Archive for the 'Marine Corps' Category

In the summer of 2005, fourteen Marines were tragically lost near Haditha while being transported in an Amphibious Assault Vehicle.  Soon after this event I had the opportunity to discuss it with a seasoned Marine Staff Sergeant, and I complained vigorously about the idea of running an Amphibious Assault Vehicle down a desert road in Iraq.  It lacked the armor for its mission, it wasn’t designed to do what was being demanded of it, and it is particularly susceptible to ordnance from the side (here is a picture of what this vehicle looked like after the IED attack).  The seasoned Sergeant waited patiently until I was finished and said, “Infantry belongs on foot, sir!”

The Strategy Page has an analysis of infantry, IEDs and travel on foot.

June 21, 2007:  Roadside bombs in Iraq now cause over 70 percent of the U.S. casualties. Moreover, most of the bomb casualties  now are combat troops, not the guys and gals who run the supply convoys up from Kuwait, and to dozens of bases in Iraq. Those routes are close watched and well patrolled. The danger comes when combat troops move into a n new area and have to patrol a lot of roads that are not closely watched for people setting up bombs. Not only are there more bombs to be encountered in these areas, but the troops naturally spend more time looking for them as they drive around on patrol. They should be looking for the bad guys and suspicious activity, but self-defense must come first.

To lower the bomb threat, many infantry commanders are resorting to an ancient practice; walking. This eliminates nearly all contact with roadside bombs. Troops can’t always accomplish their missions on foot, but many jobs can be done that way. If a raid is on a location a kilometer or so from the base, walking is no problem. Many such raids are usually carried out early in the morning, in order to take the suspects by surprise. Going in by foot in these situations is not a problem.

Another major activity, patrolling, is usually done in the vicinity of the base. You can see a lot more on foot, and have more opportunities to get information from the locals (who are increasingly willing to give it.) Even with all the heat, the troops appreciate the opportunity to amble about. Normally, the only work done on foot is frantic scrambling in combat, after dismounting from an armored vehicle. But whether the troops like to hike cross country or not, they all quickly come to appreciate the decline in roadside bomb casualties, or the anxiety that one may be just down the road.

This is the reason that Marines train to “hump” twenty miles at a time with full gear.  In an area the size of Fallujah, there isn’t any reason that foot transport cannot carry them from one side of the city to the other (and even South into the Euphrates River valley area).  Of course, heavy battlefield weight becomes a significant concern, an issue we have discussed in Body Armor Wars: The Way Forward, and Body Armor Goes Political.  Battlefield weight must be reduced, an important aim of next generation technology for the warrior.

**** UPDATE ****

A few hours after I published this article, the L.A. Times published an extensive article on EFPs, walking and infantry.

U.S. troops working the streets of the capital fear one Iraqi weapon more than others — a copper-plated explosive that can penetrate armor and has proved devastating to Humvees and even capable of severely damaging tanks.

The power of what the military calls an EFP — for explosively formed penetrator, or projectile — to spray molten metal balls that punch through the armor on vehicles has some American troops rethinking their tactics. They are asking whether the U.S. should give up its reliance on making constant improvements to vehicle defenses.

Instead, these troops think, it is time to leave the armor behind — and get out and walk.

“In our area, the biggest threat for us is EFPs. When you are in the vehicles, you are a big target,” said Army Staff Sgt. Cavin Moskwa, 33, of Hawaii, who patrols Baghdad’s Zafraniya neighborhood with the Bravo Battery of the 2nd Battalion, 17th Field Artillery Regiment. “But when you are dismounted … you are a lot safer.”

In the last three days, 15 U.S. troops have been killed in Iraq, nine of them in two powerful roadside bomb blasts. The military does not publicly identify the kind of weapon used in improvised explosive attacks, but the deadly nature of the blasts Wednesday and Thursday suggested that EFPs may have been used.

Read the entire article by the L.A. Times.

The United States Marine Corps is having gear and equipment problems, but the problems are not just with the gear and equipment.

Richard Lardner
Associated Press
Washington – The system for delivering badly needed gear to Marines in Iraq has failed to meet many urgent requests from troops in the field, according to an internal document obtained by the Associated Press.

Of more than 100 requests from deployed Marine units between February 2006 and February 2007, less than 10 percent have been fulfilled, the document says. It blamed the bureaucracy and a “risk-averse” approach by acquisition officials.

Among the items held up were a mine-resistant vehicle and a hand-held laser system.

“Process worship cripples operating forces,” according to the document. “Civilian middle management lacks technical and operational currency.”

The 32-page document – labeled “For Official Use Only” – was prepared by the staff of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force after they returned from Iraq in February.

The document was to be presented in March to senior officials in the Pentagon’s defense research and engineering office. The presentation was canceled by Marine Corps leaders because its contents were deemed too contentious, according to a defense official familiar with the document. The official spoke on condition of anonymity …

The document lists 24 examples of equipment urgently needed by Marines in Iraq’s Anbar province. One, the mine-resistant ambush-protected vehicle, has received attention as a promising way to protect troops from roadside blasts, the leading killer of U.S. forces in Iraq.

After receiving a February 2005 urgent request approved by Maj. Gen. Dennis Hejlik – who was a commander in Iraq from June 2004 to February 2005 – for nearly 1,200 of the vehicles, the Marine Corps instead purchased improved versions of the ubiquitous Humvee.

The industrial capacity did not exist to quickly build the new mine-resistant vehicles, and the more heavily armored Humvees were viewed as a suitable solution, Marine Corps officials said.

That proved not to be the case as insurgent elements in Iraq developed more powerful bombs that could penetrate the Humvees. The mine-resistant vehicles are now a top priority for all the military branches, which plan to buy 7,774 of the carriers at a cost of $8.4 billion …

A second example cited is the compact high-power laser dazzler, an inexpensive, nonlethal tool for steering unwelcome vehicles away from U.S. checkpoints in Iraq.

The dazzler emits a powerful stream of green light that stops or redirects oncoming traffic by temporarily impairing the driver’s vision.

In June 2005, Marines stationed in western Iraq filed an urgent request for several hundred of the dazzlers, which are built by LE Systems, a small company in Hartford, Conn. The request was repeated nearly a year later.

“Timely purchase and employment of all systems bureaucratically stymied,” the document states.

But the Corps didn’t stop with failing to provide the necessary equipment.  The next step was to prohibit the direct commercial procurement of the equipment by the Marines who needed it.

Separate documents indicate the deployed Marines became so frustrated at the delays they bypassed normal acquisition procedures and used money from their own budget to buy 28 of the dazzlers directly from LE Systems.

But because the lasers had not passed a safety review process, authorities in the United State (sic) barred the Marines from using them.

In January, nearly 18 months after the first request, the Marines received a less powerful laser built by a different company.

Titus Casazza, president of LE Systems, criticized the Marine Corps acquisition process.

“The bureaucrats and lab rats sitting behind a desk stateside are making decisions on what will be given to our soldiers even if contrary to the specific requests of these soldiers and their commanding generals,” he said.

The stipulation to deploy and use only government-issued gear and equipment has been codified in a recent Marine Administrative Order, MARADMIN 262/07.

1.  THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS DIRECTS THE FOLLOWING POLICY FOR MARINES AND SAILORS ASSIGNED TO USMC AND JOINT COMMANDS, ON THE WEAR AND PURCHASE OF BODY ARMOR AND PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT (PPE).  PPE REFERS TO PROTECTIVE BODY ARMOR, HELMETS, GOGGLES, CLOTHING, AND OTHER GEAR DESIGNED TO PROTECT THE WEARER’S BODY FROM BATTLEFIELD INJURIES.  PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT INCLUDES, BUT IS NOT LIMITED TO, THE FOLLOWING ITEMS: OUTER TACTICAL VEST, MODULAR TACTICAL VEST, LIGHTWEIGHT HELMET, FULL-SPECTRUM BATTLE EQUIPMENT, MILITARY EYE PROTECTION SYSTEMS (ESS ICE SPECTACLES / ESS PROFILE NVG GOGGLES), ENHANCED SMALL ARMS PROTECTIVE INSERT PLATES, SIDE SMALL ARMS PROTECTIVE INSERT PLATES, BALLISTIC PLATE CARRIER, QUAD GUARD, FLAME RESISTANT ORGANIZATIONAL GEAR AND COMBAT ARMS EARPLUGS …
2.  MARINES/SAILORS DEPLOYED TO COMBAT ZONES WILL BE ISSUED MARINE CORPS APPROVED PPE, INCLUDING MODULAR BODY ARMOR SETS.
5. INDIVIDUAL MARINES/SAILORS MAY NOT USE COMMERCIAL PPE IN LIEU OF GOVERNMENT TESTED, APPROVED AND ISSUED PPE.  COMMANDERS MAY AUTHORIZE MEMBERS OF THEIR COMMANDS TO USE COMMERCIALLY PURCHASED PPE ITEMS IN ADDITION TO THOSE ISSUED BY THE GOVERNMENT, AS LONG AS ADDITIONS DO NOT INTERFERE WITH THE FUNCTIONALITY OF APPROVED PPE.  INDIVIDUALLY PURCHASED COMMERCIAL PPE WILL NOT BE REIMBURSABLE BY COMMAND/UNIT (GOVERNMENT) FUNDS.

In fact, the much heralded Modular Tactical Vest, which was promised early in 2007, has yet to be deployed (the commercial version of the MTV is the Spartan 2 Assault Vest, which in form, fit and function, is exactly equivalent to the MTV).  This order prohibits the so-called Dragon Skin body armor, a prohibition which is probably permanent unless and until the manufacturer’s price comes down, the test protocol for the vest is clarified and a purchase order issued by the DoD.  What isn’t clear is whether this MARADMIN prohibits Marines from purchasing and using the Spartan 2.  Having put on both the IBA (Interceptor) and the Spartan 2, I can attest to the fact that the Spartan 2 (or MTV) lives up to its billing.

However, what is clear is that if the Marines would get control of the gear and equipment problems within its ranks, administrative orders such as this one would not have to be issued.  The mere existence of the order tells the story of the gear problems in the Corps.  The Marines have always been on the short end of the stick when it comes to their share of the DoD budget.  Reasons for this include the fact that they feel (with good cause) that if their share increases, along with the money will come political pressures and other meddling from which they are currently somewhat more insulated.  Of course, at the much more personal level, there are fundamental issues of fairness to be addressed that have nothing to do with the Marine’s share of the pie.  Why shouldn’t Marines be allowed to purchase and use commercially-available ballistic glasses if they meet or exceed military specifications?

But in terms of the supply and logistics bureaucracy, there is simply no excuse for failure to provide badly needed gear and equipment to the front.  Request for gear is not tantamount to griping and complaining, and critical reports to field grade officers or logistics higher-ups in the states is not the same thing as insubordination.  A more professional and open-minded approach is needed by those who should already be behaving that way.

So this is how it all ends?  Boot Camp at Parris Island, leading to School of Infantry, leading to the fleet and all of the ranges and training, leading to … Iraq.

It is hard even to know how to begin to express my feelings.  My usually quick hand taps the keyboard in boredom and listlessness as I try to write this post.  My mind, usually capable of handling Alvin Plantinga and Paul Helm, darts from one disconnected thought to another, and my prayers have become literally childlike-simple, even utterances and mumblings and repitition.  Sleep comes very hard these days.  When trying to figure out how we felt, the only thing to which my wife and I could make a comparison with the deployment of our son was a recent death in the family.  The fatigue, the sickness on the stomach, the sadness; deploying him has been like enduring a death in the family.

The mere thought of silly and trite television viewing makes be sick, and I want more than anything else information about the war.  Not the biased and leftist information from the main stream media, nor the cheerleading sis-boom-bah reporting from the conservative web sites.  No, I want the truth … and frankly, I think I am entitled to it.

I have followed Operation Iraqi Freedom for a while, writing as often as I could to express both agreements and disagreements, make observations, and give my readers an alternative view of the things that are transpiring in Iraq.  In the time I have been writing I have had to learn about counterinsurgency, MOUT, snipers, EFPs, body armor, rules of engagement, nonkinetic operations, squad rushes and room clearing tactics, Iraqi geography and the differences between Sunni and Shi’a.  I have jettisoned my reading list and picked up the Small Wars Manual and the recently published Counterinsurgency Manual.  My favorite e-mails are from people discussing military matters – because nothing else much matters at the moment.

It is hard to know where to go from here.  I spend much time in prayer and some time in fasting.  But writing?  It has been too difficult, and I have not posted in some time.  I recall the counsel that Donald Sensing gives concerning writing on a web log: do it mainly for yourself.  If others benefit from your journal, then so much the better.  I suppose I will keep doing this, albeit at a slower pace.  My wife and daughter think I am driving myself crazy with my study of the war.  My other son Joshua thinks that if I don’t study and write I will drive myself crazy.  Perhaps they are all wrong and I am already crazy.  In the end, my son deserves to be mentioned in my journal, so as hard as it was to send him off, here it goes.

We showed up in Jacksonville, N.C., on Saturday morning to begin our last visit with Daniel before he deployed.  It was good to be with him.  Not good in the usual sense of the word.  Our words flow too quickly and without serious thought when we aren’t under duress.  No, it was really good to be with him.  The visiting actually started the weekend before when we met him at the beach, family and friends, to spend quality time together.

This time it was different than previous visits.  The stress was gone, and the preparations for what was going to happen were completed.  There was only the here and now, the time to sit at the beach and talk and play football, the opportunity to grill steaks and enjoy meals together.

But the weekend we saw him off things moved apace.  Backpacks and sea bags were packed, geared was stowed away, and weapons were checked out of the armory.  He and I did manage to slip in a movie, and along with a Corporal in his unit who stayed with his family, Daniel stayed with us in the hotel the night before he deployed.  Again, it was good to be with him.  We kept his truck, and getting up at 0430 hours to get him back to Camp Lejeune wasn’t exactly in the plan, but I adapted with the help of some caffeine.

When my wife and I went back later in the morning to the parking lot between the barracks and the New River, we arrived to a mountain of backpacks and sea bags, M16s, SAWs, cars and families seeing their sons or husbands off.  Daniel tailgated with us for a while, and we got in another meal with him at our car.  Pictures were taken, families huddled up, and hugs were frequent in the parking lot that day.  A truck showed up, and backpacks and sea bags quickly made their way via a chain of Marines to be loaded up.  Contrary to the predictions, the busses arrived as scheduled.

Seeing them get on the bus was the hardest part.  My wife cried, and as I turned to look at the mother of the Corporal who stayed in the hotel with us the previous night, she was crying as well.  [This was the Corporal’s third combat tour.  Note to self concerning subsequent deployments: this doesn’t get any easier.]  Wives were distraught, but the men were jacked up and ready to go.  The busses rolled out soon after arrival, and then it was over.

The long drive home was lonely.  The exhaustion and preoccupation the remainder of the week was debilitating, and remains so to some degree.  I guess I expected much of this.  What I really didn’t expect was the reaction of some people to my son’s deployment.  Perhaps I should have known.  I recall a fellow marine parent from Connecticut wrote me once and expressed surprise at the reaction of his ‘friends’ to his son’s deployment.  In Connecticut, he said, many people saw the war as criminal adventurism, and he and his wife literally lost friends due to his son’s involvement in the war.  My son Josh made an insightful observation about this, responding to me that this father didn’t really lose friends; he weeded out the worthless.

With us it hasn’t taken on quite as draconian a form as that.  It is more subtle.  At first my wife wondered why those strange people were giving her those strange looks and gestures, until she saw what they were looking at when they did those things: her USMC car tags and stickers – things that Daniel calls moto-gear (motivational stuff that he wouldn’t be caught dead sporting … his only moto-gear is a USMC tattoo in Old English down the back of his left arm).

But there is an even more subtle form of disrespect that has become apparent to us.  Ignoring us, our son’s service, and the cost to our family.  To be sure, some people at work mention it and tell me they’re praying for his safety.  Some people at church do as well.  Were it not for our small group fellowship at church, we probably couldn’t make it.  But for those long time ‘friends’ at work and (yes, even at) church who, after hearing us mention our son, fail even to say a word, much less say they will pray for us, it causes me to wonder how I could have ever considered those people friends.  How odd this seems to me.  How could my discernment have been so poor?

Now there is only the waiting, and hoping that a fateful phone call or visit doesn’t happen.  It is the not knowing and not hearing that makes this so hard.  All we can do is pray, write to him and pray some more. And lean on our true friends.  I would go to Iraq in a heartbeat to write and report, but don’t even know how to make such a thing happen.  For the time being, my body is at work every day, but my heart is in a place I’ve never been.  Iraq.

Just before the busses arrived, a pile of sea bags in the background, SAW in hand.

[Note: Nothing related to operational security has ever been or will ever be divulged on this web site.]

USMC Community: A Support Community for Marine Corps Family and Friends

Seeing our son off to Mohave Viper yesterday for 30 days of training (here is another good description), and waiting for him to get a “medium-reg” haircut in the Semper Fi barber shop in Jacksonville, N.C., this caught my eye hanging on the wall.  I thought I would share it with you.

A dead soldier who has given his life because of the failure of his leader is a dreadful sight before God.  Like all dead soldiers, he was tired before he died and undoubtedly dirty.  And possibly, frightened to his soul — and there on top of all of that, never again to see his homeland.

Don’t be the leader who failed to instruct him properly, or who failed to lead him well.  Burn the midnight oil, that you may not in later years look at your own hands and find his blood still red upon them.

Many things can cause the diminution of a military.  During and after Vietnam it was the drug culture, political upheaval, and changes in core value systems in the family and society.  In measure, this was addressed by General Alfred Gray, the 29th Commandant of the Marine Corps, whom I hold in iconic status.  General Gray brought back the warrior ethos to the Marine Corps after the Vietnam era.  I requested that General Gray send my son an autographed picture of him as a boot camp graduation gift.  He kindly obliged with a picture of himself in cammies, autographed and with a nice note congratulating my son on becoming a “warrior.”  It is framed and hanging on our wall at home.  It is of note that he signed the photograph “General Al Gray, Marine.”

No pretentions, just “Marine.”

There are other dangers for our military, due in no small part to the military-industrial complex.  There is a very sobering piece entitled “Regression,” by William Lind.  In part he says:

When I was in Israel several years ago, I said to my host, a retired Israeli general with several interesting books to his credit, that I thought the IDF had begun to regress to the Second Generation after the 1973 war. He told me I was wrong; the regression had begun after the war in 1967.

The question of how it happened, and why maintaining the culture of a Third Generation military is so difficult even for armed services that have attained it—the Royal Navy lost it after the Napoleonic Wars, for reasons brilliantly set forth in Andrew Gordon’s The Rules of the Game, and the German Army lost it when the Bundeswehr was created, for political reasons—is of interest far beyond Israel. A number of Israelis have traced it in their case to the development of a large weapons R&D and procurement establishment, and I think there is a lot to that argument.

The virtues required in military officers involved in weapons development and procurement are the virtues of the bureaucrat: careful, even obsessive attention to process; avoiding risky decisions, and whenever possible making decisions by committee; avoiding responsibility; careerism, because success is measured by career progression; and generally shining up the handle on the big front door. Time is not very important, while dotting every i and crossing every t is vital, since at some point the auditors will be coming, and the politicians and the press will be waiting eagerly for their reports. Remunerative careers in the defense industry await those officers who know how to go along to get along. While the Israeli defense industry has produced some remarkably good products, such as the Merkava tank, getting the program funded still tends to be more important than making sure the weapon will work in combat. As time goes on, efficiency tends to become more important than effectiveness; not surprisingly, the simpler and more effective Israeli weapon systems came earlier, and more recent ones tend to reflect the American tendency toward complex and expensive ineffectiveness.

The Israeli inquiry into the Lebanon fiasco is unlikely to address this issue for the same reason it is not addressed in the United States: too much money is at stake. The R&D and procurement tail now wags the combat arms dog. Nor is the question of how to reverse the process and restore the virtues a Third Generation military requires in its officers an easy one. Those virtues—eagerness to make decisions and take responsibility, boldness, broad-mindedness and a spirit of intellectual inquiry, contempt for careerism and careerists—are not wanted in Second Generation militaries, and officers who demonstrate them are usually weeded out early. A Third Generation culture is difficult to maintain, and even more—impossible perhaps?—to restore once lost.

Yet, as I have said many times in these columns, a Second Generation military, no matter how lavishly resourced, has no chance against Fourth Generation opponents. In this conundrum lies the fate of the state of Israel, and the fate of states everywhere.

I am quick to speak out on the need for advancements in technology when it comports with troop protection and effectiveness, and when the technology is something other than R&D adventurism.  I posted on “Thermobaric Weapons and Body Armor,” and I posted here and here on proper funding of the Marine Corps.  But if you’ll notice about these posts, the equipment, if successful, would redound directly to increased safety for troops and effectiveness of our forces.  And … immediately so.

There is a darker side of the military establishment.  This side nurtures careerism, avoidance of responsibility, networking, and bowing to political pressures.  May I speak for the grunt for a minute?  When the grunts see this, they always judge it for what it is, and they immediately lose all respect for those who behave this way.  This loss of respect is irrevocable.

The most technologically advanced equipment is no replacement for well-trained, well-led and motivated troops.  To be frank, for those who have their career as the premier concern, they should just step aside and save their reports the trouble of cleaning up their mess and suffering the consequences of their careerism.  For the military-industrial complex, I have more harsh words for you.  If you are selling inferior products to the military, doctoring or embellishing data just to make a sale when you know that some other product is better suited to the mission, or in any way endangering our boys at arms in order to make a buck, you may be able to keep up the pretensions before men, but God sees things that take place in secret.  He knows the thoughts and intentions of the heart, and there will be a day of reckoning.  That will be an awful day for you.

I was dropping my son off at Camp Lejeune the day after labor day, and I saw Daniel’s eyes light up, as he said “Awesome.  Big flag today!”  He proceeded to inform me of the size of the flag and to mark the days that they flew that size flag.  He then said something rather stunning to me.  He said, “There are no more patriots.”  I rode the rest of the way to his barracks in silence.  He got out of the car, hugged me tightly, and said, “I love you dad.”  I have noticed that things that a boy wouldn’t otherwise do when he is a teen or in his early 20’s, Daniel has no problem doing, even around other Marines.  Somehow, the things that the Marine Corps instills and teaches makes them into something different than they were before.  They have a certain confidence that seems unshakable.

As I drove away from the base, I thought, “I know at least one patriot who is left.  And, I’ll bet that there are more than 2500 more who have perished in Iraq.”

With boys like these, we may just be okay.

On the heels of the report by the Center for American Progress that I posted on (Marine Corps Equipment & Dollars), we see this from North County Times:

The chairman of the House Armed Service Committee said Wednesday there has been no shortfall in money for Marine Corps combat-readiness and equipment needs as was suggested in new report from the liberal Washington think tank, the Center for American Progress.

U.S. Rep. Duncan Hunter, R-El Cajon, said the Marine Corps and the Army are getting all the money the two service branches need and have asked for to repair and replace aging equipment and aircraft. 

“We are funding every dime that the Marine Corps and Army have identified as being needed and we are adding more money than they have asked for,” Hunter said in a telephone interview before a press conference he conducted on the subject in San Diego.

The think tank’s report, released Wednesday, said the Marine Corps had lost 3,500 pieces of ground equipment and 27 helicopters in Iraq since the U.S. invasion in March 2003.

The report said that providing the service with the ground and aviation equipment and restoring those elements to their pre-war level will cost $12 billion as well as an additional $5 billion for each year the U.S. remains in Iraq.

“Because Marine Corps equipment needs have been neglected in the past and the Iraq campaign has proved more protracted than anticipated, stresses are beginning to appear in the service’s capacity to supply its troops with the best war-fighting tools available,” said Larry Korb, co-author of the report and a senior fellow at the center, which bills itself as a nonpartisan research and educational institute.

The report says that war planners did not anticipate a lengthy stay in Iraq, nor the losses of equipment incurred in combat actions.

“Like the strain on its personnel, the Marines’ inventory of equipment exhibits increasing signs of wear and tear,” the report says. “This stress is already eroding the readiness of units outside Iraq and could eventually impede operations within Iraq.”

Hunter said that during classified and public hearings with Marine and Army officials before the House Armed Services Committee earlier this year, the services told lawmakers of their specific equipment needs.

Of the $11.7 billion the Marine Corps said in January that it needed, Congress responded a short time later by allocating $5.1 billion. The remainder of that money and some additional funds is in a 2007 defense appropriations bill now in negotiations between the House and Senate, with resolution expected soon, Hunter said.

In addition, Hunter said he and Senate Armed Service Committee Chairman John Warner, R-Va., have agreed to add $20 billion to an existing $50 billion “bridge” fund established two years ago for the services to draw from to meet immediate equipment needs, the congressman said.

“We have made sure that we won’t run short of the money for equipment that is needed in the war-fighting theater,” Hunter said, adding that funding bills are continually being adjusted as new needs arise.

Similar steps have been taken to assure that the Army has all the money it needs to maintain and replace equipment, Hunter said.

“While the priorities of our military are numerous and constantly changing to meet the challenges of the war on terror, we will continue responding without hesitation to the most immediate needs of the war fighter,” Hunter said.

In an interview with the North County Times on Monday, Lt. Gen. James N. Mattis, the new commanding general at Camp Pendleton, said he is confident that Congress will appropriate the money needed for new armored personnel carriers, aircraft and other major components used to move and protect Marine forces.

“We have to keep pace because this is going to be a long fight,” Mattis said.

Psssst … listen a minute.  Here’s how it works.  The Marines are a little bit scared (well, scared might be the wrong work to use about a Marine).  They are (rightfully) concerned that if you give them more money, then you might just go messin’ with their stuff, meddling in their affairs, and picking apart what they do and how they do it.  After all, Washington has a history in these things, do they not?

Representative Hunter, if you and your colleagues will promise to be wise and circumspect about what you ask them about what they do and how and why they do it, and promise not to meddle too much in their affairs, the Marines would likely be a little more forthcoming to you about what their true needs are.  Just don’t get too nosey.  The Marines don’t like it, and for good reason.

I am sure that the brass could tell you stories until you were tired about their aircraft, troop transports, other aging equipment, and the need to increase salaries (go take a look at the pathetic salaries in the E1, E2 and E3 ranks).  I will leave the heavy lifting to the brass.  Let me mention one thing to you.  Body armor.

I posted some time back on “Heavy Battlefield Weight,” in which I cited reports that showed that the heavy body armor weight not only decreased agility in combat, but was so heavy that some Marines were actually opting to leave it behind when they went into combat in Iraq.

I also posted on “Thermobaric Weapons and Body Armor,” in which it was shown that more research is needed to design lightweight, state-of-the-art body armor that is effective not only against ballistics, but air-fuel weapons as well.

If the brass didn’t tell you these things, then they weren’t being completely forthcoming.

So I told you.

There.  That wasn’t so hard, was it?

The Center for American Progress has this study in “Marine Corps Equipment After Iraq:”

The United States has understandably focused on the tremendous human costs of the war in Iraq, yet there are other costs that must be addressed as well. Earlier this year the Center for American Progress and the Lexington Institute compiled a report examining the impact of the war in Iraq on Army equipment. This report does the same for the Marine Corps, the other service that has borne the brunt of the occupation.

Over the past three years the Marine Corps has maintained 40 percent of its ground equipment, 50 percent of its communications equipment, and 20 percent of its aviation assets in Iraq. This equipment is used at as much as nine times its planned rate, abused by a harsh environment, and depleted due to losses in combat. To maintain acceptable readiness levels, the Marines have been taking equipment from non-deployed units and drawing down Maritime Prepositioned stocks, including equipment stored in Europe, thus limiting their ability to respond to contingencies outside of Iraq.

Resetting and recovering the force will be expensive. The cost of restoring the Marines’ ground and aviation equipment to its pre-Iraq level, as of the summer of 2006, will require $12 billion plus an additional $5 billion for each year the Marines remain in Iraq.

Recovery will also not be easy. The Marine Corps, like the Army, must incorporate the lessons of Iraq into its future procurement plans while upgrading its forces. The Marines may prefer expeditionary operations to acting as an occupying force, but urban counter-insurgency and peacekeeping operations will more likely be the rule rather than the exception in the future.

Read all of the report at the link I supplied above, including near term and long term recommendations.  I have a few observations of my own to make.

First observation: I believe that we should more radically re-evaluate our deployments around the globe than even Rumsfeld has advocated.  Our NATO presence should be reduced, our bases in Germany should be cut or closed altogether, and our forces moved to the locales in the world where they need to be in order to engage in this 25-year war on radical Islamic facism that we are just now beginning.  Look folks: the cold war is over, and we need to deal with it immediately and radically, not as if we are slow and stolid and dense.  So it doesn’t bother me too much that we are depleting the equipment that would otherwise be used in Europe, for example.  But I seriously doubt that this comprises a large portion of the deployed equipment or Marines, so this might be a moot point.  Either way, Europe is the last thing that should be on our minds right now.

Second, as you might be able to tell from my posts, there are things that I wish I could tell you about Marine training and indoctrination, but cannot because it would get my son into trouble.  They are very clear that the men are not supposed to speak to those outside the “family” of Marines about what they experience.  I have suggested two books in my earlier post: “Making the Corps” and “Into the Crucible.”  I would also suggest a movie: Full Metal Jacket, a sort of cult classic (my son Daniel recommends it).  Note: Get the movie and watch it, but don’t believe everything you read in the Wikipedia link I gave you just now.  Full Metal Jacket begins to tell you what boot camp is like, but still doesn’t do the job.  It just doesn’t.

I have given you hints with the 20 mile humps with 40 lbm of body armor and 100 lbm backpacks, trying to sleep with artillery shooting, pulling leeches off of each other after waking, going two or more days without eating or sleeping, etc., etc.  But these are still just hints.  How the Marines make emotionally, physically and mentally hard men is a story that has not really been told yet, and will not be told by me.  The secrets of Parris Island are haunting and will remain with the boys who have been there.  As one who has only heard these stories, I cannot tell them with honesty.  I think its one of those things where you had to be there.

Where am I going with this?  Just this.  American wants the Marines.  American needs the Marines.  Just trust me on this.  So the thought of a funding cut (or even failure to grant a funding increase) is just not on the radar screen.  Note to Congress: Grant the Corps what they request.  They will request less than they actually need.  That’s the way they are.

Third: The saying goes “The Marines go in first, the Army gets all the equipment and gets to clean up.”  I know, I know, the Marines relish austere conditions, hardship, going without, and having less than you need.  And I know, one reason for this is the feeling that if you actually get funded, you might have to compromise your standards and become like … well, someone or something else.  You need to get past this … sort of.

Listen.  You are the President’s own, you do battle when he says so, and sometimes without the approval of much of the American people or Congress, into strange lands and without clear mandates or charges.  You are accustomed to murky goals and hard conditions, and you have to train your people that way.  But … you need to play the politics of funding in order to get the equipment you need to do the job, right up to the point of compromising and becoming politically correct.

This you will not do.  I know.  But more funding is the order of the day.  You deserve a larger portion of the pie, and unless you are willing to step forward and say so, you will continue to go without, to the detriment of your boys and your mission.

The Center for American Progress has this study in “Marine Corps Equipment After Iraq:”

The United States has understandably focused on the tremendous human costs of the war in Iraq, yet there are other costs that must be addressed as well. Earlier this year the Center for American Progress and the Lexington Institute compiled a report examining the impact of the war in Iraq on Army equipment. This report does the same for the Marine Corps, the other service that has borne the brunt of the occupation.

Over the past three years the Marine Corps has maintained 40 percent of its ground equipment, 50 percent of its communications equipment, and 20 percent of its aviation assets in Iraq. This equipment is used at as much as nine times its planned rate, abused by a harsh environment, and depleted due to losses in combat. To maintain acceptable readiness levels, the Marines have been taking equipment from non-deployed units and drawing down Maritime Prepositioned stocks, including equipment stored in Europe, thus limiting their ability to respond to contingencies outside of Iraq.

Resetting and recovering the force will be expensive. The cost of restoring the Marines’ ground and aviation equipment to its pre-Iraq level, as of the summer of 2006, will require $12 billion plus an additional $5 billion for each year the Marines remain in Iraq.

Recovery will also not be easy. The Marine Corps, like the Army, must incorporate the lessons of Iraq into its future procurement plans while upgrading its forces. The Marines may prefer expeditionary operations to acting as an occupying force, but urban counter-insurgency and peacekeeping operations will more likely be the rule rather than the exception in the future.

Read all of the report at the link I supplied above, including near term and long term recommendations.  I have a few observations of my own to make.

First observation: I believe that we should more radically re-evaluate our deployments around the globe than even Rumsfeld has advocated.  Our NATO presence should be reduced, our bases in Germany should be cut or closed altogether, and our forces moved to the locales in the world where they need to be in order to engage in this 25-year war on radical Islamic facism that we are just now beginning.  Look folks: the cold war is over, and we need to deal with it immediately and radically, not as if we are slow and stolid and dense.  So it doesn’t bother me too much that we are depleting the equipment that would otherwise be used in Europe, for example.  But I seriously doubt that this comprises a large portion of the deployed equipment or Marines, so this might be a moot point.  Either way, Europe is the last thing that should be on our minds right now.

Second, as you might be able to tell from my posts, there are things that I wish I could tell you about Marine training and indoctrination, but cannot because it would get my son into trouble.  They are very clear that the men are not supposed to speak to those outside the “family” of Marines about what they experience.  I have suggested two books in my earlier post: “Making the Corps” and “Into the Crucible.”  I would also suggest a movie: Full Metal Jacket, a sort of cult classic (my son Daniel recommends it).  Note: Get the movie and watch it, but don’t believe everything you read in the Wikipedia link I gave you just now.  Full Metal Jacket begins to tell you what boot camp is like, but still doesn’t do the job.  It just doesn’t.

I have given you hints with the 20 mile humps with 40 lbm of body armor and 100 lbm backpacks, trying to sleep with artillery shooting, pulling leeches off of each other after waking, going two or more days without eating or sleeping, etc., etc.  But these are still just hints.  How the Marines make emotionally, physically and mentally hard men is a story that has not really been told yet, and will not be told by me.  The secrets of Parris Island are haunting and will remain with the boys who have been there.  As one who has only heard these stories, I cannot tell them with honesty.  I think its one of those things where you had to be there.

Where am I going with this?  Just this.  American wants the Marines.  American needs the Marines.  Just trust me on this.  So the thought of a funding cut (or even failure to grant a funding increase) is just not on the radar screen.  Note to Congress: Grant the Corps what they request.  They will request less than they actually need.  That’s the way they are.

Third: The saying goes “The Marines go in first, the Army gets all the equipment and gets to clean up.”  I know, I know, the Marines relish austere conditions, hardship, going without, and having less than you need.  And I know, one reason for this is the feeling that if you actually get funded, you might have to compromise your standards and become like … well, someone or something else.  You need to get past this … sort of.

Listen.  You are the President’s own, you do battle when he says so, and sometimes without the approval of much of the American people or Congress, into strange lands and without clear mandates or charges.  You are accustomed to murky goals and hard conditions, and you have to train your people that way.  But … you need to play the politics of funding in order to get the equipment you need to do the job, right up to the point of compromising and becoming politically correct.

This you will not do.  I know.  But more funding is the order of the day.  You deserve a larger portion of the pie, and unless you are willing to step forward and say so, you will continue to go without, to the detriment of your boys and your mission.

From deseretnews.com, another example of Marines fighting for truth, justice and the American way:

A man who had just been released from jail was sent right back Monday after police say he picked the wrong store to attempt a robbery. 

The 30-year-old man was in line at a 7-Eleven, 2175 E. 9400 South, just before 8 p.m. When he got to the counter he asked the female clerk for a carton of cigarettes, said Sandy Police Sgt. Victor Quezada. But after he received them he walked out without paying, Quezada said.

The clerk told another female clerk who followed him outside the doors and told him to stop.

Instead, the man turned around and punched the clerk in the face, Quezada said.

James Sjostrom was standing in line right behind the man who took the cigarettes and saw the entire thing unfold.

“He just turned and clocked her,” Sjostrom said. “He pounded her face. It was pretty vicious.”

That’s when Sjostrom went after the man who assaulted the store clerk.

As he went outside, Sjostrom said he saw the man standing over the clerk, who was kneeling over on the ground, as if he were going to punch her again. When the man saw Sjostrom coming at him, he took a swing at him, too.

But the attacker quickly found out he was no match for the bulky Sjostrom.

Sjostrom is a former Marine who taught hand-to-hand combat and currently teaches a course on Russian kettlebells, or the martial art of strength training, at the Sports Mall in Murray.

“I grabbed him, threw him on the ground, put his hands behind his back, sat on him and waited for the cops to come,” Sjostrom said.

In just a matter of a few seconds Sjostrom had the man pinned. When the man realized he had no chance, Sjostrom said he became “pretty quiet.”

“Anybody would have done the same thing,” he said. “Another guy in the store said he was in the Army and asked if I needed any help.”

With a grin, Sjostrom replied to the man, “The Marines got here first.”

This isn’t the first, and will not be the last time that a Marine defends himself or others.