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Three Non-commissioned officers queue up to dispel the myths, respond to the critics, end the rumors, and weigh in on rules of engagement for U.S. troops in Iraq. 

On December 6, I published Politically Correct Rules of Engagement Endanger Troops.  This article touched quite the raw nerve, and since the time of publication I have received many communications from various interested parties, some of them with direct knowledge of the things discussed in the article.  I stated in the comments to the article that I would update the discussion with future posts, and this is my second installment on the subject of rules of engagement.  Some of the communications I received from members of the military were literally stunning, and I will focus on two such communications in this article, specifically, from NCOs who were in Iraq and who are familiar with rules of engagement and the affect they have on U.S. troops.

Introduction and Background

Necessarily preliminary to this discussion is an understanding of why it is acceptable to discuss such things in the open.  Does detail on this topic not constitute an OPSEC (operational security) violation?  This question has been posed to me on other articles I have written.  More specifically, regarding my article Snipers Having Tragic Success Against U.S. Troops, it was stated to me by one reader that the free flow of information concerning the military may be likened to the Roman roads.  The same roads the Roman armies used to build the Roman empire were used by invading armies to end it.  And as a result of the seed article to this one (on ROE), it was said to me that while it may not have been intentional, the affect of my article on rules of engagement was like the affect Jane Fonda had during her visit to North Vietnam.  I had broken the “loose lips sinks ships” rule, and it had a detrimental affect on our ability to wage war.  I must confess, I have never been compared to Jane Fonda before.

In the two articles cited above, I used only MSM reports, and tried to weave a cohesive story together from the several reports that had been filed.  One of the virtues of blogging is that a vast array of reports and other information is available to the self-initiated analyst to observe trends and other characteristics of the reports.  This fairly accurately describes the two aforementioned articles.  Nothing original existed in them.  If this information is available to me, then it is most certainly available to the enemy.  More to the point, the only way, for instance, for the MSM to be able to write that the enemy knows the ROE of U.S. troops is to get the story directly from U.S. troops.  The story is there with U.S. troops because they see it and live it daily.  The U.S. troops get the story from the enemy.  Hence, the enemy already knows the information.

To assert that a blogger with third hand knowledge of the enemy interactions with U.S. troops (e.g., dropping their weapons just prior to engagement, and then walking away when the ROE prohibits U.S. troops from engaging), packaging them up coherently, and commenting on them for several hundred people to read constitutes “loose lips” is akin to suggesting that your family accountant is responsible for the latest Congressional vote to raise taxes.  Put simply, “that dog won’t hunt.”

Additionally, there is a difference between written ROE (most of which the grunt is not allowed to read), and the implementation in the field.  Commercial jet airliners have manuals, but reading them, no matter how studiously, doesn’t qualify a person to pilot the aircraft.  The two parties most qualified to understand how ROE affects U.S. troops are U.S. troops themselves and the enemy.  The enemy sees them.  The enemy fights them.  They see the actual ROE in the field, and the claim that somehow a blog can affect what the enemy is watching on the ground is not compelling.

What honest, open and serious debate can do is make the general public aware of things that they would otherwise not have time to research for themselves.  Finally, a post like this can serve to open and continue dialogue and debate within the military ranks on a subject that involves many raw nerves and, based on the reports below, causes an impediment to achieving the mission objectives.

I hope that this post serves as a catalyst to those ends.  Concerning the two NCOs I cite below, I have done my investigative homework to verify that they are who they say they are; e-mail from *.mil network domains, independent verification from MSM accounts and other sources that the units they said that they were part of were indeed deployed to the locations and at the times that they claimed.  Finally, one word is redacted from the first account for sensibilities, and per agreement with one of the NCOs, the dates, unit designations and locations are redacted from the second account (for reasons that will not be disclosed here).  The language is “crusty,” and so the reader has been warned.

I would like to express my personal gratitude and sincere humility that these respected NCOs felt that they could share their experiences with me.  I am honored beyond what I can express here in words.

The NCOs Speak

From an NCO who was deployed in the Kirkuk area for approximately one year.

Our ROE was simple. The right to self defense was never denied. The ROE was based on a method of determining a life threatening scenario from a non-life threatening one. We called this the “Escalation Of Force.” Show, Shout, Shove, and Shoot. It’s pretty self explanatory and easy to follow in a perfect world. The problem is that the world isn’t perfect.

Scenario: You’re a gunner on an M2 .50 caliber machine gun mounted atop a M1114 Up-Armored HMMWV. You are the last vehicle and you are pulling rear security. A vehicle in the distance is swerving through traffic on a mission from God and closing on your convoy quickly. You wave your arms to get the driver’s attention to no avail. You yell obscenities at the crazy Iraqi while drawing down on the vehicle with your large caliber, fully automatic, machine gun. Hell, you even throw your water bottle hoping to get the hood on a bounce. Nothing. You notice a male driver who appears to be gripping the wheel a little too tight and who has beads of sweat forming on his brow. You realize that this could be trouble. But… to complicate the matter, there is a woman (presumably his wife) and 4 children in the car as well. The vehicle is fast approaching… and you have a mere second to react. Your buddy’s, nay, family’s lives are on the line behind you. They trust you to make the right decision. What do you do?

Option 1: Warning shots. Sure. Can work. Collateral damage becomes an issue, and high ranking military personnel HATE such paperwork.

Option 2: Wait it out. This choice is putting the lives of a “civilian” before the lives of your military “family.”  I wholeheartedly disagree with this choice, but it keeps you out of Leavenworth.

Option 3: Stop the vehicle by any means necessary. Shoot ’em up and ensure the safety of your family who depends on you.

Now with any of these options you find out in the end that either… A) Vehicle drives right on by and through the convoy, apparently the wife was in labor and they were speeding to the hospital. B) Vehicle drives right by you and slams into middle vehicle as 5 155mm Mortar rounds detonate the vehicle killing 3, wounding 4 and truly screwing up your day.

So, you don’t know if a pregnant wife is being rushed to the hospital or a family of insane insurgents are preparing to destroy you.

That is a lot of responsibility to be put on an 18 year old private sitting behind an uber powerful machine gun. That’s why our armed forces are so wonderful. We have 18 year old kids who can and do make those decisions daily. What a wonderful country we were born in.

You make the wrong move and kill civilians though, you not only have to live with the mistake, but you will be ridiculed unmercifully by the media/big army. You will be buried in proceedings and paperwork the remainder of your deployment, and you will not be the same. Your buddies will be affected as well. Cpl. X will see how bad it could be to make the wrong decision, and will hesitate just a hair too long when there is a real threat… and more men will die. The fear of failure leads to hesitation, and hesitation in war is a lesser form of suicide.

That, in my opinion, is the problem. This is not a war. The enemy does not wear uniforms, and therefore the Geneva Convention is null and void instead of applicable.

My unit, as well as the thousands of other soldiers in our area dealt with these problems on a daily basis. The “details” of the ROE changed daily. Some examples… For a time, the gunners would bring buckets full of rocks into the turret with them to throw through the windshields of vehicles not adhering to our warnings to stay away (that ended quickly after command had to pay for numerous windshields). We put signs in Arabic/Kurdish/Turkish on the backs of the vehicles warning them to stay away. We fired warning shots. We did nothing. We drove in the center of the road and dominated our routes by running ignorant drivers right off the road. We drove with the flow of traffic and narrowly averted disaster numerous times.

From another NCO who was deployed in Ramadi for about a year.

The ROE is a politically based cover your ass piece of paper.  It has caused American deaths and really hurt our ability to actually DO anything …

The full ROE is classified, but soldiers are given a small 1 or so page excerpt.  It is stressed that the ROE is not do be divulged or given out to anyone not in uniform, but is more of an FOUO at our level (for official use only) … They [the grunts] are told they can always defend themselves, but then given warning of “overdefending” themselves. 

So yes, from the grunts on the field perspective … the ROE is vague and limiting.  And every time “violations” of the ROE came up it caused our soldiers and marines to question their actions and sometimes cause casualties. If you look up the case of the [unit redacted] Soldier from the [location redacted] region you will see an excellent example.  The [unit redacted] Soldiers started pulling back after that, and even though he eventually had the charges dropped it caused problems throughout the entire Battalion.

And without going into specifics if you look at [date redacted] incident when we lost two Marine pilots and an Army Lt north of [location redacted] you will see another example of how fear of ROE kept us from hitting an enemy until after he had fired at us (and led to a downed helo and an IEDed hummer).  And it was almost much worse.  We dropped two 500 lb bombs a little later and stopped the insurgents from a planned attack that might have led to even more deaths.  And we almost didn’t do that because of ROE.

Analysis and Commentary

These reports parallel the report documented in a recent article at Blackfive by another NCO:

Let me tell you a little something about ROE (Rules of Engagement). In Baghdad thousands of people are moving around all the time. Many houses, all of them, have guns. On a general scale, none of them are planning any wrongdoing at all. But they don’t think that Americans can accomplish anything, either, because they know we can’t search at will, can’t shoot at will, can’t detain at will.

If you wish to stop a car approaching a checkpoint, you must first post a sign a long way down the road, if it is ignored, you must verbally warn them, and use a green laser to get the drivers attention. If still ignored, you must fire a warning shot with an M4, then a M240, then, finally the kill shot. If at any time the car turns away, all you can do is TRY to pursue it, never shoot at it. Technically, similar rules exist for dismounted operations, and that puts more soldiers at risk than you can possibly imagine. I’m not sure Johnny on the street has this information, but Muhammed in the mosque sure does.

I can’t even tell you how pissed it makes me to hear a JAG officer suck in breath as he tries to think real hard how to explain the murky depths of our ROE. A system that used to be a way of allowing soldiers to avoid hurting civilians by using certain weapon systems at certain times has once again degenerated into a complex “Cover Your Ass

I might be behind the news cycles a bit on this, but there is an interesting story concerning innovation and adaptation from troops in Iraq.  Hat tip to Arms and the Law, troops have discovered that they can find trip wires by shooting silly string at them:

Dear KSFO Listeners,

My good friend Deborah Johns, Vice-President of Marine Moms of Northern California, whose son William has is now serving his third tour of duty, sent me this very important letter.

Hi Melanie,

I have heard from William for the first time in 3 months. I was so excited to get a call from him. He told me that the Marines really have the pressure on the insurgents and the Marines are really uncovering big stuff that makes it difficult for them. William also said that good things are happening and to let everyone know, and to hang in there with them and keep supporting them because they need the support of the American people.

William also said that they need handwarmers because it is cold and more importantly–send Silly String. They are able to dispense that stuff from 10 feet away and it will detect trip wires that are not visible to the naked eye and saves their lives before entering a building. He said the Silly String just floats through the air and lays gently on any trip wire and works pretty cool. If there are no trip wires then it just falls and hits the ground.  So, we are trying to send any Silly String possible.

Thought you might like to know some good news from the battle field.

Love, Deb

No high tech gadgetry or gear necessary.  Purchasing it from Walmart and sending it over by mail is the most efficient way to put it in the hands of the troops.  If a defense contractor gets hold of the idea and it becomes part of the DoD budget, the cost will go up by three orders of magnitude (product testing, product QA, management oversight of the program, retirement benefits, etc.).

Note: This article has been updated and expanded with The NCOs Speak on Rules of Engagement.

In his article Spinning Haditha, Marine W. Thomas Smith made the following sad but prophetic observation:

… every student of military science understands the ugly nature of insurgencies; where insurgents are un-uniformed, unconventional fighters who move freely throughout the community during the day, and become bushwhackers at night. They routinely use women and children as human shields, and often coerce the latter into the service of operating guerrillas.

This is particularly effective against U.S. forces, because the enemy knows that no matter how much stress they may be under, American soldiers will go to great lengths to avoid killing women and children; and even hesitate (at great risk to themselves) when they see women and children shooting at them.

I followed on to predict that charges of civilian casualties and inappropriate rules of engagement would become a staple of enemy propaganda, that rules of engagement would be modified, and that U.S. troops would become increasingly hesitant to fire on the enemy. Every one of these predictions has come true.

As discussed in Newsweek’s expose on Marine Captain Rob Secher, Captain Secher wrote home that “any time an American fires a weapon there has to be an investigation into why there was an escalation of force.”

In my article Unleash the Snipers!, I noted that Marines in Ramadi have noted the hindrance the rules of engagement have become to their missison:

The military has also tightened rules of engagement as the war has progressed, toughening the requirements before a sniper may shoot an Iraqi. Potential targets must be engaged in a hostile act, or show clear hostile intent.

The marines say insurgents know the rules, and now rarely carry weapons in the open. Instead, they pose as civilians and keep their weapons concealed in cars or buildings until just before they need them. Later, when they are done shooting, they put them swiftly out of sight and mingle with civilians.

In my article Racoon Hunting and the Battle for Anbar, I noted that Marines from Fallujah report that:

“A lot of us feel like we have our hands tied behind our back,

Sun Tzu, “The Art of War,” III.26: “He who understands how to use both large and small forces will be victorious.”  Tu Yu comments, “There are circumstances in war when many cannot attack few, and others when the weak can master the strong.”

Courtesy of New York Times: Sgt. Jesse E. Leach of the Marines assisted Lance Cpl. Juan Valdez-Castillo, who was shot by a sniper in the town of Karma. He survived.

Background

The insurgents in Iraq for some time had relied on stand-off weapons to do their warfare (i.e., IEDs).  With the influx of the more well-trained al-Qaeda fighters across the Syrian and Jordanian borders, these tactics have given way to guerrilla tactics.  Every stand-up battle in which the insurgents engage the U.S. troops involves a loss for the insurgents, sometimes significant.  It has taken time for the evolution to occur, but the change to asymmetric warfare seems to be about complete.

On June 21, 2006, Marine Lance Cpl. Nicholas Whyte died from sniper fire in the streets of Ramadi.  On September 26, 2006, Marine PFC Christopher T. Riviere died in the Anbar Province from sniper fire while wearing full body armor.  On October 8, 2006, Marine Captain Robert Secher died from sniper fire.  On October 22, 2006, Specialists Nathaniel Aguirre and Matthew Creed, US Army, died from sniper fire while on foot patrol in Baghdad (see also a North County Times article on Creed).  There is no shortage of personal stories on fatalities from sniper fire, but stepping back from the personal to the statistical, there is no question that sniper attacks have increased in both frequency and lethality.

Sniper attacks on U.S. troops have risen dramatically as more Americans have been pulled into the capital to patrol on foot and in lightly armored vehicles amid raging religious violence.  Sniper attacks, generally defined as one or two well-aimed shots from a distance, have totaled 36 so far this month in Baghdad, according to U.S. military statistics.

That’s up from 23 such attacks in September and 11 in January.

The figures were confirmed by Lt. Gen. Peter Chiarelli, the No. 2 commander of U.S. forces in Iraq. “The total numbers are elevated, and the effectiveness has been greater,” he said.

At least eight of the 36 sniper attacks in Baghdad in October have been fatal, according to accounts by hometown newspapers reporting on the deaths of individual soldiers and Marines. Snipers have also killed four U.S. servicemembers in Anbar province this month.

Assessment

The picture above visually conveys the story of the sniper attack that wounded Lance Cpl. Juan Valdez-Castillo.

The bullet passed through Lance Cpl. Juan Valdez-Castillo as his Marine patrol moved down a muddy urban lane. It was a single shot. The lance corporal fell against a wall, tried to stand and fell again.

His squad leader, Sgt. Jesse E. Leach, faced where the shot had come from, raised his rifle and grenade launcher and quickly stepped between the sniper and the bloodied marine. He walked backward, scanning, ready to fire.

Shielding the marine with his own thick body, he grabbed the corporal by a strap and dragged him across a muddy road to a line of tall reeds, where they were concealed. He put down his weapon, shouted orders and cut open the lance corporal’s uniform, exposing a bubbling wound.

Lance Corporal Valdez-Castillo, shot through the right arm and torso, was saved. But the patrol was temporarily stuck. The marines were engaged in the task of calling for a casualty evacuation while staring down their barrels at dozens of windows that faced them, as if waiting for a ghost’s next move.

This sequence on Tuesday here in Anbar Province captured in a matter of seconds an expanding threat in the war in Iraq. In recent months, military officers and enlisted marines say, the insurgents have been using snipers more frequently and with greater effect, disrupting the military’s operations and fueling a climate of frustration and quiet rage.

The New York Times article goes on to say that “across Iraq, the threat has become serious enough that in late October the military held an internal conference about it, sharing the experiences of combat troops and discussing tactics to counter it. There has been no ready fix.  The battalion commander of Sergeant Leach’s unit — the Second Battalion, Eighth Marines — recalled eight sniper hits on his marines in three months and said there had been other possible incidents as well. Two of the battalion’s five fatalities have come from snipers, he said, and one marine is in a coma. Another marine gravely wounded by a sniper has suffered a stroke.”

I have covered the weaknesses in the Interceptor body armor system with its gaps in protection along the lateral torso.  The insurgent snipers have become quite sophisticated in their tactics.  They have become disciplined shots, as this chilling quote by elements of the Second Battalion, Eighth Marines indicates: “Most of the time, the marines said, the snipers aim for their heads, necks and armpits, displaying knowledge of gaps in their protective gear.

In “Old and New Body Armor for Marines,” I discussed the existing Interceptor body armor system and its replacement, the Modular Tactical Vest (MTV) by Protective Products International.  Stars and Stripes has given us a glimpse of the MTV.

In addition to more efficient weight distribution, the MTV claims better protection to the lateral torso, with less exposed area on the side and under the arms.  This is an example of the United States Marine Corps being just about as far ahead of the curve as is possible.  The Army is lagging behind, and for the Marines, the MTV is scheduled to go into service early 2007.

The MTV could not be issued soon enough.  The New York Times had an article on November 3, 2006, entitled “Sniper Attacks Adding to Peril of U.S. Troops,” in which the following nugget of gold may be found: “Most of the time, the marines said, the snipers aim for their heads, necks and armpits, displaying knowledge of gaps in their protective gear.”  The Interceptor has gaps on the side torso that the MTV promises to remedy.

I will be publishing a commentary soon on enemy sniper activity in Iraq (including recommendations on responsive tactics by the U.S.), which in my estimation will constitute the most significant threat of mortality for U.S. troops throughout the balance of deployment in Iraq.  Until then, it should be noted that the sooner the MTV can make its way into the field, the better.

Sun Tzu, “The Art of War,” II.6:

“Thus, while we have heard of blundering swiftness in war, we have not yet seen a clever operation that was prolonged.” 

Sun Tzu, “The Art of War,” II.21:

“Hence what is essentialy in war is victory, not prolonged operations.  And therefore the general who understands war is the Minister of the people’s fate and arbiter of the nation’s destiny.”

The “Small Wars Manual,” 2-9(d):

“The initiation of a campaign before adequate preparations have been made, may well be as fatal in a small war as in regular warfare.  Prolonged operations are detrimental to the morale and prestige of the intervening forces.  They can be avoided only by properly estimating the situation and by evolving as comprehensive, flexible, and simple a plan as possible before the campaign begins.”

Letter from al Qaeda high command to Zarqawi:

” … prolonging the war is in our interest.”

Concerning timeliness and adequate force projection, the counsel to us from the “Small Wars Manual” is clear and without compromise:

We have discussed the issue of “room clearing” before, and how it is not only dangerous and nervewracking, but by its very nature limited to very specific techniques and not at all flexible.  Room clearing, as we discussed in The Reasons the U.S. Won’t Clear Ramadi, involves the use of techniques that resemble SWAT tactics.  A fire team (in the USMC, four Marines, the leader with a grenade launcher on his M-16, a SAW gunner and two other members) “stacks” at a doorway and furiously enters a room after breaking the door in, firing enough rounds at the inhabitants of the room to kill everyone in the room within a few seconds.  There is no time or provision for the delineation of friend from foe.  Such a requirement would redound to the deaths of Marines and Soldiers.  Insurgents hide behind women and children, lying in wait for the U.S. troops to enter the room so that they can fire on them.  This is likely what happened in Haditha as we have discussed before.  The deaths of innocents is an unfortunate collateral effect of room clearing techniques.  It cannot be any other way.  If the decision is made that the enemy inhabits a room and the order is given to clear the room, then these techniques are employed.  The way to avoid the collateral deaths of innocents is to refrain from room clearing to begin with, not to change the techniques, thus putting the lives of U.S. troops at higher risk.  In fact, the Small Wars Manual notes that there are times when guerrillas may be near women and children and Marines are ordered not to fire because of the possibility of collateral damage.

There has been an evolution in the expectations for Marines and Soldiers in the al Anbar Province concerning urban warfare techniques.  The L A Times reports in A New Assignment for Younger Troops:

Three years after insurgents appeared as a potent force in Iraq, the U.S. military has begun to expand its counterinsurgency training by focusing more closely on younger service members and junior officers.

The new emphasis on training the lower ranks reflects the growing view among top commanders that the war cannot be won by military might alone and that U.S. troops at all levels must be taught how to win the allegiance of the local population.

After the armed resistance started in earnest, commanders and senior officers began receiving specialized instruction in defusing insurgencies. But the principles have not always trickled down to the sergeants, corporals and privates who become the face of the American military to many Iraqis.

So far, so good.  They are discussing the “strategic Corporal.”  Continuing:

In an interview in Ramadi in July, Liston, who commands the Weapons Company of the 3rd Battalion, 8th Marines Regiment, said his unit will kick down a door if it has an intelligence tip that an insurgent is inside.

But in most random searches, the Marines are supposed to knock.

“We talk to our guys about putting themselves in the position of having an occupying power in their country,” he said. “Would they understand if someone kicks down their door?”

But on the streets of Ramadi, the Marines of Weapons Company interpret the rules differently.

During a routine patrol in July, a group of Marines stopped in front of a house to search it. Although the Marines did not believe there were insurgents inside, the house offered good sight lines for a potential triggerman hoping to set off an improvised explosive device.

After throwing smoke grenades to obscure their movements, the Marines entered the courtyard by kicking open a gate, then battered open the home’s front door.

In one room, two women huddled with several crying children. “See Ali Baba?” one Marine asked, using the jargon for “bad guy.”

“No Ali Baba,” the frightened woman said.

A moment later, the Marine turned to another woman and asked, “Do you see IEDs?”

“No, no,” the woman replied, looking bewildered.

“[Expletive] liars!” the Marine shouted, then walked away.

Although the women did not understand English, the sentiment was clear.

Lance Cpl. Jose Torres, a member of the Weapons Company, said there is a simple reason the Marines do not knock on doors.

“The quicker we get in, the less likely we are to get shot,” Torres said after the search. “A month ago, we lost a guy to a sniper, so we don’t fool around with knocking.”

On June 21, Lance Cpl. Nicholas J. Whyte, a member of Weapons Company’s 3rd Platoon, was shot by a sniper on the streets of Ramadi, the Al Anbar capital. The bullet entered his neck and severed his spinal cord, killing him. He was 21.

Here the doctrine breaks down.  The Marines are taught first to defend Marines.  The “fire watch” concept is instilled in them from boot, through SOI, and then to the fleet.  It will be with them through their time in the Corps.  This is the way it should be.  The phrase “feeling threatened” takes on special meaning for a Marine, and if a Marine feels threatened, he will take action to defend himself and other Marines.  The Gaurdian Angel concept also becomes special for a Marine, in that there is always supposed to be someone or some group of Marines whose job it is to effect offensive operations from a position of concealment against the enemy who would harm Marines.

So the softer approach, i.e., knocking on doors, led eventually to the death of a Marine.  Now they do not knock.

Can you blame them?  What would you do?

It has been speculated that the U.S. will at some point “clear” Ramadi just as we did in Fallujah in 2004.  This is highly unlikely to happen for a number of reasons, but we will examine four in this analysis.

Political Landscape

The undulations in the political landscape make it difficult for the U.S. to heavily engage any area with large force projection.  Some on the political right would support more troops, but it is doubtful that this is a large enough percentage to effect foreign policy.  The political far left want to pull out completely.  I estimate this to be no larger percentage than those on the right who want to deploy more troops to Iraq.  The middle is the controlling factor, and they appear to want to persuade, or even force, the Iraqis to take responsibility for policing themselves (however naive this may or may not be).

There is a growing sense that while the U.S. may be present in the region for a protracted period of time, this presence will be in a different form (perhaps in the Kurdistan), and military operations, at least of the nature that we have recently seen, will fade from the picture in Iraq sooner rather than later.  To launch a major clearing operation in Ramadi would have political ramifications two or three orders of magnitude worse than for Israeli Prime Minister Olmer, who has been ridiculed for launching an operation right at the end of the Israel-Lebanon War in which 33 IDF soldiers died.  There has since been a growing chorus of calls for Olmert’s resignation.  Heavy losses of U.S. troops is not what the public is calling for when they say they want a “change in direction.”  And clearing operations in Ramadi similar to those in Fallujah in 2004 would cause significant losses.

Finally, operations in Fallujah were carried out after the essential evacuation of the entire city.  The only people left in Fallujah were the insurgents.  Ramadi is roughly four times the size of Fallujah, and the human catastrophy associated with the Iraqis fleeing the city would be staggering.  As it stands, there are now more than half a million Iraqis who have fled to Syria.  This would double with heavy combat in Ramadi and the surrounding areas in al Anbar.

Changes in Tactics

We have discussed the earlier redeployment of U.S. troops to heavily gaurded basis in lieu of patrols and other offensive operations in and around Baghdad, and the strengthening of the enemy because of this strategy.  As opposed to this, Michael Fumento has documented a strategy that is working brilliantly (although slowly) to pacify Ramadi, called COPS, or Combat Operation Posts.  There has previously been a battle of Generals in the military to ascertain how to approach Operation Iraqi Freedom.  The Generals who believe that the approach used in Fallujah was too heavy-handed won the doctrinal struggle (I have stated my disagreement with them).  The Generals who want a “kinder and gentler soldier” seem to have been relegated to the offices where they write reports and can’t hurt anything.  The COIN doctrine currently under development seems to be focusing on correct force size, region pacification, political machinations, stability and proper planning.  While proper force projection would help in pacification of the hot regions of Iraq, it seems unlikely that troop deployment will increase much beyond the current levels.  If this is true, then the tactics that have been used successfully (i.e., COPS) will continue to be used as forces permit, but the progress will be slow.  The administration will accept slow progress in lieu of a strategy that is known not to be successful (such as redeploying to heavily guarded bases).

High Loss of U.S. Troops

The Marines who took Fallujah did so with MOUT tactics, and more specifically, they used “clearing” techniques.  These techniques are similar to those used by police SWAT teams, with one significant exception.  There is no attempt to ascertain friend from foe.  There never can be.  As one seasoned Marine NCO said recently, “clearing a room is something that a fire team can execute to perfection, and still die.”  The tactics used in Fallujah relied upon fragmentation grenades initially, but a Marine cannot carry enough to utilize these in each room that is cleared.  Therefore, the techniques taught to Marines in SOI rely upon fast and furious “stacks” that enter a room and kill all inhabitants within a second or two.  When the order is given to clear a room, the stack enters rapidly and immediately fires rounds at all inhabitants.  In Fallujah, this was necessary because there were many rooms where insurgents were lying in wait for U.S. troops to enter the room.  As one commenter said to a recent post, this is “nervewracking.”  Literally, the Marine or Soldier is running into a potential hail of bullets.  The cost for Fallujah was significant.  The cost of these operations in Ramadi would be breathtaking.  There was a time in 2004 when the U.S. could have forced the issue in Ramadi, immediately after Fallujah when al-Qaeda and the Baathist insurgents were on the run.  To our complete and utter dismay here at the Captain’s Journal, this time has come and gone.

Iraqi Civilian Casualties

Because it is impossible to distinguish friend from foe in “room-clearing” operations (what would the Marine do – storm into the room and ask questions while a potential insurgent shot at him from behind a child?), the very nature of the operations would cause significant Iraqi casualties.  Either this would come to pass or the citizens would flee, causing a human catastrophy.  Either way, the citizens are caught in the middle.  They die or they flee.

Postscript

As a postscript, take note of the immoral slander and inappopriate allegations that the Marines have suffered at the hands of the ignorant concerning these so-called “heavy-handed” techniques.  While being asked to “clear” rooms and cities by literally running into a potential storm of bullets (from insurgents hiding behind children in rooms) and IEDs, the Marines are then maligned for heavy handed techniques.  What would the ignorant have them do?

It has been speculated that the U.S. will at some point “clear” Ramadi just as we did in Fallujah in 2004.  This is highly unlikely to happen for a number of reasons, but we will examine four in this analysis.

Political Landscape

The undulations in the political landscape make it difficult for the U.S. to heavily engage any area with large force projection.  Some on the political right would support more troops, but it is doubtful that this is a large enough percentage to effect foreign policy.  The political far left want to pull out completely.  I estimate this to be no larger percentage than those on the right who want to deploy more troops to Iraq.  The middle is the controlling factor, and they appear to want to persuade, or even force, the Iraqis to take responsibility for policing themselves (however naive this may or may not be).

There is a growing sense that while the U.S. may be present in the region for a protracted period of time, this presence will be in a different form (perhaps in the Kurdistan), and military operations, at least of the nature that we have recently seen, will fade from the picture in Iraq sooner rather than later.  To launch a major clearing operation in Ramadi would have political ramifications two or three orders of magnitude worse than for Israeli Prime Minister Olmer, who has been ridiculed for launching an operation right at the end of the Israel-Lebanon War in which 33 IDF soldiers died.  There has since been a growing chorus of calls for Olmert’s resignation.  Heavy losses of U.S. troops is not what the public is calling for when they say they want a “change in direction.”  And clearing operations in Ramadi similar to those in Fallujah in 2004 would cause significant losses.

Finally, operations in Fallujah were carried out after the essential evacuation of the entire city.  The only people left in Fallujah were the insurgents.  Ramadi is roughly four times the size of Fallujah, and the human catastrophy associated with the Iraqis fleeing the city would be staggering.  As it stands, there are now more than half a million Iraqis who have fled to Syria.  This would double with heavy combat in Ramadi and the surrounding areas in al Anbar.

Changes in Tactics

We have discussed the earlier redeployment of U.S. troops to heavily gaurded basis in lieu of patrols and other offensive operations in and around Baghdad, and the strengthening of the enemy because of this strategy.  As opposed to this, Michael Fumento has documented a strategy that is working brilliantly (although slowly) to pacify Ramadi, called COPS, or Combat Operation Posts.  There has previously been a battle of Generals in the military to ascertain how to approach Operation Iraqi Freedom.  The Generals who believe that the approach used in Fallujah was too heavy-handed won the doctrinal struggle (I have stated my disagreement with them).  The Generals who want a “kinder and gentler soldier” seem to have been relegated to the offices where they write reports and can’t hurt anything.  The COIN doctrine currently under development seems to be focusing on correct force size, region pacification, political machinations, stability and proper planning.  While proper force projection would help in pacification of the hot regions of Iraq, it seems unlikely that troop deployment will increase much beyond the current levels.  If this is true, then the tactics that have been used successfully (i.e., COPS) will continue to be used as forces permit, but the progress will be slow.  The administration will accept slow progress in lieu of a strategy that is known not to be successful (such as redeploying to heavily guarded bases).

High Loss of U.S. Troops

The Marines who took Fallujah did so with MOUT tactics, and more specifically, they used “clearing” techniques.  These techniques are similar to those used by police SWAT teams, with one significant exception.  There is no attempt to ascertain friend from foe.  There never can be.  As one seasoned Marine NCO said recently, “clearing a room is something that a fire team can execute to perfection, and still die.”  The tactics used in Fallujah relied upon fragmentation grenades initially, but a Marine cannot carry enough to utilize these in each room that is cleared.  Therefore, the techniques taught to Marines in SOI rely upon fast and furious “stacks” that enter a room and kill all inhabitants within a second or two.  When the order is given to clear a room, the stack enters rapidly and immediately fires rounds at all inhabitants.  In Fallujah, this was necessary because there were many rooms where insurgents were lying in wait for U.S. troops to enter the room.  As one commenter said to a recent post, this is “nervewracking.”  Literally, the Marine or Soldier is running into a potential hail of bullets.  The cost for Fallujah was significant.  The cost of these operations in Ramadi would be breathtaking.  There was a time in 2004 when the U.S. could have forced the issue in Ramadi, immediately after Fallujah when al-Qaeda and the Baathist insurgents were on the run.  To our complete and utter dismay here at the Captain’s Journal, this time has come and gone.

Iraqi Civilian Casualties

Because it is impossible to distinguish friend from foe in “room-clearing” operations (what would the Marine do – storm into the room and ask questions while a potential insurgent shot at him from behind a child?), the very nature of the operations would cause significant Iraqi casualties.  Either this would come to pass or the citizens would flee, causing a human catastrophy.  Either way, the citizens are caught in the middle.  They die or they flee.

Postscript

As a postscript, take note of the immoral slander and inappopriate allegations that the Marines have suffered at the hands of the ignorant concerning these so-called “heavy-handed” techniques.  While being asked to “clear” rooms and cities by literally running into a potential storm of bullets (from insurgents hiding behind children in rooms) and IEDs, the Marines are then maligned for heavy handed techniques.  What would the ignorant have them do?

NATO military leadership is weighing in on U.S. strategy in Afghanistan.  But before we get to their position, we’ll rehearse our own.

In our post Unintended Consequences: U.S. Strengthens Iran, we said of the Iraq war:

The U.S. troops too quickly transitioned from conventional operations to counterinsurgency …

Concerning Iraq, in our post Observations on Timeliness from the Small Wars Manual, we said:

No matter what tactics were employed, if the strategy had included defeat of the known enemy with dispatch, the U.S. forces could have focused more on COIN operations for smaller groups of poorly-trained and poorly-led insurgents.

In our post Afghanistan’s Lessons for Iraq: What Strategy?, we said:

If Afghanistan is the model for contemporary counterinsurgency operations, then the U.S. ought to rethink its strategy.  There is a role for both special operators and regulars in today’s warfare.  Cessation of regular operations too soon is counterproductive.

In our post Ramadi: Marines Own the Night, 3.5 Years into Iraq War, we said:

… there is simply no substitute for killing the enemy in war. Purposely circumventing urban regions in our push towards Baghdad leaving significant enemy left behind to fight another day, ignoring the al Anbar province to fester for 3.5 years, and simultaneously invoking COIN strategy, is not really COIN. It is premature cessation of conventional operations. It isn’t the failure of COIN that is to blame. It is the timing … a timing that is too connected to political altercations stateside.

NATO (British) General David Richards weighed in on our strategy early in the campaign of Afghanistan with Pentagon reporters:

The U.S.-led coalition in Afghanistan failed to follow through as it should have after ousting the government in 2001, said the NATO commander in the country.

The mistake — adopting “a peacetime approach