Archive for the 'SWAT Raids' Category

From The MetroWest Daily News:

FRAMINGHAM — Officer Paul Duncan was trained to have his M4 rifle in safety mode unless he was ready to fire. But the SWAT team member wasn’t necessarily wrong to have the safety off when he went to search Eurie Stamps Sr. for weapons during an early-morning drug raid, an expert has found.

In his review of the Jan. 5 fatality released yesterday, Steve Ijames found that Duncan and the rest of the SWAT team may have been operating under conflicting rifle-handling guidelines.

The team’s M4 rifle instructor told Ijames that officers are trained to keep their rifles on “safe” until they perceive a threat.

Lt. Michael Hill, in an internal Police Department report related to Stamps’ death, recalled slightly different instructions: for the first officers entering a room to have safeties off – and rifles in semi-automatic mode – if they perceived a “possible” threat.

That qualifier is important, Ijames suggested.

“The key consideration here is that Officer Duncan removed his weapon from safe moments after entering 26 Fountain St.” early on Jan. 5, Ijames wrote.

Authorities say Duncan shot and killed Stamps, a 68-year-old grandfather, when he lost his balance and accidentally pulled the trigger.

Stamps, who wasn’t a target of the raid, was face-down in a dark hallway, and Duncan was moving to secure the man’s hands behind his back when the shot was fired.

Ijames wrote, “The mechanical safety is what stands between good intentions and a potentially deadly outcome – but it can only do so when engaged.”

Police Chief Steven Carl sought an outside review of the tactical and technical aspects of the Stamps shooting from Ijames, a SWAT expert and retired assistant police chief from Missouri.

The town’s lawyer released Ijames’ report yesterday, as well as Hill’s internal report.

Ijames determined that Duncan and the other SWAT team members were well-trained, and that it was appropriate to use the heavily armed team to search 26 Fountain St.

He criticized the team, however, for failing to calculate a written formula (known as a SWAT threat-assessment matrix) beforehand to determine whether it needed to use that stealth. In the matrix, points are assigned based on questions such as whether targeted suspects have a record of violence, resisting arrest, drug use, mental problems, gang ties or a law enforcement or military background.

Using a SWAT team is considered optional under that formula if the tally is 1 to 16 points, while the commander weighs in if it totals 17 to 24 points. Team activation is considered necessary if the total is 25 or higher.

Analysis & Commentary

Take careful note of the foci of Ijames’ criticism: the position of the safety, and failure to use the threat assessment properly.  So apparently it is acceptable, even verging on “well trained,” for these officers to enter a home with their finger on the trigger of their weapon, but not acceptable for them to do so without the safety engaged.

This position is so odd as to be bizarre (and perhaps even dishonest).  Every responsible firearms owner, and especially every Concealed Handgun Permit holder, knows the importance of proper trigger discipline to his life, his family’s safety, and the safety of those around him.  He has had it drilled into him, night and day, through classes, practice, observation, time at the range, and so on.   There are reasons for this, and it has to do with more than just accidental discharge.  It pertains to sympathetic and involuntary muscle contractions.  There are three scenarios that may elicit involuntary muscle contractions that are sufficiently strong to bring about the involuntary discharge of a firearm: sympathetic contractions, loss of balance and startle reaction. Dr. Roger Enoka, one of the most renowned sports physiologists and director of the Human Performance Research Laboratories in Arizona (USA), was invited to testify in a court case held in Frankfurt, Germany in 1995, concerning involuntary discharges.  Here is part of his findings.

The term sympathetic contraction refers to the fact that an involuntary contraction may occur in the muscles of one limb when the same muscles in the other limb are performing an intended forceful action. In physiology literature this effect is known as a mirror movement, with the intensity of the sympathetic contraction depending on the amount of force exerted during the intended action. In policing, a common situation that may evoke such a sympathetic contraction would be, for example, a law enforcement officer attempting to restrain a struggling suspect with one hand while holding a handgun in the other.

The second scenario described by Enoka involves loss of balance. When balance is disturbed the human body evokes rapid involuntary contractions to return itself to a position of equilibrium. Thereby the involuntary contractions used to prevent a fall depend on the options available to counteract the disturbance of balance. Usually, compensatory movements following gait perturbations primarily involve correcting movements of the lower limbs to keep the body in balance, whereas movements of the arms are restricted to their extension forwards as a safeguard to counter an eventual fall. When an individual is holding a handle for support, there is, however, a tendency to use the arm muscles to maintain balance rather than the leg muscles. Under such circumstances the focal point of automatic postural activity is any contact point an individual has with his or her surroundings. In other words, if an individual’s posture is disturbed while grasping an object, for instance a handgun, he or she is likely to grasp it more forcefully.

Startle reaction, the third scenario identified by Enoka, is a whole-body reflex-like response to an unexpected stimulus, possibly a loud noise. It evokes rapid involuntary contractions that begin with the blink of an eye and spread to all muscles throughout the body. The reaction of the hands occurs less than 200ms after the stimulus and leads to individuals clenching their fists. Enoka concludes: “Accordingly, an officer who is startled by a loud, unexpected noise while searching for a suspect with his weapon drawn would surely increase the grip force on the weapon, perhaps enough to cause an involuntary discharge.”

Responsible firearms owners know this.  That’s why most firearms owners have worked so hard, and are so hard on each other, concerning proper trigger discipline.  The investigator in this so-called “independent” investigation knows this too.  That he didn’t bring it up is informative.  This officer is guilty of malfeasance by entering a home such as this with his finger on the trigger.  Moreover, take particular note of the circumstances.  Not only had this poor man surrendered, he was on the floor.  The officer in question was attempting to secure him, and this … with his finger on the trigger of a rifle with a round chambered.  The officer lost his balance, and lo and behold, he discharged his weapon.  Not only is this officer inept, his trainer(s) and supervision is inept, and perhaps even dishonest, to have accepted such a slanted “independent” assessment of the incident, and to allow this SWAT team out with weapons to terrorize citizens with their ineptitude.

But this all points to a larger problem.  Seldom is a police officer held accountable (or a better way to say it is that s/he will always get the benefit of the doubt no matter how significant the doubt it), and this goes double for SWAT teams.  If it offends our sensibilities for the Phoenix Tucson police department to have forcefully entered Jose Guerena’s home and shot him to death without due process, then that is true in the superlative for this poor man, Mr. Stamps, an innocent man, lying on the floor at the time he was shot to death.

But this last point about due process is really the crux of the issue.  We should see SWAT raids as a high risk evolution.  Risk is technically consequences times probability (C x P), and the product is used to make comparative judgments between alternatives.  Something with a high probability but low consequence can be high risk, something a low probability but a high consequence can be high risk.  As for SWAT raids, the evolving historical record shows them to have at least a moderately high probability of violence, with that violence having significant consequences.  The tactic is an extremely high risk evolution, and it will remain so.  The risk may be reduced by better training and competent officers, but in every case, management has made the decision to place the lives of suspects at high risk by use of the tactic.

In America, a man’s home is his castle.  Thus, the castle doctrine has passed into law (in various forms) in many states, and will enjoy continued success in the courts and legislatures of the states.  Rightly so.  The fact that the inhabitant of a home is a suspect in a crime doesn’t (or shouldn’t) mitigate the fact that he has a right to self defense, and defense of his loved ones.  And home invasion by criminals pretending to be police officers is becoming commonplace.

As to this last issue, by use of military tactics on American citizens, the police have bypassed legitimate constitutional protections and right to a trial by jury by placing the suspect in a position where he or his family may be in danger no matter whether he surrenders or not (a criminal will simply take his life with no remorse, while a police officer may do it with no accountability).  Moreover, SWAT tactics are routinely used on suspects who have no involvement with capital crimes.  Yet by the use of military tactics on these suspects, the police may be perpetrating capital punishment on criminals (or suspects) who do not deserve it.  The police have become judge, jury and executioner in this circumstance without regard to the nature of the crime.

While military tactics used against U.S. citizens may in fact currently be legal, such tactics are immoral in the vast majority of circumstances.  This isn’t meant to rule out the occasional use of such tactics when hostages are in play, or gun shots have already been taken, or other such exigent conditions.  But I have cataloged the evolution of tactics and danger level in SWAT raids and home invasions for a while now (and will continue to do so), and the police departments in the various cities and counties of the country – while they may be legally exonerated of wrongdoing – have some soul-searching to do.  It will be done now or in eternity, but it will be done.

Richard Fairburn, writing at PoliceOne.com, gives us this remarkable portrait of his vision for the police state in America.

I saddled up my first patrol rifle, a Colt AR15, in a Chevrolet Blazer 4×4 patrol vehicle in 1985. The other two patrol deputies in my county had their own semi-auto rifles in locking racks, one carried a Beretta AR70 (also in 5.56mm caliber) while the other had a H&K Model 91 chambered for the much more powerful 7.62x51mm NATO round (.308 Winchester). While more than one potential human target saw the business end of our rifles over the years, no one ever challenged their authority.

Now we see patrol rifles in the hands of many U.S. police officers, generally a variation of the AR15/M16/M4 system. I have long believed a rifle is the long gun “answer” to most police shooting situations, now it seems most agencies agree. So, I’ll try to stay one step ahead by suggesting we now need to move a few of our officers “beyond the patrol rifle.”

The other dominant rifle form in U.S. police usage has been the sniper rifle, generally referred to as a counter-sniper rifle in its earliest days following the “Texas Tower” massacre committed by Charles Whitman in Austin, Texas on August 1, 1966. What I propose now is that we equip and train a percentage of our patrol officers to a capability midway between those equipped with a patrol rifle and snipers who generally only deploy as one element of a SWAT team. The U.S. Army and Marine Corps are fielding these intermediate-level marksmen in significant numbers and they are proving to be extremely effective in Iraq and Afghanistan. The U.S. military refers to them as “Designated Marksmen,” and I propose we adopt similar terminology and the same weaponry for perhaps one in 10 patrol officers.

In February 2009, only a few months after the terrorist attack in Mumbai, India, PoliceOne ran my three-part series on how we should be training and preparing to counter terrorist teams of active shooters. In the development of that series of articles, I ran the drafts by LTC Dave Grossman, noted SWAT trainer Sgt. Ed Mohn, and a couple of military SpecOps dudes I know, adding their valuable input to the final product. I was more than a little gratified when I saw the Los Angeles, Las Vegas, and New York City police departments and the National Tactical Officers Association (NTOA) organize and train officers in ways that paralleled our early recommendations — the most common program being Multiple Attack Counter Terror Action Capabilities training, or MACTAC. It was in part three of that series that I first suggested the need for Designated Marksman (DM) capabilities when responding to a Mumbai-style attack.

The most simple and inexpensive way to improve on our existing patrol rifles is to upgrade existing 5.56mm carbines with low- to medium-power optical sights. This enhances the shooter’s ability to deliver precise fire at longer distances than we can generally muster with iron sights. In addition to optics, any 5.56mm DM rifle should be coupled with a heavy 5.56mm projectile like the 77gr MHP bullet in the Mk262 load. Most Army DMs are equipped with an M16 variant using a 4x optical sight and the Mk262 load. Many patrol rifle shooters can already quickly mount scopes or 3x magnifiers for low power optical sights.

But ideally, I think our Designated Marksmen should be equipped with a more powerful rifle to deal more effectively with both distance and light intervening cover. The AR15 platform can be upgraded to larger cartridges like the Remington .30 AR or the 6.8mm SPC, but stepping up even further makes more sense. The USMC Designated Riflemen generally shoot an updated M14 chambered for the 7.62x51mm (.308 Winchester). Our LE-type DMs should also opt for the 7.62mm/.308 round, but instead of firing the 168gr Match Hollow Point (MHP) round our snipers use, we should opt for a 150 grain expanding projectile. The sniper’s match hollow points are designed primarily for accuracy and give erratic terminal performance. Choosing a round like Federal Ammunition’s P308E, which uses a 150 grain Nosler Ballistic Tip bullet, or Black Hills Ammunition’s Black Hills Gold load that uses a Hornady 155 grain A-Max projectile, would provide devastating terminal performance and a reduced chance of over-penetration, coupled with the ability to switch interchangeably to military M80 Ball ammunition. The M80 Ball load is a trajectory match for a 150-155 grain expanding bullet and allows both reduced cost training as well as better penetration against barricaded targets.

The Marine Corp’s modified M14 DM rifle can be duplicated with an M1A rifle from Springfield Armory, their Scout Squad model is particularly handy. If you would prefer a semi-auto rifle with the same operating controls as your AR to simplify training, a number of AR makers offer a variation of the AR10 which is chambered for the 7.62mm round. A police DM rifle should be equipped with a scope sight of about 4x magnification (or a variable-power scope that will zoom up to at least 4x).

Analysis & Commentary

Despite his having invoked the U.S. Army, the classification of DM is primarily found in the U.S. Marine Corps (my son was a DM in his platoon).  The training for DM is much the same as the training for Marine Corps Scout Snipers, except for the stalking, evasion, and other things that make a sniper unique.

The writer invokes the memory of the shooter at the University of Texas at Austin in 1966, but Charles Whitman was killed on the observation deck at close range by a police officer using a shotgun.  Furthermore, it was a basic lack of plant security that allowed Whitman to be there at all.  The next data point in his scare tactics to pressure the reader into accepting a militarized police is the Mumbai attacks in India.  But there isn’t any indication that long range standoff weapons were used in ending the Mumbai attacks.  In fact, the notion the writer promulgates is more one of a paramilitary style force.

He specifically alludes to the DM designation, with police officers envisioned as using long range standoff weapons such as a sniper rifle.  Make no mistake about it.  Mr. Fairburn is quite literally advocating a higher ratio of snipers / DMs for the police than we typically find in Marine Corps infantry units.

Given the horrible state of no-knock raids in America (see Jose Guerenna raid among many others), the proliferation of these military tactics across the law enforcement community (see Department of Education affiliated officers and the raid on Kenneth Wright), and the common practice used by felons of announcing themselves as police officers, there isn’t any prima facie reason to entrust the police with high power weapons used in a standoff fashion.

The track record of police offices behaving as military operators (as they wish to be called) isn’t very good.  They haven’t earned the title, they haven’t deployed on combat tours, and their job function is to be peace officers.  In my own hometown I have noticed an increasing inconsistency in uniform among police officers, from cargo pants and tee shirts to formal uniforms, from OWB handgun holsters to drop holsters with tactical belts, and on and on the list goes.

While there is a need for access to more than just side arms (and training to use them in limited circumstances), police departments needs to work more towards less militarization of tactics and uniforms, less use of no-knock raids, and certainly as limited use as possible of long range standoff weapons.

Mr. Fairburn is pressing towards the increased militarization of U.S. police, while the optimum goal should be the decreased militarization of tactics.  But the troubling thing  about Mr. Fairburn’s argument is its wide acceptance within the law enforcement community.  It’s not uncommon now to find this attitude within police departments.  It’s easy to understand the interest in the so-called “black guns” (ARs) with close to two decades of war flashed across our TV screens (I have one), and I am certainly a defender of the right to bear arms as my readers know.  I regularly engage in both open and concealed carry.

But interest in tactics, dress, weapons, and so on, isn’t the same thing as behaving like military operators around the public where innocent bystanders can be injured, and where we have the bill of rights to protect us from the state.  Mr. Fairburn should rethink his position, but common citizens should become engaged in their local communities to ensure that the police aren’t in fact becoming too autonomous.

From ABC News10 (KXTV in Stockton, CA):

STOCKTON, CA – Kenneth Wright does not have a criminal record and he had no reason to believe a S.W.A.T team would be breaking down his door at 6 a.m. on Tuesday.

“I look out of my window and I see 15 police officers,” Wright said.

Wright came downstairs in his boxer shorts as a S.W.A.T team barged through his front door. Wright said an officer grabbed him by the neck and led him outside on his front lawn.

“He had his knee on my back and I had no idea why they were there,” Wright said.

According to Wright, officers also woke his three young children ages 3, 7, and 11 and put them in a Stockton police patrol car with him. Officers then searched his house.

As it turned out, the person law enforcement was looking for was not there – Wright’s estranged wife.

“They put me in handcuffs in that hot patrol car for six hours, traumatizing my kids,” Wright said.

Wright said he later went to the mayor and Stockton Police Department, but the City of Stockton had nothing to do with Wright’s search warrant.

The U.S. Department of Education issued the search and called in the S.W.A.T for his wife’s defaulted student loans.

“They busted down my door for this,” Wright said. “It wasn’t even me.”

According to the Department of Education’s Office of the Inspector General, the case can’t be discussed publicly until it is closed, but a spokesperson did confirm that the department did issue the search warrant at Wright’s home.

The Office of the Inspector General has a law enforcement branch of federal agents that carry out search warrants and investigations.

Stockton Police Department said it was asked by federal agents to provide one officer and one patrol car just for a police presence when carrying out the search warrant.

Stockton police did not participate in breaking Wright’s door, handcuffing him, or searching his home.

“All I want is an apology for me and my kids and for them to get me a new door,” Wright said.

This is difficult to swallow for one who doesn’t believe that the Department of Education should exist anyway.  So let me get this straight.  The Department of Education has a SWAT Team.  Special Weapons and Tactics!  And they are enforcing warrants with SWAT raids that pertain to payment of student loans, probably wearing “tacti-cool” gear and all swollen with their self-importance, pointing loaded weapons at innocent men.  And some judge actually issued a warrant for such a raid?

And so now Mr. Wright has traumatized children, a broken door, and probalby lost time from work to handle the hassle, and on top of that the Department of Education looks like jackbooted thugs.  And the Department of Education has a SWAT Team?  Seriously?

The one good thing that could come from this is that we’ve found the best place to start cost-cutting since the bridge to nowhere.

UPDATE #1: Note that I have previously called for a Congressional investigation into SWAT tactics in use in the United States.

I call on the House Subcommittee of the Constitution or the House Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Security to investigate the militarization of police tactics within America, and whether such tactics comport with the constitutional rights of the citizens of the United States.

I reiterate this call.

UPDATE #2: From commenter Don Delis, we learn that the raid was not about student loans.  THAT didn’t take long!  The URL has been updated, since the News10 article has been changed and the report amended to refer to some unspecified investigation.  They have got to do better than that to justify the use of SWAT tactics when knocking at the door would have been sufficient.  This is about police officers playing combat operator, and there is no excuse for it.

Pima County Sheriff Clarence Dupnik spoke on the record concerning the SWAT raid that killed former Marine Jose Guerena (courtesy of reader Rich Buckley).  There are several questions and answers that deserve our focus.

Dupnik:  I don’t know.  My feeling is that the reason he came not to the door, but entered the hallway with an assault rifle pointed, the only reason none of us were shot, is because he forgot the safety was on.  And by the time he realized, he was shot.  But my feeling is the reason he came with that gun is that he thought we were there to arrest him for murder.

Waddell:  Is there any explanation as to the mixup, because Storie has come out and said, look, we thought he wasn’t going to be home, or, we didn’t know the wife and kids were going to be home.

Dupnik:  I don’t have an explanation, but that’s not the facts that I have.  We had reason to believe that he probably was going to be there.  We also had reason to believe that the kids may not, and the mother, because they were supposed to be at school.  That was their normal pattern.  But we did not conduct the surveillance that day because we would have been identified.  We can’t do that.  First of all, when we are serving a search warrant on a property, it’s typical for when the people find out that you’re outside the house, the start destroying evidence that they can, burning documents, and things of this nature.  That’s one of the reasons that we don’t do that.  We had no reason at all to believe that this was anything other than any of the multitude of other search warrants that we’ve served where we never had a problem.  We had no reason to believe that this guy was going to do that.  But because he is part of a very violent organization, we considered it high risk.

Waddell:  There have been a lot of people who have started to call for changes in SWAT protocol in general – the way that things are surveilled, the way that the operation is conducted itself.  We’ve even had one of your former colleagues, the Graham County Sheriff, come out and say, look, I’ve worked with Sheriff Dupnik and I think it’s time to make some changes.  One, what do you say to those critics who are calling for changes in SWAT protocol?  And two, do you think that maybe it is time to review some of the policies?

Dupnik:  We’re always reviewing our policies.  And that’s one of the purposes of our shooting board, which is going to be meeting next week.  But as far as the other criticisms, let me tell you that Pima County has a nationally-recognized SWAT team.  As a matter of fact, one of our commanders goes all over the country instructing other organizations on SWAT techniques and protocol.  We have one that’s known internationally, Dr. Richard Carmona, who goes all over the world talking about SWAT.  In my judgment, we have a premiere SWAT organization, and at this point I don’t see any need to — This was an unfortunate situation that was provoked by the person himself.

Waddell:  We have had some viewers who have come out and said, look, how do I know that the SWAT team isn’t going to bust into my house and shoot me dead in my house for what they would say is no reason.  What would you say to the community to address some of those concerns of perhaps mishandling?

Dupnik:   I don’t think anything was mishandled.  Unfortunately, this individual points an assault rifle at cops.  You do that, you are going to get killed.  And the community has no reason to be concerned about it.  We have a national reputation.  We have been doing this for many years.  And our organization as I said is nationally recognized as one of the most proficient.  It’s not an issue.  We average about 50 of these searches of where we have to have a search warrant from judge.  And law abiding people don’t have to worry about confrontation with the cops.

This is just rich.  First, Sheriff Dupnik accuses Jose Guerena, a two-tour veteran of Iraq and honorably discharged Marine, of being incompetent.  He forgot to take his weapon off of safety.  It would be interesting to hear from from other Marines, active duty or former, but the notion that he forgot to take his weapon off of safety is so ridiculous that it makes the Sheriff’s case seem like just so much buffoonery.  I don’t have a handy picture of the safety on my AR, but go find one for yourself or on the web and take note of just how likely it would be for the weapon to be on safe and not know it when you picked it up.

Next, it’s a bit disconcerting to hear that the Pima County SWAT team, or any member of it, instructs other SWAT teams on proper tactics and techniques.  But a premier SWAT organization they certainly don’t have.  Recall the video of the SWAT raid?  The testimony thus far of the raid doesn’t match up with the video (courtesy of reader Dave Hardy).

Officer Hector Iglecias, told detectives he fired his handgun after he saw the muzzle flashes from Guerena’s rifle, documents state.

“I get this slight glimpse to the left, which is kind of like a living room area,” Iglecias said during the interview, which occurred right after the shooting.

“And I see, pretty much, a male subject come out,” he said.

Iglecias, of the Sahuarita Police Department, said he saw an object on the right side of Guerena’s body before he saw the muzzle flashes.

The officer said he then fired nine or 10 rounds from his handgun while holding it with one hand before the gun malfunctioned. He and other officers told authorities they saw splinters coming off the doorway during the shooting.

He fell while attempting to reload, he said, prompting the other officers to believe he was hit.

Iglecias described how officers pulled him in front of the entrance and took him behind an armored vehicle parked in front of the house.

Other officers described hearing shots fired in their direction.

Deputy Kenneth Walsh was the officer who gave the commands for Guerena to come out of the house.

Walsh told investigators he issued at least two sets of commands in English and Spanish before he and another officer were ordered to open the door.

The order to open the door came during his third set of commands, he said.

It took at least a minute to issue the commands before they knocked down the door, he said.

He also described a hectic scene filled with gunfire and splintering objects.

A full minute to issue the commands, or so they say.  The video shows four to five seconds.  All of the chaos that the testimony discusses came from the SWAT team.  The sequence of events was roughly this.

1. Guerena enters the room.
2. The first officer incorrectly believes he sees Guerena fire.
3. The first officer empties his magazine at him. Other officers now believe they are in a gunfight.
4. First officer stumbles and falls. Other officers believe Guerena has shot their buddy.
5. Other officers empty their magazines into him.

And remember.  This is a nationally recognized SWAT team who travels the nation teaching others how to do it.  And also remember, if you ever respond to a SWAT raid of your home after hearing a knock at the door four seconds before, not knowing who it is, or even if they are legitimate police officers, and armed men are entering your home, and you confront the intruders with a weapon, you’ll die.  So says Sheriff Dupnik.

Oh.  Did I mention that this team is nationally recognized and trains other SWAT teams to do this?

Prior:

New Details on the Jose Guerena Raid

Further Analysis of the Jose Guerena Raid

The Jose Guerena Raid: A Demonstration of Tactical Incompetence

From KGUN9:

TUCSON (KGUN9-TV) – This video of the shooting at Jose Guerena’s home has cast a huge spotlight on him and his family. A picture of Guerena has circulated where he’s dressed in his marine uniform but 9OYS has just received his booking photo where he’s dressed in an inmate jumpsuit.

Guerena was arrested in 2009 but never charged. 9OYS wanted to know why. Reporter Sergio Avila headed to Eloy Justice court to get the records. The documents show Guerena was arrested for drug possession, having drug paraphernalia and weapon misconduct.

9OYS also has discovered Guerena’s wife, Vanessa, paid a $2500 bond to bail him out of jail but that money was returned to her when no charges were filed.

In Arizona if the county attorney doesn’t file charges within 48 hours the person is set free. That’s what happened to Guerena, again, 9OYS wanted to know why.

The Pinal County attorney’s office released this statement on the case:

“A case regarding Mr. Jose Guerena was submitted to the Pinal County Attorney’s office and following review it was declined.”

The county attorney’s office says Guerena was arrested with two other people and the case just didn’t meet the requirements in order to charge him with a crime.

The county attorney’s office says that information has already been purged from their records as is common for older and smaller cases.

Swat team attorney Mike Storie has already told KGUN9 News, although no charges were filed, this earlier arrest of three suspects shows Guerena was involved in some wrongdoing.

“They had differing accounts of how they knew each other.  They had differing accounts of where they were going; where they were coming from,” Storie explained.  “This is typical of people who are together doing a drug deal.”

“Again, this is just consistent with somebody who is a possessor of drugs, conceals drugs, and it is certainly consistent with someone who deals with drugs,” Storie said.

But Storie also said that the SWAT team knew nothing of the previous arrest when it attempted to execute a search warrant at Guerena’s home on May 5.

More information on Guerena’s arrest will come in the police report KGUN9 News has already requested from DPS.

Perhaps this isn’t new details on the raid itself, but it certainly casts light on the attitude of the Tuscon police before, during and after the raid that took Guerena’s life.

So let’s be straight on this.  There were no charges filed in 2009.  The fact that he was arrested, along with the fact that three individuals gave partially contradictory statements is reason enough to send a heavily armed tactical team against his family, or at least to suspect that he was a criminal.

It couldn’t have been that the other two people arrested gave incorrect statements and he gave the only correct one, and it couldn’t have been that he simply never should have been arrested to begin with.  No.  The fact that the Tuscon police potentially screwed up once justified their suspicion of him.

I see.

I have not yet commented on the propriety of any charges against Mr. Guerena.  I am not in possession of the evidence, I wasn’t there, and I don’t know.  But what we know about the raid continues to make a compelling case that the wrong tactics topped off wrongheaded strategy in their quest to find the truth.  And the Tuscon police continue to add to their own bad reputation.

Prior:

Further Analysis of the Jose Guerena Raid

The Jose Guerena Raid: A Demonstration of Tactical Incompetence

In The Jose Guerena Raid: A Demonstration of Tactical Incompetence we saw the helmet camera video released by Sheriff Dupnik of the raid on the home of Jose Guerena.  I observed the following.

First, Mr. Guerena’s weapon, contrary to initial accounts by the SWAT team, was never taken off of safety.  The team took no shots from him.  Second, the team mills around for a while before breaching the home.  Third, they don’t form into a stack.  Fourth, absurdly, they knock and allow only four seconds for a response.  Fifth, one of the members falls in the doorway.  Sixth, upon shots being fired (by the SWAT team), more than one team member begins backing away from the incident.  Seventh, one of the team members who initially backed away moves forward to fire shots over the heads of other team members who are in the home (it’s a wonder that SWAT team members didn’t get shot by their own team).  All the while, several team members are standing aimlessly outside the home, doing nothing.  Then to top it all off, even though medical responders arrived within minutes, they weren’t allowed into the home for one hour and fourteen minutes.

Since then Bob Owens has done a good job of outlining in more detail why this was tactically a bad incident.  But I also received a note from a Police Department Captain (his name and city will remain anonymous).  He responds to the raid.

I am curious to see what the investigation reveals and interested in what information comes out.  Civilian police are not nearly as well-trained as military personnel going to war. In higher risk situations, it is preferable to have a team with a little more training and equipment than street officers.  The somewhat casual appearance of the officers indicated they probably didn’t anticipate armed resistance even if higher risk.  In a forced entry raid, if the homeowner displayed a weapon, he may have been hit with automatic weapons (accounting for the large number of rounds.)  The homeowner was obviously deceased immediately so there was no need to allow the paramedics in to contaminate the crime scene.  Medics may have been sent in later to make a legally-required pronouncement of death if Arizona requires a medical professional to do same.  My primary concern would be: what did the officers see when they entered, did they have the correct house and how reliable was the information used for the search warrant?  If the homeowner displayed the weapon as they made entry, they probably had no choice but to shoot.  If the first shot is not yours in that type of situation, you don’t go back home that day.

My friend raises a number of important questions and issues, so let’s go into more detail on the raid and why this was not a good choice of strategy or tactics.  First, the tactics.

To begin with, the failure was set into motion by their confusion as to procedure, and their setup of the operation.  This was neither a no-knock raid nor a knock-and-question visit.  It was the worst of both worlds.  The “tactical team” turned on the siren for a moment, whether by accident or intentionally, and then knocked on the door.  They could have used the element of concealment and surprise by not announcing their presence, but they chose to give at least a cursory announcement of the team’s presence on the grounds of the home.

Next, they didn’t allow that announcement to take effect and perform its intended function, i.e., to persuade the home’s occupants to come to the door and take questions, allow the police into their home, view a warrant, etc.  By doing what they did, the police set up their own failure.  They gave Mr. Guerena long enough to grab a weapon from a sound sleep, but not long enough to ascertain what was going on.  It is well known that decisions within 30 minutes of waking are worse than those made in a drunken state, and driving is not advisable just after waking.  In this case, they forced Mr. Guerena to decide whether to defend his family, a decision he ultimately made well, where he noticed that they were police officers and never took his weapon off of safety.  Unfortunately, the police were not as disciplined.

Next, they breached the doorway, but stayed in the “funnel” far too long.  In fact, most of the officers never left the funnel, causing unnecessary hazard to themselves and the balance of the team.  Next, they were not well-trained enough or disciplined enough to withhold fire when they saw Mr. Guerena with a weapon.  They used what I will call Fallujah tactics.  Think Operation Al Fajr, or Operation Alljah.  Every home in Iraq was allowed at least one weapon, and it was usually a Kalashnikov.  The number of times that Soldiers or Marines entered the homes of Iraqis only to find that they have weapons, perhaps at their fingertips, cannot be counted.  Yet they did it, and they learned military operations on urban terrain (MOUT).  They became accustomed to the threat and risk, and they learned that split second decision-making that accomplished the mission.

In this case, Sheriff Dupnik’s tactical team made no such judgment.  They used an “if anything moves kill it” mentality (Fallujah, Iraq tactics).  Except this isn’t Fallujah, Iraq.  This is Tuscon, Arizona.  This is completely inappropriate for homes in America.  Finally, it they had stopped shooting at two shots and allowed medical aid, Mr. Guerena might have been saved.  As it was, he was their last concern.  In this case, it was supposedly a drug related raid, and no drugs or contraband were found in this home.  And Mr. Guerena is dead.

Now for the strategy.  The police department could have decided to wait until Mr. Guerena was headed to work and accompany him with several units until they found a safe place to stop and question him.  They could have executed a search warrant of his home, with him absent, at the same time, where there would have been no decision to be made regarding defense of life and family.  In this case they would have found that whatever reason that justified the search warrant to begin with was ill-conceived and mistaken.  As it is, Mr. Guerena is dead.  There could have been a thousand such options other than a day-time raid with automatic weapons.  But they didn’t choose any of those options.

If police department wish to implement military style tactics in situations that demand such tactics (e.g., hostage situations), then they need to become skilled in such tactics and fund and train the tactical teams in a manner worthy of the tactics in use.  Things such as parallel deployments with the military to various theaters around the world comes to mind.

Otherwise, police departments are simply going to have to be wiser and more sophisticated regarding their strategic approach to what they believe to be dangerous people, and corral those people to locations where the risk is minimized to the potential victims, the police, and innocent bystanders.  Any other approach is simply malfeasance on the part of the police.

Last, I call on the House Subcommittee of the Constitution or the House Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Security to investigate the militarization of police tactics within America, and whether such tactics comport with the constitutional rights of the citizens of the United States.  While I am sympathetic to my friend’s concern about going home at the end of his shift, that sympathy is mitigated when I witness awful tactics and even worse strategy.

Helmet camera footage of the SWAT team raid on the home of Jose Guerena has been released.

Bob Owen noticed the same thing I did.  One of the team members fell in the doorway upon breaching and entering the home.  The video speaks for itself, but by way of summary, let’s observe the following.

First, Mr. Guerena’s weapon, contrary to initial accounts by the SWAT team, was never taken off of safety.  The team took no shots from him.  Second, the team mills around for a while before breaching the home.  Third, they don’t form into a stack.  Fourth, absurdly, they knock and allow only four seconds for a response.  Fifth, one of the members falls in the doorway.  Sixth, upon shots being fired (by the SWAT team), more than one team member begins backing away from the incident.  Seventh, one of the team members who initially backed away moves forward to fire shots over the heads of other team members who are in the home (it’s a wonder that SWAT team members didn’t get shot by their own team).  All the while, several team members are standing aimlessly outside the home, doing nothing.  Then to top it all off, even though medical responders arrived within minutes, they weren’t allowed into the home for one hour and fourteen minutes.

The Sheriff may as well have sent the Keystone Cops to raid the home.  These clowns shouldn’t be allowed anywhere near weapons.

UPDATE: Thanks to Glenn Reynolds for the LINK.

UPDATE #2: So I asked a certain former Marine I know (combat tour of Fallujah in 2007) what he thought about this particular raid. Here are his thoughts. This would be hilarious if a man hadn’t died in the process. Tactically speaking, their raid was foolish, and they are guilty of murder. So this SWAT team wanted to “get some?” Great. Go join the Marine Corps and deploy to a foreign country and fight insurgents. You’re supposed to be peace officers, to prevent things like this from happening. As it was, Mr. Guerena thought his home was being invaded, and so what would you do in this circumstance? Well, you go get a weapon and post up. You send rounds down range to protect your family. Mr. Guerena even had the good discipline not to do that. This whole incident was evil.

UPDATE #3: I’ve had a chance to talk with my son about this some more, and a good summary of what this raid was like is to say that “It looks like the Iraqi Army raiding a house.” I had known that the ISF wasn’t present during much of his time in Fallujah (most of the security forces were Marines and IPs), so I asked him, “Why do you say that? Have you seen the Iraqi Army raiding a house?” He said yes, and I responded by asking him what it looked like? He said “It looks like that. Just like that. People falling all over each other, emptying their weapons, shooting at everything, and shooting at nothing.”