Archive for the 'Weapons and Tactics' Category

There is much bluster over counterinsurgency operations; what it means, how to do it, what causes these operations to succeed, and what causes them to fail.  There are even washed-up Generals who want the U.S. to jettison the “kill-kill” warrior ethos of the military in favor of a different approach as part of our COIN strategy.  [As an editorial note, there are so many things misrepresented and misconstrued in the “kinder and gentler soldier” article linked above that the real confusion is where to begin with debunking them.  The Generals misrepresent when the warrior ethos was introduced into the military and focus on the history of the Army rather than the Marines, they ignore the more than 300 engagements the USMC has had over its history in which for many of these operations they have successfully executed COIN operations in spite of the washed-up Generals, etc.]

It is simply not helpful to talk counterinsurgency and “winning the hearts and minds of the people,” without giving examples of its execution so that the strategy can be taught and implemented.  Good friend of the Captain’s Journal, Michael Fumento, is blogging from Ramadi, and he is giving us good and instructive COIN discussion material with his post Cop-ing out in Ramadi.

A COP is a combat operation post, and such posts are starting to play a crucial role in pacifying Al Anbar. In the Ramadi area, at least, COPs comprise an undersized company of four companies and about 80 soldiers. (Although Anvil has considerably more than that.) Anvil also has four M-2 Bradley fighting vehicles attached to it, each of which has a .25 caliber fully automatic gun and lesser guns along with an anti-armor capability. Anvil has three American platoons and one Iraqi Army one, but one of the American ones and the IA one are being loaned elsewhere right now. No matter, a COP can operate at half strength for awhile.

COPs are tiny compared to FOBs like Corregidor, which had a full battalion plus numerous support elements or about 800 men in all. In fact, this place comprises just two houses leased from Iraqi civilians. First Armored Division has put in 11 COPs so far, I believe, and is building a 12th. There will probably be many more to come.

In any counterinsurgency effort, a key to pacifying an area is to plop fortifications with interlocking communications into enemy territory and send out patrols. For example, King Edward I of England (the guy who had Braveheart drawn and quartered) used castles to subdue Wales. Nowadays we call this “grab and hold.” Originally we started doing that in Vietnam but gave it up in favor of search and destroy missions from large base camps, which helped contribute to losing the war.

One value of a COP versus the much larger FOBs and the huge camps such as Camp Ramadi is that this is an enemy that inflicts most casualties and damage with IEDS, greatly restricting movement. But missions from COPs are inherently short-range; you’re already almost there. That’s less road to be on and fewer IEDs to worry about.

In Habitually Offensive Operations Against Guerrillas, we discussed the re-deployment of U.S. troops to large, well-gaurded bases and the reduction of patrols allowing the growth of the insurgency, in contrast with the recommendation of the Small Wars Manual.  Michael Fumento is documenting a case in which the Small Wars Manual COIN strategy is working.  Continuing:

Another advantage of a COP is a shorter reaction time for one unit to support another, although that’s rarely necessary because the enemy just doesn’t mass in large units. They don’t have the men to do that like they used to. This inability to mass also makes COPs possible. In Vietnam, the enemy had lots of soldiers and highly-trained and motivated sappers that could cut through concertina wire barriers, throw satchel charges, and wreak havoc while the VC infantry came up behind them. This allowed them to inflict heavy casualties on small units, such as those manning howitzers. On a few occasions, they completely overran those positions. But the chance of a COP being overrun is essentially nil.

The impact of the FOB system was shown to me on a map. The foreigners who come into this area do so along a mini-Ho Chi Minh trail from the west, namely Jordan and Syria. And the foreigners tend to be better trained. Certainly any good sniper will come from that route, because Iraqis are terrible shots and hence crummy snipers.

From this road the terrorists would then literally fan out in the area where the COPs have been inserted. That is, their area of operation was shaped like a fan. But the troops from the COPs have rolled them up in a counter-clockwise pattern such that the only major activity left now is in a slice near the Tigris. Areas that Capt. Sapp would originally only send full platoons into, sometimes even with armor, he will now allow a squad of perhaps 12 men to enter. At some point, the bad guys will be pushed out of this last piece of the fan. Where they’ll go, who knows. The point is that they’ll have been denied their first choice of an operating area. It’s like knocking off the head of a terrorist cell. Yes, he’ll just be replaced. But the man originally chosen for the job is now dead and the cell weakened to that extent.

Any counterinsurgency operation is likely to fail without the right force projection.  We have argued that force size is the critical element to successful pacification.  If we know that the enemy (foreign fighters, most certainly al Qaeda) is coming into Iraq along a “mini-Ho Chi Minh” trail, this information immediately redounds to the question “why can’t we stop this traffic?”

The answer is that we can with the right force projection.  If the means of ingress into Iraq are turned into a shooting gallery where the foreign fighter faces certain death should he attempt to cross the border, then one of two things happens, leading to a consequent.  Either the foreign fighter dies at the border, or if he is smart, he doesn’t attempt to cross.  The consequence is that the existing foreign fighters do not get reinforced.  As U.S. forces share the risk of the people and protect the population, and as the foreign fighters (and Sunni Mujahideen) are killed, the pacification of the region finally ensues, and mothers can trust in the security of their homes and schools.  This, rather than the “kinder and gentler soldier,” is the road to “winning the hearts and minds of the people.”

With the genesis of the Interceptor Body Armor System, Marines had access to significantly improved protection compared to the older flak vest.  It was lighter (at 16.4 pounds) than the flak vest (at 25.1 pounds), but studies showed a high mortality rate associated with rounds taken in the side of the torso, neck, shoulders, arms, groin and legs.  The currently deployed Interceptor system was provided with add-on packs, including hard side torso plates and removable components to protect each of the exposed areas (groin, upper arms, shoulders and neck).  The add-on components bring the total weight closer to 40 pounds rather than 16 pounds, more than doubling the original weight.  Press reports have even documented the fact that the weight of the body armor is so onerous to the Marine and instrusive to maneuverability that some have chosen to jettison it and go into combat without protection.

The Marine Corps has awarded a new contract for body armor to Protective Products International (hereafter PPI) for a new system called “Modular Tactical Vest.”  Marine officials hope to start producing a 60,000 vest order in October, with deployment of the vests starting early 2007.  The new Modular Tactical Vest costs about $560 each, and doesn’t promise to weigh less.  Rather, its promise is to distribute the weight more efficiently, thus making its load easier to bear, while also protecting more of the torso than the Interceptor System.

Hopefully, body armor manufacturers and the USMC have learned from past mistakes regarding the testing, quality assurance and deployment of body armor.  The Marine Corps Times exposed an attempt to continue deployment of the Interceptor System even after tests had shown catastrophic failure (picture of failed vest showing complete penetration of round) of one test vest.  As a result, several lots were rejected.  The QA (Quality Assurance) program was appropriately and correctly called into question, but in order to continue the deployment of the vests, waivers of the QA program had to signed by both industry and military authorities.

PPI has already addressed questions related to some of its components, and hopefully the QA program is robust enough that the recalcitrance associated with refusal to “stop work” and recall armor will not exist with PPI or this new body armor system.  QA programs in industry around the world have to meet specifications and standards, including some structures, systems and components that have to meet a zero failure rate.  The notion that it is necessary to deploy body armor that may be defective points to a military-industrial complex that has routinely not held industry accountable for meeting standards.  In most commercial industries, a failure to meet standards redounds to financial harm to the corporation and overtime for the workers who have to re-manufacture goods in order to avoid legal liability and meet schedule, not waivers signed by the recipient of the goods and services.  Military standards have not been high enough.  At least in the instance of body armor, failure is not an option.

The new body armor is intended to be deployed with Marines beginning early in 2007.  The Captain’s Journal will be contacting Camps Lejeune and Pendleton, along with PPI, to ascertain what units will be deployed early in 2007 and whether they will have the new system.  We will publish their response(s).

Finally, we have covered the issue of traumatic brain injury to our troops due to IEDs.  Brain injury is the signature wound of the Iraq war.  The Marine Corps Times is also reporting that the webbing or sling suspension system currently being used in combat helmets will be replaced with a system of pads designed to reduce the force of non-ballistic blunt impact.  The Captain’s Journal will also contact Camps Lejeune and Pendleton concerning the timing of deployment of these new helmet padding systems.  We will publish their reponse(s).

Prior: Thermobaric Weapons and Body Armor.

In recent action in Afghanistan, NATO forces have killed as many as 200 Taliban fighters in a battle lasting ten days.  In one interesting note about this battle:

NATO and Afghan forces began an operation Sept. 2 after warning civilians to leave the area and dropping leaflets promising the Taliban safe passage out if they gave up their weapons.

There were several pockets where the Taliban concentrated their fighters on either side of the river – at Sperwan, Pashmul and Siah Jui – and NATO deployed forces from the south, north and east in a pincer movement.

More NATO forces guarded the western and southern flanks to cut supply and escape routes.

The commander of U.S forces in southern Afghanistan, Colonel R. Stephen Williams, 46, joined the battle four days later. He gathered Canadian, American and Afghan forces for an attack on Pashmul on Sept. 12.

After wearing the Taliban down for six days with rock music blaring across the river valley, and artillery and airstrikes, they found a weak spot in the Taliban’s defenses.

Playing his favorite music, AC/DC’s “Back in Black,” to hide the sound of the armored vehicles, Williams took the Taliban by surprise, crossing the river and driving through the cornfields from the northeast.

The fighting was intense over a day and a half. The Taliban were dug in at vineyards with deep irrigation channels and high, mud-wall barns for drying grapes. The village school, a cluster of white painted classrooms, built with American aid money in the past four years, was destroyed by repeated air and artillery strikes.

“The Taliban used this as a weapons cache and their command-and-control place,” Williams said.

The Taliban pulled out under the attack in groups, leaving small numbers of men to delay the NATO advance. Williams calculated from battlefield reports that his force alone killed 150 to 200 insurgents in 10 days of fighting, and only had 4 men wounded on their side.

Our allies, friends and colleagues ‘down under’ should “get a kick” out of this (hint for those who do not know, AC/DC is an Australian band).  Before the U.S. had troops in Afghanistan post-9/11, Australia did.  They have been our ally through thick and thin.  Now, AC/DC works with the Australian special forces to defeat the Taliban.

In honor of Williams’ battle, I am posting a link to AC/DC’s “Back in Black.”   Hmmm … I wonder what speakers they used and how many watts it took?  AC/DC versus the Taliban: I think I’ll post this in my “Weapons and Tactics” category.

AC/DC, “Back in Black“

From the LA Times:

BAGHDAD — Two months after a security crackdown began in the capital, U.S. military deaths appear to be rising, even as fatalities among Iraqi security forces have fallen, U.S. military sources and analysts said.

The U.S. military Tuesday revised to eight its count of American deaths in the capital on Monday, the highest daily toll in a month. In September, 74 U.S. troops died nationwide, about a third of them in Baghdad, according to the military.

U.S. officials and military experts caution that it is too soon to declare a definitive trend, but they said the recent increases could be attributable to U.S. troops’ greater exposure to combat since redeploying in early August from heavily guarded bases to Baghdad’s streets. Their mission is to stem sectarian bloodshed involving Shiite paramilitaries and Sunni Arab insurgents.

“When you’re conducting operations and you’ve doubled the number of troops doing operations in Baghdad, there is more opportunity — as there is much more activity as they go into more neighborhoods — for attacks to occur and casualties to result,” U.S. Army spokesman Lt. Col. Barry Johnson said.

This statement about redeploying from heavily gaurded bases (a defensive strategy designed to minimize casualties) is interesting in juxtaposition with this statement from Section 2-9 of the Small Wars Manual.

Tactical operations of regular troops against guerrillas in small wars are habitually offensive.  Even though operating under a strategic defensive campaign plan, regular combatants in contact with hostile forces will emphasize the principal of the offensive to gain psychological supremacy.  Isolated forces exposed to possible attack by overwhelming numbers must be well protected in positions prepared to develop the greatest possible effect of their weapons.  Reverses, particularly at first, must be avoided at all costs.  [Bold and italics are mine]

So when did we go on the defensive in Iraq?

In Taliban Preparing for Major Spring Offensive, I cited a report that the Taliban were readying for large scale operations against Kabul:

In a recent telephone interview with a Pakistani reporter, senior Taliban leader Dadullah Akhund said he had told local Taliban members to cease attacks in Pakistan but to continue their fight “abroad” against the U.S. military. He said that he had 500 suicide bombers and 12,000 fighters at his disposal and that by next spring the Taliban would have enough force to launch major attacks on Kabul, the Afghan capital.

This might be bluster, but it also might be a revelation of the long range plan for the Taliban.  Either way, it appears as if the interim period will see smaller, lighter and more dedicated incursions into Afghan territory:

In North Waziristan, a ruggedly mountainous region where foreigners are banned, the Taliban are in control and the mood following the peace deal was buoyantly militant. Residents said there was a general expectation that the peace deal with Pakistan’s ruling army will let the militants step up fighting in Afghanistan.

In one village a few miles from the Afghan border, men said Taliban officials have declared that the jihad now will be more organized and disciplined. Men who volunteer to fight must now cross in smaller groups and stay for longer periods – at least 40 days, according to one source. Fighters will be required to hand their identity documents to the Taliban commander in their village to ensure that they will not be identifiable as Pakistani citizens.

This is the tactic of special operations: small units, silent operation, no identification, with sustenance being derived from the land or the people.  It is certainly not the case that these fighters will be the equivalent of SEALs, Delta Force, or Marine Recon, but the point is that this might signal a temporary change in tactics.

If it is deemed too risky to directly attack Waziristan due to instability in the Musharraf regime and the nuclear weapons in Pakistan, then plans must be made for operations of increased intensity along the Afghan-Pakistan border.

In a stark admission of the casualty rate for al Qaeda in Iraq, al Masri has divulged enemy intelligence to the coalition:

CAIRO, Egypt — The new leader of al-Qaida in Iraq said in an audio message posted on a Web site Thursday that more than 4,000 foreign insurgent fighters have been killed in Iraq since the U.S.-led invasion in 2003. It was believed to be the first major statement from insurgents in Iraq about their losses.

“The blood has been spilled in Iraq of more than 4,000 foreigners who came to fight,” said the man, who identified himself as Abu Hamza al-Muhajir – also known as Abu Ayyub al-Masri – the leader of al-Qaida in Iraq. The voice could not be independently identified.

The good news is that Iraq, while not being touted as such, is important to the GWOT because, if nothing else, it has become a place where literally thousands of terrorists can be killed.  The notion that this is a bad thing is a political talking point, but militarily, is nonsensical if we see the GWOT as being a larger, regional, and protracted campaign that must be won on soil other than America.

Of course, there is bad news, and the bad news is sobering.  In my post Afghanistan, Talibanistan, Waziristan and Kill Ratios, I conservatively calculated a kill ratio in recent Afghanistan action of 50:1.  Considering U.S. mortalities of 3022 as I write this post, and using a value of 4000 al Qaeda in Iraq, the Iraqi situation is much worse.  I calculate a kill ratio of 1.324.

A kill ratio is not simply a clinical number.  These are the sons of America, and it behooves us to understand the difference between Afghan fighting and the war in Iraq.

While it is easy to second-guess each strategic decision and tactical blunder that has been made, several things can be pointed out that might have contributed to this stark difference.  While there is a resurgence of the Taliban in Waziristan, at least initially, the enemy was routed and driven out of Afghanistan.  Conventional operations did not cease until the territory was relatively secure.  The enemy, even now, is being fought primarily on terrain other than urban, and in Iraq, the prevalence of MOUT (Military Operations on Urban Terrain) is noteworthy.

As I have pointed out in previous posts, bypassing large urban centers on our drive to Baghdad put a quick end to conventional operations and a start to counterinsurgency operations, but this cessation was likely premature.  Fallujah was taken with relatively few casualties compared to the continually increasing casualty count in the al Anbar Province.  We have left the enemy in Ramadi, Haditha, al Haqlaniyah, Habaniyah, and other highly urbanized parts of al Anbar, and consistently use COIN tactics to effect enemy casualties, but this leads also to a high casualty rate for U.S. troops.

The lesson is simple.  When a strategy of COIN is intended and employed in large urban areas where large numbers of the enemy have been intentionally left to operate, the kill ratio does not even come close to comparing with conventional operations.

This should cause us to think long and hard in the future about the cessation of conventional operations and the invocation of counterinsurgency operations.

Iran has designs on a regional Caliphate, and has positioned special operations forces in Iraq.  These troops, along with the Shia in Iraq, could pose more than just a theoretical threat later down the road.  If desired, they could cut or at least cripple the U.S. lines of supply in Iraq.

In Iran’s Iraq Strategy and Iran Muscles in on Iraq, as well as my posts in the Iran category, I outline what I believe to be Iran’s strategy for Iraq.  The peace cannot be won with al Qaeda by any amount of politics.  The same can be said for the Sunni diehards in al Anbar, as well as those Sunni fighters filtering into the Baghdad area.  I have long held that one key to the security of Baghdad is peace in the Sunni triangle.  If the peace was secured in the Sunni triangle, there would be few Sunni insurgents left to wreak violence in and around Baghdad.

The Shia militia are perhaps even more important than the Sunni or even al Qaeda, and whether peace can be won by political means is a salient question.  I hold that peace can be won with the Shia, but only if their power broker — Iran — has been muzzled.  The Shia in Iraq will seek peace and stability if they see Iran on the ropes, politically and militarily.

Leaving behind the question of the propriety of the war in Iraq for a moment and thinking critically about unintended consequences of our presence in Iraq, there is a sobering and statement in Time, July 24, 2006, by Joe Klein (The Iran Factor):

The U.S. “has been Iran’s very best friend,” a diplomat from a predominantly Sunni nation told me recently.  “You have eliminated its enemies, the Taliban and Saddam Hussein.  You have even reduced yourselves as a threat to Iran because you have spent so much blood and treasure in Iraq.”

The Shia in Iraq are closely connected to Iran as I have pointed out in my posts, but there is very interesting and troubling assessment of Iranian and Iraqi Shia capabilities that was published on July 21, 2206, by Patrick Lang in the Christian Science Monitor, entitled The vulnerable line of supply to U.S. troops in Iraq.  In it, he observes:

American troops all over central and northern Iraq are supplied with fuel, food, and ammunition by truck convoy from a supply base hundreds of miles away in Kuwait. All but a small amount of our soldiers’ supplies come into the country over roads that pass through the Shiite-dominated south of Iraq.

Until now the Shiite Arabs of Iraq have been told by their leaders to leave American forces alone. But an escalation of tensions between Iran and the US could change that overnight. Moreover, the ever-increasing violence of the civil war in Iraq can change the alignment of forces there unexpectedly.

Southern Iraq is thoroughly infiltrated by Iranian special operations forces working with Shiite militias, such as Moqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army and the Badr Brigades. Hostilities between Iran and the United States or a change in attitude toward US forces on the part of the Baghdad government could quickly turn the supply roads into a “shooting gallery” 400 to 800 miles long.

At present, the convoys of trucks supplying our forces in Iraq are driven by civilians – either South Asians or Turks. If the route is indeed turned into a shooting gallery, these civilian truck drivers would not persist or would require a heavier escort by the US military.

It might then be necessary to “fight” the trucks through ambushes on the roads. This is a daunting possibility. Trucks loaded with supplies are defenseless against many armaments, such as rocket-propelled grenades, small arms, and improvised explosive devices. A long, linear target such as a convoy of trucks is very hard to defend against irregulars operating in and around their own towns.

The volume of “throughput” would probably be seriously lessened in such a situation. A reduction in supplies would inevitably affect operational capability. This might lead to a downward spiral of potential against the insurgents and the militias. This would be very dangerous for our forces.

Final victory in Iraq will be a function of the degree to which we muzzle Iran.  In the mean time, let’s hope that this assessment exaggerates the danger Iran poses, but I fear that it is spot on.  This is made darker still with the newfound respect the U.S. military has for the Iranian military.

The U.S. is in an intricate dance with Pakistan, balancing concerns over a potentially unstable regime armed with nuclear weapons with the need for access to troubled provinces as well as A. Q. Khan, the father of the nuclear program in Pakistan.  This dance must end at some point, and the Taliban must be defeated while information is also mined concerning the Iranian nuclear program.

Since the intense pressure in 2001 on Pakistan to take sides in the GWOT, the U.S. has been in a tricky and tenuous dance with Musharraf.  Pakistan is armed with nuclear weapons, and the father of this program, Abdul Qadeer Khan, is widely regarded as a hero in Pakistan for putting Pakistan on even ground with India.

Pakistan also has strong elements of radical Islam in its intelligence services, but Musharraf has claimed that its nuclear weapons are under strict custody and will not fall into the wrong hands.  But the U.S. administration has taken the position that Musharraf, while weak in his handling of the radical elements in Pakistan, is better than the alternative should a coup topple his government.

It was a made-for-main-stream-media confession that Musharraf gave recently concerning their nuclear proliferation:

Musharraf claims he only suspected that Khan was passing secrets to Iran and North Korea until the then CIA director George Tenet confronted him with proof at the United Nations in 2003.

“(Tenet) passed me some papers. It was a centrifuge design with all its numbers and signatures of Pakistan. It was the most embarrassing moment,

The fact that the al Anbar tribes have made an agreement to align themselves with the government is a positive sign, but it will be a protracted period of time before these troops can be relied upon to conduct operations in a manner equivalent to the U.S. troops.

I have discussed the use of proxy fighters to accomplish mission objectives, as well as the pushback that the U.S. is getting from some of the al Anbar tribes to the pressure to take on al Qaeda and the Mujahideen themselves.  Concerning the al Anbar tribes and their pact to eject al Qaeda, the Strategy Page has this:

September 22, 2006: Coalition forces in Iraq have suddenly received the manpower equivalent of three light infantry divisions. They did not suffer any repercussions in domestic politics as a result, and now have a huge edge over al-Qaeda in al-Anbar province. How did this happen? Tribal leaders in the largely Sunni province on the Syrian border got together and signed an agreement to raise a tribal force of 30,000 fighters to take on foreign fighters and terrorists.

These leaders have thrown in with the central government in Baghdad. This is a decisive blow to al Qaeda, which has been desperately trying to fight off an Iraqi government that is getting stronger by the week. Not only are the 30,000 fighters going to provide more manpower, but these tribal fighters know the province much better than American troops – or the foreign fighters fighting for al Qaeda. Also, this represents just over 80 percent of the tribes in al-Anbar province now backing the government. 

The commentary goes on to cover some of the real benefits of these additional resources, such as indepth knowledge of the terrain (leading to an understanding of the best ambush sites that might be used by al Qaeda).  And while we can take this pact to be a victory for coalition forces, this assessment by the Strategy Page is without question overly optimistic.

It is certainly not the case that the coalition “suddenly received the manpower equivalent of three light infantry divisions,” even if you consider this manpower to be support troops rather than infantry or police.

I talked with an Army mother several days ago who has three boys under arms (one in Afghanistan, two in Iraq), and the perspective conveyed by her two sons in Iraq is one of a vast cultural difference between the U.S. forces and the Iraqis.  Of course there is, and we all know this, but it gets lost unless it is kept in the forefront of our thinking.

Regarding the missions, raids and other maneuvers that the U.S. troops go on along with the Iraqi troops, it is a frequent experience for the U.S. to go on a mission, work alongside the Iraqis, assess the results, go on another mission alongside the Iraqis, assess the results, etc., etc., until the assessment concludes that the Iraqis are ready to conduct the operations alone.  The Iraqis attempt to conduct the operation alone, and the force evaporates.  They lack self-confidence, have poor leadership, and simply have not been raised from childhood the same way U.S. boys were raised.

In the future I will comment more on this difference, focusing on the way American boys are raised.  But for now suffice it to say that al Anbar will lack proper government and control for some time.  The coalition didn’t gain three divisions.  They gained some recruits — really how many remains to be seen — who can work alongside the U.S. troops until they gain the confidence to do it themselves.  This will be a long process, and it may be longer if we rely too heavily on these proxy fighters.

The New York Times covered the fact that some of the tribes in the al Anbar Province are joining forces to fight the insurgents.  But not all tribal leaders are going along with this plan.  We also find out that the police believe that the U.S. pressure to fight the insurgents is beyond the scope of what they should be asked to do:

In Fallujah, police say residents have turned against them because of the collective-punishment tactics used by US forces. “The Americans started pushing us to fight the resistance, despite our contracts that clearly assigned us the duties of civil protection against normal crimes such as theft and tribal quarrels,” a police lieutenant said. “Now, 90% of the force has decided to quit rather than kill our brothers or get killed by them for the wishes of the Americans.” 

This sounds remarkably similar to ideas expressed in the Afghanistan war by fighters who were allegedly there to kill Taliban fighters.  Quoting from my post Afghanistan’s Lessons for Iraq: What Strategy?

Awol Gul was calm and relaxed as B-52s pummeled a mountain behind him and Al Qaeda sniper fire rang out in the distance. “They’ve been under quite a bit of pressure inside there,” he said. “It is likely that they have made a tactical withdrawal farther south. They have good roads, safe passage, and Mr. bin Laden has plenty of friends.

“We are not interested in killing the Arabs,” Mr. Gul went on to say. “They are our Muslim brothers.”

As I have pointed out, heavy reliance on proxy fighters to accomplish U.S. mission objectives can have unintended consequences, one of which is, in some cases, failure to achieve mission objectives.