Archive for the 'Iraq' Category

The object lesson may be that the axiomatic irreducible, or presupposition upon which all stratagem rests, is that nonkinetic operations may succeed in the suppression of recurring guerrilla activity only after it has been dealt a hard blow, not as the primary offensive tactic upon which our hope rests. 

I have been watching the al Anbar Province for most of the Iraq war, and I beg to differ with the U.S. generals.  I believe that however Anbar goes, so goes the war.  The key to Iraq is the Anbar Province.  While Anbar remains unpacified, insurgent groups (al Qaeda in Iraq, Ansar al-Sunna, etc.) can continue to split the tribal loyalties in the region with some tribes siding with the insurgents and others siding with the government in Baghdad.  This is done not only by propaganda, but by intimidation of the tribal leaders and violence perpetrated on their people.

This is a clever way to effect force multiplication.  The insurgents not only have their own military and personnel assets with which to conduct guerrilla operations, they coax and cajole others to join them in the fight.  This way, tribes fight tribes in internecine war throughout the Anbar Province, ensuring that the insurgents are free to continue their geurrilla operations against coalition forces.  This tactic was successfully used by the Viet Cong in the war in Vietnam.

Being freed to continue guerrilla operations, in addition to attacks against coalition forces, the insurgents can conduct death raids against Shi’ite elements, ensuring a response by Shia militia, which ensures a counter-response by more insurgents (including some tribal elements), and so the cycle goes.  Pulling troops from the Anbar province to pacify Baghdad may have been a huge mistake.  The far preferable solution might have been troop level increases resourced by extended tours of duty, further callups of reserve and national gaurd, or other means.

Anbar remains a very dangerous place to be.  Today another soldier and marine died in combat operations in Anbar, and the total U.S. killed so far in December is 54, even as an al Qaeda leader is arrested in Fallujah.  December is on track to be a very deadly month, rivaling even the first and second battles for Fallujah, with 135 and 137 killed in action, respectively.

The Multi-National Force web site has issued a press release concerning the killing of insurgents emplacing IEDs.

An estimated four insurgents were killed by aviation fires after precision munitions were employed to destroy a bongo truck used to transport improvised explosive devices Friday south of Fallujah.

Marines assigned to Regimental Combat Team 5 observed insurgents excavating IED-making material from the side of a road and loading it into a bongo truck. The truck then proceeded to another location where the insurgents began emplacing the IEDs.

The Marines established positive identification of the insurgents, ensured no civilians were in the vicinity and destroyed the truck with precision munitions.  The insurgents were killed by direct fire.

This press release raises an interesting question.  The U.S. forces observed insurgents excavating IED-making material.  Yet they didn’t engage at that time.  The Marines apparently followed the insurgents to another location where IED emplacement began.  Only after they observed this and “established positive identification” did they engage the enemy.

We don’t want to read too much into the report.  The Marines might have wanted to see if the insurgents departing the area would lead them to other insurgents or IED-making material.  But they might have lost them, or worse yet, stumbled into an ambush or sniper fire.  One hopes that rules of engagement didn’t prohibit their engaging of the enemy because they were “excavating” rather than “emplacing” IED-making material.

Fallujah remains a dangerous place, even after the first and second battles for Fallujah.  The Christian Science Monitor reports that the impact of Marine efforts to rebuild sometimes have the opposite effect.

While their weapons were ready, this was a mission about charity. The US Marines weren’t entering a hospital in downtown Fallujah to root out insurgents, they were going there simply to help.  But any interaction with American forces can prove deadly for Iraqis, and these marines received an uneasy welcome.
 
Death threats – and increasingly murder – are common against anyone seen to be cooperating with the US. And already, the presence of a Marine observation post, built adjacent to hospital grounds just days before the mission, had cut the number of patients coming to the hospital from 35 a day to just five.

U.S. forces are almost frantically attempting to pour largesse into the Anbar province, but with mixed results.

In a bid to convince the majority to side with coalition troops – as well as the fledgling local government and Iraqi Army and police units in the city – the US military has committed $200 million through more than 60 reconstruction projects.

This small civil-affairs team is on the sharp end of buying security, of finding those projects, paying the cash, and checking up on the work. The dangerous city has claimed 10 marines’ lives in a month from snipers and roadside bombs.

“Reconstruction provides a way of influencing the population, of shaping the battlespace nonkinetically, so you don’t have to put bullets down range,” says Captain Brezler, a reservist from the Bronx whose usual job is New York firefighter.

The Captain has no doubt been trained in the most recent COIN doctrine, as has the still young Marine Major interviewed by Oliver North on FNC, who said that they were employing both “kinetic and nonkinetic operations to defeat the insurgency.”  The word kinetic pertains to motion, and is closely related to the engineering word kinematics.  They mean kinetic operations to be understood as related to offensive operations to include patrols, whether the enemy is engaged or not.  Nonkinetic operations are the reconstruction projects intended to “win the hearts and minds of the people.”

Yet the casualty rate mocks the nonkinetic efforts to defeat the insurgency.  For answers, I turn to Victor Davis Hanson, who two years ago said the following prophetic words:

A year ago, we waged a brilliant three-week campaign, then mysteriously forgot the source of our success. Military audacity, lethality, unpredictability, imperviousness to cheap criticism, and iron resolve, coupled with the message of freedom, convinced neutrals to join us and enemies not yet conquered to remain in the shadows. But our failure to shoot looters, to arrest early insurrectionists like Sadr, and to subdue cities like Tikrit or Falluja only earned us contempt—and not just from those who would kill us, but from others who would have joined us as well.

The misplaced restraint of the past year is not true morality, but a sort of weird immorality that seeks to avoid ethical censure in the short term—the ever-present, 24-hour pulpit of global television that inflates a half-dozen inadvertent civilian casualties into Dresden and Hiroshima. But, in the long term, such complacency has left more moderate Iraqis to be targeted by ever more emboldened murderers. For their part, American troops have discovered that they are safer on the assault when they can fire first and kill killers, rather than simply patrol and react, hoping their newly armored Humvees and fortified flak vests will deflect projectiles.

There is certainly robust debate over COIN doctrine and whether to pursue this strategy or that one the most fervently.  In the end, the object lesson may be that the axiomatic irredicible, or presupposition upon which all stratagem rests, is that nonkinetic operations may succeed in the suppression of recurring guerrilla activity only after it has been dealt a hard blow, not as the primary offensive tactic upon which our hope rests.

Thanks to Politics Central (Pajamas Media), we learn that Iraqi insurgents have successfully launched a 24-hour propaganda television station, located in Syria, and with the help of Egypt.

Broadcasting from a secret location in Syria, Al-Qaeda and its allies now have their own 24-hour television station, Pajamas Media has learned. Known as Al-Zawraa, Arabic for “first channel,

I have argued for increased force size on many occassions, and in my article Consequences of Inadequate Force Projection, I pointed out that lack of adequate force projection (along with lack of timeliness and speed with which the war has been conducted) has had debilitating consequences to the war effort.

There is currently debate over whether to increase, decrease or leave as is the force size in Iraq.  But what would these forces do if we did increase them?  In fact, what will the current forces do if we leave them there?  Taken literally, the Baker report implies that they will be protecting themselves.  Right in the executive summary are these words: “By the first quarter of 2008, subject to unexpected developments in the security situation on the ground, all combat brigades not necessary for force protection could be out of Iraq.”

Consider the logical contortions of this statement for a moment.  Rewind:

“All combat brigades not necessary for force protection …”

The Department of Defense concept of “force protection” brings together all the security disciplines in a broader program to protect service members, civilian employees, family members, facilities and equipment.  Basically, “force protection” is a defensive posture.  If U.S. troops were going to be engaged in the sole duty of self-preservation on cloistered bases, why would they be deployed to Iraq at all?

Since Baker’s team obviously suffers under the delusion that Iran and Syria might just be willing to help us out with Iraq, the presence of U.S. forces would not be there as a detering presence.  So if not for Iran or Syria, then what?  Why would U.S. forces be present in the region at all after security had been achieved?  And if Baker would respond “to embed with Iraqi forces,” then the logical retort would be that this isn’t force protection as defined by the DoD.

The formal logical fallacy should not be overlooked here, because it is merely a symptom of the larger and more serious sickness of the study.  This is actually a point so important and fundamental that a middle-schooler should have been able to ascertain the problem prior to releasing the report.  The Baker commission has no mission for the troops after “security has been achieved,” but yet has them located in the region for a strategy that they do not define, engaged in “force protection.”  Were the Baker vision to reign, presumably we would have U.S. troops deployed to huge bases in Iraq, protecting each other, doing PTs in the morning, watching movies at night, and getting fat on the excessive food.

I have given a chance for Sun Tzu to speak to James Baker, but I have not yet weighed in.  Pitiful.  Just pitiful.  The congress should demand a refund.  The words of Macbeth come to mind: “A tale, told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, signifying nothing,” The Tragedy of Macbeth, Act 5, Scene 5.

Three Non-commissioned officers queue up to dispel the myths, respond to the critics, end the rumors, and weigh in on rules of engagement for U.S. troops in Iraq. 

On December 6, I published Politically Correct Rules of Engagement Endanger Troops.  This article touched quite the raw nerve, and since the time of publication I have received many communications from various interested parties, some of them with direct knowledge of the things discussed in the article.  I stated in the comments to the article that I would update the discussion with future posts, and this is my second installment on the subject of rules of engagement.  Some of the communications I received from members of the military were literally stunning, and I will focus on two such communications in this article, specifically, from NCOs who were in Iraq and who are familiar with rules of engagement and the affect they have on U.S. troops.

Introduction and Background

Necessarily preliminary to this discussion is an understanding of why it is acceptable to discuss such things in the open.  Does detail on this topic not constitute an OPSEC (operational security) violation?  This question has been posed to me on other articles I have written.  More specifically, regarding my article Snipers Having Tragic Success Against U.S. Troops, it was stated to me by one reader that the free flow of information concerning the military may be likened to the Roman roads.  The same roads the Roman armies used to build the Roman empire were used by invading armies to end it.  And as a result of the seed article to this one (on ROE), it was said to me that while it may not have been intentional, the affect of my article on rules of engagement was like the affect Jane Fonda had during her visit to North Vietnam.  I had broken the “loose lips sinks ships” rule, and it had a detrimental affect on our ability to wage war.  I must confess, I have never been compared to Jane Fonda before.

In the two articles cited above, I used only MSM reports, and tried to weave a cohesive story together from the several reports that had been filed.  One of the virtues of blogging is that a vast array of reports and other information is available to the self-initiated analyst to observe trends and other characteristics of the reports.  This fairly accurately describes the two aforementioned articles.  Nothing original existed in them.  If this information is available to me, then it is most certainly available to the enemy.  More to the point, the only way, for instance, for the MSM to be able to write that the enemy knows the ROE of U.S. troops is to get the story directly from U.S. troops.  The story is there with U.S. troops because they see it and live it daily.  The U.S. troops get the story from the enemy.  Hence, the enemy already knows the information.

To assert that a blogger with third hand knowledge of the enemy interactions with U.S. troops (e.g., dropping their weapons just prior to engagement, and then walking away when the ROE prohibits U.S. troops from engaging), packaging them up coherently, and commenting on them for several hundred people to read constitutes “loose lips” is akin to suggesting that your family accountant is responsible for the latest Congressional vote to raise taxes.  Put simply, “that dog won’t hunt.”

Additionally, there is a difference between written ROE (most of which the grunt is not allowed to read), and the implementation in the field.  Commercial jet airliners have manuals, but reading them, no matter how studiously, doesn’t qualify a person to pilot the aircraft.  The two parties most qualified to understand how ROE affects U.S. troops are U.S. troops themselves and the enemy.  The enemy sees them.  The enemy fights them.  They see the actual ROE in the field, and the claim that somehow a blog can affect what the enemy is watching on the ground is not compelling.

What honest, open and serious debate can do is make the general public aware of things that they would otherwise not have time to research for themselves.  Finally, a post like this can serve to open and continue dialogue and debate within the military ranks on a subject that involves many raw nerves and, based on the reports below, causes an impediment to achieving the mission objectives.

I hope that this post serves as a catalyst to those ends.  Concerning the two NCOs I cite below, I have done my investigative homework to verify that they are who they say they are; e-mail from *.mil network domains, independent verification from MSM accounts and other sources that the units they said that they were part of were indeed deployed to the locations and at the times that they claimed.  Finally, one word is redacted from the first account for sensibilities, and per agreement with one of the NCOs, the dates, unit designations and locations are redacted from the second account (for reasons that will not be disclosed here).  The language is “crusty,” and so the reader has been warned.

I would like to express my personal gratitude and sincere humility that these respected NCOs felt that they could share their experiences with me.  I am honored beyond what I can express here in words.

The NCOs Speak

From an NCO who was deployed in the Kirkuk area for approximately one year.

Our ROE was simple. The right to self defense was never denied. The ROE was based on a method of determining a life threatening scenario from a non-life threatening one. We called this the “Escalation Of Force.” Show, Shout, Shove, and Shoot. It’s pretty self explanatory and easy to follow in a perfect world. The problem is that the world isn’t perfect.

Scenario: You’re a gunner on an M2 .50 caliber machine gun mounted atop a M1114 Up-Armored HMMWV. You are the last vehicle and you are pulling rear security. A vehicle in the distance is swerving through traffic on a mission from God and closing on your convoy quickly. You wave your arms to get the driver’s attention to no avail. You yell obscenities at the crazy Iraqi while drawing down on the vehicle with your large caliber, fully automatic, machine gun. Hell, you even throw your water bottle hoping to get the hood on a bounce. Nothing. You notice a male driver who appears to be gripping the wheel a little too tight and who has beads of sweat forming on his brow. You realize that this could be trouble. But… to complicate the matter, there is a woman (presumably his wife) and 4 children in the car as well. The vehicle is fast approaching… and you have a mere second to react. Your buddy’s, nay, family’s lives are on the line behind you. They trust you to make the right decision. What do you do?

Option 1: Warning shots. Sure. Can work. Collateral damage becomes an issue, and high ranking military personnel HATE such paperwork.

Option 2: Wait it out. This choice is putting the lives of a “civilian” before the lives of your military “family.”  I wholeheartedly disagree with this choice, but it keeps you out of Leavenworth.

Option 3: Stop the vehicle by any means necessary. Shoot ’em up and ensure the safety of your family who depends on you.

Now with any of these options you find out in the end that either… A) Vehicle drives right on by and through the convoy, apparently the wife was in labor and they were speeding to the hospital. B) Vehicle drives right by you and slams into middle vehicle as 5 155mm Mortar rounds detonate the vehicle killing 3, wounding 4 and truly screwing up your day.

So, you don’t know if a pregnant wife is being rushed to the hospital or a family of insane insurgents are preparing to destroy you.

That is a lot of responsibility to be put on an 18 year old private sitting behind an uber powerful machine gun. That’s why our armed forces are so wonderful. We have 18 year old kids who can and do make those decisions daily. What a wonderful country we were born in.

You make the wrong move and kill civilians though, you not only have to live with the mistake, but you will be ridiculed unmercifully by the media/big army. You will be buried in proceedings and paperwork the remainder of your deployment, and you will not be the same. Your buddies will be affected as well. Cpl. X will see how bad it could be to make the wrong decision, and will hesitate just a hair too long when there is a real threat… and more men will die. The fear of failure leads to hesitation, and hesitation in war is a lesser form of suicide.

That, in my opinion, is the problem. This is not a war. The enemy does not wear uniforms, and therefore the Geneva Convention is null and void instead of applicable.

My unit, as well as the thousands of other soldiers in our area dealt with these problems on a daily basis. The “details” of the ROE changed daily. Some examples… For a time, the gunners would bring buckets full of rocks into the turret with them to throw through the windshields of vehicles not adhering to our warnings to stay away (that ended quickly after command had to pay for numerous windshields). We put signs in Arabic/Kurdish/Turkish on the backs of the vehicles warning them to stay away. We fired warning shots. We did nothing. We drove in the center of the road and dominated our routes by running ignorant drivers right off the road. We drove with the flow of traffic and narrowly averted disaster numerous times.

From another NCO who was deployed in Ramadi for about a year.

The ROE is a politically based cover your ass piece of paper.  It has caused American deaths and really hurt our ability to actually DO anything …

The full ROE is classified, but soldiers are given a small 1 or so page excerpt.  It is stressed that the ROE is not do be divulged or given out to anyone not in uniform, but is more of an FOUO at our level (for official use only) … They [the grunts] are told they can always defend themselves, but then given warning of “overdefending” themselves. 

So yes, from the grunts on the field perspective … the ROE is vague and limiting.  And every time “violations” of the ROE came up it caused our soldiers and marines to question their actions and sometimes cause casualties. If you look up the case of the [unit redacted] Soldier from the [location redacted] region you will see an excellent example.  The [unit redacted] Soldiers started pulling back after that, and even though he eventually had the charges dropped it caused problems throughout the entire Battalion.

And without going into specifics if you look at [date redacted] incident when we lost two Marine pilots and an Army Lt north of [location redacted] you will see another example of how fear of ROE kept us from hitting an enemy until after he had fired at us (and led to a downed helo and an IEDed hummer).  And it was almost much worse.  We dropped two 500 lb bombs a little later and stopped the insurgents from a planned attack that might have led to even more deaths.  And we almost didn’t do that because of ROE.

Analysis and Commentary

These reports parallel the report documented in a recent article at Blackfive by another NCO:

Let me tell you a little something about ROE (Rules of Engagement). In Baghdad thousands of people are moving around all the time. Many houses, all of them, have guns. On a general scale, none of them are planning any wrongdoing at all. But they don’t think that Americans can accomplish anything, either, because they know we can’t search at will, can’t shoot at will, can’t detain at will.

If you wish to stop a car approaching a checkpoint, you must first post a sign a long way down the road, if it is ignored, you must verbally warn them, and use a green laser to get the drivers attention. If still ignored, you must fire a warning shot with an M4, then a M240, then, finally the kill shot. If at any time the car turns away, all you can do is TRY to pursue it, never shoot at it. Technically, similar rules exist for dismounted operations, and that puts more soldiers at risk than you can possibly imagine. I’m not sure Johnny on the street has this information, but Muhammed in the mosque sure does.

I can’t even tell you how pissed it makes me to hear a JAG officer suck in breath as he tries to think real hard how to explain the murky depths of our ROE. A system that used to be a way of allowing soldiers to avoid hurting civilians by using certain weapon systems at certain times has once again degenerated into a complex “Cover Your Ass

Honorable Secretary Baker, I wish you had consulted with me before you and your colleagues wrote your report about Iraq.  I lived long ago, but thought I would return and visit just this once, since it seems that my counsel is so badly needed.

It is with dismay that I read your heart in the report.  I have always found that it is best to hide your intentions.  If I am able to determine the enemy’s dispositions while at the same time I conceal my own, then I can concentrate and he must divide.  And if I concentrate while he divides, I can use my entire strength to attack a fraction of his (VI.13).  War is based on deception (VII.12), and I am afraid that you have told the enemy your dispositions.

It seems that you have set great burden upon this idea of training other armies to do your work for you.  Be careful!  One who sets an entire army in motion to chase an advantage will not attain it (VII.5).  Your approach to victory should be like a jewel – with many facets.  The good and experienced general makes no mistakes in war (X.25).

Remember this adage to assure that your army will have what it needs.  Use normal force to engage; use the extraordinary to win (V.5).  And whatever you do, hasten to push forward with your forces, because speed is the essence of war (XI.29).

You have enemy both in the middle of combat with your armies, and yet also off to the side, watching, aiding, and providing succor to the enemy you are fighting.  I note with dismay that you wish to talk with them and ask for their assistance in attaining victory.  Oh, please be careful here.

I am a proponent of winning wars without fighting, but to do this requires being in a position that you have not attained and apparently to which you do not aspire.  When your ardour is dampened, neighbors will take advantage of you (II.5).  You must not miss any opportunity to master your enemy (IV.13).  Requesting their help will only empower them, tell them the thoughts of your heart, and convince them that you are weak.

You must always assume that the enemy will come to fight you, and be prepared for him (VIII.16).  Do not ever assume that your enemy will provide you with help, for it is at that time that he will take the advantage and master you.

If you wish to engage the enemy in talk, then you must do so by first positioning yourself as the master.  He who intimidates his neighbors does so by inflicting injury upon them (VIII.14).  Your enemies must be intimidated by you in order for talk of peace to have the affect you desire.

You will know when you have attained this position.  Your enemy will come to you and ask for talk, rather that you going to him.

In Ansar al Sunna Leadership: U.S. Forces Net Big Insurgent Catch, I discussed the coup that had been accomplished against what might be the most significant insurgent group in Iraq.  In Failure of Main Stream Media to Report Huge Victory Against Insurgents, I discussed how the MSM had utterly failed to understand or report the significance of this.  The Multi-National Force Web Site is now fully engaged in the story (why so late?), and is giving us some of the details of the story.

BAGHDAD, Iraq – On Wednesday, the Government of Iraq released the names and photos of several suspected senior-level Ansar al Sunna emirs who were captured by Coalition Forces during a series of raids in mid-November.

The AAS network is responsible for improvised explosive device attacks and suicide attacks on Iraqi government, Coalition Forces and Iraqi civilians.  The AAS network is also responsible for multiple kidnappings, small arms attacks and other crimes in the central and northern part of Iraq. 

One terrorist emir, Abu Mohammed aka Ismail, AAS Emir of Yusifiyah was killed during a raid late November.

The suspected Ansar al Sunna emirs who were captured are:

National level:

– Ramadan Muhammad Salih Ahmad (Bilbas) aka Abu Mustafa, AAS Emir of Iraq.  Abu Mustafa is a founding member of AAS.
– Taha Ahmad Pir-Dawud Ahmad (Surchi), aka Hajji Sa’id, Senior AAS representative and al-Qaida facilitator.
– ‘Adnan ‘Abdallah ‘Alaywi Muhammad (al-‘Ithawi), aka Abu Jaffar, AAS Secretary.  He was Abu Mustafa’s personal assistant and he was responsible for arranging AAS senior-level meetings.

Regional level:

– Hatim Abd-al-Ghafar Muslim Muhammad (al Shimar), aka Abu Taha, AAS Emir of Al Qa’im and Western al Anbar.  He allegedly was a Colonel in the Iraqi Army before the war.
– ‘Abd-al-Basit ‘Abd-al-Razzaq Hasan ‘Ali (al-‘Abbasi), aka Abu Asim, AAS Emir of Tikrit.
– ‘Ali Hasayn ‘Ali “Abdallah (Zandi), aka Abu Bandar, AAS Emir of Baqubah.
– Amjad ‘Abd-al-Sattar Muhammad ‘Ali (al-Ta’i), aka Abu Najila, AAS Emir of Ramadi and Eastern al Anbar.
– Sa’id Jasim Muhammad Khudayyir al-Jadid (al-Juwaynat), aka Abu Sayf, AAS Emir of Bayji.
– Husayn Khudayyir ‘Abbas Majid (al-Zubaydi), aka Abu Husayn, AAS Emir of Bazayiz.
– Salih Khudayyir Salman Jadi (al-Juburi), aka Sajad, AAS Emir of Fallujah.

This is another step closer to defeating al-Qaida in Iraq and helping establish a safe and peaceful Iraq.  Coalition Forces will continue to target not only senior al-Qaida in Iraq leaders, but all associated terrorist movements like Ansar Al Sunna.

What they are not telling you is just how this relates to al Qaeda.  I had known some of the relationship, but in posting originally on this, Michael Ledeen saw some inaccuracies and, by use of one of his contacts, gave me the correct scoop.  I thought I would provide you with it below, citing from my original post linked above.

“Ansar al-Islam was formed out of a merger of the majority Kurdish groups Hamas (inspired by but not identical to the Palestinian group of the same name), Second Soran Unit, and al-Tawhid. I think September 2001 was the last time that they were majority Kurdish, because after that they started receiving a heavy influx of “Afghan Arabs

I might be behind the news cycles a bit on this, but there is an interesting story concerning innovation and adaptation from troops in Iraq.  Hat tip to Arms and the Law, troops have discovered that they can find trip wires by shooting silly string at them:

Dear KSFO Listeners,

My good friend Deborah Johns, Vice-President of Marine Moms of Northern California, whose son William has is now serving his third tour of duty, sent me this very important letter.

Hi Melanie,

I have heard from William for the first time in 3 months. I was so excited to get a call from him. He told me that the Marines really have the pressure on the insurgents and the Marines are really uncovering big stuff that makes it difficult for them. William also said that good things are happening and to let everyone know, and to hang in there with them and keep supporting them because they need the support of the American people.

William also said that they need handwarmers because it is cold and more importantly–send Silly String. They are able to dispense that stuff from 10 feet away and it will detect trip wires that are not visible to the naked eye and saves their lives before entering a building. He said the Silly String just floats through the air and lays gently on any trip wire and works pretty cool. If there are no trip wires then it just falls and hits the ground.  So, we are trying to send any Silly String possible.

Thought you might like to know some good news from the battle field.

Love, Deb

No high tech gadgetry or gear necessary.  Purchasing it from Walmart and sending it over by mail is the most efficient way to put it in the hands of the troops.  If a defense contractor gets hold of the idea and it becomes part of the DoD budget, the cost will go up by three orders of magnitude (product testing, product QA, management oversight of the program, retirement benefits, etc.).

Note: This article has been updated and expanded with The NCOs Speak on Rules of Engagement.

In his article Spinning Haditha, Marine W. Thomas Smith made the following sad but prophetic observation:

… every student of military science understands the ugly nature of insurgencies; where insurgents are un-uniformed, unconventional fighters who move freely throughout the community during the day, and become bushwhackers at night. They routinely use women and children as human shields, and often coerce the latter into the service of operating guerrillas.

This is particularly effective against U.S. forces, because the enemy knows that no matter how much stress they may be under, American soldiers will go to great lengths to avoid killing women and children; and even hesitate (at great risk to themselves) when they see women and children shooting at them.

I followed on to predict that charges of civilian casualties and inappropriate rules of engagement would become a staple of enemy propaganda, that rules of engagement would be modified, and that U.S. troops would become increasingly hesitant to fire on the enemy. Every one of these predictions has come true.

As discussed in Newsweek’s expose on Marine Captain Rob Secher, Captain Secher wrote home that “any time an American fires a weapon there has to be an investigation into why there was an escalation of force.”

In my article Unleash the Snipers!, I noted that Marines in Ramadi have noted the hindrance the rules of engagement have become to their missison:

The military has also tightened rules of engagement as the war has progressed, toughening the requirements before a sniper may shoot an Iraqi. Potential targets must be engaged in a hostile act, or show clear hostile intent.

The marines say insurgents know the rules, and now rarely carry weapons in the open. Instead, they pose as civilians and keep their weapons concealed in cars or buildings until just before they need them. Later, when they are done shooting, they put them swiftly out of sight and mingle with civilians.

In my article Racoon Hunting and the Battle for Anbar, I noted that Marines from Fallujah report that:

“A lot of us feel like we have our hands tied behind our back,

There is enough bad news coming from Iraq, and I have done my fair share of reporting and commenting on it.  But from time to time there are outstanding and remarkable stories of victory and success, and these instances are made all the more remarkable by the fact that the main stream media completely ignores them.

In Ansar al Sunna Leadership: U.S. Forces Net Big Insurgent Catch, I reported on the capture of eleven senior level leadership of terrorist group Ansar al Sunna.  Specifically, among those captured were the emirs of Iraq, Ramadi, Baqubah, Tikrit, al Qa’im, Bayji and Baghdad.  They also captured two terrorist facilitators, a courier, an explosives expert and a financier.  The detention of these terrorists delivers a serious blow to the AAS network that is responsible for improvised explosive device attacks and suicide attacks and on Iraqi government, Coalition Forces and Iraqi civilians.  The AAS network is also responsible for multiple kidnappings, small arms attacks and other crimes in the central and northern part of Iraq.  AAS is considered by some to be a leading terror organization in Iraq … Although some AAS senior leadership allegedly hide in Iran, they continually plan attacks to disrupt Iraqi reconstruction efforts.  This allows the AAS leadership to attempt to disrupt Iraqi reconstruction progress using their followers, while keeping the leadership out of harms way.

I went on to point out that an emir is a chieftan, or a military governor of his assigned territory.  This was no small catch of trouble-makers.  Ansar al-Sunna is considered by some experts to be the most important insurgent group in Iraq, and U.S. forces captured more than half a dozen high level leaders of the group.

There is a case to be made that while the killing of Zarqawi had a Hollywood aspect to it, the capture of these insurgents was more significant and will have greater ramifications than the demise of Zarqawi.  Major news organizations should have been clamoring for information in order to weave a story together for the American public.  Americans should have information to share with each other over nightly dinner, and this specific victory should be in the public consciousness for several weeks to come.

Writing the article was relatively easy.  A few minutes worth of study of the press releases, a few more studying the relevant articles about it, and finally a few more studying the research and scholarly works on Ansar al-Sunna, and presto, there was the article.  Granted, Michael Ledeen had to write me and correct (what I hope to be a somewhat inconsequential) point of history on the group, but still, the reader now knows more than s/he did prior to reading my article.  Ignoring my foible on history, the main thrust of the story is encouraging, and would have taken a seasoned reporter only a few minutes to a couple of hours to construct.

But again, on what might be the most significant counterinsurgency victory in months, the main stream media is noticeably absent.  I posted my article on December 2, and decided to give the main stream media Monday, the start of the normal weekly news cycle, to pick up on the story.  But a quick check of the major outlets shows that there is nothing out there.  Is this a symptom of their incompetence or their bias?

And the ghosts of U.S. servicemen cry out … and haunt the memory of a nation who sent them off to war without what they needed to win.

In Options for Iraq, I mentioned something that might have come as a surprise to readers.  The U.S. is under what is called by the U.N. Security Council a “security partnership