Archive for the 'Weapons and Tactics' Category

The Marines in Ramadi are quite capable of counter-insurgency (COIN) operations and the proper conduct of “small wars.” The bone of contention is the doctrine of use of proxy fighters to effect stability while signficant enemy remain. To the extent that this remains a pivotal doctrine of COIN strategy, it may be a failing strategy.

As backdrop for this post, I will give a few points to help the discussion below make some sense. My post Ramadi, Iraq: A Mess, continues to be one of the most visited posts I have made since the start of blogging, visited by multiple visitors every day since its post date of August 1, and many of the visits continue to be from military personnel using military network domains. In part, my thinking about Ramadi led me to publish my post on The Debate Over Diminished Force Projection. In my post Afghanistan’s Lessons for Iraq: What Strategy?, I argue that premature cessation of operations to combat the enemy (and hence, the premature invocation of counterinsurgency tactics) is counterproductive. In my post Will we Lose the Anbar Province?, I stated:

Remembering Iraqi politics is necessary to understand why these things have happened, and invoking the lessons of Vietnam is not very helpful. Politics teaches us that to refer to “Iraqis

My Marine son would laugh at this panty-waist list of “torture” techniques. 

We now learn what the techniques are to which the pitiful John McCain and Lindsey Graham are so opposed.  Courtesy of RWN, here they are:

The techniques sought by the CIA are: induced hypothermia; forcing suspects to stand for prolonged periods; sleep deprivation; a technique called “the attention grab” where a suspect’s shirt is forcefully seized; the “attention slap” or open hand slapping that hurts but does not lead to physical damage; the “belly slap”; and sound and light manipulation. 

Now compare this to what our own men go through who train for the military.  In School of Infantry, my son has undergone sleep deprivation, heat, cold, being wet for extended periods of time, 100 pound backpacks and 40 pounds of body armor on 20 mile hikes, being assailed by leeches, ticks, chiggers, and snakes, and food deprivation.  The things that went on on boot camp … well, I say this honestly, I cannot discuss, because they inform young Marines that the things that go on in boot camp are not to be divulged.  I am also circumspect enough to know that I cannot discuss the things I know about boot camp at Parris Island.  But I can say without a shadow of doubt that the “torture” technques outlined above are panty-waist and pathetically laughable compared to what a young Marine goes through in boot training.  Also see one commenter to my post Harsher Prisoner Treatment Justified:

Actually, waterboarding is in fact a humane way to interogate (sic) prisoners because they aren’t physically injured. I have been waterboarded in special forces training and I can tell you that is terrifying. You really think you are going to die, but, in fact, you are being closely monitored and in no real danger.

I knew about SERE training for our own men, but failed to mention it in my initial post on this subject.  The link I gave you is worth the read, but fails to convey the real hardship that some of our special forces operators and pilots go through.  I have heard about it first hand from a pilot.  The prisoners at Gitmo have it good compared to our own men in uniform.

John and Lindsey, can we please cease and desist with the whimpering and hand-wringing now?  It embarrasses you.

My Marine son would laugh at this panty-waist list of “torture” techniques. 

We now learn what the techniques are to which the pitiful John McCain and Lindsey Graham are so opposed.  Courtesy of RWN, here they are:

The techniques sought by the CIA are: induced hypothermia; forcing suspects to stand for prolonged periods; sleep deprivation; a technique called “the attention grab” where a suspect’s shirt is forcefully seized; the “attention slap” or open hand slapping that hurts but does not lead to physical damage; the “belly slap”; and sound and light manipulation. 

Now compare this to what our own men go through who train for the military.  In School of Infantry, my son has undergone sleep deprivation, heat, cold, being wet for extended periods of time, 100 pound backpacks and 40 pounds of body armor on 20 mile hikes, being assailed by leeches, ticks, chiggers, and snakes, and food deprivation.  The things that went on on boot camp … well, I say this honestly, I cannot discuss, because they inform young Marines that the things that go on in boot camp are not to be divulged.  I am also circumspect enough to know that I cannot discuss the things I know about boot camp at Parris Island.  But I can say without a shadow of doubt that the “torture” technques outlined above are panty-waist and pathetically laughable compared to what a young Marine goes through in boot training.  Also see one commenter to my post Harsher Prisoner Treatment Justified:

Actually, waterboarding is in fact a humane way to interogate (sic) prisoners because they aren’t physically injured. I have been waterboarded in special forces training and I can tell you that is terrifying. You really think you are going to die, but, in fact, you are being closely monitored and in no real danger.

I knew about SERE training for our own men, but failed to mention it in my initial post on this subject.  The link I gave you is worth the read, but fails to convey the real hardship that some of our special forces operators and pilots go through.  I have heard about it first hand from a pilot.  The prisoners at Gitmo have it good compared to our own men in uniform.

John and Lindsey, can we please cease and desist with the whimpering and hand-wringing now?  It embarrasses you.

If Afghanistan is the model for contemporary counterinsurgency operations, then the U.S. ought to rethink its strategy.  There is a role for both special operators and regulars in today’s warfare.  Cessation of regular operations too soon is counterproductive.

Bill Roggio is covering the fact that Pakistan has released more than 2500 al-Qaeda and Taliban, most of whom are heading to Waziristan.  Bill also covers the continuing operations in Afghanistan, stating that:

But the Afghan and Coalition efforts may merely be a holding action. Attempts to stabilize the provinces on the Pakistani border has been a difficult task as Taliban and al-Qaeda have used Pakistan’s Baluchistan and North West Frontier Provinces as bases of operations … The fighting in Afghanistan will only intensify.

Vital Perspective is reporting (from Jane’s Defence) that the Army and Marine Corps are putting the finishing touches on a new counter-insurgency manual that is designed to fill a crucial gap in U.S. military doctrine.  Afghanistan has lessons for our struggle in Iraq.  If this manual doesn’t mention and learn from our (at least partially) failed strategy in Afghanistan, then they should go back to the drawing board.

Much has been made about counterinsurgency warfare and the strategy the U.S. uses to attain peace and stability in Iraq.  The Washington Post recently published an article entitled In a Volatile Region of Iraq, U.S. Military Takes Two Paths.  In this article, the Staff Writer compares and contrasts two (allegedly) different approaches to securing peace and stability in the al Anbar province (the problems of which I have written on in my post Will We Lose the Anbar Province?).  I have also discussed the debate over force size and military footprint in my post The Debate Over Diminished Force Projection, which bears on the subject of force size and strategy and how various forces are utilized.

The Washington Post article is similar to those published previously, where the special forces operator is characterized as smart, patient, politically astute, and easily maleable and adaptable in new and challenging situations, while the non-special forces are depicted as dull, stolid, slow to adapt, and hopelessly educated and trained in the age-old military practices and stategy, much of which is too coarse and heavy-handed for the current situation in Iraq.  One is left to conclude that the regulars are knuckle-draggers.  It is an easy article to write — an easy story to tell.

The truth is neither of these depictions, and it is not somewhere in between.  The truth is more complicated.  As I have noted before from the U.S. Joint Forces Command’s Urban Resolve program:

In military operations since World War II, United States forces have preferred to bypass major urban areas to avoid the costly combat expected inside cities.

There is a huge difference between bypassing the troops (both regular and irregular such as the Fedayeen) on our advance to Baghdad, leaving the enemy behind, and killing the enemy if he can be identified and located, when he is identified and located.  The special forces might claim that the entire operation should have been a counterinsurgency operation, while the regulars might claim that we stopped conventional operations too soon, and much of the enemy was still intact when we switched over to counterinsurgency strategy.

There are those who are complaining that the regulars are not taking an approach that more closely resembles newer and more sophisticated counter-insurgency techniques.  But ironically, no one complains that the Afghanistan campaign was too “regular.”  In fact, it was nothing but irregular and Special Forces operations.  We primarily used the Northern Alliance to drive the Taliban from northern Afghanistan and Kabul, while we relied heavily on three tribal leaders / warlords, at least one of whom could not be trusted, to attempt closure with the enemy at Tora Bora.  The attitude of many of the fighters was in part responsible for the failure to close in on the enemy.  From the perspective of one fighter:

Awol Gul was calm and relaxed as B-52s pummeled a mountain behind him and Al Qaeda sniper fire rang out in the distance. “They’ve been under quite a bit of pressure inside there,” he said. “It is likely that they have made a tactical withdrawal farther south. They have good roads, safe passage, and Mr. bin Laden has plenty of friends.

“We are not interested in killing the Arabs,” Mr. Gul went on to say. “They are our Muslim brothers.”

We lost Osama bin Laden and hundreds (perhaps thousands) of Taliban fighters.  When the last cave was taken at Tora Bora:

On Dec. 16, Afghan warlords announced they had advanced into the last of the Tora Bora caves. One young commander fighting with 600 of his own troops alongside Ali and Ghamsharik, Haji Zahir, could not have been less pleased with the final prize. There were only 21 bedraggled Al Qaeda fighters who were taken prisoners. “No one told us to surround Tora Bora,” Mr. Zahir complained. “The only ones left inside for us were the stupid ones, the foolish and the weak.”

Today the Taliban and al Qaeda have control over Waziristan, have recently fought the Pakistani army to a draw, have seen 2500 of their fellow Taliban released, and have managed to inflict enough terror into Afghanistan that 267 schools have been forced to cease operations altogether.  If Afghanistan is the model for special operations, then we ought to rethink how we are conducting these operations.

There is a place for special operations, and certainly there is need always to adapt our techniques to the circumstances.  And with counterterrorist tactics being all the rage now, should I be bold enough to say that it is not the answer to all of our problems?

When we lose thousands of Taliban at Tora Bora, fighters are shooting at Marines and Soldiers in foxholes in Ramadi and U.S. forces will not hunt down and kill the enemy in response (while they also take bets as to when they will be attacked again), and no one in the chain of command can make a decision to kill 190 Taliban at a funeral because of “religious sensibilities,” may I suggest that we need to re-evaluate our strategy?  And to reflexively demur to special operations is easy, but not the answer. 

If Afghanistan is the model for contemporary counterinsurgency operations, then the U.S. ought to rethink its strategy.  There is a role for both special operators and regulars in today’s warfare.  Cessation of regular operations too soon is counterproductive.

Bill Roggio is covering the fact that Pakistan has released more than 2500 al-Qaeda and Taliban, most of whom are heading to Waziristan.  Bill also covers the continuing operations in Afghanistan, stating that:

But the Afghan and Coalition efforts may merely be a holding action. Attempts to stabilize the provinces on the Pakistani border has been a difficult task as Taliban and al-Qaeda have used Pakistan’s Baluchistan and North West Frontier Provinces as bases of operations … The fighting in Afghanistan will only intensify.

Vital Perspective is reporting (from Jane’s Defence) that the Army and Marine Corps are putting the finishing touches on a new counter-insurgency manual that is designed to fill a crucial gap in U.S. military doctrine.  Afghanistan has lessons for our struggle in Iraq.  If this manual doesn’t mention and learn from our (at least partially) failed strategy in Afghanistan, then they should go back to the drawing board.

Much has been made about counterinsurgency warfare and the strategy the U.S. uses to attain peace and stability in Iraq.  The Washington Post recently published an article entitled In a Volatile Region of Iraq, U.S. Military Takes Two Paths.  In this article, the Staff Writer compares and contrasts two (allegedly) different approaches to securing peace and stability in the al Anbar province (the problems of which I have written on in my post Will We Lose the Anbar Province?).  I have also discussed the debate over force size and military footprint in my post The Debate Over Diminished Force Projection, which bears on the subject of force size and strategy and how various forces are utilized.

The Washington Post article is similar to those published previously, where the special forces operator is characterized as smart, patient, politically astute, and easily maleable and adaptable in new and challenging situations, while the non-special forces are depicted as dull, stolid, slow to adapt, and hopelessly educated and trained in the age-old military practices and stategy, much of which is too coarse and heavy-handed for the current situation in Iraq.  One is left to conclude that the regulars are knuckle-draggers.  It is an easy article to write — an easy story to tell.

The truth is neither of these depictions, and it is not somewhere in between.  The truth is more complicated.  As I have noted before from the U.S. Joint Forces Command’s Urban Resolve program:

In military operations since World War II, United States forces have preferred to bypass major urban areas to avoid the costly combat expected inside cities.

There is a huge difference between bypassing the troops (both regular and irregular such as the Fedayeen) on our advance to Baghdad, leaving the enemy behind, and killing the enemy if he can be identified and located, when he is identified and located.  The special forces might claim that the entire operation should have been a counterinsurgency operation, while the regulars might claim that we stopped conventional operations too soon, and much of the enemy was still intact when we switched over to counterinsurgency strategy.

There are those who are complaining that the regulars are not taking an approach that more closely resembles newer and more sophisticated counter-insurgency techniques.  But ironically, no one complains that the Afghanistan campaign was too “regular.”  In fact, it was nothing but irregular and Special Forces operations.  We primarily used the Northern Alliance to drive the Taliban from northern Afghanistan and Kabul, while we relied heavily on three tribal leaders / warlords, at least one of whom could not be trusted, to attempt closure with the enemy at Tora Bora.  The attitude of many of the fighters was in part responsible for the failure to close in on the enemy.  From the perspective of one fighter:

Awol Gul was calm and relaxed as B-52s pummeled a mountain behind him and Al Qaeda sniper fire rang out in the distance. “They’ve been under quite a bit of pressure inside there,” he said. “It is likely that they have made a tactical withdrawal farther south. They have good roads, safe passage, and Mr. bin Laden has plenty of friends.

“We are not interested in killing the Arabs,” Mr. Gul went on to say. “They are our Muslim brothers.”

We lost Osama bin Laden and hundreds (perhaps thousands) of Taliban fighters.  When the last cave was taken at Tora Bora:

On Dec. 16, Afghan warlords announced they had advanced into the last of the Tora Bora caves. One young commander fighting with 600 of his own troops alongside Ali and Ghamsharik, Haji Zahir, could not have been less pleased with the final prize. There were only 21 bedraggled Al Qaeda fighters who were taken prisoners. “No one told us to surround Tora Bora,” Mr. Zahir complained. “The only ones left inside for us were the stupid ones, the foolish and the weak.”

Today the Taliban and al Qaeda have control over Waziristan, have recently fought the Pakistani army to a draw, have seen 2500 of their fellow Taliban released, and have managed to inflict enough terror into Afghanistan that 267 schools have been forced to cease operations altogether.  If Afghanistan is the model for special operations, then we ought to rethink how we are conducting these operations.

There is a place for special operations, and certainly there is need always to adapt our techniques to the circumstances.  And with counterterrorist tactics being all the rage now, should I be bold enough to say that it is not the answer to all of our problems?

When we lose thousands of Taliban at Tora Bora, fighters are shooting at Marines and Soldiers in foxholes in Ramadi and U.S. forces will not hunt down and kill the enemy in response (while they also take bets as to when they will be attacked again), and no one in the chain of command can make a decision to kill 190 Taliban at a funeral because of “religious sensibilities,” may I suggest that we need to re-evaluate our strategy?  And to reflexively demur to special operations is easy, but not the answer. 

Either indecision cost the U.S. the opportunity to achieve effective kill, or decision did not consider moral ramifications of leaving the Taliban alive to kill NATO troops. 

In my post Lost Chance to Kill Taliban: Two Mistakes Were Made, we learned only a few facts about the drone that captured the picture of the approximately 190 Taliban who were in formation for a funeral.  The image is below.

We have since learned a little more about this incident.  Regarding chain of command:

Every airstrike, whether from a manned aircraft or a Predator, must be at least approved by commanders at the regional Combined Air Operations Center, or CAOC. If an intended target is particularly sensitive, the decision could go all the way up to a general officer serving as top combat commander.

When an organization gives too much latitude, it suffers from apoplexy.  When it gives too little latitude, it suffers from indecision and ineptitude.  With ROE that require approval of remotely located senior officers, it certainly must be considered indecisive and inept.

Continuing:

The current rules of engagement, likely developed by senior Pentagon officials, do not rule out an attack on religious gathering but do generally prohibit an attack on a religious site such as a cemetery or mosque, military analyst and retired Army Col. Jack Jacobs told MSNBC TV. 

In my post GIs Attack Militants in Ramadi Mosque, I discussed the fact that GIs who were fired upon from insurgents inside a Mosque returned fire and “finally unleashed several rounds from M1 tanks.”

So it apparently is not correct that the troops doing battle cannot fire upon religious structures or gatherings (the report documents the fact that the GIs didn’t know whether prayers had begun when they returned fire).

In a stunning defense of the decision not to fire at the Taliban gathered for the funeral, the military issued this statement:

“During the observation of the group over a significant period of time, it was determined that the group was located on the grounds of a cemetery and were likely conducting a funeral for Taliban insurgents killed in a coalition operation nearby earlier in the day,

The U.S. Military establishment needs to find a compromise position between dollars for new boots-on-the-ground programs, training and equipment, keeping the Battleships operational, and new Destroyers for the Navy.  We should do some of all of it rather than a lot of one of them.

In my post Squad Rushes and War Gaming, I argue that the money spent towards the U.S. Joint Forces Command program “Urban Resolve” is wise money.  I promised in that post to give you an example of unwise money.  But before I get to that, let me give you one more example of smart money.  The quote below is long, but worth the read.  The Stategy Page is reporting:

The U.S. Army currently has a battalion of infantry testing the “Land Warrior” gear. Many of the troops involved are combat veterans, and their opinions will carry a lot of weight. The army wants to get this stuff to Iraq and Afghanistan as soon as possible, but only if it passes muster with the troops. So far, there have been some communications problems. This is not unusual, but the “Land Warrior” system depends on continuous communications to provide accurate position information for all the wired troops, and their commanders.

What the field tests are trying to prove is whether the usual imperfect communications, which have long been common in combat, before and after radio was introduced, render “Land Warrior” not- worth- the- effort. This is where using combat veterans is so important. Troops who have not been in combat have to guess if certain test conditions would result in a battlefield disaster, or just an annoyance, especially in light of the potential advantages from using “Land Warrior.”

Indications are that the new gear will pass the test. That’s because similar equipment (Blue Force Tracker and the wired Stryker) have already proved worthwhile, despite commo and reliability problems common with this kind of equipment.

It was the use of the new Stryker wheeled armored vehicle in Iraq that accelerated the development of the Land Warrior equipment. The Strykers were using a partial set of the “Mounted Warrior” equipment, a version of Land Warrior for the crews of armored vehicles. The troops liked all their new electronic gadgets a lot, just as commanders took to Blue Force Tracker in 2003.

While the current Land Warrior gear includes a wearable computer/GPS/radio combination, plus improvements in body armor and uniform design, the original, 1990s, Land Warrior concept was a lot more ambitious. But this version had a science fiction air about it, and was not expected to appear for two decades or more. The brass eventually got more realistic, especially since September 11, 2001. That, plus the unexpectedly rapid appearance of new computer and communications technology, caused them to reduce the number of items included in the initial Land Warrior release. At the same time, this all made it possible for the first version of Land Warrior to undergo field testing right now and, if that’s successful, appear next year in combat.

In effect, the first beta of Mounted Warrior was installed in the Stryker vehicles headed for Iraq last year. That gear worked well, and the troops were enthusiastic about using a vehicle that was booted, rather than simply started. The main idea with this new gear was to provide the troops with superior “situational awareness.” That’s a fancy term for having a good sense of where you are. The Stryker troops always knew where they were, by looking at a computer screen. There, a GPS placed the vehicle on a detailed map of the area.

Over half a century of studies have revealed some key information on what an infantryman needs to be more effective. They need to know where they are, quickly. Having a poor idea of where you are proved to be one of the main shortcomings of armored vehicles. The crews are even more easily disoriented, with most of them inside the vehicle. When the shooting starts, even the commander, instead of standing up with his head outside the turret, ducks back inside to stay alive. Infantry aren’t much better off. Although they can see their surroundings, they are often crouching behind something. When getting shot at, standing up to look around is not much of an option.

So Land Warrior gives the infantryman a wearable computer, using an eyepiece as a display (attached to the helmet, and flips down for use), and a small keypad to control the thing. GPS puts the soldiers location on the map shown in the eyepiece. Tests so far have shown that this works. More extensive tests are taking place now.

Even in Iraq, infantry officers and NCOs, equipped with PDAs, have found the map/GPS combo a tremendous aid to getting around, and getting the job done. Land Warrior will also provide a wireless networking capability, so troops not only see where they are in their eyepiece, but can receive new maps and other information. Land Warrior troops can also use a vidcam  to transmit images to headquarters, their immediate commander, or simply to the other guys in their squad. Perhaps most importantly, the Land Warrior gear will provide the same capability as the 2003 “Blue Force Tracker”, and show each grunt, via his eyepiece, where all the other guys in his unit are. When fighting inside a building, this can be a life saver.

There are several other issues that need to be worked out. The battlefield wi-fi system takes about ten seconds to update everyones position. That will eventually get down to a third of that, but real-time updates may be a decade away. The troops can work around that. For the moment, just knowing where everyone is before you move out (or into a building) is useful. The troops are providing lots of feedback, and the changes to the equipment are being made quickly. For example, the troops want a keypad, at least similar to a cell phone, so they can more easily send text messages (like many of them do now with their cell phones.) The small vidcam mounted on the end of everyones rifle will, in a few months, have the ability to send still pictures to anywhere.

If Land Warrior 1.0 proves durable and reliable enough to work in combat, it will change the way troops fight. Everyone will be able to move around more quickly, confidently and effectively. This model has already been demonstrated with the Stryker units. Captured enemy gunmen often complained of how the Strykers came out of nowhere, and skillfully maneuvered to surround and destroy their targets. This was often done at night, with no lights (using night vision gear.) When you have infantry using Land Warrior gear to do the same thing on foot, you demoralize the enemy. Hostile Iraqis already attribute all manner of science fiction type capabilities to American troops. But with Land Warrior, the bar will have to be raised on what’s science fiction, and what is just regular issue gear. This is typical of what happens in wartime, where the demand for better weapons and equipment, and a realistic place to test it, greatly accelerates the development and deployment of the new stuff.

I am the self-appointed protagonist of the grunt.  So in what may be the surprise of the century, I will go on record saying that the program described above is a good idea.  It is well worth the money beng spent on it.  The only problem with this type of program is that it tends to take too long to validate, quality assure, field test and implement in the U.S. forces.  My bet is that it will not be available for years.  Because of the line of work I am in, I am qualified to say that the tendency is to make systems perfectly functional 100% of the time and in all circumstances, to perform failure mode and effects analyses, to quality validate and verify the input data and assumptions forever, and evalute and assess performance test results forever before putting a system into service.  It is how engineers do business.  The military and defense contractors need to put someone other than engineers in charge.  The system needs to be functional sooner rather than later.  And 95% is good enough.

Finally, to the unwise money.  Small Wars Journal has had a discussion thread based on Robert Novak’s column at Townhall, Marines vs. the military-industrial complex.  The Navy wants to retire the USS Iowa and USS Wisconsin in favor of building and commissioning new destroyers.  Novak says:

“The Navy wants shiny new equipment,” Bartlett told me. That desire comports with intimate ties between defense contractors and senior naval officers, who may be looking forward to retirement jobs. The Navy brass’s antipathy toward battleships dates back to destruction of the big ships by the Japanese at Pearl Harbor. Over objections by the admirals, battleships have served effectively in the Korean, Vietnam and Gulf wars.

Regardless of the less rational reasons for or against retirement of the battleships, the history of the engineering and construction of these huge ships, and indeed, the very nature of engineering and construction, argues for the continuing viability of these vessels and against wholesale replacement.  This is true regardless of whether destroyers are constructed and commissioned.

Whether it is a bridge, large building, hydroelectric project (such as the Hoover Dam), nuclear power plant, or large sea-going vessel, these things end up being once-in-a-lifetime, unparalleled projects that can never be precisely duplicated.  First of all there is the so-called “tribal knowledge,” or things that are not writtten down, codified, or even necessarily passed on to successors, that contributes to huge projects.  This tribal knowledge has to be re-created and re-learned with each new project, especially with projects that are separated in time 50+ years.

Second, there is the well-known demise of the steel and shipbuilding industry in the U.S.  Many large steel components, including ships, are now constructed in the Rotterdam Shipyard.  Battleships literally could not be constructed in the U.S. today (at least, not without re-training, re-tooling and significant changes and modifications).

Retirement of Battleships is profoundly unwise, but here we need to hedge a bit in how we aim at the future.  The shipbuilding industry in the U.S. is not only in a dire condition, it may not survive without the infusion of defense dollars to — yes, you guessed it — build things like new destroyers.

We are in the unenviable position of saying that we need to find middle ground.  The Battleships should not be mothballed, but defense dollars should be found for newer, well-armed destroyers, even if not in the numbers that the Navy has requested.

Cool Hand Luke: “What we’ve got here is a failure to communicate.”

Michelle Malkin informs us of the New York Post story of an opportunity to kill a significant number of Taliban.  Two mistakes were made in this sad episode.  As the Post reported about losing this opportunity:

U.S. intelligence officers in Afghanistan are still fuming about the recent lost opportunity for an easy kill of Taliban honchos packed in tight formation for the burial, NBC News reported.

The unmanned airplane, circling undetected high overhead, fed a continuous satellite feed of the juicy target to officers on the ground.

“We were so excited. I came rushing in with the picture,” one U.S. Army officer told NBC.

But that excitement quickly turned to gut-wrenching frustration because the rules of engagement on the ground in Afghanistan blocked the U.S. from mounting a missile or bomb strike in a cemetery, according to the report. 

The first mistake is that the rules of engagement prohibited killing the enemy.  I don’t care whether it is a Mosque, a cemetary, someone’s house, a school, or someone’s bath tub.  If the enemy is there, he should be killed.  If the officers are afraid to craft such ROE, I will be happy to assist them.  All they have to do it call me.

The second mistake is that the senior officer didn’t override the ridiculous rules of engagement and order the killing of the Taliban.  This is simply unacceptable, and points to officers who will not make hard decisions because of careerism.  I have addressed this careerism before in my post Patriotism, Big Flags and Military Regression:

To be frank, for those who have their career as the premier concern, they should just step aside and save their reports the trouble of cleaning up their mess and suffering the consequences of their careerism.

There is no reason that these Taliban should not be dead; not ROE, and not the officers present and their lack of willingness to make hard decisions.  As it stands, these Taliban are alive to injure or kill NATO troops, and the officers who are responsible still have careers.  They shouldn’t.

Note: Original edited for typographical error.

It has been said that armies train to fight the last war (or sometimes, two or three wars ago).  There is a pressing need to keep the training, equipment and tactics up-to-date.  On the other hand, as I pointed out in my post “Patriotism, Big Flags and Military Regression,” the military-industrial complex can become self-serving to the point of the regression of the military, this regression nurturing careerism, expensive military toys, and retirement opportunities for officers leaving the military if cooperation with weapons manufacturers has opened the right doors.  And I pointed out that because this sort of thing deprives the right programs of the dollars necessary for force protection and training, it is evil.  So care must be taken as to how monies are spent in matters military.  Lives are literally on the line.

I am certain that tactical maneuvers must be practiced until they are second nature.  Squad rushes should be performed and practiced, but when the most likely application of firepower will be in an urban setting, to focus too heavily on these tactics is to remember the lessons of World War II and the Korean War, and to forget the lessons of Fallujah and Ramadi.  In fact, the training for tactics to properly effect MOUT (Military Operations on Urban Terrain) is not only necessary and desired by Marines and Soldiers (because this is what they will most likely be doing in Iraq), but it is also slow in coming, and is not nearly frequent enough.  Marine Corps training at Twentynine Palms and the Mohave desert facilities is state of the art, appropriate, and the right thing at the right time.  At SOI (School of Infantry), Marines war against each other with chalk bullets, and getting hit by these bullets is painful, leading to incentive not to get hit.  This is outstanding and praiseworthy training.  But more is needed.  Marines need to engage in Arabic language classes, IED technology classes, more urban warfare simulations, and war gaming.  In summary, training needs to relevant to the threats sustained by the troops; therefore, the highest risks should receive the greatest attention.

The calculus is simple.  While Marines should be well-rounded, the training on weapons and tactics should be a mathematical function of the probability of usage, need and application.  This approach helps to set the boundary conditions for smart expenditures of money.  So let’s rehearse something that is probably a smart expenditure of money.  Later we’ll visit something that probably isn’t.  First, the smart money.

The U.S. Joint Forces Command is engaged in something called Urban Resolve.  To explain the reason for the program’s existence, USJFC informs us that:

In military operations since World War II, United States forces have preferred to bypass major urban areas to avoid the costly combat expected inside cities.

The urban environment contains extremely complex terrain, with urban canyons, complicated infrastructures, and subsurface maneuver space.

The explosive growth of the world’s major urban centers, changes in enemy strategies, and the global war on terrorism have made the urban battlespace potentially decisive and virtually unavoidable.

Some of our most advanced military systems do not work as well in urban areas as they do in open terrain. Therefore, joint and coalition forces should expect that future opponents will choose to operate in urban environments to try to level the huge disparity between our military and technological capabilities and theirs. 

The plan to address the needs in urban warfare — as proposed by the USJFC — is rather complex, relying on things that do not directly involve the Marine or Soldier in the field, at least not yet.  The initial stages involves a lot of war-gaming, tabletop reviews, and battlefield modeling and simulations.  I don’t know exactly how this might work, but I have an idea that might approximate what will happen.

Any gaming, modeling or training that is done should be probabilistic.  Probabilistic Risk Assessments (PRA) are commonly used in industries in which failure is not an option, e.g., the airline industry, and the commercial nuclear power industry.  Probabilistic analysis requires Monte Carlo simulation techniques.  These probabilistic techniques are applied to data that has been mined and cataloged concerning the nature of reality, that is, how and why things happen the way that they do given certain initial conditions.

Using probabilistic techniques, the analyst may then, based on certain assumptions and initial conditions, “play roulette” with the next event.  Monte Carlo simulation will account for the fact that one event is more probable than the alternate event, and each individual path of events, or “history,” will use these techniques throughout the chain of events at each new event to evaluate the likelihood of various consequences and make choices based on mathematical probabilities.  The virtue of the method is that with enough histories simulated, given that no history, or chain of events, is exactly like the previous or subsequent chain of events, the analyst gets a comprehensive picture of the kinds of things that can happen and how to plan for them.

This picture can be used to evaluate relative risk.  Risk is the product of probability and consequences, which means that the analyst may focus his energies on those things that pose the highest risk.  Something may have a low probability, but very high consequences (e.g., high casualty rate).  This kind of thing, while not as important as those things that are high probability and high consequences, still may require some attention.

Finally, this method relies on correct data, so the analyst is required to interview, use expert witness and testimony, record history, watch video of actual war footage using cameras carried into battle, use audio recordings, catalog experiences of the infantry, interrogate the enemy, mine statistics, etc.

Questions like these will be important in tabletop reviews and computer simulations:

1. What is the probability that the enemy has a particular weapon or weapons system?
2. What is the probability that they know how to use it correctly?
3. What is the enemy’s motivation?
4. Where is the enemy initially located?
5. What is likely to be his tactics upon being engaged?
6. Has the enemy pre-staged the area?
7. What is likely to be our response given our training?
8. Is this the correct response?
9. Is there a better response?
10. Are we under time constraints?
11. Will collateral damage ensue from the altercation?
12. If so, is this collateral damage acceptable?
13. What is the command and control of our troops, and how much latitude have they been given?
14. How much latitude do our troops need?
15. How much latitude does the enemy have?
16. Can the combatant be ascertained and discerned from the non-combatant?
17. Are changes in our weapons systems needed in order to effect a successful altercation?
18. Do our troops have the right weapons sytems for the ensuing altercation, and if not, can they be aquired within the necessary time frame?

The USJFC summarizes the advantages of this virtual battlefield thusly:

The DCEE uses its analytic, faster-than-real-time simulations nearly continuously. It uses simulations to support wargames and human-in-the-loop events simultaneously. As the DCEE continues to mature, the total number of modeled battlespace elements possible will soon be more than one million individual entities. This expanding capability, combined with the high definition and clarity of modeled global population areas, will provide a virtual capability second to none. The ability to replicate multiple iterations of an issue quickly is an important additional capability that permits rapid examination of issues.

Ultimately, a distributed environment that incorporates virtual simulation, concept development, real-world situations, and optional live field training in a seamless environment is a significant transformational capability.

Good, because unless this is tested in the field, the alleged advantages are unproven and perhaps even dangerous.  And the Marines (that is, the grunts doing the heavy lifting) will need and benefit from this virtual battle space.

As a final note, if you think that this is perhaps beyond the comprehension of the typical Marine, think again.  Take a wild guess as to how many Marines already play commercially-available, complex war games on their free time with the aid of a computer, head-sets and the internet, while online with several hundred other people in their “guild?”