Archive for the 'Iraq' Category

Apparently, Rumsfeld has begun thinking about how we have failed in Iraq and has recommended a potential remedy to the administration.  We are limited to main stream media reports about the contents of a letter he sent to Bush, reportedly on November 6 (note, prior to the election), but some of the recommendations he allegedly made are:

• Publicly announce a set of benchmarks agreed to by the Iraqi government and the U.S. … to chart a path ahead for the Iraqi government and Iraqi people (to get them moving) and for the U.S. public (to reassure them that progress can and is being made).
• Significantly increase U.S. trainers and embeds, and transfer more U.S. equipment to Iraqi security forces.
• Initiate a reverse embeds program … by putting one or more Iraqi soldiers with every U.S. and possibly coalition squad.
• Aggressively beef up Iraqi ministries by reaching out to U.S. military retirees and Reserve and National Guard volunteers.
• Conduct an accelerated drawdown of U.S. bases, noting they have already been reduced from 110 to 55. “Plan to get down to 10 to 15 bases by April 2007, and to 5 bases by July 2007.
• Retain high-end … capability … to target al Qaeda, death squads, and Iranians in Iraq, while drawing down all other coalition forces, except those necessary to provide certain key enablers for Iraqi forces.
• Provide U.S. security forces only for those provinces or cities that openly request U.S. help and that actively cooperate.
• Stop rewarding “bad behavior” with reconstruction funds and start rewarding “good behavior.”
• Position substantial U.S. forces near the Iranian and Syrian borders to reduce infiltration and, importantly, reduce Iranian influence on the Iraqi government.
• Withdraw U.S. forces from vulnerable positions and move to a quick reaction force status, operating from within Iraq and Kuwait, to be available when Iraqi security forces need assistance.
• “Begin modest withdrawals of U.S. and coalition forces (start `taking our hand off the cycle seat’) so Iraqis know they have to pull up their socks, step up and take responsibility for their country.

Rumsfeld further remarks that “In my view it is time for a major adjustment,” Rumsfeld wrote in a November 6 memorandum to the White House. “Clearly, what U.S. forces are currently doing in Iraq is not working well enough or fast enough.”  Rumsfeld further noted that the situation in Iraq “has been evolving” and said U.S. forces have adjusted from “major combat operations, to counterterrorism, to counterinsurgency, to dealing with death squads and sectarian violence.”

It is a stunning assertion that the man who superintended three and a half years of an increasing U.S. casualty rate now concludes that it is “time for a change.”  But the ideas Rumsfeld profers are not novel.  In Options for Iraq, I cited a Stratfor assessment which, in part, concluded that

We do believe that the ISG will recommend a fundamental shift in the way U.S. forces are used. The troops currently are absorbing casualties without moving closer to their goal, and it is not clear that they can attain it. If U.S. forces remain in Iraq — which will be recommended — there will be a shift in their primary mission. Rather than trying to create a secure environment for the Iraqi government, their mission will shift to guaranteeing that Iran, and to a lesser extent Syria, do not gain further power and influence in Iraq. Nothing can be done about the influence they wield among Iraqi Shia, but the United States will oppose anything that would allow them to move from a covert to an overt presence in Iraq. U.S. forces will remain in-country but shift their focus to deterring overt foreign intrusion. That means a redeployment and a change in day-to-day responsibility. U.S. forces will be present in Iraq but not conducting continual security operations.

Then, after presenting the least likely option for Iraq (based on lack of political support for appropriate force projection in Iraq), I presented what I saw as the most likely option for U.S. forces, an option that, while similar to the Stratfor position, was somewhat more detailed:

… withdraw forces to the north in Kurdistan, supporting the Iraqi army and police in offensive operations on an as-need basis.  This support would not include regular or routine “security

Apparently, Rumsfeld has begun thinking about how we have failed in Iraq and has recommended a potential remedy to the administration.  We are limited to main stream media reports about the contents of a letter he sent to Bush, reportedly on November 6 (note, prior to the election), but some of the recommendations he allegedly made are:

• Publicly announce a set of benchmarks agreed to by the Iraqi government and the U.S. … to chart a path ahead for the Iraqi government and Iraqi people (to get them moving) and for the U.S. public (to reassure them that progress can and is being made).
• Significantly increase U.S. trainers and embeds, and transfer more U.S. equipment to Iraqi security forces.
• Initiate a reverse embeds program … by putting one or more Iraqi soldiers with every U.S. and possibly coalition squad.
• Aggressively beef up Iraqi ministries by reaching out to U.S. military retirees and Reserve and National Guard volunteers.
• Conduct an accelerated drawdown of U.S. bases, noting they have already been reduced from 110 to 55. “Plan to get down to 10 to 15 bases by April 2007, and to 5 bases by July 2007.
• Retain high-end … capability … to target al Qaeda, death squads, and Iranians in Iraq, while drawing down all other coalition forces, except those necessary to provide certain key enablers for Iraqi forces.
• Provide U.S. security forces only for those provinces or cities that openly request U.S. help and that actively cooperate.
• Stop rewarding “bad behavior” with reconstruction funds and start rewarding “good behavior.”
• Position substantial U.S. forces near the Iranian and Syrian borders to reduce infiltration and, importantly, reduce Iranian influence on the Iraqi government.
• Withdraw U.S. forces from vulnerable positions and move to a quick reaction force status, operating from within Iraq and Kuwait, to be available when Iraqi security forces need assistance.
• “Begin modest withdrawals of U.S. and coalition forces (start `taking our hand off the cycle seat’) so Iraqis know they have to pull up their socks, step up and take responsibility for their country.

Rumsfeld further remarks that “In my view it is time for a major adjustment,” Rumsfeld wrote in a November 6 memorandum to the White House. “Clearly, what U.S. forces are currently doing in Iraq is not working well enough or fast enough.”  Rumsfeld further noted that the situation in Iraq “has been evolving” and said U.S. forces have adjusted from “major combat operations, to counterterrorism, to counterinsurgency, to dealing with death squads and sectarian violence.”

It is a stunning assertion that the man who superintended three and a half years of an increasing U.S. casualty rate now concludes that it is “time for a change.”  But the ideas Rumsfeld profers are not novel.  In Options for Iraq, I cited a Stratfor assessment which, in part, concluded that

We do believe that the ISG will recommend a fundamental shift in the way U.S. forces are used. The troops currently are absorbing casualties without moving closer to their goal, and it is not clear that they can attain it. If U.S. forces remain in Iraq — which will be recommended — there will be a shift in their primary mission. Rather than trying to create a secure environment for the Iraqi government, their mission will shift to guaranteeing that Iran, and to a lesser extent Syria, do not gain further power and influence in Iraq. Nothing can be done about the influence they wield among Iraqi Shia, but the United States will oppose anything that would allow them to move from a covert to an overt presence in Iraq. U.S. forces will remain in-country but shift their focus to deterring overt foreign intrusion. That means a redeployment and a change in day-to-day responsibility. U.S. forces will be present in Iraq but not conducting continual security operations.

Then, after presenting the least likely option for Iraq (based on lack of political support for appropriate force projection in Iraq), I presented what I saw as the most likely option for U.S. forces, an option that, while similar to the Stratfor position, was somewhat more detailed:

… withdraw forces to the north in Kurdistan, supporting the Iraqi army and police in offensive operations on an as-need basis.  This support would not include regular or routine “security

**** SCROLL FOR UPDATES **** 

The Multi-National Force – Iraq Combined Press Information Center has issued a press release concerning the capture of some high ranking insurgents in Iraq.

“In one week’s time, Coalition Forces captured 11 suspected senior-level terrorists of Ansar al Sunna during a series of raids in north-central Iraq during mid-November.  During the raids, Coalition Forces captured the terrorist emirs of Iraq, Ramadi, Baqubah, Tikrit, al Qa’im, Bayji and Baghdad.  They also captured two terrorist facilitators, a courier, an explosives expert and a financier.  The detention of these terrorists delivers a serious blow to the AAS network that is responsible for improvised explosive device attacks and suicide attacks and on Iraqi government, Coalition Forces and Iraqi civilians.  The AAS network is also responsible for multiple kidnappings, small arms attacks and other crimes in the central and northern part of Iraq.  AAS is considered by some to be a leading terror organization in Iraq … Although some AAS senior leadership allegedly hide in Iran, they continually plan attacks to disrupt Iraqi reconstruction efforts.  This allows the AAS leadership to attempt to disrupt Iraqi reconstruction progress using their followers, while keeping the leadership out of harms way.”

An emir is a chieftan or ruler, and in this case, the military governor of his territory.  Ansar al Sunna is today believed to be the most significant insurgent group in Iraq.  Its core membership is believed to be 500-1000 strong.  Going initially under the name Jund al-Islam (Soldiers of Islam), Ansar al-Sunna is an outgrowth of Ansar al-Islam [Defenders of Islam], a group with ties to Iran and which administration officials have linked to al-Qaeda.  Ansar al-Islam grew out of the September 2001 unification of several militant Islamist groups which had taken root in the mountains of northern Iraq along the Iranian border.

Prior to the US occupation of Iraq, Ansar al-Islam based itself in the mountains around Khurmal, a small town three miles from the Iranian border. On March 29, 2003, US Special Forces, coupled with PUK peshmerga, attacked the town, killing or scattering hundreds of fighters. In the wake of the fighting, Ansar al-Islam went underground. Most fled to Iran, which continues to provide safe-haven to a variety of wanted individuals. In February 2004, Kurdish intelligence officials uncovered a cache of Syrian, Yemeni, and Saudi passports – all bearing Iranian entry stamps – in an Ansar al-Islam safe-house on the Iranian side of the border. That the passports have Iranian stamps indicates that the terrorists did not secretly infiltrate into Iran, but entered with the cognizance of the Iranian authorities.

During the summer, the jihadists began infiltrating back to Iraq, often bribing corrupt Kurdish border guards for safe passage. By August, according to American intelligence reports, hundreds of Ansar terrorists had re-entered the country.  There is a connection between them and al Qaeda.  The Kurdish Islamic militants who initially formed Ansar al-Islam dispersed into two different paths.  One path eventually formed Ansar al Sunna, while the other path followed al Zarqawi to form al Qaeda in Iraq.  With the Coalition capture of so many al Qaeda leadership, Ansar al Sunna had emerged as the more significant threat in Iraq.  Unwelcome in more secular Kurdistan, they have appealed to a wider constituency and brought in terrorists from other parts of the world, including Europe.

The methodology of Ansar al Sunna is primarily kidnappings, ambushes, car bombings, and more recently Hamas-like tactics of suicide bombers.  They do not usually engage in direct combat with U.S. forces.  The “Army of Ansar al Sunnah” claims responsibility for assasinations, bombings and violence from Haqlaniyah, to Haditha (in the west) and Mosul and Kirkuk (in the north).  They have been a prolific terror organization, and catching so many senior level leaders of this group is a victory of major proportions.  It is just the kind of thing that will not receive publicity in the main stream media.

Each arrest fed the information flow for subsequent arrests.  “We have caught a lot of the major players from multiple insurgent cells, providing a lot of useful information leading to the capture of more insurgents and the discoveries of their hideouts and weapons caches,

The educational process that the administration should have started four years ago has begun.  General John Abizaid recently discussed the protracted nature of the global war on terror at Harvard University.

America cannot walk away from Iraq without risking another world war. That warning was sounded at the Kennedy School forum Nov. 17 by Gen. John Abizaid, commander of the United States Central Command (CENTCOM), the man responsible for U.S. military strategy in the Middle East.

“We can walk away from this enemy, but they will not walk away from us,” Abizaid told the forum audience during a discussion titled “The Long War.”

“We have not failed yet and we will not fail if we all understand what we have to do. If we can stay together nothing can stop us and we can make the world a better place.”

Abizaid cited what he called the three greatest challenges facing the world – the Arab-Israeli conflict; the rise of extremist groups “with a dark vision of the future”; and, specifically, the dangers posed by “Shia revolutionary thought.”

“Where these things come together is in Iraq,” he said. “It’s absolutely not an easy thing to do,” Abizaid went on to say. “But the sacrifice that is necessary to stabilize Iraq must be sustained in order for the region itself to become more resilient against these three challenges.”

Soon after 9.11, I sat with my father, once a paratrooper in the 82 Airborne, and explained step by step, country by country, how I believed that we would engage the enemy as a result of this event.  Upon finishing, my father paused for a bit, and then responded with a grimaced look on his face, “Son, what you have just described is a twenty-year war.”  I hesitated, and then responded, “No, sir – a twenty-five year war.”

The nation is slowly grasping the significance of the GWOT, and as she does, she seems to me very disoriented and dazed.  The educational process will be painful, but this is no reason to avoid or neglect it.  Michael Fumento made the observation recently that while the war planners didn’t plan on conducting a guerrilla war in Iraq, now that it is here, it will likely take ten years to win.  Most guerrilla wars, he pointed out, take ten years.  His point might have been lost on an audience who wanted to discuss other things and engage in finger pointing at each other’s political party.

Of course, General Abizaid’s remarks are deadly accurate, but there is a collision of ideas, or a logical dilemma with which to contend.  In War, Counterinsurgency and Prolonged Operations, I used the famous quotations from Sun Tzu (and the less famous quotations from the Small Wars Manual) to show that prolonged operations have a deleterious effect on warriors, and that protracted operations seldom lead to victory.

This is a dilemma that the Pentagon must manage, both perceptually and strategically.  Perceptually, the educational process may prove to be fruitful.  Strategically, lamentable mistakes were made in Iraq.  I have covered the consequences of inadequate force projection.  The upshot of these failures is that we know what we did wrong.  The irony is that the force projection is inversely proportional to the need to exercise that force.  Proper force projection makes for a safer and more secure situation on the ground.

Therein lies the strategy.  “The Long War” will possibly consist of one or more large scale wars, but doubtless many “small wars.”  The protraction of these small wars, the increase in casualty count, and the lack of progress on the ground can be avoided with the proper strategy at the start of the conflict.  As long as the situation is improving at any given time, or at least as long as there is hope on the horizon that the situation will improve, the American people can be very forgiving.

Prior:

• Force Size
• Observations on Timeliness from the Small Wars Manual
• The Debate Over Diminished Force Projection

Friend of the Captain’s Journal Michael Fumento does C-SPAN’s Washington Journal.  It is about one hour long, but well worth the time.  Get ready to be humored and educated at the same time.  There is also an interview by John Hawkins at RWN.

I consider Michael to be the clearest, most level-headed and compelling correspondent and blogger on the war in Iraq, hands down.  He has no equal.  But not only that, he is just simply a nice guy.  The link to the show is below.

Michael Fumento on C-SPAN’s Washington Journal

In Where is Anbar Headed? Where are the Marines Headed?, I cited the ABC News Report that claimed that the Pentagon officials were considering a major pullback of Marines from the Anbar Province, due in part to the most recent Devlin intelligence report covered by the Washington Post.  Michael Fumento notes that the Post article stands in stark contrast to his recent experiences as an embedded reporter in Ramadi.  I said in “Where is Anbar Headed” that it looked like the U.S. was either getting out of Anbar or getting serious about Anbar.

Today General Peter Pace denied reports that the Pentagon was considering a movement of Marines out of the Anbar province.  Asked specifically whether serious consideration is being given to the idea of abandoning Al-Anbar to put more U.S. forces in Baghdad, Pace bluntly replied “no.”  “You gave me a very straight question. I gave you a very straight answer. No. Why would we want to forfeit any part of Iraq to the enemy? We don’t,” he told reporters at a Pentagon briefing.

I believe that it is important to keep balance with respect to our understanding of the Anbar Province.  Assuming that Pace is correct and that conditions and intentions don’t change, the U.S. will not abandon Anbar.  I have discussed the alignment of some of the tribes in the Anbar Province with the Iraqi government and against al Qaeda, but it is also clear that these tribes cannot secure Anbar without the help of Iraqi security forces and more particularly U.S. forces.

In Coalition, Al Qaeda and Tribes Battle in Anbar and Diyala, I covered the recent battles against al Qaeda in which tribal elements participated.

On November 25, insurgents linked to al Qaeda attacked an Anbar tribe in an alliance of twenty five tribes who have vowed to fight al Qaeda.  The insurgents attacked the Abu Soda tribe in Sofiya, near the provincial capital of Ramadi, with mortars and small arms, burning homes, in apparent revenge for their support of the Iraqi government.  “Al Qaeda has decided to attack the tribes due to their support,

John Little has given us a tip to a breaking story about potential movement of the Marines out of Anbar altogether.  This is major … major … news.  ABC News is reporting the following (I will copy and paste at length, and then offer up [I hope] some interesting … and unique … observations):

ABC News has learned that Pentagon officials are considering a major strategic shift in Iraq, to move U.S. forces out of the dangerous Sunni-dominated al-Anbar province and join the fight to secure Baghdad.

The news comes as President Bush prepares to meet with Iraq’s president to discuss the growing sectarian violence.

There are now 30,000 U.S. troops in al-Anbar, mainly Marines, braving some of the fiercest fighting in Iraq. At least 1,055 Americans have been killed in this region, making al-Anbar the deadliest province for American troops.

The region is a Sunni stronghold and the main base of operations for al Qaeda in Iraq and has been a place of increasing frustration to U.S. commanders.

In a recent intelligence assessment, top Marine in al-Anbar, Col. Peter Devlin, concluded that without a massive infusement of more troops, the battle in al-Anbar is unwinnable.

In the memo, first reported by the Washington Post, Devlin writes, “Despite the success of the December elections, nearly all government institutions from the village to provincial levels have disintegrated or have been thoroughly corrupted and infiltrated by al Qaeda in Iraq.”

Faced with that situation in al-Anbar, and the desperate need to control Iraq’s capital, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Peter Pace is considering turning al-Anbar over to Iraqi security forces and moving U.S. troops from there into Baghdad.

“If we are not going to do a better job doing what we are doing out [in al-Anbar], what’s the point of having them out there?” said a senior military official.

Another option under consideration is to increase the overall U.S. troop level in Iraq by two to five brigades (that’s about 7,000 to 18,000 troops).

Generals Casey and Abizaid, however, have both weighed in against this idea. And such an increase would only be sustainable for six to eight months. Far more likely, the official says, will be a repositioning of forces currently in Iraq. “There is a push for a change of footprint, not more combat power.”

In Racoon Hunting and the Battle for Anbar, after the Marines had said that Fallujah held iconic status to them, and losing it would be like losing Iwo Jima, I asked the question, “Will we lose this hallowed soil, this soil on which so much U.S. blood has been shed?”

Perhaps.  And then perhaps not.  There are two possibilities that I see.  Either we have ceded power to al Qaeda and asked the Iraqi security forces to take them out, or we are cordoning off the area, only to go in later to “clear” it.  On October 24, I said that we would not “clear” Ramadi Fallujah-style, and at the time I had what I thought were good reasons to take this position.

I believe that there is some possibility, however remote it may seem to the reader (and to me), that we are cordoning off the Anbar Province (and in particular Ramadi), in order to prepare an assault later “Fallujah-style.”  More Marine patrols where they are getting sniper attacks is not adding to security.  We are either getting out, or we’re getting serious.

I confess, I am at a point of indecision on this, because I think the military brass may be.  It might be left to the incoming SECDEF to make the decision.  More force projection, or do we turn it over to the Iraqis?

The war turns on this decision.

In Old and New Body Armor for Marines, I discussed the planned deployment of the new Modular Tactical Vest (MTV) to replace the Interceptor System.  Following up on this post, I wrote Snipers and Body Armor, and followed up this post with Snipers Having Tragic Success Against U.S. Troops, in which, using a New York Times article, I showed that snipers in Iraq had adapted and were learning to aim for gaps in SAPI plate coverage in the Interceptor body armor system, and that the new MTV was superior to the Interceptor regarding these gaps in coverage.

While writing and subsequent to these posts, I communicated numerous times with USMC Public Affairs Officers, and they were mostly helpful.  For instance, unless it is explained to you in a word-picture, it is difficult to understand how the MTV handles weight distribution better than its predecessors.  Backpackers can visualize this easily, but others may not be able to as well.  Any back packer who carries a heavy pack, whether internal or external frame, knows that the shoulders cannot withstand all of the weight for very long.  The shoulders need a break.  The MTV gives them the break they need.  The MTV has a design similar to backpacks in which the weight rests on the hips rather than the shoulders, and this may give the Marine the edge he needs to fight more effectively.

The help from the PAOs has withered lately, and hopefully will start up soon as I press the issues I have with body armor.  It has been said to me that the MTV was intended to be an improvement over the Interceptor as it regards comfort, but that “Interceptor offers the same level of ballistic protection as the MTV.”  This contradicts the Strategy Pages and Stars and Stripes, both of which are linked in my earlier posts.  In fact, the MTV apparently offers fully and more integrated protection in the side SAPI plates.  Here is a picture of the side SAPI plate.

The Marine Corps Times has a nice 360-degree flash player that shows the body armor and how it fits the Marine.  There is also an updated article in the Marine Corps Times that says what I have learned from the PAOs, that the USMC will issue the new MTV in or about February, but that they do not know yet which specific units will have the MTV.  For me, this isn’t very satisfying, and I will pursue the matter.

On the issue of snipers which I have covered with a vengeance, the Strategy Page has an interesting update, which doesn’t shed new light beyond what I have already covered, except to say that al Qaeda snipers in Anbar are using children to hunt for snipers, and paying handsome rewards for kids who find U.S. snipers and report back to them.

The Information Ministry of the Islamic State of Iraq periodically publishes updated propaganda.  Their mother web site is blocked by some ISPs, but it is easy enough (if you cannot get to it) to find web sites who profer the propaganda without verification, such as Jihad Unspun.  Al Qaeda claims to have had a stellar day on November 18.  The claim is that in two separate incidents, five “crusaders” were killed in each incident for a total of ten killed by IEDs.

Let’s evaluate this claim.  First of all, the Multi-National Force web site publishes press releases upon the death of any U.S. service member.  A quick check of the home page for press releases shows that no such deaths occurred.  On the other hand, Jihad Unspun uses phrases like “so-called Iraqis” and “collaborators” to describe the Iraqi troops, and it is possible that rather than U.S. forces, they are referring to Iraqi forces (although, frankly, it seems strange to refer to Iraqis as “crusaders” even if they are your enemy).

This too can be independently verified.  The Iraq Coalition Casualty Count tracks all Iraqi deaths (both army and police).  A quick check of this web site shows that no such deaths occurred on November 18.

The Jihadists have made outlandish claims to have killed ten troops in a single day by IEDs, while absolutely no independent reports of this exist anywhere.  To the jihadist claims, I say, prove it!

I have made heavy use of a phrase at TCJ that I have not seen anywhere else: force projection.  Its full meaning will come clear in a minute.  Even if it is difficult for the U.S. commanders to admit that force projection at the beginning of the Iraq war was inadequate (as it currently is), Australia’s Commander in Chief has no problems telling us that we needed more troops.  In an interview with the Weekend Australian Magazine, Governor-General Michael Jeffery said he believes a lack of troops on the ground in the weeks after the US-led coalition went into Iraq hampered efforts to secure Baghdad.

He contrasted early tactics in Iraq with the counter-insurgency campaign he led in Phuoc Tuy province during the Vietnam War. “We were charged with winning the hearts and minds of local people and ensuring they were safe, which is the antithesis of what’s happening in Baghdad. People aren’t safe,” he said.  Reflecting on the initial phase of the Iraqi conflict, in March 2003, the Governor-General said: “There weren’t enough soldiers to seal Baghdad off.”

“A lack of troops, a lack of police, the structures weren’t there, the numbers weren’t there and this is a vitally important time immediately after the first battles.”

This lack of troop presence (note, not exactly equal to the definition of force projection) causes various contortions by the commanders regarding situational details.  In testimony before the Senate where senators questioned the adequacy of the number of troops, Abizaid said that “Al-Anbar province is not under control.  But while “Al-Anbar province is critical, more critical than al-Anbar province is Baghdad. Baghdad’s the main military effort,” Abizaid told Nelson. “That’s where our military resources will go.”

It is a remarkable thing to witness a general say that a particular province is “not under control” three and a half years into the war effort, and then to demur to the “more critical” city of Baghdad, presumably because it is the seat of government in Iraq.  The point is that this question – and its remarkable answer – would never have been salient with the right number of troops.  Said another way, only a lack of troop presence causes the need to shift resources from one location to another, while leaving the one to suffer and descend into anarchy.  Is this clear enough?

There isn’t any question that despite the heavy media attention given to Baghdad and the various street bombings and other violence, the al Anbar Province is still the most dangerous place in Iraq, and likely then the most dangerous place on earth.  Further, this “whack-a-mole” concept of war has extended the war effort in Iraq longer than the U.S. was involved in World War II, contrary to the counsel from the Small Wars Manual that I discussed in “War, Counterinsurgency and Prolonged Operations” (note from this post the unwillingness to mention or tackle the issue of prolonged operations and its effect on moral in the draft U.S. Counterinsurgency Field Manual FM 3-24).

Finally, there is more to the concept of force projection than number of troops.  Proper force projection also has to do with how the troops are used, i.e., their mission.  I have previously noted that the Marines in the Anbar Province feel hamstrung by the rules of engagement, which have evolved over the war in Iraq.  Further, having a troop presence, even with robust rules of engagement, is not the same thing as utilizing them.  Camp Fallujah has at the present around 10,000 troops resident.  Of those troops in the area, only 300 currently have a continual presence in Fallujah-proper, a city of 300,000.  Note that this is a ratio 1000:1 Iraqis to Marines.

As Marines in Iraq expand into more advisory roles to Iraqi troops, the insurgency, by the use of criminal techniques, has become financially self-sufficient.  The violence has not abated, there are daily retaliatory attacks by Sunni and Shia, and there is talk of civil war in Iraq.  U.S. troops face the daily threat of sniper attacks, and the U.S. casualty rate in Iraq has a positive slope line.  At least in part, these are the consequences of inadequate force projection.