Archive for the 'Iraq' Category

From IHT, we learn that Ibrahim al-Shimmari of the Islamic Army of Iraq is alleged to have made an overture to the U.S.

BAGHDAD, Iraq A purported spokesman for a Sunni insurgent group, the Islamic Army in Iraq, offered to open negotiations with the Americans in an audiotape aired by Al-Jazeera television on Thursday.

The tape was said to be from Ibrahim al-Shimmari, whose name has appeared in past statements by the group, which has claimed responsibility for a number of suicide bombings against civilians and attacks on U.S. troops.

The tape’s authenticity could not be independently confirmed.

“We are prepared for any negotiations, whether secret or public, on the condition only that they are sincere. We have no objection to mediators with international credentials, and it is possible to exchange letters,” the speaker in the tape said.

Al-Shimmari has offered such negotiations in past statements. He did not elaborate on the goal of any talks.

The Islamic Army in Iraq is believed to include former members of Saddam Hussein’s Baath Party, his intelligence service and former army officers. It rejected a call from Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki earlier this year for insurgents to join the political process, saying it would not participate until there was a timetable for withdrawal of U.S.-led forces.

In sections of the tape not aired, the speaker on the tape said Iraq faces occupation by two powers — “the Crusader Americans and the Iranians … and the latter is the more dangerous,” Al-Jazeera reported.

He said his group was allied to former al-Qaida in Iraq leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who was killed June by a U.S. airstrike. But the speaker criticized al-Zarqawi, saying he “committed some mistakes,” including the killing of four Russian embassy workers who were kidnapped, then slain in late June.

In contrast to the Islamic Army, al-Qaida in Iraq is believed largely made up of Arab Islamic militants, though the group has tried to ally itself with Iraqi insurgents.

U.S. policy will soon have to consider the disposition of the remaining Baathists in the al Anbar province.  The foreign fighters such as al Qaeda pose an easy decision.  They are dedicated to the overthrow of the current regime by violent means as shown by the recently released letter from al Qaeda senior leadership to Zarqawi.  They will have to be killed.

But as the Strategy Page discusses, the issue of the Sunni insurgents is a more problematic situation.

When it comes to fighting the terrorists, tribal ties still matter. In central Iraq, three Sunni tribes are particularly linked to the Sunni Arab violence; the Bulaym, Janabi, and Shammar Jarba. They were mainstays of the old Saddam Hussein regime, providing many recruits for the secret police and Republican Guard. Tribal politics for these three is all about either regaining control of the government, or getting amnesty. The government has been discussing amnesty deals with many of the tribal leaders. The problem is that the tribes want amnesty for more people than the government believes it can get away with. Attempts to give amnesty to those known to have been involved in killing Americans, blew up when Americans got wind of it. Same thing happened in Iraq when the government proposed giving amnesty to Sunni Arab tribal officials who had participated in attacks on Kurds and Shia Arabs both before, and after, the fall of Saddam in 2003. What it comes down to is that there are thousands of prominent Sunni Arabs who have to be either pardoned, captured or killed, before there can be peace in Iraq.

High sounding phrases such as helping the Iraqis to “secure Ramadi,” and “winning the hearts and minds of the people,” might sound impressive in a hot-off-the-press master’s thesis, but are sometimes not very useful for formulating policy or doctrine.  The fact is that the U.S. administration will have to make a difficult decision.  Either we kill or capture the remaining Baathist elements in the al Anbar Province, or we formulate some sort of treaty, pact or agreement with them to secure the surrender of their weapons and the standdown of their armies, while stopping short of killing or incarcerating them.  These are the only two options.

If we decide for the former option, there is much work remaining, and it will be hard and bloody work.  There is no “winning the hearts and minds” of those for whom you have made it clear that you intend to kill them.  There is absolutely no reason for a person with a sure and certain death sentence to surrender.  If we decide for the later option, the objections from the U.S. will be understandably loud and emotional.

How can we make peace with those who have killed our sons?  But if we do not, how many more sons will we lose?

From Iraq News:

Baghdad, Oct 1, (VOI) – A coup almost toppled Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Malki’s government over the last two days, the Iraqi legislator Baha’ al-A’raji said on Sunday.

“Al-Malki’s government has survived a coup planned by Saddamists and Islamic extremists who wanted to send a clear message to the Iraqi government of their presence in Iraq,

From Iraq News:

Baghdad, Oct 1, (VOI) – A coup almost toppled Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Malki’s government over the last two days, the Iraqi legislator Baha’ al-A’raji said on Sunday.

“Al-Malki’s government has survived a coup planned by Saddamists and Islamic extremists who wanted to send a clear message to the Iraqi government of their presence in Iraq,

Remaining highly recommended is the Marine Corps Small Wars Manual (large PDF document).  The war in Afghanistan is more than 4.5 years old, and the war in Iraq is about 3.5 years old.  The SWM has something to way about timeliness that will edify and enrich our understanding of the various blunders that have been made in these wars so far.  By way of editorial note, I would comment that there seems to be an undercurrent among supporters of the war(s) that is unhealthy and unproductive for the prospective of evolution in our doctrine, strategy and tactics based on our mistakes.  Analysis, assessment and constructive criticism are generally taken to be opposition to the war or to our warriors.  To be seen as patriotic and supportive of our troops, one almost has to be jingoistic.  This is not a mature attitude, but more importantly, it is not supportive of the necessary changes that will mark the future of warfare and thus the warriors who will be participating in those wars.  Proceeding now to the SWJ and what we may learn about timeliness (italics and bold are mine):

” … when forced to resort to arms to carry out the object of the intervention, the operation must be pursued energetically and expeditiously in order to overcome the resistance as quickly as possible.  The campaign plan and strategy must be adapted to the character of the people encountered.  National Policy and the precepts of civilized procedure demand that our dealings with other peoples be maintained on a high moral plan (sic).  However, the military strategy of the campaign and the tactics employed by the commander in the field must be adapted to the situation in order to accomplish the mission without delay.” (Page 34)

“The force must be of sufficient strength and so proportioned that it can accomplish its mission in the minimum time and with minimum losses.” (Page 113)

From the modern days of Blitzkrieg forward, speed and surprise were useful as a strategy to prevent the enemy from implementing a coherent defense.  Leaving behind the issue of conventional war versus COIN, rural operations versus MOUT, and all of the other issues that can cloud simple evaluations and make the lessons poignant for us, allowing a protracted period of time for [a] al Qaeda to recruit and train more foreign fighters to enter the fray, [b] al Sadr’s militia to strengthen from Iranian funding, and [c] the Baathist diehards to wreak havoc unimpeded, has caused the U.S. strategy to become muddled and weakened.  It has also added to the perception of the U.S. as an occupying force rather than a liberator.

No matter what tactics were employed, if the strategy had included defeat of the known enemy with dispatch, the U.S. forces could have focused more on COIN operations for smaller groups of poorly-trained and poorly-led insurgents.  The current U.S. mission in Iraq is not apparently one of defeating the enemy.  Rather, it is training proxy fighters to defeat the enemy.  This is strategically smart only to the degree that it is successful, useful, helpful and effective to accomplishing the final goals.  Altruism (i.e., in this case, nation-building) is not particually useful as a military strategy.

Michael Fumento is back in Iraq.

More ominously, the enemy has also obviously brought in crack snipers from other countries. The last death in 1/506th was from sniper fire. Closer to home (in a personal sense), last month an embed with 1/506th took what was presumably a sniper round in the ribcage that tumbled a bit and popped out his chest. I think he got out of the hospital in Landstuhl, Germany just last week. The photographer embedded with 1/506th who was shot right before I got there in April was definitely sniped, suffering two broken legs. Incidentals like machine gun fire, rifle fire, IEDs and mortar barrages just add a bit of spice. My efforts in returning, therefore, have revolved around snipers.

… my physical training this time comprised jogging with full armor and all the gear I’ll be wearing on patrol plus a bit extra. Contrary to Hollywood portrayals, a sniper cannot put a scope on a rapidly-moving target. The men of the 101st know that and whenever they aren’t under cover, they jog or go at a dead run. Nothing can provide perfect protection; sometimes you have to expose yourself to get a good shot whether with a rifle or a camera. But I can cut the odds.

Read his whole entry at Back to Iraq, by Michael Fumento. It is worth the read.

This little nuggert from an article otherwise focused on Iranian funding of the violence in Iraq:

“You see them enabling all comers,

In a stark admission of the casualty rate for al Qaeda in Iraq, al Masri has divulged enemy intelligence to the coalition:

CAIRO, Egypt — The new leader of al-Qaida in Iraq said in an audio message posted on a Web site Thursday that more than 4,000 foreign insurgent fighters have been killed in Iraq since the U.S.-led invasion in 2003. It was believed to be the first major statement from insurgents in Iraq about their losses.

“The blood has been spilled in Iraq of more than 4,000 foreigners who came to fight,” said the man, who identified himself as Abu Hamza al-Muhajir – also known as Abu Ayyub al-Masri – the leader of al-Qaida in Iraq. The voice could not be independently identified.

The good news is that Iraq, while not being touted as such, is important to the GWOT because, if nothing else, it has become a place where literally thousands of terrorists can be killed.  The notion that this is a bad thing is a political talking point, but militarily, is nonsensical if we see the GWOT as being a larger, regional, and protracted campaign that must be won on soil other than America.

Of course, there is bad news, and the bad news is sobering.  In my post Afghanistan, Talibanistan, Waziristan and Kill Ratios, I conservatively calculated a kill ratio in recent Afghanistan action of 50:1.  Considering U.S. mortalities of 3022 as I write this post, and using a value of 4000 al Qaeda in Iraq, the Iraqi situation is much worse.  I calculate a kill ratio of 1.324.

A kill ratio is not simply a clinical number.  These are the sons of America, and it behooves us to understand the difference between Afghan fighting and the war in Iraq.

While it is easy to second-guess each strategic decision and tactical blunder that has been made, several things can be pointed out that might have contributed to this stark difference.  While there is a resurgence of the Taliban in Waziristan, at least initially, the enemy was routed and driven out of Afghanistan.  Conventional operations did not cease until the territory was relatively secure.  The enemy, even now, is being fought primarily on terrain other than urban, and in Iraq, the prevalence of MOUT (Military Operations on Urban Terrain) is noteworthy.

As I have pointed out in previous posts, bypassing large urban centers on our drive to Baghdad put a quick end to conventional operations and a start to counterinsurgency operations, but this cessation was likely premature.  Fallujah was taken with relatively few casualties compared to the continually increasing casualty count in the al Anbar Province.  We have left the enemy in Ramadi, Haditha, al Haqlaniyah, Habaniyah, and other highly urbanized parts of al Anbar, and consistently use COIN tactics to effect enemy casualties, but this leads also to a high casualty rate for U.S. troops.

The lesson is simple.  When a strategy of COIN is intended and employed in large urban areas where large numbers of the enemy have been intentionally left to operate, the kill ratio does not even come close to comparing with conventional operations.

This should cause us to think long and hard in the future about the cessation of conventional operations and the invocation of counterinsurgency operations.

Iraqi President Jalal Talabani has gone on record stating the obvious, i.e., that Iraq will need troop presence for some protracted period of time to protect against aggression from its neighbors (and it is presumed he is speaking mainly of Iran).

“The American presence has always prevented any kind of foreign invasion to Iraq,” Talabani said.

“That’s one of the main reasons why we think that we need an American presence, even symbolical, in the country to prevent our neighbors attacking us,” he said at a forum at the Woodrow Wilson Center, a Washington think thank (sic).

Talabani also said Baghdad could not “further tolerate” neighbors’ interference in its internal affairs.

“I think that our neighbors must understand that our patience is limited,” he said, refusing to single out countries but adding “we mean all of them.”

Iraq shares borders with Syria, Iran, Turkey, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.

Asked if there was concern over aggression from Turkey, Talabani said: “I don’t think there is any danger for invasion by Turkey to Iraq.”

But as soon as he said this, dissenting voices began to howl back at this proposal, including specifically Sunni clerics and generally the Shia.  It is no mistake that Talabani, a Kurdish politician who has reached out to the Sunni in an attempt at reconciliation, has made these statements.  The Kurds and the Sunni population know exactly what the Shia majority is capable of given the recent revenge killings by Shia death squads.

I’ll go out on a limb and say that if the U.S. doesn’t have a strong military presence in Iraq for the foreseeable future, U.S. deaths will have been in vain.  Our operation in Iraq will amount to nothing more than the overthrow of the Sunni strongman so that Iran could then wield its influence.  That is, we will have done Iran’s work for them at the expense of U.S. lives.

From the Gulf News:

A major Sunni group is holding talks with the Iraqi government over disarming of the Shiite militia belonging to Moqtada Al Sadr, Iraqi political sources said.

Adnan Al Dulaimi, head of the Iraqi Accordance Front who is holding the talks with the government, has also called for the government to resign if it fails to handle the issue of disarming Shiite militias, like the Mehdi Army, which is led by Al Sadr.

Sunni locations in Baghdad, such as Saydiya, Hurriya and Doura, are witnessing attacks by men in black clothes, believed to be members of the Mehdi Army.

Al Dulaimi, in direct contact with the Americans, asked them to disperse a special military force in Hurriya to put an end to the Mehdi Army attacks.

Sources in the Iraqi Accordance Front are negotiating with Iraq Prime Minister Nouri Al Maliki to chalk out procedures to disarm militias and deter the Mehdi Army in Baghdad.

“Al Maliki is ready to take additional … procedures against the Mehdi Army. But apparently is under pressure from religious Shiite leaders to stop …taking serious measures in this respect,” said a source in the Front.

The same sources told Gulf News there is an Iraqi-American military plan to tackle the Mehdi Army, which attacks Sunni locations, carries out abductions, tortures and killing.

However, Al Maliki seems reluctant to implement the plan. Also, the contacts between the Iraqi Accordance Front and the Shiite coalition headed by Abdul Aziz Al Hakim has reached a dead end, after the Shiite coalition and Al Sadr refused to admit the responsibility of some of their members in killing tens of Iraqis daily.

“Al Maliki wants to conduct a political dialogue with the Al Sadr group. He wants to be backed by religious Shiite leaders to resolve the Mehdi dossier peacefully,” Abbas Al Bayati, a Member of Parliament, told Gulf News.

However, sources in Meshaan Al Jubouri’s group, a Sunni Member in Parliament, told Gulf News Al Maliki’s plans to rid the Ministry of Interior of Al Sadr elements is greatly criticised by religious leaders in Najaf and Karbala.

I have made the point that the degree to which the U.S. wins the war in Iraq is a linear function of the degree to which we disarm and muzzle both the Shia militia and their proximate leaders, Iran.

Rewind … repeat.  I say again.  If we do not disarm the Shia militias and muzzle Iran, we will lose the war.  Period.  No amount of reconstruction and good will can change this axiom.

Late Monday evening, September 25, 2006, I received the following e-mail from Michael Fumento:

I head out Tuesday, should be in the IZ by Saturday and probably will send out my first blog then. Then will catch first helo to Ramadi. Hooah!

Michael Fumento
www.fumento.com
Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute

Michael and I then exchanged some more pleasant e-mail, and I told him to say hello from a Marine father to the young warriors he meets in the al Anbar Province.

I have said Michael Fumento, in my opinion, is the closest thing we have to a contemporary version of Ernie Pyle.  Check out his blog from the al Anbar Province (or if you don’t, rest assured that I will remind you in my posts).

God bless Michael, the Marines, the Soldiers and all of our other boys under arms in al Anbar and in Iraq generally.  You fight.  We pray for your safety and victory.  All I can do is blog and pray, so that’s what I do.

Semper Fidelis.