Archive for the 'Iraq' Category

It has been reported that dozens of al-Qaeda linked gunmen took to the streets in Ramadi on Wednesday to announce that the city was joining a new Sunni Islamic state.  The gunmen are purported to be part of the Mujahideen Shura Council.  This al-Qaeda led group is comprised of Mujahideed fighters loyal to Saddam.  The gunmen also announced that all Sunni provinces would be part of the Islamic state.  In what might be an exaggeration of the story above, Aljazeera is reporting that there were hundreds of fighters rather than dozens of fighters.  Continuing with the Aljazeera report:

Abu Harith said the state would be headed by Amir Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, a little-known militant, and would include the Sunni areas of Baghdad, the provinces of Anbar, Diyala, Kirkuk, Salah al-Din, Nineveh and parts of Babil and Wasit.

Following these demonstrations, Friday saw similar demonstrations in the al Anbar towns of Bani, Daher, Rwah, Haditha and Haqlaniyah.  In these last two cities, the demonstrations were held within one kilometer of U.S. military bases.

It might be tempting to see these reports as an indication of the weakness of the Sunni insurgents in al Anbar.  After all, dozens of fighters is barely a group of criminals in a city the size of Ramadi.  But this view would be a mistake.  Some tribes in the so-called Sunni triangle have vowed to oppose al-Qaeda and the Shura Council, but we have pointed out that there isn’t unanimity among the al Anbar tribes to fight al-Qaeda.  Moreover, the chieftans of the tribes who have agreed to fight al-Qaeda are the heads of small tribes, and some of the chiefs reside outside of Iraq for fear of assasination.  Al-Qaeda is strong enough not only to wreak havoc and violence, but to cause fear among the larger population in al Anbar.  But the demonstration was not about either al Qaeda or the Sunni insurgents driving the U.S. out of al Anbar, although they want to use that as a means to an end.

The Washington Post article cited above stated the reason for the demonstrations:

” … to protect our religion and our people, to prevent strife and so that the blood and sacrifices of your martyrs are not lost.”

Don’t mistake this protection as being primarily from the U.S.  Rather, it is from the Shia.  Stratfor is also reporting that “this is a response to the Shiite-controlled parliament’s decision to pass a law that allows provinces to form federal regions because the law weakens Sunnis.”  In the face of al Sadr’s death squads taking revenge on the Sunnis who have repressed the Shia for years, along with the potential loss of wealth of the Sunni provinces, they are fighting back against what they see as the potential repression of the Sunnis.

To be sure, for al-Qaeda and the Council to embark upon their plan to turn the Sunni triangle into an Islamic stronghold for their “holy fighters,” the U.S. will have to be gone.  But right now the U.S. is yet another tribe in a region where tribes have cut deals, aligned themselves for and against al Qaeda, and are defending themselves daily against Shia death squads.  The 3rd Battalion, 2nd Marine Regiment, is reporting that the area they find themselves in is not safe.  But it is “safer than when the Marines had arrived.”

Without the presence of U.S. troops to fight with, there was plenty of animosity to drive the violence due to Shia – Sunni tensions.  The demonstrations, the violence and the politics are all preparatory for when the U.S. presence is not determinative in the direction al Anbar takes.  Sooner or later, they apparently feel, the stronger tribe will be gone.  The recent Makkah pact forbids Shiite-Sunni killings, and the hope is apparently that this will provide some ideological underpinnings for stability.

In the mean time, the bravery of the Marines and Soldiers in al Anbar speaks to their character, as Ramadi and the surrounding and adjacent cities are still the most dangerous places in Iraq, and perhaps the world.

Prime Minister Maliki today said that the execution of Saddam would help to undermine the insurgency.  Maliki’s statement should not be seen in the aggregate, as a position statement disconnected from the balance of events in Iraq.  President Bush’s insistence that he would not pull the troops out before the terrorists are defeated stands juxtaposed with the growing chorus of voices calling for change in Iraq, sooner rather than later.

Maliki’s government appears to be too weak to continue without the support of the current level of U.S. troop deployment, and even perhaps a larger deployment given that the U.S. has been forced to admit that its strategic plan to reduce the level of violence in Baghdad has failed.  The installation of a so-called ‘strong-man’ to regain control of Iraq has been floated in hushed circles, but it has been reported that the calls for a change at the top of the political landscape in Iraq are beginning to be heard in Washington.  David Ignatius, of the Washington Post, reported on the currently deteriorating situation in Iraq and the relation to the calls for a new regime:

The situation is deteriorating so fast that even radical militia leaders are said to be complaining about the anarchy. Moqtada al-Sadr, a Shiite firebrand who heads the militia known as the Mahdi Army, recently told a top official of the Iraqi intelligence service that “an increasing number of Shia death squads, operating under the name of his Mahdi Army, are Iranian pasdaran [Revolutionary Guards] staff officers and Hezbollah fighters, who are executing operational activities that he is not aware of, nor can he control,” according to one U.S. source.

Bush administration officials have been puzzling over why the coup rumors have become so widespread in Baghdad. One reason is that Iraqis remember the country’s history of coups, including the 1958 putsch that overthrew the monarchy and the one in 1968 that brought the Baath Party to power. Another explanation is America’s increasingly vocal frustration with Maliki and the perception in Iraq that he has been given a deadline to crack down on militias, or else. Finally, the rumors may reflect ongoing U.S. efforts to reach out to former Baath Party leaders and insurgents in an effort to stabilize the country.

An [unsourced] former CIA officer is reported to have said that there is Washington ‘buzz’ of a coup:

It’s being talked about in Washington. One scenario is, the Iraqis do it themselves, some Iraqi colonel who’s fed up with the whole thing, who takes over the country. And it would take the United States forty-eight hours to figure out how to respond, and meanwhile he’s taken over everything. The other side of the coin is, we do it ourselves. Find some general up in Ramadi or somewhere, and help him take over. And he’d declare a state of emergency and crack down. And he’d ask us to leave – that would be our exit strategy. It’s a distinct possibility. I’ve raised this with a number of foreign service and intelligence people, and most of them – remembering the days of the coups d’etat in the Middle East – say, “Hear, hear!”

Whether the threat of a coup is real or not, with such ‘buzz’ in Washington, the increasing violence in Iraq, out-of-control militias, and increasing pressure from the Bush administration, Maliki cannot appear to be a strong leader.

In continuing violence in Iraq, the U.S. has announced the deaths of nine more U.S. troops.  The U.S. is keeping up the pressure on al Sadr’s militia, arresting a senior militia leader; the al Sadr loyalists have threatened massive demonstrations and even violence if he is not released, and so a test has been set up for Prime Minister Maliki.  It appears, however, that Maliki and al Sadr ostensibly agree on one thing: the Iraqi people should and will decide on the issue of federalism in Iraq.

Thus the politics, some of it mixed with violence, ensues for power in post-war Iraq.  It appears that Iraq is headed towards what is being called a “dramatic change,” or a course correction.  There are even speculations that an overthrow of Maliki’s regime is in the works, with Maliki to be replaced by a ‘strongman’ who would use the power of the military to regain control of Iraq.

James Baker correctly see the problem as stabilization, at least initially.

His group’s main concepts seem to be “stability first” and “redeploy and contain”, as they are called. The first would concentrate less on democracy and more on stabilisation, especially in Baghdad, and on trying to bring in nationalist (ie not al-Qaeda jihadist) insurgents into political life and even consulting Iran and Syria. New anti-guerrilla tactics might be devised.

This could tie in with thinking in Washington that there is merit in the idea of a government of “national salvation” in Iraq.

The second would be more radical. It foresees a possible major, phased withdrawal of US forces, perhaps even to bases in the region from which they could support the Iraqi government if necessary.

We have discussed the issue of incorporation of the Sunni Baathists into the Iraqi political scene with amnesty, including the difficulty of accepting peace with those who have killed U.S. troops.  Maliki is claiming once again that there will be no amnesty for those who have killed U.S. troops.

Just two days after announcing his national reconciliation plan, Maliki reported that several insurgent groups have contacted his office or other government ministries to open a dialogue. Speaking on state television, Maliki stuck to the position he carved out Monday, that the amnesty offer will not apply to insurgents who have taken lives in the violence.

But this is surely just politics.  Unless Maliki is proposing amnesty for only those inept fighters and poor shots who have failed at every attempt to perpetrate violence on U.S. or Iraqi troops (which leaves no need for amnesty in the first place), then the deal will include at least some who have perpetrated violence.  We may speculate that a few of the notorious will be handed over, but until this plays out, perhaps only Maliki knows exactly what he means.  The NPR story continues:

Some insurgent groups have already rejected the amnesty offer. Ansar al Sunna, a group reportedly linked to al-Qaida, put out a statement on an Islamist Web site saying it will never compromise. It also urged all insurgent groups to remain united against the government.

Al Qaeda and those who have thrown in their hat with them will likely contest the al Anbar Province until the bitter end.  In all of this, speed, efficiency and effectiveness is of the essence in the defeat of al Qaeda and defeat or disarming of the Shia militia.  There are still signs that al Sadr has lost control of many of his prior loyalists, with them splintering into radicalized cells.

In Baathists Make Overture to U.S.: Now What?, we mentioned that Ibrahim al-Shimmari of the Islamic Army of Iraq made an offer, via Al-Jazeera television, to negotiate with the U.S.  Specifically, he said:

“We are prepared for any negotiations, whether secret or public, on the condition only that they are sincere. We have no objection to mediators with international credentials, and it is possible to exchange letters.

On July 26, 2006, David Frum posted on “Iraq: New Plan Wanted.”  David set before us the current situation in Iraq, and then taking off of Peter Galbraith’s op-ed piece in the NYT, recommended a backup plan for Iraq that involves a redeployment of troops to northern Iraq in Kurdish territory.

As an alternative to using Shiite and American troops to fight the insurgency in Iraq’s Sunni center, the administration should encourage the formation of several provinces into a Sunni Arab region with its own army, as allowed by Iraq’s Constitution. Then the Pentagon should pull its troops from this Sunni territory and allow the new leaders to establish their authority without being seen as collaborators.

Seeing as we cannot maintain the peace in Iraq, we have but one overriding interest there today — to keep Al Qaeda from creating a base from which it can plot attacks on the United States. Thus we need to have troops nearby prepared to re-engage in case the Sunni Arabs prove unable to provide for their own security against the foreign jihadists.

This would be best accomplished by placing a small “over the horizon

Thematic in our discussions here have been that the best counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy is to provide the people with security.  Mothers want to know that their children can go to school and play in the yards and streets without fear of harm.  To use a heavily worn expression, the way to “win the hearts and minds of the people” is to give them peace.  This is true in Iraq at least of tribes and sects (the Sunni want protection from the Shia, the Shia from the Sunni, etc.).

We have shown that the force size to effect this security has been too small in Iraq, and that trust in local troops yields both uncertain results and an impedance to U.S. troops.  Moreover, constantly offensive operations against guerrilla forces is a tactic that has a proven track record.  Contrary to this, forces in Iraq, after the initial campaign to overthrow the regime, redeployed to well-gaurded bases, while failing to share the risk with the people and consistently conduct COIN operations against the enemy.  As an example of the success of properly conducted COIN operations, our good friend Michael Fumento has recently blogged directly from Ramadi concerning the strategic success of Combat Operation Posts.  These posts, scattered throughout Ramadi, ensure that the U.S. troops are close to both the people and the enemy, while also forcing daily operations against the enemy.

Contrary to this proven COIN strategy, UPI is reporting that troops in Afghanistan are redeploying to their barracks, thereby committing the same mistake we made in Iraq.

More than a month after Pakistan inked a peace deal with local leaders in the restive tribal region straddling its frontier with Afghanistan, some NATO troops are trying the same tactic on their side of the border, redeploying to barracks and relying on tribal militias to keep Taliban insurgents in check.

The truces are part of a new “hearts and minds” strategy on both sides of the border, as coalition and Pakistani authorities attempt to engage local tribal leaders and woo them away from Taliban extremists.

But the NATO deal, in four northern districts of Helmand province, comes as evidence mounts that the Pakistani truce in Waziristan has failed to reduce cross-border infiltration by Taliban fighters looking to engage coalition troops in Afghanistan.

So the strategy here is to let the tribes in Afghanistan send their fathers and sons to wage war against better trained and equipped fighters, potentially losing their lives, with these fighters being of the same or similar religious persuasion, while the U.S. troops redeploy to their barracks in safety.  Stunningly, this is the strategy employed as part of the doctrine to “win the hearts and minds of the people.”  The UPI article does make mention of one very important factor.

“The effort to engage the Taliban’s tribal base makes sense,” said Haqqani, “if at the same time you are degrading the ideological leadership through a military campaign.”

It is difficult to see how NATO forces will wage a military campaign while redeployed to their barracks.

Shia Islamic cleric Moqtada al Sadr has issued orders to his loosely organized militias by calling for an end to Iraqi-on-Iraqi violence.

BAGHDAD – Radical cleric Moqtada Al Sadr ordered his militia on Friday not to take part in the wave of sectarian bloodshed sweeping Iraq, as the head of the British army called for his troops to be brought home.

The Shia firebrand issued the order amid what a US military spokesman called a “tremendous spike

In Ramadi is Still a Troubled City it was shown that Ramadi, capital of the al Anbar Province, is still a very deadly city, and that the region appears to be regressing, or devolving, into deeper trouble with the passage of time.  Al Qaeda brazenly attacks in daylight hours, recently even taking over a Hospital in Ramadi and executing wounded Iraqi soldiers and police.  It is an area awash in arms, and the flood of arms into the area may increase due to pressure from the Sunni tribes (who have ostensibly sided with the Iraqi central government against al Qaeda) for the U.S. to arm them for the fight against the foreign elements.

The redeployment of troops to Baghdad has hurt the effort in al Anbar.  Four Marines were killed July 29th, the very day that soldiers were pulling out of al Anbar to redeploy to Baghdad.  Three Marines with Regimental Combat Team 7 were killed Sunday, and Michael Fumento is blogging directly from Ramadi at the present.  He is reporting that the 1/6 Marines just arrived in Ramadi, and the enemy is testing them.  They lost three Marines to an IED today, October 9, 2006 (read all of Michael’s reports from the al Anbar Province at his web log).

About one third of the U.S. troops who have died in Iraq since September 1 have been killed in al Anbar.  The U.S. is paying for some of the same territory more than once, and losing confidence among the citizens due to the transient nature of force presence.  In complaints that mirror our concerns over Force Size, U.S. commanders privately disclose that the lack of force projection in al Anbar has hurt their efforts.

Commanders in western Anbar have long complained privately that they don’t have enough troops to control their area, which is about the size of South Carolina and includes notoriously violent cities such as Haditha, Rawah and Haqlaniyah.

“Any time you reduce forces it’s a concern,” said Marine Lt. Col. Norm Cooling, commander of the 3rd Battalion, 3rd Regiment which is scattered across western Anbar.

Few dispute that the U.S. military had to do something about the deteriorating security in the Iraqi capital, which threatened to spiral into fullscale civil war.

But the question is whether the U.S. has enough forces in the country overall to both regain control in Baghdad while also preventing Sunni insurgents in the west from using the U.S. military drawdown there to gain strength.

About a third of the 102 U.S. troops who have died in Iraq since Sept. 1 have been killed in Anbar, according to Pentagon reports.

“Where we’re not, the insurgency goes there. That’s just how an insurgency works,” said Capt. Chris L’Heureux, 30, of Woonsocket, R.I., who was also among those relocated to Baghdad.

U.S. commanders have also said that the reshuffling of forces makes it difficult to build trust among civilians and convince them to cooperate with U.S. forces.

For example, five different U.S. units were based in the western city of Hit in the space of just last year.

“It’s been like a transient area” in Hit, said Lt. Col. Ronald Gridley, the executive officer for Marine Regimental Combat Team 7.

“In a counterinsurgency,” he said recently, “you can’t throw put (sic) someone in there for 45 days and expect them to understand the communities, the different tribes, the different personalities involved.”

We have discussed both the positive and negative aspects of the alignment of some of the Sunni tribes in al Anbar with the Iraqi central government.  In the interest of full disclosure, it is meaningful and productive to hear voices of dissent.

“We heard a lot from the Americans and successive Iraqi governorates that they arrest hundreds of al-Qaeda men in Anbar and other places in Iraq,” said Ibrahim an electrical engineer in Hiyt, “but the number of these fighters is increasing daily”.

A former Iraqi intelligence officer believes the challenge in curbing violence may lie in the fact that the tribal leaders are not fully representative of the people in Anbar.

“There is no agreement among the tribes in Anbar to fight the foreign gunmen,” he told Aljazeera.net.

“The chieftains who attended the meetings with al-Maliki represent small tribes in the province and many of them reside outside Iraq for fear of assassination and so on.”

He believes the tribal leaders who met with al-Maliki have little clout over armed groups in western Iraq.

We have provocatively posed interrogatory with “Will we Lose the Anbar Province?”  The answer is that we have not yet lost, and we do not have to lose.  But winning efficiently and effectively will require U.S. force projection an order of magnitude greater than that of the enemy.

Iraq today is a land of many small wars, each with different goals, participants and dangers.  Bill Roggio is commenting on the multiple counterinsurgency operations currently taking place, in Kirkuk, Diyala and Diwaniyah.  The nature of these operations (COIN) and the widespread geography of these (and other recent actions) demonstrate the problematic nature of the conflict today in Iraq.  Also at The Fourth Rail, it was pointed out that al Sadr had sent two companies of the Madhi army into Kirkuk over the spring.

This was not a random action by al Sadr; there is a reason that his forces are located near or in the Kurdish north.  Iran has trained as many as 40,000 Iraqis in order to prevent an unlikely rollback of Shiite control, and is likely pulling the strings to effect the policy that is most beneficial to their interests in regional control.  Shiite control is also related to control over oil and refinery infrastructure.  Kurdish leaders have made it clear that they will not relent on their demands to reverse Saddam’s Arabization of the Kirkuk oil fields, which accounted for the bulk of exports before the 2003 invasion.  “We always said we would make no concessions on … the Kurdish identity of Kirkuk,” said leading Kurdish politician Massoud Barzani.

It is likely that al Sadr’s forces (and other factions in Iraq) are positioning for negotiations and decisions that might be determinative for the future of Iraq, namely, the division of Iraq into three autonomous regions: Shiite, Kurdish and Sunni.  In a strategically timed trip to the Middle East, Condoleezza Rice has put political pressure on the Kurds to share the wealth associated with a Kurdish Kirkuk.

Rice visited the region’s powerful president, Massoud Barzani, less than two weeks after the regional government threatened to break away from Iraq in a dispute over oil.

Barzani told reporters after meeting with Rice that Kurdistan, “like any other nation, has the right to self-determination.

Ramadi has seen successes recently, not only from action by the U.S. forces, but also from the Sunni tribes, some of which have turned against al Qaeda.  However, al Qaeda is still very active, and Ramadi remains a deadly city with troubled times ahead.

The 3rd Battalion, 8th Marines, recently returned home from Ramadi, Iraq.  There is good news and bad news to convey.

During their deployment, the unit had its hands in counter-insurgency operations, detaining more than 300 insurgents, said Lt. Col. Steve Neary, the battalion commander. They also cut the violence in half in the western sections of the city.

“Central Ramadi is a different story,