Archive for the 'Nuclear' Category

The Guardian brings us a report on the coming summer war with Iran, intended to peak just prior to the report by General David Petraeus to congress in September.

Iran is secretly forging ties with al-Qaida elements and Sunni Arab militias in Iraq in preparation for a summer showdown with coalition forces intended to tip a wavering US Congress into voting for full military withdrawal, US officials say.

“Iran is fighting a proxy war in Iraq and it’s a very dangerous course for them to be following. They are already committing daily acts of war against US and British forces,” a senior US official in Baghdad warned. “They [Iran] are behind a lot of high-profile attacks meant to undermine US will and British will, such as the rocket attacks on Basra palace and the Green Zone [in Baghdad]. The attacks are directed by the Revolutionary Guard who are connected right to the top [of the Iranian government].”

The official said US commanders were bracing for a nationwide, Iranian-orchestrated summer offensive, linking al-Qaida and Sunni insurgents to Tehran’s Shia militia allies, that Iran hoped would trigger a political mutiny in Washington and a US retreat. “We expect that al-Qaida and Iran will both attempt to increase the propaganda and increase the violence prior to Petraeus’s report in September [when the US commander General David Petraeus will report to Congress on President George Bush’s controversial, six-month security “surge” of 30,000 troop reinforcements],” the official said.

“Certainly it [the violence] is going to pick up from their side. There is significant latent capability in Iraq, especially Iranian-sponsored capability. They can turn it up whenever they want. You can see that from the pre-positioning that’s been going on and the huge stockpiles of Iranian weapons that we’ve turned up in the last couple of months. The relationships between Iran and groups like al-Qaida are very fluid,” the official said.

“It often comes down to individuals, and people constantly move around. For instance, the Sunni Arab so-called resistance groups use Salafi jihadist ideology for their own purposes. But the whole Iran- al-Qaida linkup is very sinister.”

Iran has maintained close links to Iraq’s Shia political parties and militias but has previously eschewed collaboration with al-Qaida and Sunni insurgents.

US officials now say they have firm evidence that Tehran has switched tack as it senses a chance of victory in Iraq. In a parallel development, they say they also have proof that Iran has reversed its previous policy in Afghanistan and is now supporting and supplying the Taliban’s campaign against US, British and other Nato forces.

Tehran’s strategy to discredit the US surge and foment a decisive congressional revolt against Mr Bush is national in scope and not confined to the Shia south, its traditional sphere of influence, the senior official in Baghdad said. It included stepped-up coordination with Shia militias such as Moqtada al-Sadr’s Jaish al-Mahdi as well as Syrian-backed Sunni Arab groups and al-Qaida in Mesopotamia, he added. Iran was also expanding contacts across the board with paramilitary forces and political groups, including Kurdish parties such as the PUK, a US ally.

“Their strategy takes into account all these various parties. Iran is playing all these different factions to maximise its future control and maximise US and British difficulties. Their co-conspirator is Syria which is allowing the takfirists [fundamentalist Salafi jihadis] to come across the border,” the official said.

Of course, there are longer term issues to deal with regarding Iran’s nuclear program.  In fact, it appears that the erstwhile problems with Uranium enrichment might not be as insurmountable for Iran as previously thought.

One year from now, Iran could possess the means of producing a nuclear bomb – that was the chilling message delivered by Ambassador Dore Gold during an interview with Ynetnews Tuesday.

Gold, who has written numerous books on the Middle East, is President of the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs (JCPA), and has served as Israel’s ambassador to the United Nations.

He was responding to a statement released Tuesday morning by the International Atomic Energy’s Director (IAEA), Mohamed El-Baradei, who said Iran had made massive progress in creating uranium enrichment centrifuges, so much so the world should consider it a ‘fact that Iran can enrich uranium independently.

Gold said the information revealed by El-Baradei undercut previous estimates of when Iran could weaponize its nuclear process …

“If all Iran wanted to do was destroy the State of Israel, it would simply invest in the 1300 kilometer range Shihab – 3 missile, which which it already has,” Gold said, adding that Iran was however developing North Korean missiles with far great (sic) ranges.

The Iranian Mullahs have said that there will be absolutely no negotiation with the U.S., so the U.S. intent to chat Iran out of a nuclear program (following the counsel of the Baker Commission) is as likely to fail as the European effort over the last four years.

Whatever else happens, while Americans are frolicking at the beach and parks this summer, it is sure to be busy for Soldiers and Marines in Iraq, battling more than just Iraqi insurgents.  Then unfortunately, this will not end it.  The Long War continues.

In an odd occurrence today, Defense Secretary Robert Gates argued that diplomatic efforts to resolve the nuclear standoff with Iran are working and should be given a chance to succeed.  This pronouncement comes on the heels of an announcement by General Peter Pace that Iran is supplying weapons and other support to insurgents in both Iraq and Afghanistan.

Iran is shipping arms and explosives to Afghanistan, in addition to providing deadly armor-piercing bombs covertly to Iraqi insurgents, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said yesterday.

“It is not as clear in Afghanistan which Iranian entity is responsible, but we have intercepted weapons in Afghanistan headed for the Taliban that were made in Iran,” Marine Corps Gen. Peter Pace told reporters at a breakfast meeting …

A U.S. official with access to intelligence data confirmed that there are new signs of Iranian arms shipments to the Taliban in recent months. “We are concerned about Quds Force links to the Taliban, and there is reason to believe that shipments of rockets, mortars, small arms and other weapons are making their way from Iran to Afghanistan,” the official said …

“We know that there are munitions that were made in Iran that are in Iraq and in Afghanistan,” Gen. Pace said. He noted that members of the Quds Force are part of the IRGC, which is under the direction of Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei …

There are also reports Iran is stepping up support for Iraqi insurgents. Army Lt. Gen. Ray Odierno, commander of Multinational Corps-Iraq, told reporters Friday there are new signs that Iran is “not only providing support to Shia groups, but also Sunni insurgent groups.”

Just why Gates feels that whatever bargains are struck with Iran can be relied upon when Iran has denied a thousand times that they are involved in Iraq is not manifestly obvious.  But a far better indicator of the danger that lies ahead may be found the in reaction of Iran’s neighbors.  There appears to be a mad rush throughout the Middle East to go nuclear.

Two years ago, the leaders of Saudi Arabia told international atomic regulators that they could foresee no need for the kingdom to develop nuclear power. Today, they are scrambling to hire atomic contractors, buy nuclear hardware and build support for a regional system of reactors.

So, too, Turkey is preparing for its first atomic plant. And Egypt has announced plans to build one on its Mediterranean coast. In all, roughly a dozen states in the region have recently turned to the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna for help in starting their own nuclear programs. While interest in nuclear energy is rising globally, it is unusually strong in the Middle East.

“The rules have changed,

The Intelligence Bulletin is an aggregation and commentary series, and this is the fourth entry in that series.

Intelligence Bulletin #4 covers the following subjects: [1] Petraeus addresses rules of engagement, [2] Iranian nuclear program, [3] Chlorine gas attacks in Iraq, [4] Continued insurgent activity inside Mosques, [5] Iranian and Syrian threats in the covert war, [6] Ongoing coverage of the covert war against the CIA, [7] Continuing coverage of Anbar tribesmen in their battles against AQI, [8] Insurgents use women and children as shields, [9] Sadr’s Long Game, and [10] Thoughts on Walter Reed scandal.

Petraeus Addresses Rules of Engagement

Glenn Reynolds informs us of a communication by General Petraeus to his reports concerning rules of engagement.

Rules of engagement (ROE), highly criticized as being too restrictive and sometimes endangering our troops, have been “clarified.” “There were unintended consequences with ROE for too long,” Petraeus acknowledged. Because of what junior leaders perceived as too harsh punishment meted out to troops acting in the heat of battle, the ROE issued from the top commanders were second-guessed and made more restrictive by some on the ground. The end result was unnecessary – even harmful – restrictions placed on the troops in contact with the enemy.

“I’ve made two things clear,” Petraeus emphasized: “My ROE may not be modified with supplemental guidance lower down. And I’ve written a letter to all Coalition forces saying ‘your chain-of-command will stay with you.’ I think that solved the issue.”

In our rules of engagement coverage, we have argued for seeing the problems with ROE under four rubrics: The written ROE, the communication of the ROE, the application of the ROE in a counterinsurgency where fighters hide behind the population, and the main stream media feeding frenzy every time another story hits the wires, true or not.

The communication by General Petraeus addresses only one of the four categories above.  In our coverage we have cited:

[a] instances where NCOs have given us stories of lack of engagement that ultimately led to U.S. casualties:

… the ROE is vague and limiting.  And every time “violations

It is being reported that there are plans to destroy the Iranian enrichment facility at Natanz.

Israel has drawn up secret plans to destroy Iran’s uranium enrichment facilities with conventional and tactical nuclear weapons, Britain’s Sunday Times newspaper has reported.

Citing what it said were several Israel Defense Forces sources, the paper said two Israel Air Force squadrons had been training to blow up an enrichment plant in Natanz using low-yield nuclear “bunker busters.”

Two other sites, a heavy water plant at Arak and a uranium conversion plant at Isfahan, would be targeted with conventional bombs, the Sunday Times said.

The United Nations Security Council voted unanimously last month to slap sanctions on Iran to try to stop uranium enrichment that Western powers fear could lead to making bombs. Tehran insists its plans are peaceful and says it will continue enrichment.

Israel has refused to rule out pre-emptive military action against Iran along the lines of its 1981 air strike against an atomic reactor in Iraq, though many analysts believe Iran’s nuclear facilities are too much for Israel to take on alone.

The newspaper said the Israeli plan envisaged conventional laser-guided bombs opening “tunnels” into the targets. Nuclear warheads would then be used fired into the plant at Natanz, exploding deep underground to reduce radioactive fallout.

IAF pilots have flown to Gibraltar in recent weeks to train for the 2,000 mile round-trip to the Iranian targets, the Sunday Times said, and three possible routes to Iran have been mapped out including one over Turkey.

However, it also quoted sources as saying a nuclear strike would only be used if a conventional attack was ruled out and if the United States declined to intervene. Disclosure of the plans could be intended to put pressure on Tehran to halt enrichment, the paper added.

Washington has said military force remains an option while insisting that its priority is to reach a diplomatic solution.

Fox News military analyst Col. David Hunt, when asked why the Israelis would divulge this information, responded that he believed that it was possible that the U.S. did it, in order to stop this plan.  Col. Hunt: “No one in their right mind wants nuclear footballs being lobbed around in the Middle East.”

The problem with Col. Hunt’s analysis is that it is only compelling if the U.S. has a viable means of stopping the Iranian nuclear program.  And the notion of “viable” includes willingness to execute it.  If we don’t, then it would be irresponsible for the IDF to not have a plan.  The U.S. should be assisting the IDF rather than undercutting their efforts.

It is extremely difficult to earn a PhD in Engineering.  While PhDs in other disciplines read hundreds of books, perform research and author and verbally defend dissertations, engineering is still a cut above and a category apart from other fields.  To earn a PhD in engineering most often means not only the above, but additionally four to five years in graduate school, along with complicated research and most often computer modeling.  A typical PhD candidate might write the source code, debug and validate a computer code consisting of 100,000 lines of FORTRAN and/or C++ for the purpose of modeling some esoteric problem that possibly only he and his thesis advisor knows about and understands.  The investment in time and resources (monetary) often create circumstances in which it is not worthwhile for U.S. students to go this far with their education.  The pay that a BS or MS graduate in engineering can earn over four or five years, modified by the time value of money, has decreased the number of students in the U.S. seeking advanced degrees in engineering.  Of course, this creates the need for other PhD candidates to fill the gap in order to keep programs open.

Enter the foreign student.  It has for some time been recognized that foreign students are comprising an increasing fraction of the PhD students in U.S. universities.  In fact, universities themselves are aware of the problem and know that it is important, along with the U.S. government, to track such students and be aware of their intentions (will they stay in the U.S. or return to their homeland?).  The “sensitive” disciplines are: nuclear technology, cyberterrorism, chemical and explosives technology (munitions), and biological terrorism, with nuclear technology being the most sensitive.

But this alleged knowledge of who is earning advanced degrees in the U.S. has not held in abatement the increasing number of foreign students in sensitive disciplines, many from surprising countries.  According to a study entitled “The Importance of Foreign Ph.D. Students to U.S. Science,” the authors point out that concerning the sensitive fields of nuclear and organic chemistry, chemical and nuclear engineering, bacteriology, biochemistry, biotechnology research, microbiology and neuroscience, and atomic, chemical, molecular and nuclear physics, approximately 10% of the degrees awarded in these areas were awarded to students from 26 countries that are on the State Department “watch” list as being state sponsors of terrorism, including Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, Malaysia, Egypt and Jordan.

Jordan is ostensibly an ally in the global war on terror.  In fact, the newly released “Militant Ideology Atlas” from the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point notes that the most influential jihadist cleric in the world today, al-Maqdisi, resides in Jordan.  Also, we have covered the Iranian push for nuclear weapons technology.  In further demonstration of the Iranian duplicity in claiming that the pursuit of nuclear technology is for peaceful purposes, CNN, the Telegraph, UPI and the Strategy Page are all covering the Iranian weapons exchange for Somalian uranium that was recently exposed by the IAEA.

Development in U.S. nuclear forensics technology includes, in part, signature methods to ascertain the origin and history of radioactive materials.  For example, materials irradiated in reactors have trace constituents that are informative of the original target composition, reactor type and irradiation history.

For my readers who have written before to complain that the prose on this web site that “issues forth from my pen” (e.g., concerning snipers) informs the enemy of our weaknesses and vulnerabilities, they should consider the fact that (in this instance) Iran already knows U.S. vulnerabilities and forensic capabilities, and is attempting to exploit them by purchasing uranium from Somalia.  In the future, when a nuclear device explodes in a U.S. city or somewhere in the Middle East, presumably Israel, if the uranium was deemed to be originally from Somalia, Iran has a alibi, or at least, so they think.

Pointing out U.S. vulnerabilities is the honest thing to do, and ignoring them the dangerous and unethical thing.  Henceforth, when we observe developments in nuclear technology, chemical and biological warfare capabilities, and the other myriad things that can cause mass injury and death to American citizens, we should keep in the forefront of our thinking: “The U.S. has possibly aided the enemy by training him to kill us.”

There is much confusion over the recently released International Atomic Energy Agency (hereafter, IAEA) report on the Iranian nuclear program.  The International Herald Tribune is reporting that the “International Atomic Energy Agency experts have found unexplained plutonium and highly enriched uranium traces in a nuclear waste facility in Iran and have asked Tehran for details, an IAEA report said Tuesday.”  Reuters is reporting that “IAEA inspectors detected bits of plutonium in samples of particles of highly enriched uranium (HEU) taken earlier from containers at the Karaj atomic waste facility near Tehran.”

To gain clarity on these issues, one needs access to documents and analysis other than main stream media reports and disjointed accounts of the situation.  The IAEA has a page devoted to formal statements on Iran.  The story begins long ago, but it is necessary to go back at least to January of 2006 to understand the November report.

In January of 2006, IAEA inspectors found some high enriched Uranium particles at locations where Iran has declared that centrifuge components had been manufactured, used and/or stored.  In the same report, the IAEA said “in order to clarify differences between findings by the Agency and statements made by Iran, a number of plutonium discs were brought by the Agency back to to Vienna for further analysis to determine the exact isotopic composition of the plutonium.  The Agency’s analysis showed, in particular, that the Pu-240 content measured on eight of the discs was significantly lower than the Pu-240 content of the solution from which the plutonium deposited on the discs was said to have originated.”

In a report on August 31, 2006, the IAEA reiterated the complaint (lodged in earlier reports) that Iran had refused to cooperate in ascertaining the origin of the high enriched uranium particles found and discussed in the February report.  The IAEA also confirmed the laboratory results of the sample, stating that “Analysis of the environmental samples taken from equipment at a technical university in January 2006, referred to in paragraph 25 of GOV/2006/27, showed a small number of particles of natural and high enriched uranium.”

The IAEA prepares reports for board review prior to meetings, and the board decides on release of the reports to the public as one of the functions of the meeting.  The November 14, 2006 report (GOV/2006/64) has not been formally released yet, but Vital Perspective has obtained the report and has posted a link to it.  In this report the IAEA divulges that the test results had been communicated to Iran: “Under cover of the Agency’s letter of 16 October 2006 … Iran was provided with a detailed assessment of the results of further analysis of the samples taken from the containers at Karaj, and was requested to provide further clarification of the presence of the HEU particles and clarification of an additional finding of plutonium in the samples.  On 13 November 2006, Iran provided a response to that request, which the Agency is currently assessing.”

Iran’s reponse is nothing but a subterfuge.  Nothing technical, detailed, meaningful or substantive is contained in the response.  Further, there is technical falsehood contained in the response.  From the Reuters article cited above, Iran has included this in their reponse: “the HEU could have come from spent fuel from a Tehran light-water research reactor.”

The IAEA has found a plutonium ‘vector’ (i.e., isotopic composition) on certain components that is different from the alleged source.  They have also found highly enriched uranium particles, leading to significant concerns over the enrichment process.  As we have discussed before, highly enriched uranium does not come from spent fuel.  Low enriched uranium (5% or lower) is used to fuel and operate commercial light water reactors, but highly enriched uranium (>> 90%) is used for only two purposes: Naval reactors (Submarines and Aircraft Carriers), for which Iran does not have the technology, and nuclear weapons.  HEU has these two purposes, and no more.  HEU comes from the enrichment process, not from spent fuel.

Finally, we have covered the issue of Iran’s heavy water reactor and the fact that the alleged medical use of heavy water is a lie.  Heavy water will be used, upon completion of Iran’s reactor, to create plutonium for nuclear weapons.

Despite the hyperventilating media reports, the discovery of HEU particles and plutonium is nothing new.  There is no need for a new discovery.  The old ones – and the test results, and Iran’s refusal to come clean about them – is enough.

There are a lot of unknowns at the moment, such as yield, degree of success, etc.  But Fox News is reporting that North Korea has tested a nuclear weapon.  There will be many consequences to this action, but perhaps the most significant will be what happens with Japan.

We have argued before that while Japan has not gone nuclear yet, the right set of circumstances could converge to cause Japan to embark on a robust nuclear program.  This is the right set of circumstances.  After Japan, South Korea will likely succeed in the development of such a program, and then possibly Taiwan.

The real loser in this is China, because the balance of power has just dramatically shifted.  Numbers of troops and size of industrial infrastructure now matters less than it did prior to a nuclear arms race.

A nuclear arms race has just begun in the Far East.  Japan and South Korea are set up to succeed in this race given their success at commercial nuclear power.

The contention between the House Intelligence Committee and the national intelligence community continues, while Condoleezza Rice continues to believe (falsely) that Russia will support sanctions.  Meanwhile, Iran continues its push to go nuclear.

The U.S. intelligence community still suffers from the Clinton administration’s stripping it thread-bare of human intelligence resources.  There is a woeful dearth of reliable and trustworthy information concerning the precise state of affairs of the Iranian nuclear enrichment program.  Even so, the U.S. intelligence community is sticking to its guns by refusing to revise the timeline for a nuclear Iran, in a showdown with the House Intelligence Committee.  At the same time, Israel’s foreign minister Tzipi Livni said on Sunday that the world may have as little as a few months to avoid a nuclear Iran, and called for sanctions.

Elsewhere we learn that the EU is capitulating and Condoleezza Rice actually believes that Russia and China will support the U.S. as it pertains to U.N. sanctions.  Of course, this is false.  As Dick Morris reported on FNC a few nights ago, and has reported elsewhere, Russia is practicing regional energy hegemony, and needs the natural gas supply from Iran to effect this control over energy.  Neither Russia nor China will support sanctions, and it is mystifying that Rice believes so.

Finally, we learn that:

Another of the U.S. officials said intel reports show Iran was experiencing significant problems with gyroscopes it has been trying to install on missiles that could deliver Iranian bombs to targets in the region and even further. 

In the total absence of consideration of a nuclear program, Iran is pursuing missile technology that it does not need to defend itself from any sort of regional aggression.

Prior:

• Iran’s Highly Enriched Uranium from Spent Fuel? Not Hardly
• Iran’s Heavy Water Reactor
• Highly Enriched Uranium Found in Iran

In what may just be the most boneheaded quote I have ever seen in print, the Washington Post says:

Also, traces of highly enriched uranium, which can be used for the core of a weapon, were discovered through environmental samples taken at another facility. Previous traces were found to have been the result of used and discarded centrifuge equipment the Iranians bought from Pakistan. Officials at the IAEA said privately yesterday that the new contamination appears to be from old spent fuel the Iranians moved out of harm’s way during their eight-year war with Iraq. 

No, not hardly.  Highly enriched Uranium does not come from spent fuel.  Further, if the argument from the IAEA was that actinides were found which were initially thought to be highly enriched Uranium, this would mean that spent fuel (note, not the gap gases inside the fuel cladding, but actual pieces of fuel pellets), in pulverized or powdered form suitable for gamma spectroscopy had become available on the surfaces of components, leading us to believe that someone took a pulverizing machine and created powdered spent fuel.  Of course, I am being sarcastic.

Finally, highly enriched Uranium includes highly enriched Uranium, i.e., U-235.  Spent Fuel includes other actinides, such as Thorium, Neptunium, Americium, Curium, etc.  The two cannot be mistaken for each other.  Highly enriched Uranium is not spent fuel, and spent fuel is not highly enriched Uranium.

In what may just be the most boneheaded quote I have ever seen in print, the Washington Post says:

Also, traces of highly enriched uranium, which can be used for the core of a weapon, were discovered through environmental samples taken at another facility. Previous traces were found to have been the result of used and discarded centrifuge equipment the Iranians bought from Pakistan. Officials at the IAEA said privately yesterday that the new contamination appears to be from old spent fuel the Iranians moved out of harm’s way during their eight-year war with Iraq. 

No, not hardly.  Highly enriched Uranium does not come from spent fuel.  Further, if the argument from the IAEA was that actinides were found which were initially thought to be highly enriched Uranium, this would mean that spent fuel (note, not the gap gases inside the fuel cladding, but actual pieces of fuel pellets), in pulverized or powdered form suitable for gamma spectroscopy had become available on the surfaces of components, leading us to believe that someone took a pulverizing machine and created powdered spent fuel.  Of course, I am being sarcastic.

Finally, highly enriched Uranium includes highly enriched Uranium, i.e., U-235.  Spent Fuel includes other actinides, such as Thorium, Neptunium, Americium, Curium, etc.  The two cannot be mistaken for each other.  Highly enriched Uranium is not spent fuel, and spent fuel is not highly enriched Uranium.