary comments that are appropriate at this point.

First, troops (most of the time) are given some basic instruction in Arabic as part of the training for deployment.  This training is based on the philosophy of phonetics (i.e., sounds, proper pronunciation).  With limited time, money and resources, this is the best approach and sure to yield the best possible results in the short term.  But proper planning for the long war needs to take the next step.  Immersion in Arabic (both spoken and written) needs to be part of the planning for not only officers, but enlisted men as well.  A better knowledge of Arabic would cause a remarkable step change in warfighting capabilities in Iraq (and throughout the Middle East) given the nature of COIN.

Second, we must remember that the counterinsurgency will morph upon the potential demise of al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI).  It doesn’t end, and in fact it might become more complicated given the potential support of the broader population if this revised and restructured insurgency no longer engages in acts of brutality towards the population.

Iraqi Governing Coalition Set to Collapse

BY Herschel Smith
17 years, 6 months ago

In Sistani, Maliki and Sadr Versus the U.S., I made the case that Maliki was in the pocket of both Sistani and Sadr, and had effectively become nothing more than a sectarian political puppet (while also pointing out that all three were enemies of U.S. interests).  The degree to which this is true is becoming increasingly manifested with time.  Now from MEMRI we learn that “An investigative article by journalist Mahdi Mustafa, published March 31, 2007 in the Egyptian government weekly Al-Ahram Al-Arabi, featured photographs of documents indicating that Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki has ties with Muqtada Al-Sadr and with the Iranian Revolutionary Guards.”  The following is a summary of one important document.

Al-Maliki Calls to Withdraw Iranian Revolutionary Guards Commanders from the Iraqi Front in Order to Protect Them

The first document, labeled “secret, personal, and urgent,” is a January 2007 letter from Al-Maliki’s office to the Iranian Embassy in Baghdad, with copies to the presidency of the [Shi’ite party] Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq and to the Al-Shahid Al-Sadr organization.” [2] In it, Al-Maliki requests that the commanders of the Mahdi Army, who have ties with the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, be pulled off the Iraqi frontlines, in order to protect them from being arrested or killed. The following is a translation of the document:

“Secret, Personal and Urgent

“Based on a phone conversation with Sayyid Muqtada Al-Sadr and [after] consulting with [Iraq’s National Security Advisor] Dr. Muwafaq Al-Rubai’i, in order to preserve our great achievements and in light of what the present circumstances demand, we ask to temporarily conceal the commanders of the Mahdi Army, who are connected to the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, [and to remove them] from the front line [of battle] in order to protect them from being arrested or killed by the American forces. [The names of the commanders] are listed below. It would be best to send them to Iran for the time being, until the crisis passes.

“In addition, [we ask] to send the commanders from the second line [of battle] to the southern regions, since we know that intensive efforts are underway to persuade the Americans to leave the situation [there] as it is. All administrative and security arrangements for the transportation of these commanders have [already] been made.

“We ask you to implement [these orders] and report to us.

“[Signed,] Nouri Al-Maliki, Prime Minster [of Iraq]

“[List of commanders]…

“Cc:

“The Iranian Embassy [in] Baghdad,

“The presidency of the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq,

“The office of Al-Shahid Al-Sadr.”

Maliki has worked directly against not only U.S. interests in Iraq, but Iraqi security as well.  The Sunni minority has been reluctant to enjoin the political process simply because they know that the government is riddled with sectarian power plays.  Not surprisingly, they are threatening to withdraw, thus seriously weakening the government and ending what little reconciliation effort there has been thus far (what little effort that has been expended has been on the part of the Sunnis).

Iraq’s top Sunni official has set a deadline of next week for pulling his entire bloc out of the government — a potentially devastating blow to reconciliation efforts within Iraq. He also said he turned down an offer by President Bush to visit Washington until he can count more fully on U.S. help.

Iraqi Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi made his comments in an interview with CNN. He said if key amendments to the Iraq Constitution are not made by May 15, he will step down and pull his 44 Sunni politicians out of the 275-member Iraqi parliament.

“If the constitution is not subject to major changes, definitely, I will tell my constituency frankly that I have made the mistake of my life when I put my endorsement to that national accord,” he said.

I had previously said that “Maliki’s government is dead, and the real question is how clever the military and political thinkers are and how quickly they will figure it out.”  The U.S. has so far refused to support replacement of Maliki.

It has been reported earlier that the Kurdish parties and the Fadhila party had not agreed to join the Allawi bloc, but the withdrawal of support from the Tawafuq Front would set Allawi’s efforts back to square one. The alliance of Allawi’s list and the Tawafuq Front, the largest Sunni bloc in the Parliament, was expected to be the core of the new opposition front.

The admission of a lack of American support for the efforts, if proven to be true, would also dispel suspicions that the US had decided to back Allawi’s attempt to bring down the Maliki government and replace it with a “strongman


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