Archive for the 'Small Wars' Category

Thematic in our discussions here have been that the best counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy is to provide the people with security.  Mothers want to know that their children can go to school and play in the yards and streets without fear of harm.  To use a heavily worn expression, the way to “win the hearts and minds of the people” is to give them peace.  This is true in Iraq at least of tribes and sects (the Sunni want protection from the Shia, the Shia from the Sunni, etc.).

We have shown that the force size to effect this security has been too small in Iraq, and that trust in local troops yields both uncertain results and an impedance to U.S. troops.  Moreover, constantly offensive operations against guerrilla forces is a tactic that has a proven track record.  Contrary to this, forces in Iraq, after the initial campaign to overthrow the regime, redeployed to well-gaurded bases, while failing to share the risk with the people and consistently conduct COIN operations against the enemy.  As an example of the success of properly conducted COIN operations, our good friend Michael Fumento has recently blogged directly from Ramadi concerning the strategic success of Combat Operation Posts.  These posts, scattered throughout Ramadi, ensure that the U.S. troops are close to both the people and the enemy, while also forcing daily operations against the enemy.

Contrary to this proven COIN strategy, UPI is reporting that troops in Afghanistan are redeploying to their barracks, thereby committing the same mistake we made in Iraq.

More than a month after Pakistan inked a peace deal with local leaders in the restive tribal region straddling its frontier with Afghanistan, some NATO troops are trying the same tactic on their side of the border, redeploying to barracks and relying on tribal militias to keep Taliban insurgents in check.

The truces are part of a new “hearts and minds” strategy on both sides of the border, as coalition and Pakistani authorities attempt to engage local tribal leaders and woo them away from Taliban extremists.

But the NATO deal, in four northern districts of Helmand province, comes as evidence mounts that the Pakistani truce in Waziristan has failed to reduce cross-border infiltration by Taliban fighters looking to engage coalition troops in Afghanistan.

So the strategy here is to let the tribes in Afghanistan send their fathers and sons to wage war against better trained and equipped fighters, potentially losing their lives, with these fighters being of the same or similar religious persuasion, while the U.S. troops redeploy to their barracks in safety.  Stunningly, this is the strategy employed as part of the doctrine to “win the hearts and minds of the people.”  The UPI article does make mention of one very important factor.

“The effort to engage the Taliban’s tribal base makes sense,” said Haqqani, “if at the same time you are degrading the ideological leadership through a military campaign.”

It is difficult to see how NATO forces will wage a military campaign while redeployed to their barracks.

There is much bluster over counterinsurgency operations; what it means, how to do it, what causes these operations to succeed, and what causes them to fail.  There are even washed-up Generals who want the U.S. to jettison the “kill-kill” warrior ethos of the military in favor of a different approach as part of our COIN strategy.  [As an editorial note, there are so many things misrepresented and misconstrued in the “kinder and gentler soldier” article linked above that the real confusion is where to begin with debunking them.  The Generals misrepresent when the warrior ethos was introduced into the military and focus on the history of the Army rather than the Marines, they ignore the more than 300 engagements the USMC has had over its history in which for many of these operations they have successfully executed COIN operations in spite of the washed-up Generals, etc.]

It is simply not helpful to talk counterinsurgency and “winning the hearts and minds of the people,” without giving examples of its execution so that the strategy can be taught and implemented.  Good friend of the Captain’s Journal, Michael Fumento, is blogging from Ramadi, and he is giving us good and instructive COIN discussion material with his post Cop-ing out in Ramadi.

A COP is a combat operation post, and such posts are starting to play a crucial role in pacifying Al Anbar. In the Ramadi area, at least, COPs comprise an undersized company of four companies and about 80 soldiers. (Although Anvil has considerably more than that.) Anvil also has four M-2 Bradley fighting vehicles attached to it, each of which has a .25 caliber fully automatic gun and lesser guns along with an anti-armor capability. Anvil has three American platoons and one Iraqi Army one, but one of the American ones and the IA one are being loaned elsewhere right now. No matter, a COP can operate at half strength for awhile.

COPs are tiny compared to FOBs like Corregidor, which had a full battalion plus numerous support elements or about 800 men in all. In fact, this place comprises just two houses leased from Iraqi civilians. First Armored Division has put in 11 COPs so far, I believe, and is building a 12th. There will probably be many more to come.

In any counterinsurgency effort, a key to pacifying an area is to plop fortifications with interlocking communications into enemy territory and send out patrols. For example, King Edward I of England (the guy who had Braveheart drawn and quartered) used castles to subdue Wales. Nowadays we call this “grab and hold.” Originally we started doing that in Vietnam but gave it up in favor of search and destroy missions from large base camps, which helped contribute to losing the war.

One value of a COP versus the much larger FOBs and the huge camps such as Camp Ramadi is that this is an enemy that inflicts most casualties and damage with IEDS, greatly restricting movement. But missions from COPs are inherently short-range; you’re already almost there. That’s less road to be on and fewer IEDs to worry about.

In Habitually Offensive Operations Against Guerrillas, we discussed the re-deployment of U.S. troops to large, well-gaurded bases and the reduction of patrols allowing the growth of the insurgency, in contrast with the recommendation of the Small Wars Manual.  Michael Fumento is documenting a case in which the Small Wars Manual COIN strategy is working.  Continuing:

Another advantage of a COP is a shorter reaction time for one unit to support another, although that’s rarely necessary because the enemy just doesn’t mass in large units. They don’t have the men to do that like they used to. This inability to mass also makes COPs possible. In Vietnam, the enemy had lots of soldiers and highly-trained and motivated sappers that could cut through concertina wire barriers, throw satchel charges, and wreak havoc while the VC infantry came up behind them. This allowed them to inflict heavy casualties on small units, such as those manning howitzers. On a few occasions, they completely overran those positions. But the chance of a COP being overrun is essentially nil.

The impact of the FOB system was shown to me on a map. The foreigners who come into this area do so along a mini-Ho Chi Minh trail from the west, namely Jordan and Syria. And the foreigners tend to be better trained. Certainly any good sniper will come from that route, because Iraqis are terrible shots and hence crummy snipers.

From this road the terrorists would then literally fan out in the area where the COPs have been inserted. That is, their area of operation was shaped like a fan. But the troops from the COPs have rolled them up in a counter-clockwise pattern such that the only major activity left now is in a slice near the Tigris. Areas that Capt. Sapp would originally only send full platoons into, sometimes even with armor, he will now allow a squad of perhaps 12 men to enter. At some point, the bad guys will be pushed out of this last piece of the fan. Where they’ll go, who knows. The point is that they’ll have been denied their first choice of an operating area. It’s like knocking off the head of a terrorist cell. Yes, he’ll just be replaced. But the man originally chosen for the job is now dead and the cell weakened to that extent.

Any counterinsurgency operation is likely to fail without the right force projection.  We have argued that force size is the critical element to successful pacification.  If we know that the enemy (foreign fighters, most certainly al Qaeda) is coming into Iraq along a “mini-Ho Chi Minh” trail, this information immediately redounds to the question “why can’t we stop this traffic?”

The answer is that we can with the right force projection.  If the means of ingress into Iraq are turned into a shooting gallery where the foreign fighter faces certain death should he attempt to cross the border, then one of two things happens, leading to a consequent.  Either the foreign fighter dies at the border, or if he is smart, he doesn’t attempt to cross.  The consequence is that the existing foreign fighters do not get reinforced.  As U.S. forces share the risk of the people and protect the population, and as the foreign fighters (and Sunni Mujahideen) are killed, the pacification of the region finally ensues, and mothers can trust in the security of their homes and schools.  This, rather than the “kinder and gentler soldier,” is the road to “winning the hearts and minds of the people.”

Following the Small Wars Manual, I have argued before that force projection and timeliness are critical for counterinsurgency operations, and that constant and perpetual offensive operations against guerrilla fighers is the way to effect security and thus stabilize territory.  Protracted duration is the enemy of victory in war and a sure path to defeat.  The al Qaeda high command letter to Zarqawi frankly admitted that “prolonging the war is in our interest.”  My arguments have been directly contrary to the Generals who have argued for a small footprint, believing that most effective way to achieve security is to use the minimum number of troops.  It is possible that the Generals have confused large force projection with the actual implementation of force.  There are even Generals who want to jettison the “kill-kill ethos” of the Army and Marines.  Yet this is certainly not the case.  The larger the force size, the smaller the probability that force will have to be exercised.  The two have proven to be inversely proportional.

The boots know that there aren’t enough troops, and haven’t been from the beginning.  In recent action in Iraq, we see what can happen with enough troops, versus the carnage that can ensue when the U.S. is not present.

… members of the Army’s 172nd Stryker Brigade are on a charm offensive. The soldiers spent 12 months in the restive city of Mosul, before having their tour in Iraq extended to help in the U.S.’s campaign to pacify Baghdad. The unit’s experience shows. They are alert but relaxed, carrying themselves with a gentle posture, weapons down, waving to the locals, talking with them. Kids hold hands with the Americans; an Iraqi mother hands a soldier her baby to hold. Locals invite U.S. officers in to sit and have glasses upon glasses of tea, orange Fanta, Pepsi and Arabic coffee. They don’t go into a house without a few Iraqi soldiers who can better gauge if someone looks suspicious. Walking out of one Iraqi home, Lieut. Colonel John Norris, commander of the Stryker 4th Battalion, 23rd Infantry Regiment Tomahawks, enjoys a moment of guarded optimism. “Days like this you think, wow, they can really do it. If they can just stop the killing.”

It’s the glimmers of hope that make the realities in Iraq so heartbreaking. Residents of Ur say that with the Strykers around, sectarian murders have all but disappeared. Neighbors emerge from their homes to chat and allow their sons and daughters to play in the street. But the Iraqis and Americans know that such sanity won’t last. Though 12,000 U.S. and Iraqi troops have moved to the capital to try to defuse sectarian violence, the level of killing across the city remains as high as ever. That’s because the U.S. doesn’t have enough troops to maintain the peace in the areas they’ve secured, instead relying on Iraqi units who have yet to prove they can impose order. In Ghazaliyah, a west Baghdad neighborhood the 172nd Strykers cleared weeks earlier, violence has already gone back up to previous levels. For all the progress made in Ur, the troops know the cycle is bound to repeat itself there too. “We leave,” says Sergeant First Class Joshua Brown, as his Stryker pulls out of Ur city, “and it turns into f—— Somalia.”

Commanders in Iraq have recently called for more troops, but will stop short of directly saying that these troops need to be U.S. rather than Iraqi troops.  As we have pointed out, Iraqi soldiers can sometimes hinder U.S. efforts.

There is a revised field manual soon to be issued, including reformulated counterinsurgency doctrine.  But is has been pointed out that the number of troops required to uphold this strategy are not there in Iraq, and are not coming.

Iraq today is a land of many small wars, each with different goals, participants and dangers.  Bill Roggio is commenting on the multiple counterinsurgency operations currently taking place, in Kirkuk, Diyala and Diwaniyah.  The nature of these operations (COIN) and the widespread geography of these (and other recent actions) demonstrate the problematic nature of the conflict today in Iraq.  Also at The Fourth Rail, it was pointed out that al Sadr had sent two companies of the Madhi army into Kirkuk over the spring.

This was not a random action by al Sadr; there is a reason that his forces are located near or in the Kurdish north.  Iran has trained as many as 40,000 Iraqis in order to prevent an unlikely rollback of Shiite control, and is likely pulling the strings to effect the policy that is most beneficial to their interests in regional control.  Shiite control is also related to control over oil and refinery infrastructure.  Kurdish leaders have made it clear that they will not relent on their demands to reverse Saddam’s Arabization of the Kirkuk oil fields, which accounted for the bulk of exports before the 2003 invasion.  “We always said we would make no concessions on … the Kurdish identity of Kirkuk,” said leading Kurdish politician Massoud Barzani.

It is likely that al Sadr’s forces (and other factions in Iraq) are positioning for negotiations and decisions that might be determinative for the future of Iraq, namely, the division of Iraq into three autonomous regions: Shiite, Kurdish and Sunni.  In a strategically timed trip to the Middle East, Condoleezza Rice has put political pressure on the Kurds to share the wealth associated with a Kurdish Kirkuk.

Rice visited the region’s powerful president, Massoud Barzani, less than two weeks after the regional government threatened to break away from Iraq in a dispute over oil.

Barzani told reporters after meeting with Rice that Kurdistan, “like any other nation, has the right to self-determination.

From the LA Times:

BAGHDAD — Two months after a security crackdown began in the capital, U.S. military deaths appear to be rising, even as fatalities among Iraqi security forces have fallen, U.S. military sources and analysts said.

The U.S. military Tuesday revised to eight its count of American deaths in the capital on Monday, the highest daily toll in a month. In September, 74 U.S. troops died nationwide, about a third of them in Baghdad, according to the military.

U.S. officials and military experts caution that it is too soon to declare a definitive trend, but they said the recent increases could be attributable to U.S. troops’ greater exposure to combat since redeploying in early August from heavily guarded bases to Baghdad’s streets. Their mission is to stem sectarian bloodshed involving Shiite paramilitaries and Sunni Arab insurgents.

“When you’re conducting operations and you’ve doubled the number of troops doing operations in Baghdad, there is more opportunity — as there is much more activity as they go into more neighborhoods — for attacks to occur and casualties to result,” U.S. Army spokesman Lt. Col. Barry Johnson said.

This statement about redeploying from heavily gaurded bases (a defensive strategy designed to minimize casualties) is interesting in juxtaposition with this statement from Section 2-9 of the Small Wars Manual.

Tactical operations of regular troops against guerrillas in small wars are habitually offensive.  Even though operating under a strategic defensive campaign plan, regular combatants in contact with hostile forces will emphasize the principal of the offensive to gain psychological supremacy.  Isolated forces exposed to possible attack by overwhelming numbers must be well protected in positions prepared to develop the greatest possible effect of their weapons.  Reverses, particularly at first, must be avoided at all costs.  [Bold and italics are mine]

So when did we go on the defensive in Iraq?

Remaining highly recommended is the Marine Corps Small Wars Manual (large PDF document).  The war in Afghanistan is more than 4.5 years old, and the war in Iraq is about 3.5 years old.  The SWM has something to way about timeliness that will edify and enrich our understanding of the various blunders that have been made in these wars so far.  By way of editorial note, I would comment that there seems to be an undercurrent among supporters of the war(s) that is unhealthy and unproductive for the prospective of evolution in our doctrine, strategy and tactics based on our mistakes.  Analysis, assessment and constructive criticism are generally taken to be opposition to the war or to our warriors.  To be seen as patriotic and supportive of our troops, one almost has to be jingoistic.  This is not a mature attitude, but more importantly, it is not supportive of the necessary changes that will mark the future of warfare and thus the warriors who will be participating in those wars.  Proceeding now to the SWJ and what we may learn about timeliness (italics and bold are mine):

” … when forced to resort to arms to carry out the object of the intervention, the operation must be pursued energetically and expeditiously in order to overcome the resistance as quickly as possible.  The campaign plan and strategy must be adapted to the character of the people encountered.  National Policy and the precepts of civilized procedure demand that our dealings with other peoples be maintained on a high moral plan (sic).  However, the military strategy of the campaign and the tactics employed by the commander in the field must be adapted to the situation in order to accomplish the mission without delay.” (Page 34)

“The force must be of sufficient strength and so proportioned that it can accomplish its mission in the minimum time and with minimum losses.” (Page 113)

From the modern days of Blitzkrieg forward, speed and surprise were useful as a strategy to prevent the enemy from implementing a coherent defense.  Leaving behind the issue of conventional war versus COIN, rural operations versus MOUT, and all of the other issues that can cloud simple evaluations and make the lessons poignant for us, allowing a protracted period of time for [a] al Qaeda to recruit and train more foreign fighters to enter the fray, [b] al Sadr’s militia to strengthen from Iranian funding, and [c] the Baathist diehards to wreak havoc unimpeded, has caused the U.S. strategy to become muddled and weakened.  It has also added to the perception of the U.S. as an occupying force rather than a liberator.

No matter what tactics were employed, if the strategy had included defeat of the known enemy with dispatch, the U.S. forces could have focused more on COIN operations for smaller groups of poorly-trained and poorly-led insurgents.  The current U.S. mission in Iraq is not apparently one of defeating the enemy.  Rather, it is training proxy fighters to defeat the enemy.  This is strategically smart only to the degree that it is successful, useful, helpful and effective to accomplishing the final goals.  Altruism (i.e., in this case, nation-building) is not particually useful as a military strategy.

The Marines in Ramadi are quite capable of counter-insurgency (COIN) operations and the proper conduct of “small wars.” The bone of contention is the doctrine of use of proxy fighters to effect stability while signficant enemy remain. To the extent that this remains a pivotal doctrine of COIN strategy, it may be a failing strategy.

As backdrop for this post, I will give a few points to help the discussion below make some sense. My post Ramadi, Iraq: A Mess, continues to be one of the most visited posts I have made since the start of blogging, visited by multiple visitors every day since its post date of August 1, and many of the visits continue to be from military personnel using military network domains. In part, my thinking about Ramadi led me to publish my post on The Debate Over Diminished Force Projection. In my post Afghanistan’s Lessons for Iraq: What Strategy?, I argue that premature cessation of operations to combat the enemy (and hence, the premature invocation of counterinsurgency tactics) is counterproductive. In my post Will we Lose the Anbar Province?, I stated:

Remembering Iraqi politics is necessary to understand why these things have happened, and invoking the lessons of Vietnam is not very helpful. Politics teaches us that to refer to “Iraqis

If Afghanistan is the model for contemporary counterinsurgency operations, then the U.S. ought to rethink its strategy.  There is a role for both special operators and regulars in today’s warfare.  Cessation of regular operations too soon is counterproductive.

Bill Roggio is covering the fact that Pakistan has released more than 2500 al-Qaeda and Taliban, most of whom are heading to Waziristan.  Bill also covers the continuing operations in Afghanistan, stating that:

But the Afghan and Coalition efforts may merely be a holding action. Attempts to stabilize the provinces on the Pakistani border has been a difficult task as Taliban and al-Qaeda have used Pakistan’s Baluchistan and North West Frontier Provinces as bases of operations … The fighting in Afghanistan will only intensify.

Vital Perspective is reporting (from Jane’s Defence) that the Army and Marine Corps are putting the finishing touches on a new counter-insurgency manual that is designed to fill a crucial gap in U.S. military doctrine.  Afghanistan has lessons for our struggle in Iraq.  If this manual doesn’t mention and learn from our (at least partially) failed strategy in Afghanistan, then they should go back to the drawing board.

Much has been made about counterinsurgency warfare and the strategy the U.S. uses to attain peace and stability in Iraq.  The Washington Post recently published an article entitled In a Volatile Region of Iraq, U.S. Military Takes Two Paths.  In this article, the Staff Writer compares and contrasts two (allegedly) different approaches to securing peace and stability in the al Anbar province (the problems of which I have written on in my post Will We Lose the Anbar Province?).  I have also discussed the debate over force size and military footprint in my post The Debate Over Diminished Force Projection, which bears on the subject of force size and strategy and how various forces are utilized.

The Washington Post article is similar to those published previously, where the special forces operator is characterized as smart, patient, politically astute, and easily maleable and adaptable in new and challenging situations, while the non-special forces are depicted as dull, stolid, slow to adapt, and hopelessly educated and trained in the age-old military practices and stategy, much of which is too coarse and heavy-handed for the current situation in Iraq.  One is left to conclude that the regulars are knuckle-draggers.  It is an easy article to write — an easy story to tell.

The truth is neither of these depictions, and it is not somewhere in between.  The truth is more complicated.  As I have noted before from the U.S. Joint Forces Command’s Urban Resolve program:

In military operations since World War II, United States forces have preferred to bypass major urban areas to avoid the costly combat expected inside cities.

There is a huge difference between bypassing the troops (both regular and irregular such as the Fedayeen) on our advance to Baghdad, leaving the enemy behind, and killing the enemy if he can be identified and located, when he is identified and located.  The special forces might claim that the entire operation should have been a counterinsurgency operation, while the regulars might claim that we stopped conventional operations too soon, and much of the enemy was still intact when we switched over to counterinsurgency strategy.

There are those who are complaining that the regulars are not taking an approach that more closely resembles newer and more sophisticated counter-insurgency techniques.  But ironically, no one complains that the Afghanistan campaign was too “regular.”  In fact, it was nothing but irregular and Special Forces operations.  We primarily used the Northern Alliance to drive the Taliban from northern Afghanistan and Kabul, while we relied heavily on three tribal leaders / warlords, at least one of whom could not be trusted, to attempt closure with the enemy at Tora Bora.  The attitude of many of the fighters was in part responsible for the failure to close in on the enemy.  From the perspective of one fighter:

Awol Gul was calm and relaxed as B-52s pummeled a mountain behind him and Al Qaeda sniper fire rang out in the distance. “They’ve been under quite a bit of pressure inside there,” he said. “It is likely that they have made a tactical withdrawal farther south. They have good roads, safe passage, and Mr. bin Laden has plenty of friends.

“We are not interested in killing the Arabs,” Mr. Gul went on to say. “They are our Muslim brothers.”

We lost Osama bin Laden and hundreds (perhaps thousands) of Taliban fighters.  When the last cave was taken at Tora Bora:

On Dec. 16, Afghan warlords announced they had advanced into the last of the Tora Bora caves. One young commander fighting with 600 of his own troops alongside Ali and Ghamsharik, Haji Zahir, could not have been less pleased with the final prize. There were only 21 bedraggled Al Qaeda fighters who were taken prisoners. “No one told us to surround Tora Bora,” Mr. Zahir complained. “The only ones left inside for us were the stupid ones, the foolish and the weak.”

Today the Taliban and al Qaeda have control over Waziristan, have recently fought the Pakistani army to a draw, have seen 2500 of their fellow Taliban released, and have managed to inflict enough terror into Afghanistan that 267 schools have been forced to cease operations altogether.  If Afghanistan is the model for special operations, then we ought to rethink how we are conducting these operations.

There is a place for special operations, and certainly there is need always to adapt our techniques to the circumstances.  And with counterterrorist tactics being all the rage now, should I be bold enough to say that it is not the answer to all of our problems?

When we lose thousands of Taliban at Tora Bora, fighters are shooting at Marines and Soldiers in foxholes in Ramadi and U.S. forces will not hunt down and kill the enemy in response (while they also take bets as to when they will be attacked again), and no one in the chain of command can make a decision to kill 190 Taliban at a funeral because of “religious sensibilities,” may I suggest that we need to re-evaluate our strategy?  And to reflexively demur to special operations is easy, but not the answer. 

If Afghanistan is the model for contemporary counterinsurgency operations, then the U.S. ought to rethink its strategy.  There is a role for both special operators and regulars in today’s warfare.  Cessation of regular operations too soon is counterproductive.

Bill Roggio is covering the fact that Pakistan has released more than 2500 al-Qaeda and Taliban, most of whom are heading to Waziristan.  Bill also covers the continuing operations in Afghanistan, stating that:

But the Afghan and Coalition efforts may merely be a holding action. Attempts to stabilize the provinces on the Pakistani border has been a difficult task as Taliban and al-Qaeda have used Pakistan’s Baluchistan and North West Frontier Provinces as bases of operations … The fighting in Afghanistan will only intensify.

Vital Perspective is reporting (from Jane’s Defence) that the Army and Marine Corps are putting the finishing touches on a new counter-insurgency manual that is designed to fill a crucial gap in U.S. military doctrine.  Afghanistan has lessons for our struggle in Iraq.  If this manual doesn’t mention and learn from our (at least partially) failed strategy in Afghanistan, then they should go back to the drawing board.

Much has been made about counterinsurgency warfare and the strategy the U.S. uses to attain peace and stability in Iraq.  The Washington Post recently published an article entitled In a Volatile Region of Iraq, U.S. Military Takes Two Paths.  In this article, the Staff Writer compares and contrasts two (allegedly) different approaches to securing peace and stability in the al Anbar province (the problems of which I have written on in my post Will We Lose the Anbar Province?).  I have also discussed the debate over force size and military footprint in my post The Debate Over Diminished Force Projection, which bears on the subject of force size and strategy and how various forces are utilized.

The Washington Post article is similar to those published previously, where the special forces operator is characterized as smart, patient, politically astute, and easily maleable and adaptable in new and challenging situations, while the non-special forces are depicted as dull, stolid, slow to adapt, and hopelessly educated and trained in the age-old military practices and stategy, much of which is too coarse and heavy-handed for the current situation in Iraq.  One is left to conclude that the regulars are knuckle-draggers.  It is an easy article to write — an easy story to tell.

The truth is neither of these depictions, and it is not somewhere in between.  The truth is more complicated.  As I have noted before from the U.S. Joint Forces Command’s Urban Resolve program:

In military operations since World War II, United States forces have preferred to bypass major urban areas to avoid the costly combat expected inside cities.

There is a huge difference between bypassing the troops (both regular and irregular such as the Fedayeen) on our advance to Baghdad, leaving the enemy behind, and killing the enemy if he can be identified and located, when he is identified and located.  The special forces might claim that the entire operation should have been a counterinsurgency operation, while the regulars might claim that we stopped conventional operations too soon, and much of the enemy was still intact when we switched over to counterinsurgency strategy.

There are those who are complaining that the regulars are not taking an approach that more closely resembles newer and more sophisticated counter-insurgency techniques.  But ironically, no one complains that the Afghanistan campaign was too “regular.”  In fact, it was nothing but irregular and Special Forces operations.  We primarily used the Northern Alliance to drive the Taliban from northern Afghanistan and Kabul, while we relied heavily on three tribal leaders / warlords, at least one of whom could not be trusted, to attempt closure with the enemy at Tora Bora.  The attitude of many of the fighters was in part responsible for the failure to close in on the enemy.  From the perspective of one fighter:

Awol Gul was calm and relaxed as B-52s pummeled a mountain behind him and Al Qaeda sniper fire rang out in the distance. “They’ve been under quite a bit of pressure inside there,” he said. “It is likely that they have made a tactical withdrawal farther south. They have good roads, safe passage, and Mr. bin Laden has plenty of friends.

“We are not interested in killing the Arabs,” Mr. Gul went on to say. “They are our Muslim brothers.”

We lost Osama bin Laden and hundreds (perhaps thousands) of Taliban fighters.  When the last cave was taken at Tora Bora:

On Dec. 16, Afghan warlords announced they had advanced into the last of the Tora Bora caves. One young commander fighting with 600 of his own troops alongside Ali and Ghamsharik, Haji Zahir, could not have been less pleased with the final prize. There were only 21 bedraggled Al Qaeda fighters who were taken prisoners. “No one told us to surround Tora Bora,” Mr. Zahir complained. “The only ones left inside for us were the stupid ones, the foolish and the weak.”

Today the Taliban and al Qaeda have control over Waziristan, have recently fought the Pakistani army to a draw, have seen 2500 of their fellow Taliban released, and have managed to inflict enough terror into Afghanistan that 267 schools have been forced to cease operations altogether.  If Afghanistan is the model for special operations, then we ought to rethink how we are conducting these operations.

There is a place for special operations, and certainly there is need always to adapt our techniques to the circumstances.  And with counterterrorist tactics being all the rage now, should I be bold enough to say that it is not the answer to all of our problems?

When we lose thousands of Taliban at Tora Bora, fighters are shooting at Marines and Soldiers in foxholes in Ramadi and U.S. forces will not hunt down and kill the enemy in response (while they also take bets as to when they will be attacked again), and no one in the chain of command can make a decision to kill 190 Taliban at a funeral because of “religious sensibilities,” may I suggest that we need to re-evaluate our strategy?  And to reflexively demur to special operations is easy, but not the answer. 

Courtesy of SWJ, this from the San Francisco Chronicle:

In the first and second years after the U.S. invasion, critics say, American troops were focused on kicking in doors and looking for bad guys, when they needed to take a softer approach to the local population. The military brought along civil affairs units to help Iraqis build schools and hospitals, but those efforts were often overshadowed by the damage done by air strikes and artillery bombardments.

That’s not to say those methods were not necessary at the time, but analysts say the insurgency was strengthened because the soldiers and Marines used too much force too often. And they didn’t simultaneously work closely enough with Iraqi leaders to provide security and to get the local population on their side…

I have gone on record favoring the approach used in Fallujah as opposed to the approach currently in use in Ramadi in my post “The Debate over Diminished Force Projection.”  The difference is in how the enemy is identified and defeated.  There are reports of Marines and Soldiers running — even within the protected government compounds — to avoid sniper fire in Ramadi, hoping to cover the government officials who want to make it to the next building without being shot.

The Strategy Page has this today:

September 8, 2006: In Iraq, the rate of attacks remains very high compared to this time last year. Over the past three months, attacks have average 800-1000 a week. Curiously, during the same period, attacks that are identified as “sectarian” have declined from about 20 percent of all incidents to about 10-12 percent. Incidents in Baghdad are also down, by about 10 percent, due to the concerted government/Coalition effort to get more personnel into difficult neighborhoods. Most attacks are still against civilians, with attacks on Government troops and police in second place, and Coalition forces a rather distant third. But in Anbar province, Al-Qaeda, which has come to dominate the insurgency in region, seems to be focusing on U.S. Forces, which have take (sic) some 75-85 percent of the attacks. 

Al Qaeda have made Ramadi their home, and even if we (or the Iraqis) win in Ramadi, it is likely that the next phase is Al Haqlaniyah.  So we need to deal now with how we will attack the issue of Al Qaeda in and among the population.  Even after Ramadi, the deal is not done.  There is more to go nearer to the Syrian border.

In Fallujah we essentially caused the evacuation of the city of the civilian population, and hence, could use hard techniques and overwhelming force to kill or capture the enemy.  While this may not work to our advantage in Ramadi or other parts of the Sunni triangle, we don’t have to send mortar shells or JDAMs in to kill the enemy.  When Marines are running from building to building trying to protect government officials from being shot by sniper fire in the Ramadi protected zones, we have a problem.

Once again … and I feel like I am rewinding, play again, rewind, play again … “winning the heart and mind of the population” does not require us to leave the enemy alive and killing us or the Iraqis.  We will only win the cities and the people by killing Al Qaeda in the Sunni triangle.

This might involve Marine snipers, or it might involve more patrols, or it might involve a sweep of the city, or three-block strategy, or a series of mini-sweeps, or other tactics.  And I understand that Marines and Soldiers need to be on the ground, talking to the population, keeping the power grid functional, smoking with the men on the street corner, working with the locals to get people medical treatment, etc.

But you would have a hard time convincing me that business is operating properly with snipers shooting at “safe-zones.”  The way to win the population is to kill their enemy.  The Sunnis will not see Al Qaeda as their allies.  They are foreigners who are preventing the practice of business, worship, and a return to normalcy.